Vikshepashakti

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Wed, 11 Jan 2006 12:56:15 -0000

 

"Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik

 

Vikshepa Shakti (continued)

 

(First the post from Chitta ji is reproduced and the response commences at the

end of this reproduction)

 

Dear Sri Subrahmanian-ji,

 

 

 

Om Namah Shivaya

 

 

 

Om Mata Annapurna

 

 

 

Refer my post 29760

 

 

 

I am continuing this discussion which had temporarily halted at the

 

point where I had asked you to reproduce the relevant quotes from Sri

 

Shankaracharya's bhashyas wherein the Acharya himself explains the

 

meanings of the two critical arguments (regarding non-existence and

 

snake-rope analogy) that are used throughout Advaita. I had asked for

 

illumination on these two arguments in the overall context of this

 

discussion which is for the purpose of determining whether it is

 

Brahman or avyakta that is the efficient cause of the universe. We

 

had stopped the discussion at the point where a part of the Mandukya

 

Upanishad bhashya was produced. I shall now proceed with the

 

discussion. This will be a long post, but I believe that the

 

importance of the topic is adequate justification for the length of

 

the post.

 

 

 

 

 

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

 

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

 

 

 

 

> VS-ji, I am aware of the part of the bhashya you quote.

> They don't mean what you seem to be implying they mean.

> I will ask you two questions which when answered will

> illuminate what the bhashya here means. The questions are:

>

> 1. What does the negation of existence mean? Do you know

> where the Acharya himself has explained it?

>

> 2. What does the snake-rope analogy mean? Do you know

> where the Acharya himself has explained it?

>

> Both these have been answered by the Acharya. Would you be

> kind enough to reproduce them and them we shall continue

> the discussion? If you wish I will reproduce them.

 

 

 

 

 

I shall now take the liberty of reproducing the relevant texts from

 

the Acharya's bhashyas.

 

 

 

 

 

1. THE MEANING OF THE NEGATION OF EXISTENCE

 

 

 

FIRST QUOTE:

 

 

 

The Brahma Sutra (II.i.17)

 

 

 

"If it be argued that the effect did not exist before creation, since

 

it is declared (in the Upanishad) as 'non-existent', then we say, no,

 

because from the complementary portion it is known that the word is

 

used from the standpoint of a difference in characteristics."

 

 

 

Shankara bhashya:

 

 

 

"The condition in which name and form become evolved is different

 

from the condition in which name and form is not so evolved. Hence

 

although the effect exists as non-different from the cause before

 

creation, still from the standpoint of this difference in conditions

 

the effect is declared to be non-existent before creation."

 

Later: "Therefore this declaration of non-existence of the effect

 

before creation is made from the standpoint of a difference of

 

conditions. Since in the world a thing is said to exist when it

 

manifests itself through name and form, therefore, as a concession to

 

common sense, the universe is said to be non-existent before being

 

evolved through name and form."

 

 

 

SECOND QUOTE:

 

 

 

Brahadaranyaka Upanishad bhashya (I,2)

 

 

 

"It is a common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which

 

was hidden by darkness or any other thing and comes within the range

 

of perception when the obstruction is removed by the appearance of

 

light or in some other way, does not preclude its previous existence.

 

Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its

 

manifestation. For a jar that is non-existent is not perceived even

 

when the sun rises......Every effect such as a jar has two kinds of

 

obstruction. When it has become manifest from its component clay,

 

darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions; while before its

 

manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists in particles of

 

clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump. Therefore, the

 

effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its

 

manifestation, as it is hidden. The terms and

 

concepts 'destroyed', 'produced', 'existence' and 'non-existence'

 

depend on this two-fold character of manifestation and disappearance."

