Sridakshinamurtistotram (Part VII -a)

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Sridakshinamurtistotram

(Part VII - a)

 

Yairime GurubhiH purvam pada-vakya-pramanataH |

VyaakhyaataaH Sarva-vedantaaH Taan nityam pranatosmyaham ||

(Forever do I pay obeisance to my Preceptors who have expounded the

entire Vedanta with the aid of Vyakarana (pada), Mimamsa (vakya) and

Tarka (pramana) shastras)

(A benedictory verse by Acharya Shankara at the commencement of His

Bhashyam on the Taittiriya Upanishad)

 

Verse 6 of the Stotram:

Rahu-grasta-divakarendu-sadrsho maya-samaacchaadanaat

SanmaatraH karanopasamharanato yo'bhut-sushuptaH pumaan |

Praagasvaasamiti prabodha-samaye yaH pratyabhijnaayate

Tasmai Srigurumurtaye nama idam Sridakshinamurtaye ||

 

(Obeisance to Him who, by going to deep sleep on withdrawal of all

organs (of cognition and action as also the internal one etc.,),

becomes the One Existence enshrouded by Maya like the Sun or the

Moon eclipsed, which he recalls when he wakes up, as 'I have slept

hitherto', to that resplendent Sridakshinamurti incarnate in the

glorious figure of one's own Guru.)

 

The Anvaya:

Karanopasamharanatah Yah sushuptaH pumaan Maya-samaacchaadanaat Rahu-

grasta-divakarendu-sadrshaH sanmaatraH abhUt, (Yashcha) prabodha-

samaye 'praagasvaapsam' iti pratyabhijnaayate,Tasmai

Sridakshinamurtaye, Srigurumurtaye, idam namaH.

 

While the earlier verse detailed the various viewpoints in respect

of the Self and refuted them and showed that the One unfailing

impartite Consciousness taught by the Vedanta alone is the True

Self, yet there arises a need to clearly distinguish this Atman from

the 'void', shunya, that seems to assert itself when all the

entities born of Avidya, namely, the gross body upto the vijnana are

discarded. That a consequence such as this is natural in the

sadhana and has to be carefully handled is evident from the

Vivekachoodamani (214) verse wherein the disciple asks:

 

When the five koshas, the sheaths, are negated as being mithya, I do

not find anything with which I, the Conscious principle, can

identify myself. And the question is appreciated by the Guru as

being quite appropriate and one that deserves to be set at rest.

One cannot negate oneself and end up in a void. That is

impossible. However much one would try to do this, one always

remains over as the Witness of that 'void'.

 

The case for Shunyavada:

The deep sleep wherein it is believed that nothing whatsoever is

experienced, apparently lends support to Shunyavada. Who is there

to experience, what is there to be experienced and who persists

there as a conscious entity? Such questions apparently strengthen

the possibility of the Shunyavada. Srutis such as 'Asadevedamagra

aasit' (Chandogya.Up. 6.2.1), 'Asadva idamagra Asit' (Tai. Up. 2.7)

are quoted by the shunyavadin in his favour.

Further, the Sruti while teaching the identity of Atman with

Brahman, describes Brahman as attributeless, devoid of all activity,

causeless, effectless, having no interior, no exterior, etc., 'That'

whence speech and mind return and to be known by using the method

of 'neti neti'. This looks so perilously a contentless abstraction

that is very easily mistaken for the void of the Buddhist. Acharya

Shankara, at the commencement of the Bhashya to the Chandogya Up.

8.1.1 points to this danger: ….Brahman, Existence, Absolute, the One

without a second, verily free from space, attributes, motion,

fruition and difference, seems to the dull-witted to be no more

than non-existence.

 

The Sixth verse, a refutation of Shunyavada:

 

This verse of the Stotram refutes the Shunyavada in unequivocal

terms by establishing the existence of Atman in deep sleep. It is

appropriate to take up the deep sleep experience as this is what

lends the occasion for saying that there is the void when all else

is absent. If it is shown that Atman, the Consciousness, persists

in this state, the possibility of the shunya stands negated. The

Manasollasa VI-2 commences by recalling the Supreme teaching of

the Buddha with its purport in the Shunyavada: Sarvam cha Kshanikam,

Shunyam, sarvameva Svalakshanam meaning Everything is momentary,

everything is void and everything is self-defined. The Bauddhas

show that existence comes out of non-existence when they assert, '

the effect cannot arise without the previous destruction of the

cause', for they say that from the destroyed seed alone does the

sprout spring, curd is produced only on the destruction of milk and

a pot ermerges on the destruction of the lump of clay. They justify

this by saying that were a product to come out of an unchanging

cause, anything could come out of anything, for the cause is common

to all. The Sutrabhashya 2.2.4.26 points out this. The

Bahyarthavada positing 'clusters' is refuted in the Sutrabhashya

2.2.4.18, 19, 20 and 21. So also their other theories, Pratisankhya-

nirodha (deliberated annihilation) and Apratisankhya-nirodha

(annihilation by itself) are shown to be untenable in the

Sutrabhashya 2.2.4.22. The cessation of nescience, (namely, the

illusion of persistence in what are momentary) included in

pratisankhyanirodha by the Bauddhas must take place as a result of

the right knowledge with its auxiliaries (viz. yama, niyama, etc.)

