Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the US

[Guest guest]

>Title: Triangle of Tension: India, Pakistan and the United States

>Author and Publication:

http://www.stratfor.com/fib/topStory_view.php?ID=204614

>28 May 2002

>

>Summary

>

>Historical distrust and tensions between India and Pakistan have

>reached practically unsustainable levels. New Delhi cannot tolerate

>paramilitary attacks such as the one against its parliament in

>December, but the regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf

simply

>may not be able to rein in the militants. Any concession on

Islamabad's

>part could set off a destabilizing political backlash, but this

reality

>also moves the countries closer to a war footing. The United

States,

>meanwhile, has willingly used the threat of war to pressure

Islamabad

>for cooperation in its battle against al Qaeda. Washington realizes

>that actual war between India and Pakistan would harm its own

>interests, but for New Delhi there has never been a better time to

act.

>

>Analysis

>

>Tension between India and Pakistan has been a feature of the

>international system since Britain withdrew from the subcontinent

and

>its imperium was partitioned between predominantly Muslim Pakistan

and

>predominantly Hindu India. The rhetoric has concerned Kashmir, but

the

>reality is that each nation deeply distrusts the intentions of the

>other. As with other conflicts, the litanies of injustice on both

sides

>are real but ultimately irrelevant. India and Pakistan are two

nations

>that regard the very existence of the other as a threat to their

>fundamental interests.

>

>From India's viewpoint, Pakistan represents the only serious

national

>security challenge. However bad Sino-Indian relations might become,

>China's ability to sustain an invasion deep into India, with a

supply

>line running over the Himalayas, is negligible. To the east, India

is

>buffered by deep jungles and weak nations. To the south lies the

Indian

>Ocean, which is militarily dominated by the United States, a

country

>whose interests frequently have diverged from India's but which

never

>has threatened India's existence. In other words, India is

effectively

>an island except on its western frontier. There lies Pakistan:

>insecure, fragmented and therefore unpredictable.

>

>If Pakistan were to cease to exist, India's strategic situation

would

>shift to invulnerability on land, thus opening up strategic

>opportunities at sea.

>

>On a deeper level, the Pakistani-Indian frontier represents the

>borderland between the Islamic and Hindu worlds. Whatever the

current

>condition of India, the broad historical threat is that the Islamic

>world one day might unite. In that case, the manageable threat

posed by

>Pakistan would become a potentially unmanageable situation, in

which

>the weight of re-emergent Islamic power would thrust up against an

>India that might not be able to resist. These are hypothetical

fears,

>far in the future, but they are not trivial.

>

>Islamabad is acutely aware of India's hopes and fears. Given

India's

>enormously greater size and military potential, logic would dictate

>that it would be in Pakistan's strategic interest to reach a stable

>accommodation with its neighbor, but two problems prevent this.

>

>First, Islamabad perceives -- not irrationally -- that India's

ultimate

>goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan. Rather than stabilizing the

>situation, any concession to India would simply increase the

>disadvantage at which Pakistan is already operating.

>

>Second, Pakistan as a nation is fragile. It is divided by ethnic

group

>as well as by worldviews. The essentially secular Pakistan of the

>founders and their heirs collides with the profoundly religious

>Pakistan that has re-emerged. It would be difficult, if not

impossible,

>for a Pakistani government to make substantial concessions to

India.

>Any concession -- in Kashmir, for example -- would come at the

expense

>of an ethnic group and a religious perspective that has the

potential

>to destabilize the entire regime if displeased, thereby increasing

the

>danger to national survival.

>

>Under these conditions, it has been Pakistan's historical

imperative to

>avoid engaging India in any negotiations that might lead to a

>comprehensive settlement. This is because of both reasonable fears

of

>India's long-term intentions and even more reasonable fears of the

>domestic response to any concession. For instance, if Pakistan were

to

>accept the current Line of Control in Kashmir, the consequences

would

>be destabilizing.

>

>Pakistan has therefore adopted a three-part strategy that is

>essentially military in nature.