 

 

 

"Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not mean that it does

 

not at all exist as an entity before it comes into being. If however,

 

you say that the previous non-existence of a jar means the jar

 

itself, then to mention it as being 'of a jar' (instead of 'the jar

 

itself') is an incongruity. If you use it merely as a fancy, as in

 

the expression, 'The body of the stone roller', then the phrase 'the

 

previous non-existence of a jar' would only mean that it is the

 

imaginary non-existence that is mentioned in terms of the jar, and

 

not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the negation

 

of a jar is something other than it, we have already answered the

 

point. Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be an absolute

 

nonentity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot be connected

 

either with its cause or with existence (as the logicians hold), for

 

connection requires two positive entities. Objection: It is all right

 

with things that are inseparable. Reply: No, for we cannot conceive

 

of an inseparable connection between an existent and a non-existent

 

thing. Separable or inseparable connection is possible between two

 

positive entities only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor

 

between two nonentities. Therefore we conclude that the effect does

 

exist before it is manifested."

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION ON THE MEANING OF NON-EXISTENCE

 

 

 

So, what does the negation of existence mean? If we are to understand

 

non-existence correctly, and in accordance with what the Acharya

 

establishes, it means that the non-existence of an object is merely

 

the non-manifestation (or hiddenness) of the eternally existing

 

object. This is paramartha, the absolute truth. It can by no means be

 

said that this is a vyavahrika truth because nobody in vyavahara sees

 

objects as being eternal. Moreover, mithya is said to be that which

 

is not existing in three points of time - past, present and future.

 

If objects were mithya, it would be absurd for the Acharya to be

 

establishing that they are eternal and thereby make it impossible for

 

anybody to assert that they are mithya. Therefore the mithyatva of

 

the world is the false notion that it is temporal. The truth of

 

paramartha is that the world is eternal. The negation of existence is

 

therefore merely the negation of the limitedness of manifestation

 

that eternal objects seem to have in temporality, and it is not a

 

negation of the existence of objects themselves.

 

 

MEANING OF THE SNAKE-ROPE ANALOGY

 

 

 

The Upanishad text and the Acharya's bhashya that I am going to quote

 

next provide a vital point regarding the Advaita point of view. The

 

bhashya first re-enforces the conclusion that we have (just) stated

 

above (regarding the eternality of objects), and then based on this

 

very conclusion, it proceeds to explain how the snake-rope analogy is

 

to be interpreted. In almost all other parts of the bhashyas, the

 

snake-rope analogy is merely used, but this is perhaps the only place

 

in the bhashya where the analogy is not simply used, but is also

 

explained.

 

 

 

 

 

Chandogya Upanishad (VI.ii.3): "That (Existence) saw, 'I shall become

 

many. I shall be born'."

 

 

 

Shankara: "How did That visualise? This is being answered: 'Syam, I

 

shall become; bahu, many; Prajayeya, I shall be born excellently',

 

like earth taking shapes of pots etc. or ropes taking the shapes of

 

snakes etc. imagined by the intellect."

 

 

 

Objection: "In that case whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope

 

perceived in the shape of a snake etc."

 

 

 

Shankara: "No. Since it is Existence itself that is perceived

 

otherwise through the duality of different forms, therefore, THERE IS

 

NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE. That is what we say."

 

 

 

Shankara (continuing): "As the Nyaya school, after assuming that a

 

thing is different from existence, says again that it has no

 

existence before its birth and after its destruction – it is not

 

assumed by us in that way, at anytime or anywhere, that any word or

 

any thing denoted by the word can be there differently from

 

Existence. But all words and all things that are spoken of with THE

 

IDEA OF THEIR BEING DIFFERENT FROM EXISTENCE, are Existence only,

 

just as in the world a rope itself is spoken of as a snake, under THE

 

IDEA THAT IT IS A SNAKE."

 

 

 

 

 

What is it that is negated in the snake-rope analogy? The snake.

 

 

 

What is it that is negated when the snake-rope analogy is used for

 

negating the world as seen in samsara? The IDEA of the world being

 

DIFFERENT from existence.

 

 

 

What does the Acharya say when the purva-paksha says: "In that case

 

whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope perceived in the shape

 

of a snake etc?" The Acharya says: "No. Since it is Existence itself

 

that is perceived otherwise through the duality of different forms,

 

therefore, THERE IS NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE."