or of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the

abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place

without a cause; and the latter alternative would imply the

uselessness of the upadesha, instruction, as to the path which, as

taught by the Buddhist, is that everything is by itself only (sarvam

svalakshanam), is momentary (sarvam kshanikam), is ridden with grief

(sarvam duHkham) and is void (sarvam shunyam). The Sutrabhashya

2.2.4.23 gives the details.

 

Akasha not non-entity:

 

The Buddhist holds akasha to be a non-entity. This too is

untenable. The Sruti 'Akasha sprang from Atman' shows that it is

not a non-entity. As he does not admit Sruti as authority,

reasoning is offered to show the untenability. It could be inferred

that Akasha is a positive entity from the guna namely sound just

like the earth which is observed to be the abode of the guna of

smell. He says that akasha is merely an absence of obstruction (or

covering). To this it is replied that when one bird flies in

akasha, there is the presence of obstruction thereby offering no

scope for the flight of another. If he says that the bird can fly

where there is absence of obstruction, then that very thing which

thus stands as an attribute to the absence of covering would itself

be akasha, a positive entity, and not merely an absence of

obstruction. Further, such an assertion about akasha would land the

Saugata, Buddhist, in self-contradiction for, according to him, the

chain of questions starting with 'What is the support of earth?'

ends with the question 'Sir, what is the support of air?' to which

it is replied 'akasha is the support of air'. This reply would be

inconsistent if akasha is a non-entity. Again, it is contradictory

to hold that the three: Pratisankhya-nirodha (deliberated

annihilation) and Apratisankhya-nirodha (annihilation by itself) and

akasha – are all non-entities and yet they are eternal, for that

which is non-existent can neithr be eternal nor non-eternal, for

all judgements about relationship, as between a quality and the

qualified, are based on an existing entity. This relationship would

inevitably mean that the thing in itself is as much real as a pot,

for instance, and it cannot be an undefinable non-entity. We show

that the akasha is not a non-entity as it has a purpose to serve,

namely, to afford accommodation to all beings, avakasha-

pradaatrutvam. In the same manner, since Atman also has a purpose

as the doer and cogniser, this abiding existence must be admitted.

The Manasollasa VI 20 and the tika thereon point out this.

 

Refutation of Momentariness of Self

 

We have the experience of remembering what was experienced earlier.

This experience compels us to accept an abiding Self because what is

experienced by one cannot be recalled by someone else. The

hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for such an

experience in parlance would not be proper, for the experience

pertains to a particular entity and not to another which is merely

similar to it. While it is possible to have a doubt regarding an

external object, there can never be such a doubt regarding oneself

in the manner of 'Am I that very person or similar to him?' There

occurs a definite recognition of identity as in 'I who saw yesterday

am remembering today'. This is not sublated, as shown in the

Sutrabhashya 2.2.4.25. Again, the recognition of identity,

Pratyabhijna, cannot be set aside. The Manasollasa VI – 18,19

points out that if pratyabhijna be an illusion, why should one eat

or do any such thing. It is only in the belief that today's food

will satisfy the craving as yesterday's food did, that even a child

resorts to eating. This would be impossible if one and the same

individual were not the subject of the experiences of the two days.

 

Origination not from non-existence

 

The assertion of the Bauddhas that entities spring out of non-

existence, abhava, is not valid since it does not accord with

experience. It is impossible to particularise abhava in any

manner. The abhava pertaining to the destruction of a seed, for

example, cannot in any manner be distinguished from the abhava such

as the horns of a hare. (This is a refutation of the theory: A

sprout comes into existence only after the seed has been destroyed.

A seed destroyed no longer exists and hence is abhava. This abhava

alone is the cause of the sprout that comes out). If it is averred

that the particular abhava can be equated to a lotus being

particularised by its blueness, then our reply is that in that case,

it onlt becomes a positive entity for no quality can be given for a

non-existing entity. The causehood of abhava is unacceptable, even

as the son of a barren woman cannot be the cause of anything. There

is this further difficulty: If all entities arise out of abhava,

they must be imbued with abhava just as the pot, etc. coming out of

mud are imbued with mud, their material cause. If this were to be

accepted to be so, then we would be experiencing 'this pot is not'

instead of 'this pot is'. Evidently, our experience with regard to

all objects is, 'this pot is'. The Buddhists assert that the

paramanus are the cause of all external objects and the internal

world has four types of causes. At the same time they say that

abhava is the cause of everything. This is none other tha

perplexing people. All this is brought out by the Sutrabhashya

2.2.4.26.

