Reason and faith

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael and Shri Sankarraman and others,

 

Michael wrote (post 30163, Feb 7): "... the word 'philosophia' which

my Greek dictionary translates as love of knowledge and wisdom....

There seems to me to be in that not the evidence of an early

departure from the inquiry aspect of wisdom for the trumpery of

system building but the actual equation in the Greek mind of the

two. Really it is quite obvious that the opposition which you

suggest did not exist for them at all. To know something truly is to

discern in the manifold instances the unifying principle and law.

Wisdom and the empirical were not separate from each other ...

However the Greeks also had their Eleusinian mysteries in which the

initiates (mystai) participated in some rite about which little is

known. In this experience the aporia of the students of the academy

and their masters were perhaps dissolved in an experience that

surpassed dialectic."

 

I agree wholeheartedly with Michael about translating the Greek

'philosophia' as "love of knowledge and wisdom". And I would say

that the same meaning is carried by the English word 'philosophy'.

 

I also agree that "To know something truly is to discern in the

manifold instances the unifying principle ..." Indeed, this is why

the English 'philosophy' may be translated by the Sanskrit

'tattva-shastra'. 'Tattva' (literally 'that-ness') refers precisely

to a common principle which underlies differing appearances (or

instances).

 

So, if I may, I take it as agreed that the name 'tattva-shastra'

refers to a reasoned investigation ('shastra') into that changeless

and common reality ('tattva') which underlies a changing variety of

differing appearances. And further, I take it as agreed that the

names 'philosophia' and 'philosophy' refer to the same

investigation, whose essence is a love of wisdom or true knowing.

 

Where true knowing is confused with the inadequate perceptions and

beliefs of our partial personalities, this confusion produces

various changing and differing appearances, which are shown

superimposed upon the common principle of reality that's truly

known. The word 'philosophy' refers then simply to that love of true

knowing which uses reason to discern what's true from what is false,

thus investigating back from the confusions and complexities of

superimposition to the plain and simple truth of reality that is

directly known.

 

That investigation back is from the 'many' to the 'one', from the

changing variety of superimposed appearances to the changeless

simplicity of underlying reality. The changing variety is

superimposed by a picturing of world that is constructed by our

senses and our minds. The changeless simplicity belongs to the

unconstructed background, beneath the sensual and mental picturing.

 

Each sensual and mental object is a pictured element, which takes

part in the picturing. Where such objects are desired, this desire

drives action that takes make-belief for granted, in the conception

of some partial objective and how it may be attained. Here, the

action is directed partially -- towards an object which is pictured

on the basis of some partial belief, but which is not quite fully

and impartially known.

 

As such action is driven by desire towards physical and mental

objects, it does not examine the make-belief that it implies and

assumes. In its overriding concern with achieving objects, it does

not ask how far its assumed beliefs are true. It lets pass an

element of prejudice and make-belief and obscurity, which is not

open to examination and not clearly known.

 

In pursuit of desired objects, we keep on letting pass some degree

of ignorance and prejudice and 'white lies' that go on compromising

what we get done and what we learn thereby. In the course of time,

as one object is pursued after another, the compromise builds up; so

that our pictures and beliefs keep getting further complicated and

confused.

 

But there are times when we get fed up with the compromise. Then we

lose interest in the partial objects of our sensual and mental

picturing. Our interest then turns to ask for a truth that is one

hundred percent, beneath the partialities and compromises of the

picturing. We ask then for a plain and simple truth that is

impartial and uncompromised. It's there that philosophy comes in,

with its love of true knowing.

 

There, truth is not sought for the sake of any pictured object, but

only for itself. It's sought for the pure love of knowing truly and

impartially. That pure love seeks what is truly and impartially

shown, by the compromised and partial appearances which are produced

by our physical and mental picturing.

 

That love reflects accordingly upon the pictured show, to ask what's

false and what is true in the beliefs on which the picturing has

been constructed. This asking is for clarity. It seeks clear truth,

freed from its confusing mixture with falsity, in the appearances

that are constructed by the picturing. And the asking is essentially

reflective. It essentially turns back from the built-up pictures; so

as to ask down beneath their assumed beliefs, towards an unpictured

and unconstructed ground, beneath all the construction and the

picturing.

 

This is what I had in mind, when I wrote: "... from an Advaita

perspective, system-building goes in quite the opposite direction to

philosophy. The proper task of philosophy is to turn back from

building pictures, by a skeptical investigation down into their

assumed foundations."

 

Please forgive me if I gave the impression of dismissing

system-building entirely. It can of course be used as an aid to

philosophical enquiry, by stating some basic assumptions and

constructing a systematic theory from them. This system-building can

be used to develop generic concepts that refer to common principles,

when we reflect upon their meaning.