>

>First, it has created a military force designed to impose heavy

costs

>on any Indian offensive. While this has strained Pakistan's economy

in

>comparison with India's, the country has had, as force multipliers,

the

>advantages both of terrain and of being on the defensive.

>

>Second, it has developed nuclear weapons -- not only to counter

India's

>nuclear force but also to deter India from threatening its

existence.

>In the central region of the front, where terrain is less

defensible,

>Islamabad is aware that India potentially could launch an attack

that

>would split the country in half. Pakistan's nuclear force, like

that of

>Israel, is designed to prevent conventional defeat by making the

risk

>of success too high for its foe.

>

>Third and most risky, Islamabad has adopted a strategy of

permitting

>paramilitary operations by various groups against Indian

installations,

>such as that against its parliament in December. It might be

>overstating it to say this is part of a strategy. Rather, these

well

>may be groups whose operations the government can't control or,

>alternatively, whose operations it chooses not to control for

domestic

>reasons. Clamping down on these groups might pose political

challenges

>at home.

>

>The paradox is that the domestic benefits of permitting these

>operations inevitably increase the risk of Indian military action.

It

>has been Pakistan's strategy to present a substantial defense along

the

>frontier while using the nuclear threat as the final deterrent. If

>India were to penetrate the frontier to any depth, it is not clear

>whether Pakistani forces would fall back, regroup and allow

guerrillas

>to operate to the rear of the Indian forces or whether they would

>rapidly grow nuclear. This is precisely the indeterminacy Islamabad

>wants to create.

>

>The situation was fairly stable, if noisy, until the United States

>entered the picture after Sept. 11. For Washington, the essential

>strategic problem in the region has been Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

>After the defeat of the Taliban regime, al Qaeda redeployed into

>Pakistan, joining forces that were already there. In the same way

that

>Islamabad found it less risky to permit paramilitary operations

against

>India than to prevent them, it found it less risky to permit al

Qaeda

>forces sanctuary than to close them down -- not to mention

permitting

>U.S. forces to take on al Qaeda in Pakistani territory.

>

>Following the attack on India's Parliament, New Delhi created the

first

>post-Sept. 11 crisis. The United States used that crisis to back

the

>government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf into a corner:

While

>publicly seeking to defuse the crisis, Washington used the Indian

>threat to change the equation for Pakistan. Officials made it clear

>that, in fact, permitting al Qaeda to operate in Pakistan is a

greater

>threat to regime survival than permitting U.S. forces to operate

>against al Qaeda. If India attacked Pakistan and the United States

>remained neutral or actively participated, the consequences for

>Pakistan would be catastrophic.

>

>Musharraf publicly conceded, and U.S. forces entered Pakistan.

>Obviously, with India and the United States involved, Musharraf had

to

>re-evaluate the value of his nuclear capability. The United States

>clearly had the ability to destroy Pakistan's nuclear facilities

more

>effectively than India might. When Washington announced a shift in

its

>nuclear policy to permit first strikes, Pakistan was the

unmentioned

>audience. Musharraf clearly heard and understood. Unconfirmed

rumors

>have persisted in the region for several months that Pakistan's

nuclear

>arsenals already are in U.S. hands or that U.S. observers are at

least

>positioned at various facilities. The Times of India recently

published

>an article to this effect, without providing evidence.

>

>Musharraf, however, has limited control, whatever his desires might

be.

>Operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan clearly have been less than

>successful because of limits on Pakistani cooperation. Musharraf's

>ability to control anti-Indian groups is similarly limited. Thus,

the

>recent attack on an Indian facility by Pakistan-based

paramilitaries

>has reignited the crisis with India -- at the same time that the

United

>States is revisiting the issue of Pakistan's support for U.S.

>operations against al Qaeda.

>

>Washington has been moving steadily closer to India, particularly

in

>the area of military cooperation. This is partly out of recognition

>that the two countries have similar interests in combating Islamic

>groups in Pakistan. It also is because the United States wants to

>replicate its maneuvers of earlier this year, using India as the

lever

>to compel cooperation from Pakistan.

