Adhyasa-Adhyaropa discussion

[Guest guest]

Dear Bhaskarji,

 

Thank you for sharing your understanding of adhyasa and adhyaropa.

 

I personally see some problems with the manner it is presented. By

making adhyaropa (in the sense you have defined it) an effect of

adhyasa, you are suggesting that whilst there cannot be adhyaropa

without adhyasa, there can be adhyasa without adhyaropa.

 

However, as you know adhyasa in this context is the superimposition of

something onto the Self. Without the "something" there can be no

superimposition (adhyasa). You are saying that the "something" is a

product of the superimposition, but this doesn't make sense because

without the superimposed object, how can there superimposition?

 

Lets look at the silver/mop example. You are saying that the creation

(by imagination) of silver is adhyaropa and is an effect of adhyasa.

However, if silver were not imagined, you cannot superimpose it onto

the mop in the first place, so there couldn't be adhyasa in the first

place.

 

So in all cases, the creation of the superimposed object (which is

what you call adhyaropa) and the superimposition of it onto the Self

(adhyasa) have to be simulataneous.

 

At a more general level, I see a bigger problem with this model and

with any model which individualizes maya. That you and I both fail to

recognize Brahman by superimposing objects onto it is perfectly

naturally and as you like to say, it appeals to universal experience.

However, why is that you and I both imagine the same objects by

adhyaropa? Why is there is so much concensus between us as to what we

percieve if what we percieve is simply the effect of our personal

adhyaropa which is in turn an effect of personal adhyasa?

 

Dear Subrahmanianji,

 

Your response to Bhaskarji is very interesting and well phrased, but I

see some problematic issues.

 

If you suggest that the cause of avidya is adhyasa, then that means

that it is possible to have avidya without adhyasa. You suggest deep

sleep as an example of this, but I do not believe this is so, but not

for the same reason as Bhaskarji.

 

Bhaskarji suggests that in deep sleep there is no avidya. The problem

with this is that there is either ignorance or absence of ignorance,

no third option. Shankara is very clear on this and says they are like

light and dark. When there is no avidya, that means one has aparoksha

jnana (which is a negative knowledge - its the absence of all avidya).

If one gets aparoksha jnana when during nidra, then nidra is moksha.

 

I would instead suggest that that there is adhyasa during deep sleep.

"Non-apprehension" is not unconsciousness since consciousness can't go

away or turn off. Rather non-apprehension is apprehension of

nothingness. As the classic phrase upon waking up goes, "I knew

nothing". When everything is Brahman, how did this "nothing" come

about? One can only say that it was superimposed upon the Self,

 

Regards,

 

Rishi.

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Rishi,

 

advaitin, "risrajlam" <rishi.lamichhane@g...> wrote:

 

> So in all cases, the creation of the superimposed object

> (which is what you call adhyaropa) and the superimposition

> of it onto the Self (adhyasa) have to be simulataneous.

 

That is logical, since the chronology of time itself isn't there without this

avidya-adhyasa matrix.

 

> Bhaskarji suggests that in deep sleep there is no avidya.

> The problem with this is that there is either ignorance

> or absence of ignorance, no third option. Shankara is very

> clear on this and says they are like light and dark. When

> there is no avidya, that means one has aparoksha jnana

> (which is a negative knowledge - its the absence of all

> avidya). If one gets aparoksha jnana when during nidra,

> then nidra is moksha.

 

That is again logical. From the premises, the conclusion follows.

 

> I would instead suggest that that there is adhyasa during

> deep sleep. "Non-apprehension" is not unconsciousness since

> consciousness can't go away or turn off. Rather non-apprehension

> is apprehension of nothingness. As the classic phrase upon

> waking up goes, "I knew nothing". When everything is Brahman,

> how did this "nothing" come about? One can only say that it

> was superimposed upon the Self,

 

Impeccably stated.

 

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Namaste to all participating in this thread.

 

The essay at the following link might be helpful in answering the

several doubts that are being expressed. This List is thankful to Shri

Atmachaitanyaji who guided us to it in 2002.

 

http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/articles/adhyasa_bhashyam.htm

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

advaitin, "Madathil Rajendran Nair"

<madathilnair> wrote:

> Namaste to all participating in this thread.

>

> The essay at the following link might be helpful in answering

> the several doubts that are being expressed. This List is

> thankful to Shri Atmachaitanyaji who guided us to it in 2002.

>

> http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/articles/adhyasa_bhashyam.htm

 

 

In my humble view, the adhyasa espoused by Sri Atmachaityaji (pun

unintended :-)) is incorrect.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Dear Madathilji,

 

I have read the article and some posts by Atmachaitanyaji in this list

(both of them recently).

 

The article does not deal with deep sleep, or with how adhyasa creates

adhyaropa as Bhaskarji describes and so will not be of help with this

part of the discussion,

 

Regards,

 

Rishi.