 

The Sutrabhashya 2.2.4.27 points out to another undesirable

consequence of accepting that abhava is the cause of everything. As

abhava, the cause as per the Buddhists, is always there, one need

not take up any activity and just be indifferent to anything desired

to be secured, earthly or heavenly. And no effort needs to be made

for securing liberation as everything will happen by itself from the

one cause – Abhava !

 

The Vijnanavada of the Buddhist

 

The Vijnanavada comes as a remedy to the defects contained in the

bahyarthavada which, as per the Vijnanavadins, is only a concession

offered for those who have predilections to external things. The

Sutrabhashya 2.2.5.28 gives an idea of this Vada: According to

Vijnanavada, since all factors pertaining to knowledge namely the

means of knowledge, its objects and its result depend only on

knowledge, i.e., consciousness, parlance relating to them must be

deemed to be only internal. This would be so even if external

objects were to be accepted.

 

No object apart from cognition – Vijnanavada

 

 

It may be appreciated that the Vijnanavada comes into being by

refuting the bahyarthavada, the theory that admits the external

objects.

The vijnanavadin gives the reasons as to why his position has to be

accepted:

(a) He questsions: When a pillar, etc. are experienced with the

eye as being tall, big, etc, it is not that we see the paramanus

with the eye, or that the paramanus have attributes as tall, etc.

If it is replied by the bahyarthavadin that the objects are like a

heap of corn, and therefore is a group of paramanus, then the

Vijnanavadin objects that since a single paramanu cannot be seen, it

is impossible to see a group of them also, just as a group of ghosts

cannot be perceived. As it is impossible to formulate as to what

exactly an object is, apart from the cognition. Thus, genus,

quality, are to be rejected as well.

(b) The cognitions are all of a uniform nature inasmuch as they

are all only states of consciousness. The particularities like pot-

cogniton are to be accounted for by associating the particular forms

such as the cognition of a pot, pillar, etc. As such it would be

meaningless to postulate the existence of external objects.

© Again, form the fact of the simultaneous awareness always of

the cognition and its objects, it follows that they are not

different; hence also the non-existence of external objects apart

from their cognition.

(d) The Bauddhakarikas are quoted in the Sarvadarshanasangraha

wherein it is declared that the difference that is seen as between

the object and its knowledge is illusory like the appearance of two

Moons. Even though consciousness is undivided the appearance of the

triad of experienced, the experience and the experience is due to

illusion. Further, the various states of consciousness are not due

to external objects but are to be deemed on par with those in dream,

magic, mirage, phantom-city in the sky, etc.

(e) The Sutrabhashya 2.2.5.28 continues to state that for the

Vijnanavadin, the variety in the form of cognitions comes to be (in

the absence of external objects) due to the variety of vasanas,

impressions, as admitted in the case of dreams, which along with the

cognitions have reciprocal cause-effect relationship in the

beginningless samsara just like the chain of the seeds and sprouts.

The Bauddhakarika declares (as quoted in the Sarvadarshanasangraha)

that just as the ctton that eventually comes out of the plant from a

seed that had been soaked in molten lac would be coloured red, the

fruit also occurs eventually in that series in which are implanted

the impressions of karmas.

 

Under these circumstances, says the Vijnanavadin, there is no need

whatsoever to postulate the existence of external objects.

 

The refutation of Vijnanavada shall be taken up next.

 

(To be continued)

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

A brilliant, rare, complete and irrefutable refutation of

Shunyavada. This is really amazing because you have compiled all

that refutes very clearly Shunyavada and put it together. I´m coping

this to a document and saving in my computer for reading whenever I

begin to feel insecure in my meditation (due to Shunyavada) because

I have been practicing under the guidance of a Guru who is a

Buddhist, and have practiced Buddhism for years. But then I began to

feel very afraid and insecure when I heard one Bikkhuni exposing the

Dharma of the Buddha about Voidness. It seems that Buddhists simply

want to deny the undeniable, that is, Consciousness, by saying it is

unreal. Still, the Bikkhuni said "I am enlightened". How can she

assert that she is enlightened if she denies her own existence? She

would have to say: "only the Voidness is real", but she did not

affirm that.

It has seemed to me that while Buddhism is a very interesting

philosophy (in its content about rebirth, virtue and the Bodhisattva

goal) it is also contradictory because the experiencer of the so-

called Voidness remains there to say: "the Voidness exists". So this

is leading me away from Buddhism. I appreciate the philosophy but

denying one´s own existence is way too crazy from me. I think it

probably arose (Shunyavada) as a distorted perception of Brahman: as

Shankaracharya says, "to the dull-minded Brahman appears to be non-

existence", which is a mistake due to dullness of mind.

Thanks a lot for this rendering...

Pranams,

frederico