Vikshepa Shakti (continued)

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Dear Sri Subrahmanian-ji,

 

Om Namah Shivaya

 

Om Mata Annapurna

 

Refer my post 29760

 

I am continuing this discussion which had temporarily halted at the

point where I had asked you to reproduce the relevant quotes from Sri

Shankaracharya's bhashyas wherein the Acharya himself explains the

meanings of the two critical arguments (regarding non-existence and

snake-rope analogy) that are used throughout Advaita. I had asked for

illumination on these two arguments in the overall context of this

discussion which is for the purpose of determining whether it is

Brahman or avyakta that is the efficient cause of the universe. We

had stopped the discussion at the point where a part of the Mandukya

Upanishad bhashya was produced. I shall now proceed with the

discussion. This will be a long post, but I believe that the

importance of the topic is adequate justification for the length of

the post.

 

 

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

 

> VS-ji, I am aware of the part of the bhashya you quote.

> They don't mean what you seem to be implying they mean.

> I will ask you two questions which when answered will

> illuminate what the bhashya here means. The questions are:

>

> 1. What does the negation of existence mean? Do you know

> where the Acharya himself has explained it?

>

> 2. What does the snake-rope analogy mean? Do you know

> where the Acharya himself has explained it?

>

> Both these have been answered by the Acharya. Would you be

> kind enough to reproduce them and them we shall continue

> the discussion? If you wish I will reproduce them.

 

 

I shall now take the liberty of reproducing the relevant texts from

the Acharya's bhashyas.

 

 

1. THE MEANING OF THE NEGATION OF EXISTENCE

 

FIRST QUOTE:

 

The Brahma Sutra (II.i.17)

 

"If it be argued that the effect did not exist before creation, since

it is declared (in the Upanishad) as 'non-existent', then we say, no,

because from the complementary portion it is known that the word is

used from the standpoint of a difference in characteristics."

 

Shankara bhashya:

 

"The condition in which name and form become evolved is different

from the condition in which name and form is not so evolved. Hence

although the effect exists as non-different from the cause before

creation, still from the standpoint of this difference in conditions

the effect is declared to be non-existent before creation."

Later: "Therefore this declaration of non-existence of the effect

before creation is made from the standpoint of a difference of

conditions. Since in the world a thing is said to exist when it

manifests itself through name and form, therefore, as a concession to

common sense, the universe is said to be non-existent before being

evolved through name and form."

 

SECOND QUOTE:

 

Brahadaranyaka Upanishad bhashya (I,2)

 

"It is a common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which

was hidden by darkness or any other thing and comes within the range

of perception when the obstruction is removed by the appearance of

light or in some other way, does not preclude its previous existence.

Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its

manifestation. For a jar that is non-existent is not perceived even

when the sun rises......Every effect such as a jar has two kinds of

obstruction. When it has become manifest from its component clay,

darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions; while before its

manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists in particles of

clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump. Therefore, the

effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its

manifestation, as it is hidden. The terms and

concepts 'destroyed', 'produced', 'existence' and 'non-existence'

depend on this two-fold character of manifestation and disappearance."

 

"Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not mean that it does

not at all exist as an entity before it comes into being. If however,

you say that the previous non-existence of a jar means the jar

itself, then to mention it as being 'of a jar' (instead of 'the jar

itself') is an incongruity. If you use it merely as a fancy, as in

the expression, 'The body of the stone roller', then the phrase 'the

previous non-existence of a jar' would only mean that it is the

imaginary non-existence that is mentioned in terms of the jar, and

not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the negation

of a jar is something other than it, we have already answered the

point. Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be an absolute

nonentity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot be connected

either with its cause or with existence (as the logicians hold), for

connection requires two positive entities. Objection: It is all right

with things that are inseparable. Reply: No, for we cannot conceive

of an inseparable connection between an existent and a non-existent

thing. Separable or inseparable connection is possible between two

positive entities only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor

between two nonentities. Therefore we conclude that the effect does

exist before it is manifested."

 

 

CONCLUSION ON THE MEANING OF NON-EXISTENCE

 

So, what does the negation of existence mean? If we are to understand

non-existence correctly, and in accordance with what the Acharya

establishes, it means that the non-existence of an object is merely

the non-manifestation (or hiddenness) of the eternally existing

object. This is paramartha, the absolute truth. It can by no means be

said that this is a vyavahrika truth because nobody in vyavahara sees

objects as being eternal. Moreover, mithya is said to be that which

is not existing in three points of time - past, present and future.

If objects were mithya, it would be absurd for the Acharya to be

establishing that they are eternal and thereby make it impossible for

anybody to assert that they are mithya. Therefore the mithyatva of

the world is the false notion that it is temporal. The truth of

paramartha is that the world is eternal. The negation of existence is

therefore merely the negation of the limitedness of manifestation

that eternal objects seem to have in temporality, and it is not a

negation of the existence of objects themselves.