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

Sri Atmachaitanyaji's argument revolves around the view that bhava-

rupa-avidya is alien to the philosophy of Advaita. But I don't

believe this to be the case. Bhava-rupa-avidya is nothing but

adhyasa. Sri Atmachaitanyaji fails to take into account large parts

of the Acharya's bhashyas such as, for example, the following:

 

1) Mandukya Upanishad bhashya (I.5):

 

"Since sleep, consisting in the unawareness of Reality is a common

feature of the two states (waking and dream) where there are presence

and absence (respectively, of perceptible gross objects), therefore

the adverbial clause, 'where the sleeper' etc., is used in order to

keep in view the state of deep sleep. Or since sleep, consisting in

the unawareness of Reality, is equally present in all the three

states, deep sleep is being distinguished from the earlier two

states."

 

2) Again in explaining Gaudapada's Karika (I.2), Sri Shankaracharya

says:

 

"This verse aims at establishing how all the three starting with

Vishva, are experienced in the waking state itself.... The causal

state, too, is verily experienced in the body, inasmuch as an

awakened man is seen to have such recollection as, 'I did not know

anything'. Hence it is said, 'tridha dehe vyavasthitah' – existing in

three ways in the body."

 

3) Sri Shankaracharya speaks about it also in the BSB (I.IV.3):

 

"Without that latent state, the absence of birth for the freed souls

cannot be explained. Why? Because liberation comes when the potential

power (of Maya) is burnt away by knowledge. The potential power,

constituted by nescience, is mentioned by the word unmanifest. It

rests on God, and is comparable to magic. It is a kind of deep

slumber in which the transmigrating souls sleep without any

consciousness of their real nature. (Br.III.viii.11)."

 

 

Deep sleep is the causal body. Because it is an experience of

nothing, it is an abhava, the unmanifest. Sri Shankaracharya says

that avyakta (the unmanifest) is avidya. But Sri Shankaracharya also

says that the latency of avidya (persisting as the deep sleep state)

has to be admitted to account for samsara. As a metaphysical

principle this latency is articulated as the 'bhava of nothing' (as

eminently pointed out by Sri Rishi). This is what is called the bija

sharira or causal body. This sleep is always said to be present in

the gross body in the 'form' of the bija sharira because one is

always asleep, as it were, while being in the embodied state.

Embodiment is nothing but the result of sleep. It is this sleep that

results in the non-recognition of the true natures of things thereby

causing one thing to be mistaken for another. Since it is a seen

thing (primarily being one form seen as another) it is a bhava-rupa.

Since it is a mistake (of seeing erroneously) it is avidya. Thus

derives bhava-rupa-avidya, which is a part of Shankaracharya's

bhashya.

 

Sri Atmachaitanyaji fears that admitting bhava-rupa-avidya would

result in Advaita becoming indefensible against the arguments of the

purva-paksha. But such a fear is completely unfounded. Bija-sharira

is not a bhava because, being merely a privation of knowledge, it is

essentially 'no thing'. It becomes a metaphysical posit only because

there has to be a cause assigned to superimposition i.e., of one

thing being seen as another. But neither of these ontological

statuses of avidya (as bhava or abhava) is epistemologically

ascertainable (within the matrix of avidya) because ascertainment

means the determination of the truth, and it is not possible to

ascertain the truth of something seen through avidya (falsity) while

the avidya is persisting. Such a determination (of truth) would

result in a contradiction in terms. The problem that Sri

Atmachaitanyaji sees arises only because he equates adhyasa to the

world instead of restricting adhyasa to the illusion of seeing one

thing as another (to the loss of genuineness). But if one were to

abstain from going beyond the Acharya's words as precisely stated in

the preamble, there would be no fear of Advaita becoming indefensible

on account of bhava-rupa-avidya. The bija sharira is essentially a

privation, and there is 'no thing' to go away in moksha.

 

The main problem that I see with interpretations such as those

espoused by Sri Atmachaitanyaji is that they ignore, almost

completely, the tenets of Advaita Vedanta with respect to the

following:

 

1. That a word is eternal and is eternally connected to its object.

2. That a word denotes the samanya and not merely the vishesha.

3. That a particular (vishesha) is non-different from the universal

(samanya)

 

When Brahman is said to be nirvisesha, the denial of vishesha is

merely the denial of the limitedness of things as they appear in

their particularities (visheshas) and not the denial of things as

they persist in Brahman who is the formless samanya of all things.

Brahman is known as Purnam, the infinite fullness, once the negation

has negated all limitations.

 

Finally, I would like to clarify that I am not arguing the case here

because it has already been argued (almost endlessly) on this list.

But having said that Sri Atmachaitanyaji's views were incorrect, I

felt that it was necessary on my part to say a few words justifying

my statement and opinion. This post has this limited purpose in mind.

I respect those members who may have views different than mine.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

praNAms CN prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

CN prabhuji:

 

Sri Atmachaitanyaji's argument revolves around the view that bhava-

rupa-avidya is alien to the philosophy of Advaita.

 

bhaskar :

 

To be precise, bhAva rUpa avidyA is alien to the philosophy of advaita as

propounded by *shankara*....

 

CN prabhuji:

 

But I don't believe this to be the case. Bhava-rupa-avidya is nothing but

adhyasa.

