RE: [Y-Indology] a fortunate exchange

[Guest guest]

Wujastyk wrote: "If this subject actually interests Malhotra, he should

start a literary and sociological study to interview "Western Indologists"

(yes, all six of them :-) and actually find out what they think." Yes, I

agree we should do this. But I use the term Indology more broadly as the

study of India through a variety of disciplines including religious studies,

history, anthropology, philology, political thought, economics, etc. - hence

there are more than just six scholars in it.

 

To avoid misunderstandings, I want to state that my interests are NOT

centered on ancient history (i.e. Indus Valley) but on more recent centuries

when the current images of 'India', 'West', etc were constructed. Second, my

comments do not pertain to all scholars, and I primarily wish to get to the

origins of textbook biases. I must say that Prof. Witzel has made an

enormous contribution to refute the commonly held view amongst scholars that

Indians did not have a sense of history. He refutes this based on

examination of indigenous texts of history found in regions of the Indian

subcontinent that were spared destruction of such records. This is an

excellent example to counter at least one major stereotype that feeds the

notion of a static society frozen except for invasions. At the recent AAS

conference in Chicago, Ranajit Guha surprised the audience when he made an

extensive remark that much of the portrayal of India's history needs to be

replaced by a fresh start using indigenous writings.

 

To get a wider perspective, one can review recent works that examine western

scholarship. J. M. Blaut's book, 'The Colonizer's Model of the World' is

based on an extensive analysis of western scholars' historiography. The

author describes his mission is "to undermine one of the most powerful

beliefs of our time concerning world history and world geography. This

belief is the notion that European civilization - "The West" - has had some

unique historical advantage, some special quality of race or culture or

environment or mind or spirit, which gives this human community a permanent

superiority over all other communities, at all times in history and down to

the present. The belief is both historical and geographical. Europeans are

seen as the "makers of history"."

 

He then explains the links between scholars and textbooks: "Textbooks are an

important window into a culture; ...they are semiofficial statements of

exactly what the opinion-forming elite of the culture want the educated

youth of that culture to believe.... European and Anglo-American history

textbooks assert that most of the causes of historical progress occur, or

originate, in the European sector of the world......This view still, in the

main, prevails, although racism has been discarded and non-Europe is no

longer considered to have been 'absolutely' stagnant and traditional...

[T]he views put forward by historical scholars today tend to be quite

consonant with the theories projected in textbooks...."

 

Wujastyk considers my suggestion of Eurocentrism in scholarship as "pure

fantasy". Here is how Blaut explains this disbelief amongst scholars. He

lists 14 "European-centered propositions" that are accepted by the majority

of European historical scholars. "Historians who accept these propositions

as true would be indignant if we described the propositions as "Eurocentric

beliefs". Every historian in this category would deny emphatically that he

or she holds any Eurocentric prejudices, and very few of them actually do

hold such prejudices. If they assert that Europeans invented democracy,

science, feudalism, capitalism, the modern nation-state, and so on, they

make these assertions because they think that all of this is fact." Blaut

then raises the question that becomes the subject for his book: "How is it

that Eurocentric historical statements which are not valid - that is, not

confirmed by evidence and sometimes contradicted by evidence - are able to

gain acceptance in European historical thought, and thereafter survive as

accepted beliefs, hardly ever questioned, for generations and even

centuries?"

 

His answer: "Scholarly beliefs are embedded in culture, and are shaped by

culture. This helps to explain the paradox that Eurocentric historical

beliefs are so strangely persistent; that old myths continue to be believed

in long after the rationale for their belief has been forgotten or

rejected...." In other words, Blaut says that Eurocentrism is often

unconsciously applied today even by those who are consciously opposed to it.

 

Now comes his more provocative diagnosis: "Eurocentrism is, as I will argue

at great length in this book, a unique set of beliefs, and uniquely

powerful, because it is the intellectual and scholarly rationale for one of

the most powerful social interests of the European elite. I will argue not

only that European colonialism initiated the development of Europe (and the

underdevelopment of non-Europe) in 1492, but that since then the wealth

obtained from non-Europe, through colonialism in its many forms, including

neocolonialism forms, has been a necessary and very important basis for the

continued development of Europe and the continued power of Europe's elite."

Blaut believes that this attitude persists today: "For this reason, the

development of a body of Eurocentric beliefs, justifying and assisting

Europe's colonial activities, has been, and still is, of very great

importance."

 

There is too much to restate here, so I suggest serious scholars should read

this book for themselves.

[Guest guest]

INDOLOGY, "Rajiv Malhotra" <rajiv.malhotra@a...> wrote:

> > Now comes his more provocative diagnosis: "Eurocentrism is, as I

will argue> at great length in this book, a unique set of beliefs, and

uniquely> powerful, because it is the intellectual and scholarly

rationale for one of> the most powerful social interests of the

European elite. I will argue not> only that European colonialism

initiated the development of Europe (and the> underdevelopment of

non-Europe) in 1492, but that since then the wealth > obtained from

non-Europe, through colonialism in its many forms, including >

neocolonialism forms, has been a necessary and very important basis

for the> continued development of Europe and the continued power of

Europe's elite." > Blaut believes that this attitude persists today:

"For this reason, the > development of a body of Eurocentric beliefs,

justifying and assisting> Europe's colonial activities, has been, and

still is, of very great> importance."> > There is too much to restate

here, so I suggest serious scholars should read > this book for

themselves.

