Sridakshinamurtistotram Part VI (first half)

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Sridakshinamurtistotram

Part VI (first half)

Ajnaana-timiraandhasya jnaanaanjana-shalaakayaa |

Chakshur-unmiilitam yena tasmai srigurave namaH ||

(Obeisance to the Guru who, by applying the collyrium of Jnana to the 'eye'

afflicted

with the disease of ajnaana, enabled it to perceive the Truth)

 

 

The Fifth verse:

 

Deham praanamapi indriyaanyapi chalaam buddhim cha shunyam viduH

Stri-baala-andha-jadopamaastvahamiti bhraantaa bhrsham vaadinaH |

Maayaa-shakti-vilaasa-kalpita-mahaa-vyaamoha-samhaarine

Tasmai Srigurumurtaye nama idam Sridakshinamurtaye ||

 

(Obeisance to Him who destroys the mighty delusion set up by the play of the

power of Maya because of which people akin to ignorant women and children, the

blind and the stupid, regard the body, the vital air, the senses, the fleeting

intellect or the void as the Self and engage themselves in vain and violent

disputations, to that resplendent Dakshinamurti incarnate in the glorious figure

of one's own Guru.)

 

The anvaya:

Stri-baala-andha-jadopamaaH bhraantaa bhrsham vaadinaH tu, Deham praanamapi

indriyaanyapi chalaam buddhim cha shunyam ahamiti| viduH..

Maayaa-shakti-vilaasa-kalpita-mahaa-vyaamoha-samhaarine

Srigurumurtaye Sridakshinamurtaye Tasmai idam namaH.

 

Everyone agrees that he is sentient. The previous verse established that the

effulgence that one really is is what is also grasped by the experience 'I

know'. The sentiency pertaining to oneself needs to be precisely known as to

what it pertains to. This is because it is in one's experience, although

deluded, that the body, the prana, the senses, the intellect and the void are

all taken as 'candidates' for sentiency. Since we interact with the body in the

world and all endeavour is to satisfy the body, it is easy for anyone to take

the body to be the sentient ' I '. So is the case with the prana. One feels

'enlivened' by the vital airs and thus considers oneself to be none other than

the prana itself. The case of the senses to claim ' I '-ness is no different.

We receive all inputs from the world through the senses and the identification

of sentiency with the senses as the self is quite understandable. The subtle

intellect which is the locus for all our desires, hopes,

scheming, evaluating, thinking, joys and sorrows, in effect, our soul, the very

'heart' of our being, is also taken as the sentient ' I '. Then, there are

those who claim themselves to be 'informed' thinkers who put forth the view that

none of the above can be the real ' I ' and an inexplicable 'void' is what one

is.

 

The Sutrabhashya 1.1.1.1 refers to these views. The Siddhantabindu, a

commentary by Sri Madhusudana Saraswati on the Dashashloki of Acharya Shankara

gives a detailed account of the various views held in respect of Atman:

 

The materialists, the followers of Charvaka, hold that the sense of the term

'thou' is the four elements (earth, water, fire and air) combining to form the

body. Some followers of the same school hold that 'each of the organs, the eye

and the others' is sentient and is Atman. Others think that Atman is all the

sense organs taken collectively. Some believe that Atman is the mind, others say

that It is the vital air. Some followers of Sugata (called Buddhist Idealists)

hold that the Self is the momentary consciousness. The followers of the Buddha,

called Madhyamikas hold that It is the void. The Digambaras or Aarhatas believe

that Atman is different from the body, the organs etc, and is of the size of the

body. The Vaiseshikas, Naiyayikas and the followers of Sri Prabhakara, the

Acharya of one of the two prominent schools of Mimamsa, hold that Atman is an

agent and therefore an experiencer too; He is inert by nature and is

Omnipresent. Others i.e, the followers of Sri

Kumaarilabhatta, the Acharya of the other school of Mimamsa, say that Atman is

an agent, an experiencer and is Omnipresent, but He is inert and yet of the

nature of Consciousness. The followers of the Sankhya and the Yoga schools

(established according to tradition by Sages Kapila and Patanjali) believe that

Atman is the enjoyer only (and not the agent) and is of the nature of

Consciousness only. In addition the Patanjalas assert the existence of an

Omnipotent Isvara, as distinguished from the other Purushas. The followers of

the Upanishads hold that Atman comes to be regarded as an agent, enjoyer, etc.,

on account of Avidya; but in reality, It is without qualities, and is Supreme

Bliss and Consciousness.