 

bhaskar :

 

I am sorry to say that *this is your definition of bhAva rUpa avidyA* ..and

not *as explained* by later commentators from different schools...bhAva

rUpa avidyA or mUlAvidyA vAdins say mUlAvidyA is the *material cause*

(upAdAna kAraNa) for the universe and ahaNkAra and also for the three types

of avidyA i.e. agrahaNa, saMshaya & viparIta jnAna...( the hint of this you

can find in latest V.subramanian prabhuji's post wherein he distinguishes

avidyA & adhyAsa) as against your understanding of advaita that advocates

universe (words & objects) & ahankAra etc. eternally denotes *brahman*...

 

So there is lot of difference between what you have understood as *bhAva

rUpa avidyA* and what is there in the books of later commentators that

which has been refuted by Atmachaitanya...

 

As I am in the middle of the year end audit at office...I dont have much

time to involve actively in this discussion...Pls. bear with me for some

time...we'll take up this issue in a more detailed manner...till then....

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Bhaskar Prabhuji,

 

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

> I am sorry to say that *this is your definition of bhAva rUpa

> avidyA* ..and not *as explained* by later commentators from

> different schools...bhAva rUpa avidyA or mUlAvidyA vAdins

> say mUlAvidyA is the *material cause* (upAdAna kAraNa) for

> the universe and ahaNkAra

> So there is lot of difference between what you have understood

> as *bhAva rUpa avidyA* and what is there in the books of later

> commentators that which has been refuted by Atmachaitanya...

 

 

You are right in saying that my 'definition' of bhava rupa avidya

differs from those of the post-Shankara Advaita schools. Also I do

not hold avidya to be the material cause of the universe.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Dear Chittaranjanji,

 

Thank you for your interesting post, which seems like a nice summary

of your disagreement with Atmachaitanyaji's position.

 

My problem with both the classical presentation of bhava-rupa-avidya

and Atmachaitanyaji's understanding of adhyasa is that they are both

an extreme form of illusionism that present several problems. (I will

hereafter refer to my own purvapaksha with "you").

 

First, explanation of how the jivanmukta lives becomes a bit

far-fetched. A jivanmukta can sit on a chair, he can talk about a

chair, he can walk around a chair and yet the position suggests that

he absolutely does not see anything that could even be mistaken for

the chair. In effect, if we were to pluck his eye out, his

functionality would in no way be diminished because he doesn't have

sense data anyway (since this is absolutely unreal). This would be

unlikely and I don't see how a reasonable person could accept such a

thing. Or one would have to accept that some ignorance remains with

the jivanmukta, which would be Mandana Mishra's position, but not

Shankara's.

 

Aside from that, it makes a lot of Vedantic statements meaningless.

Lets talk two of them, the world is mithya and the jiva is Brahman.

 

The statement "world is mithya" is either true from a Vyavaharika

perspective or a Paramarthika perspective. If it is true from neither,

its a falsity. Now, no one says its true from a Vyavaharika

perspective. Unfortunately, according to Atmachaitanyaji's position

(as well as the standard bhava-rupa-avidya model), it cannot be true

from Paramarthik position either since there is no basis such as

"world" of which one can deny reality. If there is no world or

anything like it, the nwhat is one calling mithya? (if I understand

correctly, Chittaranjanji is saying something very similar) If this

statement is only a provisional one and later you will say "Well, in

reality there is no world" then world is mithya is not true from the

Paramarthika perspective at all. Since it is also not true from the

Vyavaharika perspective, its an absolute falsehood - it is not your

position at all.

 

Now, the other issue is a statement such as jiva is Brahman. This of

course cannot be true of the Vyavaharika perspective. Now, from the

Paramarthatika perspective, the jiva cannot be Brahman because

according to your position there is no jiva and if there were a jiva,

it would compromise non-duality. So you cannot in any way say that

from the Paramarthika perspective the jiva is Brahman because it

implies that there is something akin to a jiva in ultimate reality,

something you deny.

 

In my opinion, the problem here is that there is a misunderstanding of

what it means when one says that there is no bheda inside Brahman. It

does not mean that the cognitions that a samsari calls diversity does

not appear to the jivamukta, but it means that what the samsari

considers diversity, the Jnani does not. As Shankara says in the

Upadesha Sahasri, transitory knowledge, is in essence the same as

Eternal Knowledge. So knowledge of blue is not the problem, the

problem is not seeing it as Brahman. When we look at it in this way,

we see that what we call the world is just a transitory knowledge that

we fail to recognize as essentially the Eternal Knowledge. The

nama-rupa ordinary people call the world, the jivanmukta sees, and

because he sees, he can state that it has no existence apart from

Knowledge. Consequently, it is mithya.

 

Another approach that might help. When we say there is diversity

within something, what do we usually mean? The wall is diverse because

some of its parts are different from other of its parts. However,

Brahman is partless so it cannot be diverse. However, Brahman is not

"undiverse" in the ordinary sense either. If a wall lacks diversity it

means all its parts are non-different from each other. But Brahman has

no parts, so this kind of "undiversity" does not apply to it either.

Brahman is unlike the ordinary things we know about,

 

Regards,

 

Rishi.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Rishi-ji,

 

advaitin, "risrajlam" <rishi.lamichhane@g...>

wrote:

> Dear Chittaranjanji,

>

> Thank you for your interesting post, which seems like a nice

> summary of your disagreement with Atmachaitanyaji's position.

>

> My problem with both the classical presentation of bhava-rupa-

> avidya and Atmachaitanyaji's understanding of adhyasa is that

> they are both an extreme form of illusionism that present

> several problems. (I will hereafter refer to my own purvapaksha

> with "you").

 

 

I feel most happy to read your words.

 

In my understanding, there is no thing that is unreal in Advaita. The

unreality of the world spoken about (in Advaita) is a statement that is

conditional to the seeing of the soul-less world in vyavahara (of

seeing the effect without seeing its material cause). In paramartha,

the world is real only.

 

I am presently not in a position to engage myself in discussion, so I

will refer you to what I had written (summarised) on this topic

earlier. You may follow this link to read it:

 

www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/chittaranjan/summary_chittaranjan.htm

 

 

Sri Shankaracharya says that the term jivan-mukta is merely a

concession to the common usage of words. The mukta is the Self of the

jiva that is always free.

 

I think the problem of difference has, more often than not, been

wrongly formulated. The differences between the things seen in samsara

are not negated in paramartha; Shankara only speaks about the negation

of the difference between Brahman and the world, between material cause

and effect, and between samanya and vishesha. He does not say that the

difference between a rose and a lotus (for example) is to be negated.

Not even the Vedas can negate the nature of the rose or the lotus, says

the Acharya. Therefore 'all this' that we see here is somehow preserved

in the Oneness of the All-knowing Brahman. Paramartha is the

relationless non-duality that is not known in samsara because its

knowledge is itself the negation of samsara. Unfortunately, most

interpretations of Advaita try to remove the great mystery in the Heart

of Reality with the result that there is left in the (mis-)

interpretation a completely passive Brahman who has to rely on avidya

for presenting this beautiful world. But the Lord's YogaMaya is never

negated as She is One with the Lord.

 

A jivan-mukta sees the world, but not with the help of the body. He

sees all bodies and the world in his Self. He is not supported, He is

the very Knowledge in which everything is supported.

 

And now Rishi-ji I have overshot my quota for the day by a margin of

100% and must keep quiet.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Dear Rishi-ji and Chittaranjan-ji,

 

The essay to which I drew the List's attention doesn't belong to Shri

Atmachaitanyaji. Its author is one Shri Saxena, whose full name I

forgot and Shri Atmachitanyaji happened to guide us to it. Why do we

then unnecessarily involve Shri Atmachaitanyaji and his views,

whatever they are?

 

My intention was to point to a source that explains adhyAsa well.

Shri Saxena, in my opinion, has done a splendid job. If he is

understood, then I thought the other questions that are asked here

become irrelevant.

 

If adhyAsa, which is avidya, is anAdi and naisargika, then trying to

place it and the 'resultant' adhyAropa in a time-frame is an exercise

in futility which Shankara wouldn't condone if his intention was to

make us see the light. I would even venture to say that the three

(avidya, adhyAsa and adhyAropa) are the same and it is only due to

linguistic folly that one seems to precede the other. Hence the ' '

around the word 'resultant' above.

 

That I slept well is an object of my awareness in so-called

wakefulness. I don't say 'I am happily sleeping'. It is an awareness

of an experience of not experiencing anything. Sleep thus is part and

parcel of the world erected by adhyAsa with which Shri Saxena has

dealt. It is not 'de-adhyAsa' in any way. I thought an

understanding of the essay in question will spontaneously bestow this

understanding. Thus, Shri Saxena might not have incuded sleep in his

essay; yet, he has not deprived us the freedom to reason logically.

Has he?

 

This is my third post today. Apologies - before someone points my

excess out to the other Moderators!

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

 

_________________________

 

 

advaitin, "risrajlam" <rishi.lamichhane@g...>

wrote:

>

> I have read the article and some posts by Atmachaitanyaji in this

list

> (both of them recently).

>

> The article does not deal with deep sleep, or with how adhyasa

creates

> adhyaropa as Bhaskarji describes and so will not be of help with

this

> part of the discussion,

[Guest guest]

(PLEASE CLICK THE 'UP THREAD' LINK TO READ THE FULL MESSAGE UNDER

REFERENCE.)

 

Namaste Rishiji.

 

Kindly permit me to intervene in your exchange of views with Shri

Chittaranjanji.

 

jIvanmuktAs are there because there are non-jIvanmuktAs. To me it

looks like jIvanmukta descriptions found in SrImad Bhagawad GItA and

Sankara's works are meant only to guide or help the latter understand

what jIvanmukti is like from the transactional point of view. All

these descriptions are in the realm of adhyAsa. Such descriptions

shall not, therefore, be quoted to prove advaita fallacious. I can't

comment about Mandana Mishra's view. Admittedly, I haven't read him.

 

To summarise, jIvanmuktAs are there only for non-jIvanmuktAs because,

for them, jIvanmukti remains to be a conceptual goal to be achieved

in the transactional in time - some time in a future.

