Guest guest Posted March 15, 2006 Report Share Posted March 15, 2006 Dear Sri Sadanandaji, > When the child sees an object for the first time, he > gathers the attributes to the degree that his senses > can gather. When his mother teaches the object by > naming it – the name and the image are stored > along with its attributes in his memory. How does the child recognise the mother? Who has taught the child that the set of attributes he sees is a unity called 'mother'? > Since senses cannot grasp the substantive of an object, > the substantive knowledge is not available through > perception. Does it mean that nobody perceives objects? According to Advaita, perception is not achieved by means of the senses only. > Since knowledge can take place only via senses, > the absolute knowledge of the object does not exist, > other than the knowledge of its attributes. Knowledge > of any object is essentially attributive knowledge, > rather than absolute knowledge. This fact becomes > clearer when we examine the substantive of the objects. > Since senses cannot grasp the substantive of an object, > the substantive knowledge is not available through > perception. According to Advaita, objects are perceived. Perception is the simultaneous operation of the senses, the mind, and the consciousness of the witness. Sensible attributes such as colour, odour, etc are grasped by the senses, non sensible attributes such as largeness, smallness, etc are grasped by the mind, and the substantive as a unity is grasped by the cognitive capacity of the consciousness as the witness. Perception, according to Advaita, occurs due to the consciousness of the subject going out along with the mind and senses to make contact with the object. Moreover, the word 'object' refers to any target that the witness, mind and senses may be directed to, and accordingly, attribute is as much of an object as substance is. > The perception of the object `out there' (therefore, the > knowledge of the object `out there') occurs in three > sequential steps. First, the senses gather the attributes > of an object via perception.... Once the attributes are > gathered, they are fed to the mind. Do attributes exist out there for the senses to gather them? If not, what does 'gather' mean? If yes, what is the rationale of saying that attributes exist out there but objects do not exist out there? > The sense input and the integration by the mind > (volition) can go on continuously as more or better > information is gathered by the senses. The second > step in the process of perception involves integration > of the sense input by the mind and providing a > mental image of an object as the locus for the > attributes and the intellect cognizing the object... In what respect precisely does the mental image differ from the object? > The third step in the cognitive process involves > comparison of perceived image of the object with > the attributes with the images stored in the memory. > Recognition of the object based on the information > in the memory occurs when the image in the mind matches > with the image with their attributes in memory. How can the image match with the object if the image and the object are different? For example, how can the red colour of a rose match with the image of the rose if the image does not have the red colour? What is the basis of this three-step model? The three steps are not perceived. It cannot be said that they are inferred because without the steps being perceived, they cannot become the components of a vyapti to form the ground for such an inference. (The Advaita theory of perception comes from the interpretation of Sruti and not from inference.) Warm regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 16, 2006 Report Share Posted March 16, 2006 Namaste Sadanandaji, We have been down this road before on a few occasions and from a check in my mail folder I see one of them was on the 19th.Nov.'02.I have modified that post a little to fit the present context and I superadd to it some considerations of the Philosopher Henri Bergson on the matter. As well I add a note on the very significant commentary on Brh.II.iv.11 by Shankara. I don't wish to delay the progress of your exposition by objections; you can, so to speak, put them behind your ear until you wish to deal with them. *From Earlier Post* Hello All, A little postscript on the issue of what it is we are directly aware of when we are aware of chair for instance. According to the analysis of Sadanandaji we are aware of the form and colour and other attributes which inhere in a substantive chair. This substantive chair is not something that we can sense directly only its attributes are sensible by us. Thus the existence of the chair as a substantive thing is an inference from our perceptions. An inference is distinguished from a perception as being a logical movement of the mind. Thus it seems that perceptions are consciousness, arising as they do from the impingment of an unknowable substantive on this sensitive apparatus and inference being a mental capacity is also consciousness. In considering itself this consciousness becomes the seer and the seen. There is nothing but consciousness . I have put into my own words the thoughts of Sadanandaji on this important topic rather than paste them so it can be objected, if that turns out to be the case, that I have not understood them. I would compare this view to that of Sankara in B.S.B. II.ii.28. in which he draws the distinction between cognizing a perception to be a chair and cognizing a chair. One perceives a chair one does not infer it. "Not that anybody cognizes a perceptiom to be pillar, a wall, etc. rather all people cognize a pillar, a wall etc. as objects of perception." This is a frankly realist position as Dr.Dasgupta remarks in his introduction to Vedanta Paribhasa. It is realism but not naive realism, perhaps it could be called critical realism as he immediately fields the first 'what about' question put by objectors. What about illusion?