 

For example, in the theory of Advaita, the generic concept of

'consciousness' is developed as referring to a basic principle that

is common to all particular states and instances of knowing. And we

understand this concept of 'consciousness' reflectively -- by asking

back from changing states of knowing to the changeless principle

that stays present through them all, as their common background.

 

Accordingly, we may consider that system-building and reflective

enquiry are two complementary aspects of any science, from the most

calculating and objective kind of physics to the most deeply

reflective and subjective philosophy. In this sense, I appreciate

that Michael has a point when he says that "Wisdom [at the

unpictured depth of subjective knowing] and the empirical [build-up

of objective picturing] were not separate from each other ..."

Moreover, I would go on to say that this is true not just for

ancient and classical Greeks but also for all cultures and

traditions everywhere.

 

But when Michael speaks of "the actual equation in the Greek mind"

of wisdom and system building and when he says that "Really it is

quite obvious that the opposition ... did not exist for them at

all", then this is one of those situations where it is perhaps best

that we agree to differ. For I cannot help thinking that some Greek

philosophers made quite a sharp and prominent distinction between

the true knowing of wisdom and the construction of pictures

(systematic or otherwise) from belief.

 

In particular, Parmenides makes a very sharp and prominent

distinction between two ways of learning. They are the way of

'aletheia' or 'truth' and the way of 'doxa' or 'belief and

appearance'.

 

In 'Peri psuche' or 'On Nature' (fragment 8.35-40), Parmenides

says:

 

It is one and the same thing:

both to know and to be

that for whose sake knowledge is.

For knowing never can be found

apart from that which is.

 

There is not now, nor ever shall there be

anything besides what is.

For of necessity, it is defined

as one and unchanging.

 

Hence, 'coming to be' and 'passing away',

'presence' and 'absence',

'change of place' and

'alteration of bright colour':

 

all these are merely names

given by the dying,

who believe them to be true.

 

As I interpret this passage, it has two parts. The first part

describes 'aletheia' -- as a non-dual truth where "to know and to be

are one and the same thing", which is "of necessity ... defined as

one and unchanging".

 

The second part describes 'doxa' -- as a conflicting and confused

realm of changing appearances, where "'coming to be' and 'passing

away' ... and 'alteration of bright colour' ... are merely names

given by the dying, who believe them to be true." System-building,

as a changing activity would of course be included in the realm of

doxa, and thus rather sharply distinguished from the true knowing of

'aletheia'.

 

Shortly after Parmenides, Socrates makes a specific distinction

between reflective questioning which he calls 'noesis' and

'system-building' which he calls 'dianoia'. This distinction is made

in the simile of the 'divided line', where noesis is identified with

philosophy and 'dianoia' with the constructive science of geometry.

 

Thus, Socrates accords a certain preparatory value to 'dianoia' and

its system-building. But it is definitely distinguished from the

reflectively reasoned questioning of 'noesis', which he presents as

the highest way to true knowing.

 

In regard to the ancient mysteries and oracles and rituals, Socrates

has an interesting position. He paid them great respect, as a vital

part of the learning and culture of his times. In fact, in his

personal life, there was quite something of a mystical and yogic

side. He tells us that his decisions were crucially guided by an

inner voice, which he called his 'daemon' (a sort of guardian spirit

or inner 'deva'). And there are reports by his contemporaries about

some amazingly long spells of concentrated contemplation.

 

But, as I interpret it, this yogic and mystical side was mainly a

matter of his personal life, in the society and culture of his place

and times. When it came to an investigation into impersonal truth,

he showed a marked preference for reasoned questioning, in which the

questioner must quite uncompromisingly examine her or his own habits

of assumption and belief.

 

Having said this, I must of course immediately admit that my

interpretation is only one among many. These matters of history must

belong to the personally transacted realm of vyavahara, where rather

differing interpretations are appropriate for different people.

 

Shri Sankarraman asked (post 30167, Feb 7) if I am influenced by

Shri Atmananda, who taught for many years at his home in Trivandrum.

Yes indeed, I am a follower of Shri Atmananda, and my approach is

determined by his teaching. This teaching centres upon reasoned

enquiry, as Shri Sankarraman points out. But that reason does not

put faith in mind. Its faith is in true knowing, from which it

arises and to which it is meant to make the mind reflect.

 

Reflecting there, the mind dissolves and with it all distinctions of

reason and unreason. It's only there that all faith and reason are

found justified.

 

Again, all this is said from the limited viewpoint of just one

particular sadhaka.

 

Ananda