 

The issue I suppose is 'historiography'.

 

There is a monograph which presents a viewpoint from Bha_rata. Sriram

Sathe, Kaliyugabda 5102, Millenniums Tested Bharateeya Science of

History, Bangalore. Some excerpts (imagine the diacritics):

 

"According to Bharateeya viewpoint, the ultimate object of history is

human welfare. It is said that history should act as the magnifier of

the culture and nourisher of the Dharma of the land. Hence, Bharateeya

history was expected to project an overall picture of all facets of

social life like religion, culture, economy, politics etc.

Accordingly, in Bharat, various facets of history writing and reciting

were fully developed. The following facets have come to our notice

thus far: 1) itihasa; 2) purakalpa; 3)puravritta; 4) akhyana; 5)

upakhyana; 6) aitihya; 7) parakriya; 8) parakriti; 9) itivritta; 10)

anucharita; 11) anuvamsha; 12) katha; 13) parikatha; 14) gatha; 15)

anwakhyan; 16) charita; 17) narashamsi; 18) kalavid; 19)

gotra-paravarkar; 20) rajashasana; 21) purana; 22) akhyayika; 23)

rabhya). (15.6.11-12) Atharvaveda mentions four, i.e. Itihasa, purana,

gatha and narasamsi. Rigveda (cf. Gurudatta, 1963, Itihasa kmein

bharateeya paramparayen, 3rd edn., 1986, New Delhi) mentions only

narasamsi and gatha along with rabhya. The Satapatha Brahmana

(14.6.10.6) adds two more in the list of Atharvaveda, i.e.

anuvyakhyana and vyakhyana which may be the same as upakhyana and

akyana of later times...Sastras like brahmanas, itihasas, puranas,

kalpas, gathas and narasamsis are enumerated in the Taittiriya

Aranyaka...Kautilya (Arth. 1.3) mentions itihasa along with the Vedas,

which shows that during the Maurya period itihasa also was found in

the specific book form like the Vedas. It was prescribed that kings

should listen to itihasa and purana in the afternoon..." (pp. 59-63).

 

If Avestan gatha is history, so is gatha of the Bha_rati_ya tradition.

[Guest guest]

Tim,

 

Thanks for some food for thoughts.

 

Although I am afraid to go a little off topic, Prof.

Halbfass' remarks reminded me of a recent newspaper

article in Germany.

 

Around Easter there was an interview with a theologian

(Hans-Georg Ziebertz) in the Hamburg Abendblatt. He

was talking about current views of God among young

people (off course Germans).

 

He cites some common views among younger people, such

as:

 

``There is a supreme power which we cannot put into

words.''

 

``There is something supreme (neuter) which in all

religions talk about. All the religions are only

different ways that brought it to words.''

 

``There is great totality of which we are part.''

 

``The divinity is deep in each person.''

 

``Each person has divinity in their deep self.''

 

The theologian did not seem to be aware that many (or

all?) of these ideas could be ascribed to the Hindus,

typically Vivekaananda.

 

I thought it would be an interesting topic of research

how Indian/Hindu/Asian ideas influenced Europeans

(Christians) without being noticed (typically the

Germans).

 

I noted that the Germans are much more into the

new-age stuff than the Americans. (West Coasters

appear to be more into it than East Coastes, BTW.)

Buddhism, especially the Tibetan Buddhism, appears to

be quite huge here.

 

The fear of science and technology is quite deep, it

seems, among younger generations if Germans. (This is

a huge contrast to the Japanese.)

 

After learning a little about what the Germans are

like, the words of Halbfass sounds very convincing.

 

> I should point out that although one might

> discern a uniquely

> European agent in this,

> --might suspect that his "we" was not fully

> inclusive,

 

Indeed I feel it more and more difficult to see the

West as a whole. The Germans and the Americans are

certainly different. One should not forget that the

Germans have long been looking for their identity.

 

> --might challenge the metaphors ("allies",

> "life and death", "therapy")

 

They in fact might not be metaphors. Alternative

medicines are quite huge in Germany. Many people turn

into them. So, it is a kind of life and death

situation. (I guess I should put a smiley not to be

misunderstood

 

As Indian politics may be very complex (as Vidyasankar

said in one post), the West also is quite diverse.

Halbfass' observation seems more appropriate as words

from a German.

 

But I am not certain if it applies to all the Western

indologists. I, for one, am having a little bit of

identity crisis. Where the Japanese fit in all those

Oriental vs. Occidental discussions?

 

 

 

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