(confusion/delusion). Therefore he begins with the adhyasa theory. However to stay with the theme of the immediate given in experience and the supposed unknowability of the substantive chair Sankara has much to say in the same section of which the core is ".. because the very likeness of an object is not possible unless the object itself be there, and also because the object is cognized outside". Outside here means 'in front', in external physical reality and not just an inference in your mind. In Vedanta Paribhasa the nature of perception is discussed(Chap.1) "To be explicit: Consciousness is threefold - as associated with the object(visaya), with the means of knowledge(pramana) and with the subject or knower(pramatr). Of these Consciousness limited by a jar etc. is the Consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental state is the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge; and that limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Now, as the water of a tank, issuing through a hole, enters in the form of a channel a number of fields, and just like them assumes rectangular or any other shape, so also the luminous mind, issuing through the eye etc., goes to the space occupied by objects such as a jar, and is modified into the form of a jar or any other object. That very modification is called a state(vritti). But in the case of inference etc. the mind does *not* go to the space occupied by fire <<as in the fire on the hill indicated by smoke>> for the latter are not in contact with the eye etc. "(pg.14/15) "The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject." Pg.25 This deserves long and careful meditation on it in order not to be decieved into a sort of Idealism. The Objector takes on a Realist stance in order to oppose this view. " How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, "I see this"? Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity ; it means having no existence apart from that of the subject."(pg.25) We may ask how a realist stance is maintained in the face of such an admission. The answer must be that a purely idealist stance would not preserve such things as concepts e.g. 'and' ,'this', 'that', 'but' (logical modifiers) whiteness, cowhood, as in B.S.B. II.ii.28. A distinction is preserved between what is in the mind and what is an object 'in front'. "But in cases of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc. is distinct from that of the subject." *From Henri Bergson:* http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/%7Elward/Bergson/Bergson_1911b/Berg son_1911_01.html From Matter and Memory by Henri Bergson(download at the url above) Psychologists who have studied infancy are well aware that our representation is at first impersonal. Only little by little, and as a result of experience, does it adopt our body as a centre and become our representation. The mechanism of this process is, moreover, easy to understand. As my body moves in space, all the other images vary, while that image, my body, remains invariable. I must therefore make it a centre, to which I refer all the other images. My belief in an external world does not come, cannot come, from the fact that I project outside myself sensations that are unextended : how could these sensations ever acquire extension, and whence should I get the notion of exteriority ? From Brh.Up 11.iv.11: Objection: In everyone of those instances the mergence of the objects only has been spoken of, but not that of the organs. What is the motive for this? Reply: True, but the Sruti considers the organs to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as a lamp, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours. Similarly, the organs are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive them, as is the case with a lamp. Hence no special care is to be taken to indicate the dissolution of the organs; for these being the same as objects in general, their dissolution is implied by that of the objects." Yes indeed everything is the Self but within manifest reality there are distinctions to be drawn between inference and perception as Vedanta Paribhasa makes clear. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 16, 2006 Report Share Posted March 16, 2006 advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: > > > Namaste Sadanandaji, > We have been down this road before on a few occasions and from >> *From Earlier Post* > Hello All, > A little postscript on the issue of what it is we are directly aware of > when we are aware of chair for instance. According to the analysis of > Sadanandaji we are aware of the form and colour and other attributes which > inhere in a substantive chair. This substantive chair is not something > that we can sense directly only its attributes are sensible by us. Thus > the existence of the chair as a substantive thing is an inference from our > perceptions. An inference is distinguished from a perception as being a > logical movement of the mind. Namaste All, It seems to be we tend to get convoluted in the middle nether regions. My understanding of Gaudapada is that there never was anything to be convoluted about. upnaway.com 22. Nothing comes to be whether from itself or from another. Nothing that exists ever comes to be, nothing that does not exist, nothing that both exists and does not exist. 