India and Russia-I

[Guest guest]

India and Russia-I

November 28, 2000

By Lieutenant Colonel Thakur Kuldip S Ludra (Retd.)

 

 

No other country has ever attracted the strong sentiments that have

been aroused in India with regards to India's relationship, first

with Soviet Russia and now with Russia. Both the proponents as well

as the antagonists are, even till date, evenly matched. While the

opponents were and still are eloquent over repressive nature of the

communist regime and how Soviet Russia considered India as a

vicarious colony, they now talk of Russia as a decaying giant who

cannot even feed its own people and betrayed India in connection with

a signed agreement to supply to India seven cryogenic engines which

she reneged on under pressure from the United States of America.

 

The proponents, on the other hand swear by the helpful attitude of

the Russian regime and how Soviet Russia had supported India on the

Kashmir issue. The unflinching support during the 1971` Operations

against Pakistan, as compared to the infamous pro-Pakistan tilt by

the Nixon's United States of America is invariably highlighted.

 

Again the opponents talk of how Shastri was coerced to return all the

territorial gains made during the 1965 Operations and how India's

case was dumped, virtually overboard by Kosygin, in his attempt to

woo Pakistan. They also talk of the bugging of Shastri's apartment at

Tashkent. The controversy rages on, to and fro unendingly. Most of

these contenders forget that inter-nation relationships depend

entirely on perceptions about their interests and policy aims derived

from these interests. Ethics and sentiments do not have any place in

such relationships.

 

Historically speaking, India was ignored completely by Stalin, who

considered Nehru and his non-alignment as unacceptable and pro-West.

His perception was that Nehru was too much under the influence of the

British. He had written off India. India was to be dealt under the

classical communist approach of instigated labour revolution of the

proletariat.

 

However, as the Cordon Sanitaire, as envisaged by the Dullesian

concepts tightened, Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, did a volte face

and started wooing India.. Reservations, however, continued and just

when India did need the delivery of the MiG21, in 1962, which had

already been paid for, the delivery was delayed. Though they were

eventually delivered, it was too late and well after the immediate

need was over.

 

Subsequently, as Bhuttonian concepts gained ground in Pakistan and

their ties with the United States of America got put on the back

burner, the Russian leaders, particularly Kosygin, felt that the

Russians had a chance to get Pakistan into the Russian fold. Soviet

Russia started wooing Pakistan. This , probably, was one major

factor, though still not talked off, which encouraged Pakistan to

launch its adventure in Kutch and again later in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Russian, though ostensibly even handed, had a positively pro

Pakistan tilt, which eventually led to the Tashkent Agreement, where

India had to surrender all the territorial gains achieved during

these operations.

 

Between'65 and '71 the relationship between China and Russia

deteriorated, while China was able to successfully woo Pakistan. Even

more important China and United States of America also started coming

closer. Suddenly the Cordon Sanitaire started tightening around

Soviet Russia. This forced Soviet Russia to improve her relations

with India once again. In addition, facing a severe crunch in the

consumer industry she found India an ideal source of western type of

goods and technology. India was also desperate for opening up new

markets and found Russia an ideal solution to her quandary. She

walked into the Russian arms by signing the 20 Years Friendship

Treaty.

 

This signing of the Treaty with Soviet Russia also secured India's

Northern Flank, when the clouds of war were looming large over the

Indo-Pakistan horizon. In addition, this increased the trade between

the countries all payable in Rupees. Thus Russia got a wide range of

consumer goods at exchange rate extremely favourable, while India got

arms and equipment for which she paid in Rupees, an extremely weak

currency in the international market. In spite of an extremely

unfavourable exchange rate India was successful in maintaining a

favourable balance of trade.

 

This mutual Economic Advantage led to further improvement in

relations and India started taking Russian help, in practically all

spheres, for granted. Ostensibly, India found that all kinds of

assistance, technological, scientific, commercial, diplomatic, as

well as military equipment and supplies forthcoming. The situation

was such that even the Indian Foreign Policy started getting

influenced by the continued Russian support of the Kashmir Problem.

In fact India had stared losing her Freedom of Action as Russia

insidiously kept on spoon feeding India.

 

For Russia the situation was very favourable indeed. Apart from her

equipment getting tested under combat conditions she was also getting

in puts and feed back that led to her improving the capability and

the quality of her military equipment. She also benefited in geo-

political terms. As Russia advanced into Afghanistan, in her final

gamble threatening to strangulate the oil shipping lanes emanating

through the Persian Gulf, she needed some one who could continue

putting pressure on Pakistan.

 

That Pakistan would be a base for any opposition and possible

retaliation against Russia from the Western or rather American camp,

was obvious to any perceptive analyst. Thus since 1971 India's

relations with Russia had been cemented by the Mutual Economic

Advantage, as well as the Russian need for assistance in her advance

into Afghanistan. It is not that the assistance provided by India was

active or material. However, the fact that India did not condemn or

react adversely to the Russian move, forced Pakistan to keep looking

over her shoulder towards India, all the time she was involved in

Afghanistan.

 

Thus we see that as Soviet Russia's antagonism against United States

of America was the prime factor in her policies she had roped in

India as her man Friday. This need for her was further accentuated

when her relations with China soured. For India who, all this while

needed a crutch to counter the faulty policies, economic, geo-

political military, initiated by the Nehruvian set up, Russia was an

important even a vital prop.