 

 

 

If we are to be consistent in our interpretation of Sri

 

Shankaracharya's bhashya, we must preserve this meaning of the snake-

 

rope analogy whenever we come across passages in the bhashya that

 

employs this analogy.

 

 

 

 

 

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDUKYA BHASHYA

 

 

 

I had earlier quoted the Mandukya Upanishad bhashya to show that

 

Brahman in two aspects, as Turiya, and as the threefold

 

manifestations of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna, is referred to as

 

catuspat, and that in realising AUM, the three quarters, Vishva,

 

Taijasa and Prajna are merged in Turiya thereby indicating the non-

 

difference of the world from Brahman. You then reproduced the

 

subsequent part of the bhashya to supposedly show that the world is

 

only 'relatively true' and that it has the status of the snake on the

 

rope. I am reproducing this part of the bhashya again herebelow for

 

our reference:

 

 

> "So'yamaatama, of the nature of both the Ultimately-true and

> the relatively-true aspects, called by the name chatushpAd,

> Its relatively- true nature, a product of Avidya, similar to

> the rope-snake etc., which is the pAdatraya, of the nature

> of seed-and-sprout. Now, the abIjAtmakam (=the not-being-

> the-seed-of-Creation nature of Turiya), Absolutely-true

> nature (of Atman), of the status of the rope (of the

> rope-snake), is being expounded by NEGATING (niraakaranena)

> the sthAnatraya (pAdatraya=vishwa, taijasa and praajna)

> that is similar to the (superimposed)snake, etc. in the

> sequel, nAntaH prajnam etc. In the body of the bhashyam

> the one-to-one negation of the three paadas, along with

> some other intermediary states is stated. End translation."

 

 

 

What is it that is ultimately true? Brahman.

 

 

 

What is it that is relatively true here? The relatively true is the

 

world that is like the snake on the rope as explanined by the

 

Acharya, i.e., the IDEA of the eternally existing world being

 

DIFFERENT from Brahman. In other words, the idea that Vishva, Taijasa

 

and Prajna are different from Brahman. If this idea of the

 

separateness (of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna) is mithya like the snake

 

on the rope, what is it that should happen for the Truth to be seen?

 

Now read the part of the bhashya that I had quoted earlier and which

 

I reproduce here below:

 

 

 

"Sah ayam atma, that Self that is such, that is signified by Om and

 

exists as the higher and lower Brahman, is catuspat, possessed of

 

four quarters, like a coin (karsapana), but not like a cow, As the

 

fourth (Turiya) is realised by successively merging the earlier

 

three, starting from Visva, the word pada (in the case of Visva,

 

Taijasa, Prajna) is derived in the instrumental sense of that by

 

which something is attained, whereas in the case of Turiya the word

 

pada is derived in the objective sense of that which is achieved".

 

 

 

See how logical it is that Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna should be

 

successively merged in Turiya for the Truth to be seen. The

 

word 'pada' is used in the instrumental sense for Vishva, Taijasa and

 

Prajna. What does it mean? It means that the merging is that by which

 

something is attained. And what does it mean when it said that the

 

word 'pada' is used in the objective sense? It means that which is

 

attained by the merging. That which is attained by the merging is the

 

Turiya. Therefore, the negation of Vishva, Taijasa and Prajna is

 

merely an instrumental device (an upaya) for attaining the object of

 

seeing the Truth which is the Oneness of the Universe and Brahman.

 

 

 

Now, why is it that the nature of Turiya is said to be abIjAtmakam

 

(not the seed of Creation)? Because the Brahman that is Purnam is not

 

the seed of something that is already in it. A thing can be the bija,

 

the seed, of another thing only in duality - in time where the whole

 

is seen partially in its limitedness as the vishesas

 

(particularities) of the whole. Now read the bhashya that I had

 

quoted earlier also:

 

 

 

"For all names, the differentiations such as Yajnadatta and Devadatta

 

springs from it, this generality of names, like particles of salt

 

from the salt rock. And an effect is not separate from its cause.