 

 

2. THE MEANING OF THE SNAKE-ROPE ANALOGY

 

The Upanishad text and the Acharya's bhashya that I am going to quote

next provide a vital point regarding the Advaita point of view. The

bhashya first re-enforces the conclusion that we have (just) stated

above (regarding the eternality of objects), and then based on this

very conclusion, it proceeds to explain how the snake-rope analogy is

to be interpreted. In almost all other parts of the bhashyas, the

snake-rope analogy is merely used, but this is perhaps the only place

in the bhashya where the analogy is not simply used, but is also

explained.

 

 

Chandogya Upanishad (VI.ii.3): "That (Existence) saw, 'I shall become

many. I shall be born'."

 

Shankara: "How did That visualise? This is being answered: 'Syam, I

shall become; bahu, many; Prajayeya, I shall be born excellently',

like earth taking shapes of pots etc. or ropes taking the shapes of

snakes etc. imagined by the intellect."

 

Objection: "In that case whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope

perceived in the shape of a snake etc."

 

Shankara: "No. Since it is Existence itself that is perceived

otherwise through the duality of different forms, therefore, THERE IS

NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE. That is what we say."

 

Shankara (continuing): "As the Nyaya school, after assuming that a

thing is different from existence, says again that it has no

existence before its birth and after its destruction – it is not

assumed by us in that way, at anytime or anywhere, that any word or

any thing denoted by the word can be there differently from

Existence. But all words and all things that are spoken of with THE

IDEA OF THEIR BEING DIFFERENT FROM EXISTENCE, are Existence only,

just as in the world a rope itself is spoken of as a snake, under THE

IDEA THAT IT IS A SNAKE."

 

 

What is it that is negated in the snake-rope analogy? The snake.

 

What is it that is negated when the snake-rope analogy is used for

negating the world as seen in samsara? The IDEA of the world being

DIFFERENT from existence.

 

What does the Acharya say when the purva-paksha says: "In that case

whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope perceived in the shape

of a snake etc?" The Acharya says: "No. Since it is Existence itself

that is perceived otherwise through the duality of different forms,

therefore, THERE IS NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE."

 

If we are to be consistent in our interpretation of Sri

Shankaracharya's bhashya, we must preserve this meaning of the snake-

rope analogy whenever we come across passages in the bhashya that

employs this analogy.

 

 

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDUKYA BHASHYA

 

I had earlier quoted the Mandukya Upanishad bhashya to show that

Brahman in two aspects, as Turiya, and as the threefold

manifestations of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna, is referred to as

catuspat, and that in realising AUM, the three quarters, Vishva,

Taijasa and Prajna are merged in Turiya thereby indicating the non-

difference of the world from Brahman. You then reproduced the

subsequent part of the bhashya to supposedly show that the world is

only 'relatively true' and that it has the status of the snake on the

rope. I am reproducing this part of the bhashya again herebelow for

our reference:

> "So'yamaatama, of the nature of both the Ultimately-true and

> the relatively-true aspects, called by the name chatushpAd,

> Its relatively- true nature, a product of Avidya, similar to

> the rope-snake etc., which is the pAdatraya, of the nature

> of seed-and-sprout. Now, the abIjAtmakam (=the not-being-

> the-seed-of-Creation nature of Turiya), Absolutely-true

> nature (of Atman), of the status of the rope (of the

> rope-snake), is being expounded by NEGATING (niraakaranena)

> the sthAnatraya (pAdatraya=vishwa, taijasa and praajna)

> that is similar to the (superimposed)snake, etc. in the

> sequel, nAntaH prajnam etc. In the body of the bhashyam

> the one-to-one negation of the three paadas, along with

> some other intermediary states is stated. End translation."

 

What is it that is ultimately true? Brahman.

 

What is it that is relatively true here? The relatively true is the

world that is like the snake on the rope as explanined by the

Acharya, i.e., the IDEA of the eternally existing world being

DIFFERENT from Brahman. In other words, the idea that Vishva, Taijasa

and Prajna are different from Brahman. If this idea of the

separateness (of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna) is mithya like the snake

on the rope, what is it that should happen for the Truth to be seen?

Now read the part of the bhashya that I had quoted earlier and which

I reproduce here below:

 

"Sah ayam atma, that Self that is such, that is signified by Om and

exists as the higher and lower Brahman, is catuspat, possessed of

four quarters, like a coin (karsapana), but not like a cow, As the

fourth (Turiya) is realised by successively merging the earlier

three, starting from Visva, the word pada (in the case of Visva,

Taijasa, Prajna) is derived in the instrumental sense of that by

which something is attained, whereas in the case of Turiya the word

pada is derived in the objective sense of that which is achieved".

 

See how logical it is that Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna should be

successively merged in Turiya for the Truth to be seen. The

word 'pada' is used in the instrumental sense for Vishva, Taijasa and

Prajna. What does it mean? It means that the merging is that by which

something is attained. And what does it mean when it said that the

word 'pada' is used in the objective sense? It means that which is

attained by the merging. That which is attained by the merging is the

Turiya. Therefore, the negation of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna is

merely an instrumental device (an upaya) for attaining the object of

seeing the Truth which is the Oneness of the Universe and Brahman.