 

In the last para of your message under reference, you have logically

concluded that the 'undiversity' of Brahman is not the oridinary

opposite of 'diversity'. If you apply the same reasoning, jIvanmukti

is not the opposite of 'non-jIvanmukti', i.e. it is not our

conceptual jIvanmukti.

 

A jIvanmukta sitting on a chair, having a merry-go-round around it or

plucking his own hair is a non-jIvanmuktA's projection in the

transactional. It is sadly adhyAsic. It is therefore an objectified

perception that needs sublation. That sublation is jIvanmukti and it

is not the creation of another objectified jIvanmukta amidst an ocean

of pining non-jIvanmuktAs.

 

This is my understanding of the issue. Let us, therefore, not fall

into the trap of treacherous words and language. jIvanmukti can only

be *understood* in the Silence that It is or we are.

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Nair-ji,

 

advaitin, "Madathil Rajendran Nair"

<madathilnair> wrote:

> Dear Rishi-ji and Chittaranjan-ji,

>

> The essay to which I drew the List's attention doesn't

> belong to Shri Atmachaitanyaji. Its author is one Shri

> Saxena, whose full name I forgot and Shri Atmachitanyaji

> happened to guide us to it. Why do we then unnecessarily

> involve Shri Atmachaitanyaji and his views, whatever

> they are?

 

It was due to avarana, the concealment of Sri Saxena's name in the

article, that there was adhyasa in my mind resulting in Sri

Atmachaitanya becoming an adhyaropa on Sri Saxena. Moreover, the

association of Sri Atmachaitanya with the topic of adhyasa was

naisargika as there was a kind of notion similar to memory regarding

Sri Atmachaitanya untiringly engaging himself in removing our adhyasa

about adhyasa.

 

> My intention was to point to a source that explains adhyAsa well.

> Shri Saxena, in my opinion, has done a splendid job.

 

I am afraid I have to disagree. This disagreeemnt is not because Sri

Saxena works for Pepsi. It is because of the following reason. Sri

Saxena says: "In a manner that is classic of shankara's style, the

author of the bhASyam begins with an objection. The objection runs as

follows: Atman is real, and is the eternal subject I . Everything

else is not real, and is perceived as a separate object you (yuSmat)."

 

Sri Shankaracharya does not say that 'everything else is unreal' as

Sri Saxena claims he is saying. Shankara says:

 

"It being an established fact that the object and the subject, that

are fit to be the contents of the concepts 'you' and 'we'

(respectively), and are by nature as contradictory as light and

darkness, cannot logically have any identity, it follows that their

attributes can have it still less. Accordingly, the superimposition

of the object, referable through the concept 'you', and its

attributes on the subject that is conscious by nature and is

referable through the concept 'we' (should be impossible), and

contrariwise the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on

the object should be impossible. Nevertheless, owing to an absence of

discrimination between these attributes, as also between substances,

which are absolutely disparate, there continues a natural human

behaviour based on self-identification in the form of 'I am this'

or 'This is mine'. This behaviour has for its material cause an

unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality and

unreality as a result of superimposing the things themselves or their

attributes on each other."

 

What is the mixing up reality and unreality that the Acharya talks

about? According to the definition that comes from the preamble

itself, the reality of a thing is the thing as it is, and the

unreality of a thing is the thing seen as another. Thus the world is

real as it is, and is unreal as it is not. Likewise, the self is real

as it is, and is unreal as it is not. This much alone is what the

preamble says. To say that 'everything else is unreal',

the 'everything else' has to be seen as something other than what it

is. Everything else cannot be unconditionally unreal.

 

Furthermore, Sri Saxena says: "Shankara's objection simply states

that, in theory, it should be crystal clear to all what reality is,

since it is so different from the unreal, so what is all the fuss

about, and what is the need to write a whole book about reality and

how to perceive it?"

 

The preamble is a preamble and is not the summary of the entire

bhashya as Sri Saxena seems to think. The preamble leads logically to

the first sutra 'atha brahma jignasa'. Shankara says that the 'atha'

indicates something coming prior to the sutras, and he identifies

this prior thing as the four-fold qualifications for a sadhaka to

undertake brahma-jignasa. Since the samanvyaya and avirodha of

Advaita Vedanta is established in the bhashya through tarka, the

specific qualification required for tarka i.e., viveka, has been

given predominance in the preamble. Viveka being the ability to

discriminate between the real and unreal, the Acharya takes care to

establish the logical nature of the real and unreal, i.e., the real

as that which is as it is, and the unreal as that which is one thing

mistaken for another (a thing not as it is).

 

The preamble does not declare the world to be false. Such a statement

would lead to the preamble negating the conclusion of Advaita that

the object is one with the subject. When the preamble is read in its

proper context and without assigning more meaning to it than what the

Acharya says in it, then a completely different meaning of Advaita

reveals itself. It is a meaning in which the (seeming) paradox

between the following two statement is seamlessly embraced:

 

1. The self and non-self are completely different from each other.

2. The object is not different than the subject.

 

Both these are statements come from Sri Shankaracharya's bhashya

itself. The common interpretation of Advaita (such as the one Saxena

seems to be espousing) never arrives at a reconciliation of these two

statements. Instead it remains in a position whereby it has locked

out the second statement from the samanvaya. Such an interpretation

begins with a misapprehension of the meanings given in the preamble

and ends up remaining stagnant in its own preconceived position

without making much headway towards an understanding of the Acharya's

bhashya. But when the preamble is read without any pre-conceived

notion, the preamble becomes a key to unlock the meaning of Advaita

Vedanta (Vedartha) as given in the bhashya. Such is my opinion.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

The preamble is a preamble and is not the summary of the entire

bhashya as Sri Saxena seems to think. The preamble leads logically to

the first sutra 'atha brahma jignasa'.

 

praNAms CN prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

prabhuji do you know what shankara said at the end of adhyAsa bhAshya?? He

says, he is going to prove from shArIraka mImAmsa that *what has been said

in his adhyAsa bhAshya*...He did not say :"logically it leads to ONLY first

sUtra* but he implied his adhyAsa bhAshya is an epitome of what he is going

to say in sUtra bhAshya... By the way first sUtra is *athAtho brahma

jignasa* not *atha brahma jignAsa* as you mentioned above!! prabhuji, you

might be knowing what would be the significance of double usage of the

term *atha* here in the first sUtra !!!

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Bhaskar Prabhuji,

 

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

> prabhuji do you know what shankara said at the end of

> adhyAsa bhAshya?? He says, he is going to prove from

> shArIraka mImAmsa that *what has been said in his adhyAsa

> bhAshya*...He did not say :"logically it leads to ONLY

> first sUtra*

 

Neither did I say that logically it leads to ONLY the first sutra.

 

In my understanding, the discrimination between the real and the

unreal as revealed by the Acharya in the preamble is the thread that

runs through the entire bhashya.

 

> but he implied his adhyAsa bhAshya is an epitome of what he

> is going to say in sUtra bhAshya...

 

In what sense do you mean 'epitome'? If you mean that the preamble is

a summary of the entire bhashya, then it would make the preamble

itself into Vedartha. I do not believe that this is the case. But you

are welcome to take it the way you see the Acharya to be 'implying'.

 

> By the way first sUtra is *athAtho brahma jignasa* not

> *atha brahma jignAsa* as you mentioned above!!

 

You are right.

 

> prabhuji, you might be knowing what would be the

> significance of double usage of the term *atha* here

> in the first sUtra !!!

 

I would be happy to learn from you its significance. However, what I

wrote about 'atha' being meant in the sense of sequence and about the

four-fold qualifications being prior to the first sutra in the

sequence is what the Acharya himself says in the bhashya to the first

sutra.

 

Now my quota for the day is over.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

In my understanding, the discrimination between the real and the

unreal as revealed by the Acharya in the preamble is the thread that

runs through the entire bhashya.

 

praNAms Sri CN prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

As far as my understanding goes...shankara's differentiation between *asmat

pratyaya* & *yushmat pratyaya* is not restricted to *adhyAsa* in

*perception of duality & holding it as reality* but deals with

*identification* with nAma & rUpa (duality)...But according to you (again

as per my understanding) when everything is real eternally...since your

*unreality* related to *reality in duality* there is no question of mention

of your understanding of *unreality* even in adhyAsa bhAshya since shankara

explicitly saying *identification* with body mind intellect is adhyAsa and

not *seeing* duality as reality is adhyAsa ...If adhyAsa is what you said

above, shakara would have closed the case by saying *see you are thinking

you are dwarf, you are tall, you are saMsAri etc...but in reality this

*dwarfness, tallness, saMsAri-ness everything eternally real in brahman,

realize that & enjoy :-)) is it not prabhuji?? But unfortunately shankara

didnot say that...he said this identification with nAma rUpa upAdhi itself

is adhyAsa & avidyA vyavahAra...and at any stretch of our imagination we

cannot conclude vikAra-s in nAma rUpa are eternally real in brahman to

accommodate your understadning of shankarAdvaita!!

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

 

PS : thought of preserving my quota of mails for something else...but could

not resist myself from writing this...though knowing its a never ending

story between us !!! :-))

[Guest guest]

Dear Shri Chittranjan-ji.

 

Your message 29670.

 

I will bullet my comments:

 

1. I am not holding any brief for Shri Saxena.

 

2. I can't also dissect each and every word of his to conclude that

he is in any way wrong in his understanding.

 

3. The English interpretation that you have provided for Sankara's

first objection may seem to be entirely different from what Shri

Saxena has contended only if he meant that the universe is

really 'unreal'.

 

4. I don't think he has said so, judging from his following

statement later in the discussion:

 

QUOTE

 

"In other words, shankara tells us "but common experience shows us

that we do it all the time! *We see duality where in reality there is

none*, we mistake one thing for another every day". That we do this

is not through any mystery but is innate. The mixing up is adhyAsa.

Shankara will later go on to say that this adhyAsa has always been

there, and is therefore beginingless. It is important to make an

important clarification here. Shankara proceeds on the same basis as

the Sruti, which takes it as axiomatic that brahman is the ultimate

reality. We find very few instances where discussions occur

to "prove" that *the correct view of the world* is that there is an

Ultimate Reality called brahman. For shankara and the Sruti this was

self evident that Atman is self-established (swayam prasiddhatwaat).

Viewed from this transcendental viewpoint of reality it is clear why

shankara views this mixing of the real and the non real as an error.

This is fundamental to understanding shankara's tradition of advaita.

*All that is required for knowledge is to remove this error to reveal

brahman, and the universe will naturally be seen in its true light.*"

(Asterisks mine)

 

UNQUOTE

 

5. That last sentence clinches the issue, as far as I am concerned.

 

6. Shri Saxena's attempt is to provide a very simple explanation

and, as such, to my eyes, the way he has summarized the first

objection seems acceptable. To be frank, the actual intent of the

alternative interpretation which you have provided has always gone

over my head despite several readings due to the cumbersomeness of

syntax. The fault may be my grey matter's.

 

7. I am afraid our random usage of the words lime 'real'

and 'unreal' is at the root of the confusion.

 

8. When Shri Saxena says 'everything else is not real', he also adds

a clause to it "and is perceived as a separate object you (yuSmat)".

To my understanding, therefore, he means the apparent non-real

separation of what is perceived from the perceiver. Mithya is the

traditional word for that. But, Unfortunately, most of us here are

in the habit of calling it 'unreal' (not even 'non-real') to indicate

that it is not really 'unreal').

 

9. My conclusion in # 8 above is confirmed by Shri Saxena's

endorsement of Sureshwara's following contention:

 

QUOTE

"That Inner Dweller, The Witness, all-knowing and un-objectifiable,

appears to become a separate object through the false superimposition

that is avidhyA"

UNQUOTE

 

10. There is no denying that my preconceived notions of advaita

might have influenced my understanding of Shri Saxena. For that

matter, to be frank, you also seem to be sailing in the same boat.

 

10. Hope this answers Michaelji also, although I wish he hadn't

referred to Pepsi and Coca Cola. What kind of humour was that when

the subject Shri Saxena has handled is so profound?!

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

Dear All,

 

I would have liked to reply to all the messages one by one, but that

would take far too long unfortunately.

 

Dear Chittaranjanji,

 

I believe I agree with you in general, but there are some points of

contention. From the Paramartha perspective the world can be described

either as unreal or as real depending on the way one uses the term

(note: this is not some kind of anirvacaniya). The fact that the jagat

is mithya is correct, and it is not correct from the vyavaharika

perspective, so it must be correct from the paramarthika perspective.

 

To make it simpler, lets take the example of a table. We believe there

is a single, independent object called a table - this in fact is

implied in the word "table". The table in reality is just a collection

of transitory knowledge acquired through the senses. This collection

has no particular unity that one can call a "table" but this table has

been superimposed on the knowledge. Thus the table is mithya, it has

to be absolutely rejected.

 

However, Shankara says that transitory knowledge is essentially the

same as Eternal Knowledge, which is the Knower, the Self. So instead

of recognizing the transitory knowledge as Brahman, we superimpose a

"table" onto it. The knowledge of the different aspects that later

would be mistakenly unified as a table is the Eternal Knower. So the

knowledge is always real, the object is superimposed on the knowledge.

 

Dear Madathilji,

 

The objections I raised (at least regarding adhyasa/adhyaropa) cannot

be adressed by your interpretation of the article, because your

interpretation tends to agree with the objections. Your interpretation

of the adhyasa/adhyaropa on the basis of the article disagrees with

Bhaskarji who holds one to be the result of the other. I too disagree.

 

Your position on deep sleep is not clear to me, in particular I do not

agree what "de-adhyasa" means. My position is that there is adhyasa

during deep sleep. Bhaskarji's position is that there is no adhyasa

during deep sleep. The classical post-Shankaran position is that there

is "mulavidya", but not adhyasa (thus they distinguish between adhyasa

and avidya which neither me and Bhaskarji equate).

 

Regarding the jivanmukta, the logic of jivanmukta not being a

non-jivanukta does not apply because there is no logical ground for

it. This seems like dialectical mysticism, which is foreign to Advaita

in my opinion. We are discussing from the vyavahara perspective in

which a person is either a jivanmukta or a non-jivamukta and both of

these are topics of discussion,

 

Regards,

 

Rishi.

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

>

>

> > By the way first sUtra is *athAtho brahma jignasa* not

> > *atha brahma jignAsa* as you mentioned above!!

>

> You are right.

>

>

> > prabhuji, you might be knowing what would be the

> > significance of double usage of the term *atha* here

> > in the first sUtra !!!

>

> I would be happy to learn from you its significance.

 

Namaste,

 

Ref. message # 29672

 

The correct sutra is ; atha ataH (= athAto) brahma-jij~nAsA

 

NOT athAtho

 

 

Regards,

 

Sunder

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

Ref. message # 29672

 

The correct sutra is ; atha ataH (= athAto) brahma-jij~nAsA

 

NOT athAtho

 

praNAms Sunderprabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Thanks for the correction with regard to *mahAprANa*...I do know that I

am not at all good at sanskrit transliterations!! I do struggle a lot

writing sanskrit in English...but at the same time I donot want to spoil

the beauty of Sanskrit by translating it into English!!!