 

Also particulars are included in the general. How does the relation

 

of general and particulars apply here? It, sound in general, is their

 

Saman, so called because of sameness. For it is common to all names,

 

which are its own particular forms. Another reason is that the

 

particular names, being derived from it, are not different from it.

 

And we see that something that is derived from another is not

 

different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from

 

clay."

 

 

 

Samanya is not different than the particularities (visheshas) which

 

are included in it. That is why in Advaita words denote only samanya

 

and not vishesha, because the objects that we see in the world are

 

visheshas and if the words denoting them were to be pointing to the

 

visheshas manifested (or a combination of samanya and vsiheshas

 

manifested), then an infinite number of names would be required to

 

denote an object in time because no two instances of its

 

manifestation are ever identical. See what the Acharya says:

 

 

 

"And words are connected with the general characteristics (i.e.,

 

genus) and not with the individuals, for the individuals are

 

infinite, and it is impossible to comprehend the relation of a word

 

(with all of them). Thus, even though the individuals are born, the

 

distinctive general characteristics remain constant, so that this

 

creates no difficulty with the eternality of the words cow, etc."

 

(BSB, I,III,27).

 

 

 

So, when Brahman is said to be Nirvishesha, it means that Brahman is

 

to be known as Purnam, not as any particular aspect (vishesha) that

 

may be manifested of It, but all of it at once in the purnanubhava of

 

Brahman. And the world is One with Brahman.

 

 

 

 

 

THE LOCUS OF VIKSHEPA SHAKTI

 

 

 

So where does it leave us in regards of Vikshepa Shakti? Does

 

Vikshepa Shakti belong to Brahman or avyakta? From the foregoing

 

discussion, it is clear that avyakta is the seed not of creation or

 

of the world, but of the schism of duality which seemingly separates

 

the world from Brahman, because it is itself the latent notion of

 

duality that persists as the anadi-bija-nidra of samsara. We have to

 

resolve the issue of the locus of vikshepa shakti in the light of

 

this nature of the world as non-different from Brahman. In other

 

words, the world is not created by avyakta; it is eternal in Brahman.

 

I shall now produce some principles from the Acharya's bhashya which

 

would help us proceed in the right manner:

 

 

 

"But anything that cannot be the characteristic of something in its

 

own right cannot certainly be so because of a similarity with

 

another. For fire, which is felt to be warm, does not become cold

 

because of some similarity with water." (BSB,II,ii,29).

 

 

 

In the Gita bhashya, Sri Shankaracharya says that not even the Vedas

 

can make fire be cold, and that if some such expression is found in

 

the Vedas, it must be taken in a secondary sense to mean something

 

else. The dharma of a thing can never change. Never. It is the nature

 

of a river to flow, and of the dam to obstruct the flow of water.

 

Subrahmanian-ji, you didn't address this point in your reply, but

 

instead you went on to produce another part of the bhashya as if

 

another passage in the bhashya can make something that is illogical

 

(such as creating power belonging to avyakta, darkness) transform

 

into something that becomes logical. Such a thing can never happen.

 

As the Acharya says, "anything that cannot be the characteristic of

 

something in its own right cannot certainly be so because of a

 

similarity with another".

 

 

 

It is in the nature of Light to reveal and in the nature of darkness

 

to hide (obstruct). Vikshepa is the showing forth of the world even

 

if such showing forth should only be particularities of the eternal

 

universe in Brahman. Avyakta is the obstruction that makes what is

 

shown forth seem to be separated from Brahman. Vikshepa should be

 

placed in a locus that is innately of the nature of light. And

 

obstruction should be placed in a locus that is innately of the

 

nature of darkness. Therefore, Vikshepa Shakti belongs to Brahman and

 

obstruction belongs to avyakta.

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESPONSE:

 

Dear Chitta ji:

 

Namaskarams.

 

Ishwara-anugrahaadeva pumsaam advaita vaasana |

 

Maha-bhaya-kRta-traanaat dvi-traanaamevOpajaayate ||

 

[it is only by the Lord's grace, the saviour from the worst of fears, that

propensity pertaining to Advaitasakshatkara arises and that barely in respect of

two or three seekers.]

 

 

 

There is a magic to your writing. I enjoyed the spiritual virtual tour that you

led all of us to Badrikashrama. Excellent indeed !!

 

 

 

Many many thanks for the quotes and the conclusion that you have arrived at. I

bow to your sincerity in taking this discussion forward. The quotes are well

analysed. About the conclusion that you have arrived, however, I have some

difficulty in fitting them in the scheme of my understanding. This post, quite

a long one, is an attempt at bringing out such of the points that defy

reconciliation and seek and bring out the picture as it would give no room for

disagreement. Let me place before you some points, as per my understanding.

 

 

 

 

 

Vedanta admits three levels of existence, 'sattaa':

 

1. Paaramaarthika sattaa

 

2. Praatibhasika sattaa

 

3. Vyavaharika sattaa

 

 

 

The first pertains to Brahman. The second pertains to the error that we come

across in our day-to-day lives; mistaking one thing for the other. The third

pertains to our daily life. While the first never undergoes sublation, baadha,

trikaala-abaadhitam, the second undergoes sublation when the right knowledge

about the thing mistaken arises. For example, I misread the figure 8000 as 3000

and did some vyavahara with the mistaken notion. Later when I realize that it

is actually 8000, the mistake is no longer continued. This baadha of the

praatibhaasika satta arises in the vyavaharic world itself, and does not wait

for Brahmajnanam to arise. The third, however, continues till Brahmajnanam

arises and only then is sublated.

 

Putting the quote provided by you in perspective, what Acharya Shankara is

establishing can be appreciated when we keep the above 'satta' classification

and the following in mind:

 

 

 

When the naiyayikas put forward the asat-karya-vada, the theory that the effect

originates anew, being not existing before their creation, the sankhyas objected

to it and came out with the theory of sat-karya-vada wherein the objects did

exist before their creation, the famous example being the statue did exist in

the rock, only in an unmanifest form.

 

The Vedantin's sat-karya vada is however different from the sankhya's viewpoint.

The vedantin's view is that the effects did exist before their origination

alright but as non-different from the cause. To reiterate the difference between

the Sankhya sat-karya vada and the Vedanta sat-karya vada:

 

Sankhya: The effect existed (before its manifestation) IN the cause

 

Vedanta: The effect existed (before its manifestation) AS the cause

 

 

 

The difference makes a world of difference!! The first view holds the world as

real, presupposes the parinama, modification, of the cause into effect. The

second view, the vivartavada, however, presupposes the cause itself 'appearing'

as the effect. It is this major difference that differentiates the sankhya and

the Vedanta viewpoints. If this difference is lost sight of, one may easily be

led into believing that the sankhya view is what is actually the Vedanta view.

It is the second view that affords room for the avidya of the perceiver to

perceive the Brahman as the jagat and the teaching Neti neti becomes meaningful

only when the vivarta view is held to be correct, as per the vedantin. What I

feel is that your presentation approximates to the view of the sankhya rather

than to that of the Vedanta.

 

 

 

You have correctly stated the vedantic view when you say:

 

'Hence although the effect exists as non-different from the cause before

creation,….'.…quoting from the Sutra Bhashya.

 

This is fine. But when you conclude you make a really mind boggling statement

(for the Vedantin):'So, what does the negation of existence mean? If we are to

understand non-existence correctly, and in accordance with what the Acharya

establishes, it means that the non-existence of an object is merely the

non-manifestation (or hiddenness) of the eternally existing object. This is

paramartha, the absolute truth.'

 

Response:

 

Vedanta never presupposes a or all eternally existing object\s. This statement

of yours is what gives me an impression that the difference between the sankhya

position and the Vedanta position has been overlooked. Are we to understand that

the effects, the objects we experience, existed in Brahman like the statue

existed in the rock only to become manifest later? This is the sankhya

position. That is why they have been called jagat-satyatva-vadins and dvaitins.

Where is the room for vivarta, the rope appearing as or being mistaken to be a

snake in this scheme? What the Acharya established in the above Brihadaranyaka

quote is that the kaarana and the karya are not non-existent, shunyam. This is

what the context of the bhashya is as it begins to unfold. The mantra under

consideration starts with the words: Naiva iha kinchana aasiit.. There was

nothing whatsoever here..

 

The Acharya sees a possible objection (to this opening phrase of the mantra)

coming from the Shunyavadin. He asks: Kim Shunyameva babhuva? Did shunyam alone

exist? And puts forth the shunyavadin's objection and then commences to reply.

What he has argued and concluded is available in the quote provided by you. The

Acharya has gone to great lengths to prove that the objects that are experienced

are not shunyam, non existence. They are positive entities. This is appealing

to common sense as well for we cannot transact in a world of shunyam. The

objects have to be seen as existing. The Guru-sishya vyavahara itself will be

possible only if the Guru is held to be existent. etc. But this vyaavaaharika

satta that the Acharya established in this Bhashyam is not to be mistaken for

the Paramarthika satta, which Brahman alone enjoys. Sadanandaji's words:

 

'The above statement of Shankara is to instruct that Veda-s do not

 

discard the experience of duality –Within the framework of vyavahaara they are

valid' are worth recalling.

 

 

 

Leaving the specific, let me place before you one more piece of information as

per my understanding. Whenever the veda speaks of creation and a description of

it, the Acharya comments on that portion adopting the sankhya view of

'manifestation of the effects from the cause wherein they remained in the

unmanifest form.' The vyakta or vyaakrita state is the one which is the

'assuming of name and form' naama-rupena vyaakaranam' of the avyakta state

alone. This adopting the sankhya view is not totally wrong, for Vedanta admits

the role of Shakti or Maya or Avidya in creation along with the Pure

Consciousness that is Brahman. But when an occasion arises to prove the

Absolute nature of Brahman, the Acharya does not lose that opportunity to bring

out the pre-eminent view of Vedanta, the vivartavada. This is patent in the

quote that you have produced for the purpose of analyzing the rope-snake

example. That the Acharya does this is corroborated by the explanation that

Anandagiri gives

to the passage quoted by you for the Rope-snake analysis: Chandogya vi.2.3.

The Acharya gives two examples: 1.Mud transforming into jar, etc and 2.Rope etc.

into snake etc. Anandagiri points out: Parinaama-vivartavaadau aashritya

udaaharana-dvayam = The two examples are based upon the Parinaama (Sankhya) vada

and the Vivarta (Vedanta) vada respectively.

 

Incidentally, although aside the point, let me quote a popular verse that speaks

about the close affinity between the two systems:

 

Quoted from the Sridakshinamurti-stotram Vol I p.127:

 

The karya-karana-prakriya that is accepted as it were, abhyupetya, is in

accordance with the vivartavada already outlined, though the language of

parinamavada is sometimes employed. Even in cases where the parinamaprakriya

has apparently been used, it is as a prelude to the vivartavada which is the

position accepted in the Siddhanta. Says the Sankshepashariraka (II . 16 )

 

 

 

Vivarta-vaadasya hi puurva-bhumiH Vedanta-vaade parinaama-vaadaH |

 

Vyavasthite'smin parinaama-vaade swayam samaayaati vivarta-vaadaH ||

 

(As per the methodology of the Upanishads, the doctrine of transformation is a

prelude to the doctrine of transfiguration. Once the doctrine of transformation

is set up, that of transfiguration follows by itself.)

 

End of quote.

 

 

 

To assert that objects are eternally existing in Brahman would take us far away

from the vedantic position. See one bombarding sentence the Acharya writes in

the Brhadaranyaka Bhashyam 2.1.20

 

Tasmaat Ekarupa-Ekatva-pratyaya-daardhyaaya eva sarva-vedanteshu utpatti sthiti

layaadi kalpana, na tatpratyaya-karanaaya.

 

Meaning: Therefore the kalpana = construct\ delineation of creation, sustenance

dissolution and the like is with the sole purpose of bringing about the

understanding of the Oneness , the Unitary nature of the Cause/Brahman and Not

to bring about the understanding of the creatorhood, sustainerhood, etc of

Brahman. Anandagiri, whose gloss on Acharya's prasthanatrayi bhashyam is

largely regarded as a valuable aid in understanding the Bhashya, says: Ekatvasya

bhedasahatvam vaarayitum ekarupa visheshanam : the adjective ekarupa in the

bhashya is used with a view to negate the difference within oneness. ….. The

tat in 'Na tatpratyayakaranaaya' in the bhashya is to indicate the different

aspects of utpatti, etc. The learned Editor, Sri S.Sastry, has added a foot

note for this expression: 'the notion of Brahman being the Cause, etc. of the

world is negated by that expression.'

 

 

 

Apart from this, and related to the above idea, when the Ekam eva Advitiyam

portion is explained, generally the scheme adopted is:

 

Ekam negates the svagata bheda, internal differences like the existence of

parts in a tree like the trunk, branches, etc. in Brahman. Eva and advitiyam we

shall not take up now. If we are to admit that the objects are eternally

existing in Brahman it would amount to the above example of tree with parts

although its own, of the same material. But the Sruti does not permit this. This

is because Brahman is Eka-rasa, saindhava-ghanavat like a big rocky salt

wherein all through it is salt and nothing else.

 

 

 

If the Brahman wherein the world exists eternally is paramartha, the Kaarika

defines paramartha avasthaa differently:

 

 

 

Na nirodho na cha utpattiH…….ityeshaa paramarthathaa (II. 32)

 

Shankara questions: How is it declared that there is no origination?

 

and replies with a plethora of quations and continues: Advaita does not

originate or dissolve.

 

 

 

While introducing the kaarika 15 of the Advaita prakarana, Shankara raises an

objection: If prior to origination all that was unborn was ekameva advitiyam

brahma, then after origination the born jivas, etc are different.

 

Vedantin: No. The Sruti delineating utpatti has a different purpose.

 

 

 

The verse: MRlloha-visphulingaadyaiH Srushtir-yaa choditaa anyathaa |

 

UpaayaH so'vataaraaya ……..

 

 

 

The various ways in which srushti has been delineated in the Veda have for their

purpose the upaaya, the means, to bring about the understanding in the aspirant

the Ekatva of jiva and Paramatma. No other purpose can be admitted for the

srutis describing utpatti, etc.

 

 

 

And the Vaitathya prakaranam of the Kaarikaa has verses bringing out the

similarity of the dream objects and the waking objects and thereby establishing

the imagined nature of the objects. Vaitathyam itself means 'not being true'.

And all this will be correct only if the vivarta vada is adopted: the appearing

of one as something else owing to the avidya of the perceiver. This position

will not admit the presence of the objects eternally in the cause Brahman.

 

 

 

The Advaita prakaranam of the Mandukya karika has this verse:

 

Ato vakshyaami….

 

Yathaa na jaayate kinchijjaayamaanam samantastaH || 2 ||

 

I commence to talk about the Ajam Brahman. By this discussion it would become

clear that even though it appears that things are originating, actually nothing

whatsoever originated.

 

A very crude translation, but it serves our purpose.

 

The Acharya comments on the second half of the verse:

 

…..In such a way that nothing whatsoever originates, even though it appears that

they originate like the rope-snake born out of a defective vision..

 

 

 

In the mantra 'Asti ityeva uplabdhavyaH.. occurring in the Kathopanishad:

2.3.13, the Acharya comments:

 

Initially, the Atman is to be known as existent 'asti'. The buddhi, etc. are

all upadhis that are existent. Upon first knowing the Atman as 'existent', one

has to know it as free from even the categories of 'existent', 'non-existent'

etc. He says, the with-upadhi Atma is Asti. The without-upadhi, the

Tattva-bhava of Atman, however, is what transcends even Asti.