 

Now, why is it that the nature of Turiya is said to be abIjAtmakam

(not the seed of Creation)? Because the Brahman that is Purnam is not

the seed of something that is already in it. A thing can be the bija,

the seed, of another thing only in duality - in time where the whole

is seen partially in its limitedness as the vishesas

(particularities) of the whole. Now read the bhashya that I had

quoted earlier also:

 

"For all names, the differentiations such as Yajnadatta and Devadatta

springs from it, this generality of names, like particles of salt

from the salt rock. And an effect is not separate from its cause.

Also particulars are included in the general. How does the relation

of general and particulars apply here? It, sound in general, is their

Saman, so called because of sameness. For it is common to all names,

which are its own particular forms. Another reason is that the

particular names, being derived from it, are not different from it.

And we see that something that is derived from another is not

different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from

clay."

 

Samanya is not different than the particularities (visheshas) which

are included in it. That is why in Advaita words denote only samanya

and not vishesha, because the objects that we see in the world are

visheshas and if the words denoting them were to be pointing to the

visheshas manifested (or a combination of samanya and vsiheshas

manifested), then an infinite number of names would be required to

denote an object in time because no two instances of its

manifestation are ever identical. See what the Acharya says:

 

"And words are connected with the general characteristics (i.e.,

genus) and not with the individuals, for the individuals are

infinite, and it is impossible to comprehend the relation of a word

(with all of them). Thus, even though the individuals are born, the

distinctive general characteristics remain constant, so that this

creates no difficulty with the eternality of the words cow, etc."

(BSB, I,III,27).

 

So, when Brahman is said to be Nirvishesha, it means that Brahman is

to be known as Purnam, not as any particular aspect (vishesha) that

may be manifested of It, but all of it at once in the purnanubhava of

Brahman. And the world is One with Brahman.

 

 

THE LOCUS OF VIKSHEPA SHAKTI

 

So where does it leave us in regards of Vikshepa Shakti? Does

Vikshepa Shakti belong to Brahman or avyakta? From the foregoing

discussion, it is clear that avyakta is the seed not of creation or

of the world, but of the schism of duality which seemingly separates

the world from Brahman, because it is itself the latent notion of

duality that persists as the anadi-bija-nidra of samsara. We have to

resolve the issue of the locus of vikshepa shakti in the light of

this nature of the world as non-different from Brahman. In other

words, the world is not created by avyakta; it is eternal in Brahman.

I shall now produce some principles from the Acharya's bhashya which

would help us proceed in the right manner:

 

"But anything that cannot be the characteristic of something in its

own right cannot certainly be so because of a similarity with

another. For fire, which is felt to be warm, does not become cold

because of some similarity with water." (BSB,II,ii,29).

 

In the Gita bhashya, Sri Shankaracharya says that not even the Vedas

can make fire be cold, and that if some such expression is found in

the Vedas, it must be taken in a secondary sense to mean something

else. The dharma of a thing can never change. Never. It is the nature

of a river to flow, and of the dam to obstruct the flow of water.

Subrahmanian-ji, you didn't address this point in your reply, but

instead you went on to produce another part of the bhashya as if

another passage in the bhashya can make something that is illogical

(such as creating power belonging to avyakta, darkness) transform

into something that becomes logical. Such a thing can never happen.

As the Acharya says, "anything that cannot be the characteristic of

something in its own right cannot certainly be so because of a

similarity with another".

 

It is in the nature of Light to reveal and in the nature of darkness

to hide (obstruct). Vikshepa is the showing forth of the world even

if such showing forth should only be particularities of the eternal

universe in Brahman. Avyakta is the obstruction that makes what is

shown forth seem to be separated from Brahman. Vikshepa should be

placed in a locus that is innately of the nature of light. And

obstruction should be placed in a locus that is innately of the

nature of darkness. Therefore, Vikshepa Shakti belongs to Brahman and

obstruction belongs to avyakta.

 

An interesting question arises at this point. The question is: Is it

possible for there to be Vikshepa without avarana (avyakta)? The

answer is Yes. It is possible to see visheshas in the full light of

the knowledge that the visheshas are only the limitedness of the

Purnatva of Brahman. Without avyakta, there is no duality in the

unobstructed Seeing of the Seer. It is called Sahaja Samadhi, the

Natural Vision in which there is samarasa, sameness, between

Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa. It is the Vision of the Full in which the

visheshas are seen for what they are. The jnani is stitha in Sahaja

Samadhi.

 

In a recent post addressed to Sri Rishi, you say:

 

"Maya or Avidya is termed the 'Parinaami-upaadaana kaaranam, roughly

translatable as 'changeful material cause' and Brahman is

the 'Vivarta-upaadaana kaaranam. I do not know how to translate this."

 

Vivarta is the unfolding of the world through the Vikshepa Shakti of

Brahman. Pure vikshepa is without avarana. Obscuration of the nature

of vivarta is avarana.

 

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan