Sridakshinamurtistotram Part VII - b

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Sridakshinamurtistotram

(Part VII – b)

AkhaNdAnanda-sambodho vandanaad yasya jaayate |

Govindam tamaham vande chidananda-tanum gurum ||

I offer my prostrations to the Govinda Guru, verily an embodiment of

Blissful Consciousness, by bowing to whom occurs the direct

experience of the Impartite Blissful Consciousness.

(Prayer by Sri Acharya Shankara at the commencement of His work:

Sarva-vedantasiddhanta-sara-sangrahaH)

 

Refutation of Vijnanavada – Experience of object external to

cognition:

 

The case for not postulating the existence of external objects was

put forward by the Vijnanavadin along with reasons thereof. Now,

the refutation of the same is presented from the Vedantin's

standpoint. The Bhashya on the Sutra 'Na abhavaH, upalabdheH'

(There is no non-existence of the external objects, because they are

cognised) 2.2.5.28 is first taken up for a discussion in the

sequel. The detailed exposition is necessitated due to the seeming

similarity with the Vedanta in spite of fundamental differences. It

was pointed out by the Vijnanavadin that cognitions are to be

accepted because one is conscious of them. The Vedantin argues that

for the very same reason that one is conscious of them, one has to

accept the external objects such as a pillar, a wall, a pot or a

cloth as well alongwith the respective cognitions as is seen in the

experience 'I cognise the pot' etc. No one experiences the

cognition itself as the pot; the pot is experienced as different

from the cognition, as its object. This is how even he who denies

the existence of external objects also experiences, as is clear from

his very statement –'That which is the content of a cognition that

is internal, appears as though external'. Otherwise, he could not

use the phrase 'as though external'. No one ever says 'Vishnumitra

appears like the son of a barren woman'. Hence faithfulness to

experience demands that the objects are revealed 'external to the

cognition' and not 'as though external', as pointed out by the

Sutrabhashya.

 

The Sutra bhashya gives other reasons as well. If his stand is

that, since there is no possibility of the existence of an external

object, it is decided that it appears 'as though external', it is

pointed out that it is an improper decision, for possibility or

otherwise is to be determined in consonance with the operation or

otherwise of the appropriate pramana and not that the operation or

otherwise of pramana be made dependent on possibility or

impossibility. Possible is whatever is apprehended by any one of

the pramanas such as perception and impossible is what is not so

apprehended.

 

Nor does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the

cognition having the form of the object, for if there were no

object, that the cognition has the form of the object is untenable

and the objects are actually apprehended as external, as pointed to

by the same Bhashya. For the same reason the invariable

simultaneous apprehension of the cognition and the object has to be

considered as proving only that the object causes its cognition by

way of offering incidence for it and not that the two are identical.

 

Again in such forms of cognitions as 'the knowledge of a pot'

and 'the knowledge of a cloth', the difference pertains only to the

two attributes of knowledge, pot and cloth, and not to the

substantive, the knowledge. Hence also an object and its knowledge

are different.

 

Further, two cognitions, each self-revealing and momentary, at

different moments of time, cannot apprehend each other. From this

it follows that the Bauddha doctrines – such as the distinction

among cognitions, momentariness and other attributes, individual

characteristics, common characteristics, bequeathing of vasanas from

one cognition to the other, misery consequent on Avidya, existents

and non-existents, bondage and liberation – all become invalidated ,

as shown by the Bhashya on the subject. If it is said that a

cognition must be accepted because one is conscious of it, then the

external object also must be accepted since one is conscious of the

external object as well, as the Bhashya points out. If it is urged

that cognition is accepted as it is self-revealing, meaning thereby

that it is conscious of itself, while the so-called external object

is not so, it should be pointed out that this would be absurd since,

whether the cognition be the same as the object or otherwise, the

cognition cannot be an object of its own activity.

 

The Sakshi of the Vedanta; difficulties overcome:

 

There is no such difficulty in the Vedantic set-up as it takes note

of what is Self-established and cannot therefore be denied namely,

Sakshi, the Immutable Eternal Witness-Self, which is never an

object, whereas the so-called cognitions with the forms of objects

are themselves objects perceived by the Sakshi. The experience 'I

know the pot' is evidently because of the Sakshi. In this

experience, the pramata viz., the aham = I, the pramana = knowing

(verb) and the prameya = the pot stand revealed all at once by the

Sakshi – as the Panchadashi X – 9 says. The Vedantic set up in

this regard is best expressed in this verse of the BrihadvArtika

(I..4.870):

 

PramAta cha pramANam cha prameyo nishchitis-tathA |

YatsAnnidhyAt prasiddhyanti tat-siddhau kim apEkshatE ||

(What need is there to establish that by whose very presence the

knower, the means as also the object of knowledge, and the knowledge

itself are established?)

 

Further, these cognitions are associated with originatioin,

destruction, manifoldness, etc.

The innermost Self, by its very nature is Consciousness of one

consistency without an particularities whatsoever, the Self-

effulgentmWitness which annot at all be denied, doubted or mistaken,

isthus hot in need of any other shine. Also, the modes of the

intellect, though not sentient, beiong pellucid, are able to cathch,

even as it comesinto evidence, the reflection of the Witness-

Consciousness which like the sky is everywhere and it is this that

is oridinarily spoken of as the shine of the cognition. The Vartika

says this in a very appealing manner:

 

'Just as a pot, along with its coming into existence, is filled with

the sky without the need of any other means for the purpose, even

so are the modes of the intellect permeated by the Witness-

Consciousness'.

 

Difference between 'Dream vision' and 'Cognitive Experience' in the

Waking:

 

The parallelism that is sought to be drawn between the dream and the

waking states is not to the point. Their characteristics are

different.

While the dream is subject to sublation (upon waking), the waking

state is not.

The dream-vision is a kind of memory relating to what arises from

the contents of the mind, whereas the cognitions of the waking state

are forms of cognitions by employing the sense organs, pramanas.

The difference between cognition and memory is this: in cognition,

there is the object available for cognition, whereas in memory, the

object is not so available. This being the case, the Sutrabhashya

2.2.5.29 points out that the waking cognition having a

characteristic of its own (objects cognised through senses), cannot

be said to have the characteristic of a dream-vision (only a case of

memory) because of a similarity with the latter.

 

The application of the Sruti pramana, 'Now, therefore, the

instruction, not this, not this' speaks of the sublation of even the

waking state, and this is testified by the experience of the

enlightened. However, there is this difference – the dream state is

sublated without the pramatr being sublated, while the waking state

is sublated (in Enlightenment) along with the pramatr. In Vedanta,

the dream is not just the case of memory of objects which are not

present then. It is like the experience of shell-silver, pertaining

to the direct experience of the Sakshi (that is, without the

intervention of the sense organs), of praatibhasika objects

presented then which are the transfiormation of the mind or Avidya

laden with the samkaras. The dream is termed as memory only in a

secondary sense because the knowledge of objects in the dream, as in

the case of memory, is produced by samskaras that produce the

objects as well and not by pramanas, the sense organs. (it may be

recalled that the knowledge, the cognitive experience, born in the

waking is due to the operation of the sense organs by contacting the

objects).

 

The absence of objects spoken of in the dream thus pertains to the

absence of vyavaharic objects of the waking state. Thus the effort

to establish, on the dream analogy, that the cognitions of the

waking state are without objective content is rendered

futile.

 

A possible question answered:

 

Seeing the above refutation of the Vijananavadin's stand on the

absence of objective content in cognitive knowledge, it might be

questioned: Is not the Vedantin's stand on the subject similar?

The reply is this: When the Vedantin says that the waking experience

is akin to that of the dream, he advances the hetu, reason: Because

the waking state is perceived, as a dream is. The Vijnanavadin's

stand is: The external objects are not there as they are non-

different from their cognitions. The Vedantin refuted this stand

saying that for a cognition using the sense organs, there have to be

corresponding objects. There is a perception of objects in the

waking state. In the Vedantin's equating the waking with the dream

experience, the reason is: because of it (the waking) being

perceived, like a dream. Thus, for example, the ground of inference

of the Vijnanavadin considered in the Brahmasutra Bhashya II.2.29

is, decidedly, 'because they are perceptions (uplabdhitvaat)'. This

is quite different from the ground 'because of being perceived

(dRshyatvaat)' considered in the Mandukya karika bhashya for the

karika II.4. What is established in this karika and the bhashya

thereon is that the perceptible objects of the waking state are

false. On the other hand, what the Brahmasutra Bhashya II.2.29

repudiates is the different position that, apart from perception,

there are no external objects at all in the waking state.

 

Just because sutra II.2.29 differentiates the states of waking and

dream, it cannot be concluded that it teaches the waking state is

real. The Gaudapada karika II.4 too, for instance, differentiates

the states of waking and dream by pointing out that unlike the

former, the latter is experienced within the body, in a contracted

space. Nonetheless, not only does the karika not admit the waking

state to be real, it establishes that the world of waking is false.

What sutra II.2.29 refers to is just the commonly understood lack of

sublation of the waking state relative to the dream state. This is

apparent from a consideration of some of the previous and later

sutras themselves; for example, sutra II.1.28. speaks of the

creation of the world as analogous to dreaming by a person, while

sutra III.4.16 states that the world is annulled on one's awakening

to the Truth. Nor again does Bhagavatpada agree that the world of

waking is real. His unequivocal position is that the world of

waking too is false and that it is sublated like a dream when one

awakens to the Truth. This is amply clear from many of His

categorical statements in the Sutrabhashya to this effect.

Moreover, where contextually appropriate, the Sutrabhashya even goes

to the extent of describing the waking state as subject to

invalidation by the dream state just as the latter is by the

former.

 

Necessity for accepting External Objects apart from vasanas:

 

The Buddhist position is: the diversity in experience, as that of a

pot, the cloth, etc., can be accounted for on the basis of the

variety of tendencies, vasanas. This is not reasonable for,

according to him there are no external objects as the content of

cognitions which would give rise to vasanas. The Sutrabhashya

2.2.5.30 brings out this point. If he says that there is a

beginningless series of vasanas that leads to the variety of

experience, the Vedantin replies that such a stand would lead, like

the blind leading the blind, only to a baseless infinite regress,

sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way

establish his position. It is like this: Since the stand that the

vasanas accrue even without the experiencing of external objects is

admitted by him, there is no scope to talk about the beginningless

series of vasanas.

 

Further, (a) from the admission that the apprehension of objects is

possible even in the absence of vasanas as in the case of every new

experience which is therefore necessarily to be traced only to the

existence of external objects and (b) from the non-admission of the

possibility of vasanas in the absence of apprehension, it follows

that the external objects do exist.

 

Moreover, vasana is a kind of samskara, impression, and cannot be

thought of without an abode for it, as is seen in common experience;

but according to his doctrine there is no such abode. Therefore, as

there is no abode for the vasanas, they, the vasanas, cannot exist.

The upshot of all this is: As vasanas are not possible, the variety

in experiences is not explainable and without explaining the cause

for variety in experiences, it is impossible to establish the

absence of external objects while maintaining the variety in

experiences.

 

If it is said that the aalayavijnana is the abode of the vasanas,

that cannot be, for it is held to be momentary by the

Vijnanavadin . The Sutrabhashya 2.2.5.31 proceeds to state that

because of the momentariness of the aalayavijnana, it also would be

subject to all the objections pointed out against the theory of

momentary existence as pertaining to external objects.

 

Thus, unless there be some principle running through everything and

abiding through all the three periods of time, or an absolutely

unchanging Self which cognises everything, there can be no human

dealing involving remembrance, recognition, etc., which are

contingent on past impressions that are stored up in conformity with

place, time and circumstances.

 

The Svarajyasiddhi 1.25 sums up the refutation of the Vijnanavada

doctrine:

 

The objects of the external world established by pramanas cannot be

negated. If external objects are negated, how can there be

different cognitions? The sublation of the external objects, as in

the case of a dream, is not in experience. And the word 'external'

loses its usual significance. How is the variety in cognitions to

be accounted for? To what are the various vasanas to be traced?

Moreover, the Kshanikavijnanavada would be subject to all the

objections mentioned previously against the Bahyarthavadin. Thus

stands refuted the Vijnanavada.

 

Shunyavada, nihilism, Void the ultimate:

 

The Development of Shunyavada is presented succinctly by the

Brahmavidyaabharanam based on the Sutrabhashya 2.2.5.31:

 

The Shunyavadin adopts this posture: The viewpoint of the

Bahyarthavadin stands shattered as a result of the criticism by the

Vijnanavadin levelled against his conception of the external objects

as paramanus or their aggregates etc. On the same grounds, the

momentary-consciousness of the Vijnanavadin also stands refuted; his

declaration that the so-called outside objects accepted by the

Bahyarthavadin are really inside, does not also brook enquiry as to

whether these inside objects are of the nature of paramanus or their

aggregates. Thus being unable to survive the onslaught of reason,

the objects, be they external or internal, cannot be considered to

be existent. Nor can they be considered to be non-existent, as they

are directly apprehended., Nor can they be existent-cum-non-

existent, they being opposites. Not even are they other than

existent and non-eistent; if they are other than existent,

necessarily they will have to be non-existent; if they are other

than non-existent, they will have to be necessarily existent. One

and the same entity cannot be other than both existent and non-

existent. Thus, as not conforming to any of these four categories,

the objects, external or internal, are not the ultimate reality.

The ultimate reality, however, is absolute nothingness, void,

sarvashunya. This is the principal doctrine of the Buddha. The

other three theories are delineated in order to accommodate those of

inferior intellect. The Sarvadarshanasangraha 2 delineates the

various topics that lead to the Shunyavada and says that the

mediations as taught by the Buddha such as 'Everything is misery,

misery', 'Everything is individualistic, individualistic, as each is

momentary and 'Everything is void, void', proceeds to the attainment

of the state of 'void' termed paranirvana.

 

Shunyavada, an apparently powerful purvapaksha, is refuted by the

Manasollasa and the Panchadashi:

(to be continued)