23. The cause cannot come to be from an unoriginate effect, nor does an effect simply happen of itself. The uncaused certainly does not come into existence. 24. Knowledge must have an object, otherwise both will be non- existent. For this reason, as also from the experience of pain, our opponent's assertion of the existence of the object should be admitted. 25. Logic demands an object as the cause of knowledge. But from the standpoint of reality, it is evident the cause is no cause at all. (because nothing comes to be or is caused, knowledge has no object and therefore does not exist!) 26. Consciousness has no contact with objects, and no contact with appearances of objects. Objects are non-existent and appearances of objects non-different from consciousness. 27. At none of the three times (past, present, future) does consciousness make contact with objects. Since there are no objects, how can there be deluded perception of such? 28. Neither consciousness nor its objects ever come into existence. Those who perceive such a coming-to-be are like those who can see footprints in the sky! 29. It is the unoriginate [they say] which comes to be - but it is essentially birthless and the transformation of that nature will not happen in any way whatsoever. 30. If the world has no beginning it will have no end either. Moksa cannot both have a beginning and be eternal. 31. What does not exist in the beginning and does not exist at the end certainly does not exist in the middle! But like illusions, they seem real. If one adds to this the questions; 1. What happens to the world when we sleep? 2. Where does it go for the Mukta? 3. If it disappears for the 'Mukta' especially after the residual body is dropped, did it ever happen in the first place? 4. If Brahman isn't aware of the illusion or appearance, doesn't this mean that the appearance didn't happen either--it was ever NirGuna Brahman......................ONS...Tony. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 16, 2006 Report Share Posted March 16, 2006 Michel PraNams I am aware of the Commentary of Shankara on BSB relating to the 2nd ch. Firs, let me complete the MAnDUkya and then take Shankara's commentary in BrihadAranyaka related to waking and dream states before I address the BSB. I consider Upanishad commentaries are more important for me to understand. I am following Shree Bhaskarji suggestion. I am going to study your comments and hopefully address them. By the by I had to study Vedanta ParibhASha back and forth in order to see if Dharmaraja Advareendra provided any indication for the swarUpa laxaNas. He does talk about deterministic attributes but I do not think he separates the necessary and necessary and sufficient qualifications. Any thoughts on that? Regards Sadananda Regards --- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: > > Namaste Sadanandaji, > We have been down this road before on a few occasions and from > a check in my mail folder I see one of them was on the 19th.Nov.'02.I > have > modified that post a little to fit the present context and I superadd > to > it some considerations of the Philosopher Henri Bergson on the matter. > As well I add a note on the very significant commentary on > Brh.II.iv.11 by Shankara. I don't wish to delay the progress of > your exposition by objections; you can, so to speak, put them behind > your > ear until you wish to deal with them. > > *From Earlier Post* > Hello All, > A little postscript on the issue of what it is we are directly aware > of > when we are aware of chair for instance. According to the analysis of > > Sadanandaji we are aware of the form and colour and other attributes > which > inhere in a substantive chair. This substantive chair is not > something > that we can sense directly only its attributes are sensible by us. > Thus > the existence of the chair as a substantive thing is an inference from > our > perceptions. An inference is distinguished from a perception as being > a > logical movement of the mind. Thus it seems that perceptions are > consciousness, arising as they do from the impingment of an unknowable > > substantive on this sensitive apparatus and inference being a mental > capacity is also consciousness. In considering itself this > consciousness > becomes the seer and the seen. There is nothing but consciousness . > > > I have put into my own words the thoughts of Sadanandaji on this > important topic rather than paste them so it can be objected, if that > > turns out to be the case, that I have not understood them. I would > compare this view to that of Sankara in B.S.B. II.ii.28. in which he > draws > the distinction between cognizing a perception to be a chair and > cognizing > a chair. One perceives a chair one does not infer it. "Not that > anybody > cognizes a perceptiom to be pillar, a wall, etc. rather all people > cognize > a pillar, a wall etc. as objects of perception." > > This is a frankly realist position as Dr.Dasgupta remarks in his > introduction to Vedanta Paribhasa. It is realism but not naive > realism, > perhaps it could be called critical realism as he immediately fields > the > first 'what about' question put by objectors. What about > illusion?