 

Are these views supported by the Sruti, reasoning and experience?

 

All the above views, excepting the Aupanishadic (vedantic) one mentioned in

the end, would look like they have the support of the Sruti. Further it would

appear that there is reasoning in support of these views and also experience to

give credence to them. The 'Vedantasara' brings out these aspects and as a

prima facie view presents the situation in a manner that each earlier view is

refuted by the successive view and shows that ultimately all views are in the

realm of ignorance alone, thus:

 

The too simple-minded seeing that since one's son is dear to oneself and since

the prosperity or otherwise of the son gives the feeling that one actually

prospers or suffers, and since the Sruti 'Atma vai jaayate putraH' , "Oneself is

verily born as the son", hold that the son, someone external to one's body, is

the Atman. The Charvaka says that the gross body is the Atman for there is the

Sruti, 'Sa vaa esha purusho'nna-rasamayaH', 'That verily is Atman which is made

up of the essence of food'. The reasoning: A person is seen to flee from a

house on fire even leaving his son behind. Experience: 'I am stout, I am lean'

etc. Some other Charvakas opine that the senses are the Atman for there is the

Sruti, 'Te ha praanaaH Prajapatim pitarametyochuH', 'those senses indeed came to

father Prajapati and said'. They reason that in the absence of the functioning

of the senses, the body does not move, etc, and there is no cognition of colour,

etc. and death ensues when the 'jiva', that

is the senses, is no longer there. The experience such as ' I hear, I speak'

'I am blind, I am deaf' supports this view. Yet another type of Charvaka bases

his view on the Sruti 'Anyo'ntara Atma praanamayaH' 'Another and yet inner self

is made of prana'. He says that the senses are not the Atman since the jiva

survives even though the sense of sight etc. may perish, the prana is wide awake

even when the senses go to sleep. In fact, the senses do not function when the

prana is not vigorous because of lack of food intake. The direct experience 'I

am hungry, I am thirsty' support the view that the prana is the Atma inasmuch as

the identitfication with the prana is pronounced. There is this type of a

Charvaka who asserts that the mind is the Atma as there is the Sruti 'Anyo'ntara

Atma manomayaH' 'Another and yet inner Self is made of manas'. The reasoning he

puts forth is: when the manas is quiescent as for example in swoon, the prana is

not in evidence. The experience such as ' I

desire, I doubt', etc. are there for everyone.

 

There is the Sruti 'Anyo'ntara Atma vijnanamayaH' 'Another and yet inner Self

is made up of vijnana'. The view that the buddhi is Atma finds support in this

Sruti. The reasoning is that no instrument can function without an agent, the

vijnanamaya. There is the experience: 'I am the doer, I am the enjoyer'. The

mode ' I ' the ahamvritti, is the aalayavijnana which is cognised to be produced

and destroyed every moment. This momentary consciousness is the Atman. So say

the Buddhist vijnanavadins. Then, there is this view that the ajnana, the

non-sentient, the resolving point of the buddhi etc. is the Atma. There is the

Sruti,'Anyo'ntara atma anandamayaH', 'Another and yet inner Self is constituted

of bliss'. There is the direct experience: 'I am ignorant, I am conscious' etc.

This view is that of the Praabhakaras and the Naiyayikas. They say that

consciousness is only a quality just like desire, pleasure, pain, virtue,

effort, etc. These arise in the Atman which is really

insentient. These qualities arise in the Atman due to adrishta and leave the

Atman in deep sleep when the adrishta is destroyed. When this happens, what

remains over is just bliss, ananda. The Bhaatta Mimamsaka view is that since

there is consciousness and unconsciousness in deep sleep and because of the

direct experience,'I do not know myself' and because of the Sruti 'Solely the

essence of consciousness and abounding in bliss', the anandamaya is the Atman

and this is consciousness-cum-insentience. The memory, 'In sleep I was

unconscious' can arise only when this unconscuiousness is experienced (by a

conscious entity). The conscious entity that experiences this unconsciousness

is present then (in order to experience). They hold that ajnana is the upadhi of

the chaitanyam and this alone is Atma. Another Buddhist holds that the 'void'

is the Atma because there are Srutis like 'This was only non-existence in the

beginning'. The reason for holding that Atman is void is that

there was nought in deep sleep. The experience 'I was non-existent while

asleep' is indicative of non-existence of Atma then.

 

After listing the various (deluded) views, the Vedantasara refutes all these

views:

 

It will now be shown how these, son etc., are not the Atman. That son etc,.

are not Atman is clear from the fact that among the misleading quotations from

Sruti, fallacious reasonings and erroneous experiences mentioned by the too

simple-minded and the others, the earlier one – Sruti, reasoning or experience –

is seen to be untenable in the light of the later one. Moreover, all these,

beginning with son and ending with the void are indeed other than Atman because

the Sruti cited, reasonings and experiences mentioned in favour of each one of

them are opposed to the weightier Srutis, reasonings and experiences. The

weightier SRUTIS are: 'the internal', 'not stout', 'not the eye', 'not prana',

'bereft of manas', 'not a doer', 'Consciousness', 'Consciousness alone',

'Existence', etc. The more rational REASONING is that son etc., upto the void

are of transient nature, which like a jar are insentient and therefore depend

for their revelation on Consciousness. Also there is the

unsublatable EXPERIENCE of the enlightened as 'I am Brahman'. Thus the

experience of those who have secured the Vedantic enlightenment, is that the

Innermost Self is Consciousness alone which reveals each one of these several

things and which, in Its essential nature, is Eternal, Pure, Intelligent, Free

and True.

 

 

The body is not Atman:

 

The refutation of the Charvaka view is carried out in a detailed manner in the

Sutrabhashya 3.3.30.50, the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad Bhashya 6.3.6, the

Vartikasara pertaining to this (latter), the Manasollasa V.9 to 14 and the

Svarajyasiddhi I 29, 30. As a sample, the last mentioned verse is given here:

 

If you say 'perception is the only pramana' how can these 'words' of yours be

taken as pramana? If you assert that though infected with defects, your

statement which has only a very high probability of conveying the truth is

powerful enough to be a pramana, why not Sruti which is absolutely free from any

fault? Perception is not possible without the senses, but the senses themselves

become known not by perception, but by other means like inference etc. Even the

validity of perceptual knowledge cannot be established by perception alone,

making it impossible to distinguish the illusory from the real. Moreover you

who swear by perception will never be able to know the mind of another person –

his knowledge, desires etc. As such, while making use of the other pramanas all

along, you are denying them verbally. Thus you are uttering falsehood, making

worthless statements which are unfit for any consideration whatsoever.

 

The senses are not Atman:

The refutation of the view that the senses are the Atman is to be found in the

Manasollasa V 14 to 17 and the Svarajyasiddhi 1.33.

The senses are not the Aman because if each of them is Atman, then due to the

defect of there being many masters, there would arise the predicament of the

body being torn asunder; a person should not be able to speak about what is

heard or seen since the speaker-Atman would not be the same as the hearer-Atman,

etc. If all the senses together constitute the Atman, the blind, the dumb,

etc., should, ipso facto, be dead. Since the senses are at rest when a man

sleeps, there will be none to perceive the dream. Experiences such as 'I see, I

hear, etc., are because of superimposition of the attributes of the eye, etc,.on

the Atman.

 

Prana is not Atman:

This is established thus: Prana cannot be the Atman for there is no

consciousness during deep sleep. When one goes to sleep to gain respite from

the worry caused by the waking and dream life, prana acts for the mere

preservation of the body wherewith to reap the fruits of karma yet unspent. If

prana be Atman seeking rest in deep sleep, then it should be inactive during

sleep. On the other hand, during sleep prana is as active as before; the

activity of prana is evidenced by the phenomenon of breathing etc. If prana be

really the sentient Atman whose instruments are the motor and sensory organs,

then it wold be impossible for the latter to be inactive for so long as the

former remains active; and deep sleep would not then be a period of inactivity.

For example, when a king is still engaged in a battle, the army cannot indeed

cease to fight. Further, Prana is dependent on food for vitalising the organs

of sense etc.

 

Manas is not Atman:

 

The Svarajyasiddhi 1.35 establishes that manas is not Atman. Manas is

produced, an instrument (of knowledge like eye etc.) and a product of food and

as such the purity or otherwise of mind depends on food. It is the cause of

bondage and liberation. The jiva enters such a body which is in tune with the

ultimate mode of mind in the previous life. Atman which is other than mind is

described as manomaya in Sruti, only when in identification with mind. It is

also quiescent in the absence of waking and dream (in deep sleep), when the

organs are quiescent. On waking there is the memory of the experience of deep

sleep and happiness therein when the 'mind' experience was not there.

 

Momentary Consciousness ('chalaam buddhiH' as mentioned in the Stotram) is not

Atman:

This refutation is found in the Manasollasa (V 23 – 26). Be it known that

momentary consciousness is but a thing which appears and disappears. It reveals

the universe, only on being itself illumined by Atman's reflection.

Consciousness arises and dissolves in Atman Itself, existing neither before it

appears nor after it disappears; by itself it does not exist at all. If each

preceding consciousness should give rise to the next, then there would be the

contingency of the presence of innumerable consciousnesses every moment. No

consciousness can give rise, subsequent to its own disappearance, to another

consciousness, as it does not then exist at all.

The Svarajyasiddhi considers the view that instead of momentary consciousness,

steady consciousness spoken of in the Sruti as vijnana, a synonym of buddhi, is

Atman because of Srutis 'vijnanam yajnam tanute karmaani tanute'pi cha (Tai.Up.

2.5) and the Sutra 'kartaa shaastraarthavatvaat' (2.3.14.33) which point to its

being sentient. The arguments used to refute the view 'manas is Atma' can be

used here as well for buddhi is also a mode of the antahkarana. There are

Srutis which teach that Atman becomes bound because of identification with

buddhi and this vijnana is the driver of the chariot that is the body. Hence,

the witness of this vijnana must be another, namely, the inner Atman. Vijnana

is only the upadhi for Atman.

 

Atman cannot be sentient-cum-insentient. How can he be an object to himself?

Which are the two parts and how are they related to each other? To what is the

non-sentience of the sentient due? What is the nature of his doership? How does

he incorporate in himself the group of senses? These are the objections the

Svarajyasiddhi 1.38 raises against this view.

 

Atman is neither an Enjoyer (and not a doer) as held by the Sankhyas. If

purusha who is the non-doer is the enjoyer, that means there is the accruing of

the result of what is not done and the destruction of the result of what is

done. What sort of enjoyment can there be for the purusha who is detached and

attributeless? How is prakriti, the bhogya, concerned with it? What is

non-discrimination and to whom does it belong? To whom does discrimination

belong? What is its outcome? The Svarajyasiddhi (1.18) asks these questions

and ends up wondering: If even God Brahma ponders over such questions He too

will not be able to answer them!!

 

Having shown that all the views erroneously held in regard to the nature of

Atman are untenable, there arises the need to specify what indeed is the

Vedantic position about the Atman. This can be taken up in the sequel.

 

(end of Part VI first half)

(to be continued)

 

 

 

 

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