>

>Washington expects it can manage the India-Pakistan confrontation

>effectively, but there are two reasons this might not be the case

this

>time. First, Musharraf simply may have reached the limits of his

power.

>He just may not be able to provide the United States and India with

the

>degree of control over Islamic factions that they seek.

>

>Indeed, Musharraf has known his limits all along and has been

playing

>for time, hoping the crisis can be defused. The Islamic groups do

not

>want to see the crisis defused, since their goal is to create a

>cauldron that draws in U.S. forces on the ground, sucking them into

a

>war of attrition that will, in the long run, enhance their own

>position. Since Musharraf cannot deliver what is demanded, he is

being

>forced to consider alternative solutions to the crisis. The

solution is

>to increase the fearsomeness of his military -- in short, brush

aside

>U.S. threats and brandish Pakistan's nuclear capability.

>

>The second problem is India. New Delhi understands that there will

>never be a better time to deal with Pakistan. Paramilitary attacks

are

>genuinely intolerable to India. They also provide an excuse for war

to

>which the United States cannot ultimately object, given its views

on al

>Qaeda and its support for Israel. Washington is neither politically

nor

>militarily in a position to block New Delhi. Therefore, if India

ever

>intends to deal with Pakistan, now is the time to act.

>

>There are two problems with action. First, from the Indian

standpoint,

>the Pakistani nuclear threat must be treated as real and likely to

be

>used in the event of war. This leaves New Delhi with two options.

One

>is a non-regime threatening strategy of special operations against

>Islamic groups in Pakistan, but this would not solve the core

problem.

>The second option is a broader attack into Pakistan, designed to

>shatter the country. That attack could be carried out only with a

>pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities. The issue

is

>the degree of confidence India has in its own surgical nuclear

>capabilities -- or the United States' willingness to take out

Pakistani

>weapons in order to prevent nuclear escalation.

>

>This brings us to the second problem. The dismemberment of Pakistan

>would compound rather than solve the United States' problem. The

chaos

>that would follow would create precisely the conditions al Qaeda

needs

>for its own security. Entire areas of the country, in the least

>hospitable terrain, would become more secure for al Qaeda than

before.

>Therefore, from the U.S. standpoint, using the threat of an Indian

>attack is ideal; a successful Indian attack would be harmful.

>

>India's calculus is not the same, however. If it is accepted that

>Pakistan represents a permanent strategic threat to India, the

question

>of war is not whether but when. Given the current political

situation

>and correlation of forces, if this isn't the perfect time, what is?

>

>If war is inevitable, it is difficult to see how India can act

without

>taking out Pakistan's nuclear capability. It is unclear how India

could

>take those out without nuclear weapons, or without U.S.

>precision-guided munitions, Special Operations and other covert

forces.

>But at the end of the day, the United States does not want Pakistan

in

>chaos, it does not want an Indian nuclear strike and it certainly

>doesn't want Pakistan -- facing a use-it-or-lose-it scenario -- to

>launch its own nuclear strike.

>

>The United States probably could paralyze Pakistan's nuclear force.

>That, however, would open the door to Indian attack, since the

United

>States could not prevent paramilitary operations and cannot permit

>India to achieve its historical goal -- at least not until al Qaeda

has

>been dealt with. On the other hand, India cannot afford to miss

this

>historic opportunity.

>

>We are therefore in an extraordinarily difficult crisis. The three

>players each have strategic interests that simply don't mesh. If

>Washington convinces New Delhi to wait, it will have to convince

>Islamabad to stay in India's crosshairs and India to put up with

>intolerable attacks. If India proceeds, it essentially would save

al

>Qaeda by shattering Pakistan. In the event of complete

mismanagement, a

>nuclear exchange costing millions of lives is a genuine

possibility.

>

>India has given Pakistan a small window of opportunity to solve the

>problem it cannot solve. It gives the United States a period of

time to

>defuse a situation that, in STRATFOR's view, could suddenly and

>catastrophically get out of hand.

>

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