(confusion/delusion). Therefore he begins with the adhyasa > theory. > > However to stay with the theme of the immediate given in experience > and > the supposed unknowability of the substantive chair Sankara has much > to > say in the same section of which the core is ".. because the very > likeness > of an object is not possible unless the object itself be there, and > also > because the object is cognized outside". Outside here means 'in > front', > in external physical reality and not just an inference in > your mind. > > In Vedanta Paribhasa the nature of perception is discussed(Chap.1) > > "To be explicit: Consciousness is threefold - as associated with the > object(visaya), with the means of knowledge(pramana) and with the > subject > or knower(pramatr). Of these Consciousness limited by a jar etc. is > the > Consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental > state > is the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge; and that > > limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. > Now, as the water of a tank, issuing through a hole, > enters in the form of a channel a number of fields, and just like them > > assumes rectangular or any other shape, so also the luminous mind, > issuing > through the eye etc., goes to the space occupied by objects such as a > jar, > and is modified into the form of a jar or any other object. That very > > modification is called a state(vritti). But in the case of inference > etc. > the mind does *not* go to the space occupied by fire <<as in the fire > on > the hill indicated by smoke>> for the latter are not in contact with > the > eye etc. "(pg.14/15) > > "The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in > their > not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) > subject." > Pg.25 > > This deserves long and careful meditation on it in order not to be > decieved into a sort of Idealism. The Objector takes on a Realist > stance > in order to oppose this view. " How can a jar etc. be one with the > Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience > of > difference, as when we say, "I see this"? > > Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject > > does not indeed mean identity ; it means having no existence apart > from > that of the subject."(pg.25) > > We may ask how a realist stance is maintained in the face of such an > admission. The answer must be that a purely idealist stance would not > > preserve such things as concepts e.g. 'and' ,'this', 'that', 'but' > (logical modifiers) whiteness, cowhood, as in B.S.B. II.ii.28. A > distinction is preserved between what is in the mind and what is an > object > 'in front'. > > "But in cases of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to > the > space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire > is > not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and > therefore > the existence of the fire etc. is distinct from that of the subject." > > *From Henri Bergson:* > > http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/%7Elward/Bergson/Bergson_1911b/Berg > > son_1911_01.html > > From Matter and Memory by Henri Bergson(download at the url > above) > Psychologists who have studied infancy are well aware that our > representation is at first impersonal. Only little by little, and as a > > result of experience, does it adopt our body as a centre and become > our > representation. The mechanism of this process is, moreover, easy to > understand. As my body moves in space, all the other images vary, > while > that image, my body, remains invariable. I must therefore make it a > centre, to which I refer all the other images. My belief in an > external > world does not come, cannot come, from the fact that I project outside > > myself sensations that are unextended : how could these sensations > ever > acquire extension, and whence should I get the > notion of exteriority ? > > From Brh.Up 11.iv.11: > Objection: In everyone of those instances the mergence of the > objects only has been spoken of, but not that of the organs. > What is the motive for this? > Reply: True, but the Sruti considers the organs to be > of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. > The organs are but modes of the objects in order to > perceive them, as a lamp, which is but a mode of colour, > is an instrument for revealing all colours. Similarly, the organs > are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive > them, as is the case with a lamp. Hence no special care > is to be taken to indicate the dissolution of the organs; > for these being the same as objects in general, their > dissolution is implied by that of the objects." > > Yes indeed everything is the Self > but within manifest reality there are distinctions to be > drawn between inference and perception as Vedanta > Paribhasa makes clear. > > Best Wishes, > Michael. > > > ------------------------ Sponsor > --------------------~--> > Join modern day disciples reach the disfigured and poor with hope and > healing > http://us.click./lMct6A/Vp3LAA/i1hLAA/XUWolB/TM > --~-> > > > Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity > of Atman and Brahman. > Advaitin List Archives available at: > http://www.eScribe.com/culture/advaitin/ > To Post a message send an email to : advaitin > Messages Archived at: advaitin/messages > > > Links > > > > > > > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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