 

The Gita verse 12 of Chapter 13 and its Bhashya can be perused in this

connection. I mentioned these two only to show that the word sat or asti or

existence are taken in the above two instances as only vyavaharic and not

paramarthic.

 

 

 

This is one more instance where words, phrases, whole sentences or even entire

paragraphs can be misleading\misunderstood. When Vedanta is learnt from a

qualified teacher, the greatest advantage is that there is every possibility of

his drawing our particular attention to the passages as we pass through them by

pinpointing: 'look, this is said from the relative standpoint and the other is

actually the absolute standpoint'. Such a training is invaluable in

understanding the Vedanta. The entire literature is of such a nature. To

mention something personal: I have found the Anandamayaadhikaranam, consisting

of sutras I.i.12 to 19 as a real brain teaser and only people of the like of our

Rishi-ji will relish understanding the ultimate purport of the adhikaranam.

 

 

In the unqualified Brahman vikshepashakti is not heard of, at least by me so

far. If you say it is so in the Maya-shabalita Brahman, the Brahman tinged by

Maya, there would not be a problem. But this qualified Brahman is not the

Paaramaarthika Brahman, free of all upaadhis. The recent superb summary of

sutrabhashya : II.i.14 by Rishi ji provides a lot of clarifications on the

vyavaharika and paramarthika standpoints.

 

 

 

The Rope snake analysis provided by you is fine, but again, regarding the

conclusion there is a problem:

 

Your quote:

 

What does the Acharya say when the purva-paksha says: "In that case

 

whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope perceived in the shape

 

of a snake etc?" The Acharya says: "No. Since it is Existence itself

 

that is perceived otherwise through the duality of different forms,

 

therefore, THERE IS NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE."

 

RESPONSE

 

By saying THERE IS NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE

 

if you mean, as you have done in the overall presentation of your viewpoint,

that as different from the cause there is no non-existence of anything

anywhere, it is fine with me.

 

But if you mean by that statement that the objects are eternally present in

Brahman and that is what the Acharya establishes in this dialogue, then I have

to differ from this perception.

 

 

 

The reasons: 1.That is not the vedantic position of vivartavada

 

2. That does not concur with the Vedantic position as regards the true purport

of the utpatti (creation) srutis.

 

3. There cannot be svagata-bheda in Brahman, even of the tree - branches type.

 

4. The Jnanis who have had the direct realization of the Nirvishesha Brahman do

not perceive the world to be eternal as situated in Brahman even in an

unmanifest form. The Brahmavid is said to be Brahman Itself. After remaining

in the body for a while post-realisation, the body shell is also cast off and in

the absence of the instrument required to perceive duality, albeit with the

knowledge that it is unreal, the videhamukta is not said to be experiencing a

Brahman that contains the eternal world.

 

If you say the world is eternal from the vyavaharic point of view, then it is

alright. For, to account for the transmigrating jivas' several births and

experiences therein, there has to be a world, although itself subject to

repeated srishti pralaya cycles. The parinaaminityatva of jagat is admitted.

And the cause of this jagat is Maya sahita Brahman, Ishwara. In him if the

jagat is said to inhere during the pralaya state, that is also fine. But in the

Kutashta nitya Shuddha Brahman, the mukhya taatparya of the Shankara Vedanta, if

the world is said to eternally rest, that is not acceptable.

 

 

 

If these small but important differences are reconciled, there is no problem in

taking your viewpoint.

 

 

 

Again, no motive behind the above presentation. My only concern is that since

this List is looked upon as the Voice of Shankara Vedanta, there ought not to be

any confusion that could be caused by any of the postings. You are open to show

the places where I have perhaps misunderstood you and or the Shastra tatparya.

I am open to be corrected.

 

 

 

Thanks and warm regards

 

subbu

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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