[world-vedic] Turn-the-Other-Cheek Diplomacy - Article from the Washington Post, January 27, 2000

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>[indianembassy] Turn-the-Other-Cheek Diplomacy - Article from the

>Washington Post, January 27, 2000

>Thu, 27 Jan 2000 07:46:09 -0800

>

>

>Turn-the-Other-Cheek Diplomacy

>By Jim Hoagland

>

>Washinton Post

>Thursday, January 27, 2000

>

>Exactly what would it take to get the State Department's

>South Asia experts to stop promoting an ill-advised trip

>by President Clinton to Pakistan in March? I shudder to think.

>

>Pakistani help to terrorists does not seem to be enough

>to overcome the peculiar turn-the-other-cheek style of

>diplomacy that has flourished in this presidency. It seems

>in fact to whet the appetite of some to throw the president

>at the world's most dangerous confrontation and see what

>turns up.

>

>Clinton and his aides have been secretly debating for weeks

>whether he should stop over even briefly at the airport

>near Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, during a proposed

>journey to India and Bangladesh in March.

>

>The subtle pros of a "heart to heart" chat with Pervez

>Musharraf, the general who seized power on Oct. 12, were

>from the outset closely balanced against the obvious

>cons of security and politics: Pakistan's notorious

>intelligence services are linked to the murderous

>Osama bin Laden gang in neighboring Afghanistan,

>and Musharraf has refused to establish a timetable

>for a return to democracy.

>

>Then came a development that suggests the Pakistanis have

>been attending the North Korean school of international

>diplomacy, which stresses that a punch in the nose is

>the best way to get the Clinton White House to offer

>you rewards.

>

>In December a Kashmiri terrorist group with a long and

>clear history of support from the Pakistani military and

>intelligence services hijacked an Indian airliner to

>obtain the release of a radical Pakistani Islamic cleric,

>Maulana Masood Azhar. The hijackers made their escape

>into Pakistan and then returned to Kashmir.

>

>Pakistan denies it helped the terrorists plan or carry

>out this particular hijacking, and the Clinton

>administration has not been able to develop intelligence

>to the contrary, State Department spokesman James

>P. Rubin tells me.

>

>But the fingerprints of Pakistan's Inter-Services

>Intelligence agency were all over the escape of the

>hijackers back to Kashmiri territory controlled by Pakistan.

>

>So how did Madeleine Albright's State Department react

>to the obvious? By dispatching Assistant Secretary of

>State Karl F. Inderfurth to Islamabad last week to tell

>Musharraf that the option of a presidential visit to

>Islamabad was still open.

>

>True, Inderfurth added that the Pakistanis would have

>to take steps to clean up their act on terrorism,

>nuclear testing and a return to civilian rule if they

>want to see Air Force One descend from the clouds and

>Clinton sit side by side in a VIP airport lounge with

>the general whose name George W. Bush could not

>remember in a television pop quiz.

>

>But Inderfurth did not set specific benchmarks of

>performance in the conversation, and Musharraf did not

>offer any specific promises to meet U.S. concerns. In

>the days following the meeting, which was disclosed in

>the Jan. 25 edition of the New York Times, Afghanistan

>actually hardened its line against turning bin Laden

>over for prosecution.

>

>Inderfurth's continuing promotion of the Pakistani

>stopover was apparent in his explanation to the Times

>of his refusal to offer benchmarks or warnings to Musharraf

>about the consequences of a failure to crack down on terrorist

>groups and to defuse tensions with India over Kashmir:

>

>"To influence Pakistan on democracy, terrorism and

>nonproliferation, we have to engage them. Our president

>is our best engager."

>

>That last sentence has to win an award for a political

>appointee simultaneously buttering up the boss in print

>and trying to manipulate said boss--in this case the

>president of the United States--in the cause of making

>an assistant secretary's life easier with his or her clients.

>

>There may also be a more serious hidden agenda at work

>here. Musharraf, who was born in India and educated in

>Britain, is a secularist who impresses Western officials

>with his relative moderation. He appears to be locked in

>a power struggle with those who represent the darkest side

>of the Pakistani regime, such as Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed, the

>director of Inter-Services Intelligence.

>

>But a Clinton visit to shore up Musharraf internally

>is a risky enterprise from every standpoint. Such a

>ploy oversells the U.S. ability to transform or even

>moderate a bad situation that seems to be getting worse.

>Withholding this visit is the minimum that needs to be

>done to send a message to Pakistan and other regimes that

>flout international norms and expect to get rewards.

>

>Engagement is not a self-contained goal or policy. It has

>to produce results that advance U.S. interests. Pakistan

>does not pass that simple test.

>

>

>© Copyright 2000 The Washington Post Company

>

>

>

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