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

 

PS : Hope this mail will not be counted in today'quota ..as I am

planning to write couple of mesgs. today :-))

[Guest guest]

Namaste All...

 

Pardon me for stepping in the discussion this late, but some posts have been

disruptive to my creativity. I have had some ideas in mind, but they came

and went as the issue moved on. Now i fear i might be a little late, but

nevertheless, here it is...

 

Another interesting convergence of topics has happened on the list, and i

must begin by pointing to what i feel to be the root of my standpoint on the

issue. In an earlier post, talks were held against translating dharma into

truth. As it cannot be done semantically, i believe it can be done in the

light of "pure concept". As i have ellaborated on my previous post, as

regards dialectics, conceptual (and from them linguistical) problems tend to

be raised only after mind has assigned different attributes to otherwise

"pure concepts". One most certainly can digress upon the apparent

contradiction that is raised in the concept of "pure concepts", but

conceptualization (in my view) can be a tool to move beyond (ironically)

conceptualization itself.

 

Systems are only erected so that intuition, as in the right side of the

brain, can be translated (thru the left hemisphere) into logically pleasing

discourse, or produce. So, starting from pure intuition of the highest kind

(which can only be understood by the seer), one envelopes thoughts in a

layer of logically coherent parameters, so that others (other than the seer

himself, but not excluding) can enjoy the fruit of intuition. So starting

from any sort of divine inspiration, one "Beethoven" receives the pure

concept, envelopes it in the logically perfect musical system, and delivers

logically perfect 9th Simphony, which can be understood (though not

fully...) by mostly everyone.

 

So within our linguistic system, with the use of the system of dialectics,

abstract concepts are pallatable to mind, through the opposites. Thus, as

linguistic concepts, dharma and truth are irremediably separated, both

having different opposites. However, if we are able to look at both before

the first step in intelectualization (thus treading the opposite path, as in

the "uprooted tree" metaphor), one powerfull common ground is to be found.

 

Before questioning our own decisions (as to wether they would be dharmic or

otherwise), or reactions to any given subject, one fraction of second stands

where there is no contradiction whatsoever in mind. Within that infinitely

small speck of time, stands a concept that still has no opposite (thus

outside dialectical linguistic systems), which is in essence pure - and from

which itself an opposite will be drawn in mind (for the sake of

systematization). That speck can be brought to systemic light as intuition,

above likes and dislikes (even though the strongest generator of both), and

which represents rightfull decision to the individual. From then on, series

of chained thoughts take place, eventually leading mind away from the

original (pure) concept, and trough the grace of jnana or (dis)grace of

ajnana then, concepts can be grasped correctly or otherwise, leading to

adharmic apprehension of truth (in this system untruth) etc. When correctly

apprehended, even though stirring havoc in buddhi, such concepts are

back-traceable to their source, thus eventually leading to a progessively

quieter mind. When grasped incorrectly, such mis-apprehended concepts take

root in buddhi, becoming intellectual knots that block the path to the

origin of thoughts (and birth-giver of the intellect), thus locking with

forever stronger grip perception of atman (as true-self) behind the steel

door of the corrupted intellect (as in a maze-system).

 

So before being subject to any intellectual system (coherent or otherwise)

dharma is truth (as long as there is no opposite to truth). When (i believe

it was) Michael-ji pointed the child as the root of the problem, buddhi

itself resonated, as it had intuitively(?) been telling me for a while. For

a child, the perception of reality exists (depending on how well the memory

system for that particular BMI takes it back). What lacks is depth to the

linguistic/cognizant system it has been immersed in. So when a child sees a

horse, it depicts perfectly (perception-wise) in its mind the peacefull

(absent concept) grazing animal (absent concept). And if that child had been

alone, gradual observation of the phenomenon would suffice intelectually.

But within a concept of forced (linguistic and otherwise) interaction,

whereas inner concepts are pulled out from the child by it's parents (for

instance), and as more and more diverse ones are shoved in, the need arises,

in the child, to establish systems. At this point, the child asks its mother

"what is that?", and the mother replies "it's a horse". From then on, the

concept (pure) is linked to the word (system). Had the mother replied to the

child "that is brahman", no different effect would have been observed

whatsoever, because within the system of social interaction and

multiplicity, apparent individuals assert themselves through speech and

interaction, thus confirming the illusion of individuality in the newcomer

as a reflection of their own views.

 

At the risk of confusing more than explaining, and in the light of this

exposition, adhyasa and adhyaropa, in my view, can only be accepted as

mutually interlaced concepts, with no chronology whatsoever. For what would

be the need, in a system-less setting, to establish such natures as

mis-apprehension and super-imposition? For that matter, at this point (at

least to me), it should have become clear that advaita is a system as well

(even though the one to trace all systems back to their single source,

therefore destructing itself upon attainment, as it is stated), and to

discuss adhyasa without adhyaropa is to discuss wether a child that grew up

in a system-less setting would understand itself as one with brahman or not

(which seems even more difficult than attempting to trace the source within

cognitive systems themselves, as the concept "brahman" would not be there as

well).

 

My warmest regards to the valluable members of the list...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_____

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