"Safeguarding India" By Former RAW Director

[Guest guest]

NRI's please awake from your slumber. Mr Das was deputy director of

RAW, Indian Intelligence. This article is copied from Bharat

Rakshak. Its time to unleash the sword. The imminent attack on Iraq

will be the signal.

 

 

 

Safeguarding Indian interests in the unipolar world

 

A. Das

 

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980-early 1990s

impacted every player on the international stage. Its most direct

impact on India has been the extraordinary extent to which American

sensitivities have since influenced India's relations with the world

at large. As a matter of course, Indian decision-makers factor in

possible U.S. reactions to potential Indian actions as a determinant

of national policy[ii]. In other words, an increasingly large

swathe of India's external relations have to be viewed through the

prism of the Indo-American relationship till a more multi-polar

global scenario emerges.

This paper is an attempt to define an optimal approach for managing

this relationship.

Historical background

The dictum "no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent

interests" is regarded as a basic principle governing serious

debates on geopolitics and international affairs. Further, even

interests are not permanent but subject to constant modification and

fine-tuning, thus resulting in actual policies and subsequently,

plans.

In the 1940s[iii] and 50s[iv], it was in the Anglo-American interest

to support and buttress the Indian republic as a role model for the

emerging post-colonial world. India's choice of democracy as

opposed to communism or totalitarianism was only part of the

motivation. The more significant issue was the Indian leadership's

conviction that India shall not bear grudges[v] against the west.

The Republic matures

The Mahatma during the freedom struggle and Pandit Nehru after

Independence had ensured that the Indian republic presented a supine

and non-threatening picture to the outside world. But, a reading of

the Mahatma's Autobiography[vi] and Panditji's numerous writings

[vii] brings out subtle differences in their views. While the

Mahatma's belief in non-violent struggle was completely heart-felt,

his decision to choose non-violent mobilization was driven primarily

by his conviction that it was the only tactic with any acceptable

probability of success. His responses to Lt. Gen. K.M. Cariappa's

[viii] queries on the subject during the Jammu & Kashmir operations

of 1947-48 attest to this[ix]. On the other hand, like other

leading figures of the era, Panditji derived his belief in the

Mahatma's methods of political mobilization second-hand from the

Mahatma. Hence his understanding of the underlying logic was a tad

superficial. The widespread fetishization of "Gandhianism" among

the Congress leadership[x] well into the early 1980s is a direct

result of this disconnect.

More than the events in Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-48, the 1962

debacle on the Tibetan frontier was a seminal event that illustrated

to the thinking public in India that Independence had changed the

rules of the game[xi] as far as national security affairs were

concerned. It could be argued that Chairman Mao stood a better

chance of acquiring India under his wing by largely non-violent

methods centering around the Communist Party of India (CPI), than by

his "teach a lesson" strategy"[xii]. But, such subtlety was rare in

that dogged long-marcher[xiii].

The last twenty years have seen both generational and ideological

churnings in the Indian body politic. The Indian self-image of an

increasingly strong and prosperous nation is no longer easy to

rubbish as wishful thinking by outsiders. Not that some will stop

trying[xiv].

U.S. imperatives

It is fair to say that the U.S. favors an India that continues to be

non-threatening. That would mean that the U.S. would continue to

deepen its economic, social, cultural and military ties with India.

The more entangled and inter-twined the institutions of the two

countries are, the better things look from the U.S. perspective as

this enhances U.S. leverage on India. This inter-twining is largely

in India's interest as well, as it grants India access to technology

and capital. But, India can expect periodic exertions of

psychological, economic and political pressure from the U.S. to

materialize whenever the U.S. feels the need to "guide" Indian

behavior[xv].

A conceptual "box" exists within the minds of American planners and

they will do what they can to keep India within that box. In other

words, IT parks[xvi] are fine but ICBMs[xvii] are not. Mobilization

against terror-sponsors is fine, movement against terror-sponsors is

not[xviii],[xix]. Given their way, these planners would rather see

an Indian elephant[xx] that resembles the hapless Gajendra[xxi] than

the glorious Airavata[xxii].

Indian interests

At a minimum, thinking Indians would like to "break out of this

box". One indicator of a successful "break out" would be carte

blanche to prosecute unlimited war against the perpetrators of

periodic barbaric acts in India that sit fairly unmolested across

the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir and the International Border

elsewhere in India's northwest. Another would be a substantive and

meaningful multi-lateral economic development roadmap that would

enable India to take up a seat at such financial high tables as the

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)[xxiii]

and the G-8 (Group of Eight Industrialized Nations)[xxiv]. A third

would be an invitation to join the P-5 (Five Permanent Members of

the United Nations Security Council)[xxv]. One need not have

inherited Vishnu Gupta Chanakya's[xxvi] genetic material to deduce

that these are utopian expectations, to say the least.

The paradigm of respect

"Winning the respect" of the Americans would lead to a

successful "break out". Nations that have "won the respect" of the

Americans include the British, the Germans, the Russians, the

Japanese, the Chinese and the Vietnamese.

The British, in American eyes, are like the "Swayambu Lingam"[xxvii]

in Shaivaite[xxviii] lore, imbued with noble qualities by nature.

The Germans have earned their respect from the Americans time and

time again, from Gen. Baron von Steuben[xxix] in the American

Revolution, to the German exploits during 1914-1945. The Russians

will go down in American history as the only nation to have posed an

existential threat[xxx] to the Americans. The Japanese victory in

the 1905 Russo-Japanese War[xxxi] was a seminal inflection point in

the evolution of 20th Century American policies in East Asia. The

Chinese in Korea impressed[xxxii] Harry Truman, that paragon of

American spunk. The Vietnamese can legitimately claim to have

defeated 3[xxxiii],[xxxiv] of the P-5.

A victory too Pyrrhic?

As elected leaders of a democratic republic, Indian decision-makers

cannot consciously make choices that impose unacceptable costs on

the citizenry[xxxv]. "Winning the respect" of the International

Community as the Germans, the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese

and the Vietnamese did would be unconscionable, as it would entail

many Indians dying and many more regressing into poverty. India

will have to blaze its own trail towards respect, devoid of

unacceptable deaths and destruction.

A journey already begun

It is not uncommon among American families to have one member become

a College Professor, another a Soldier, another a Stock Broker, and

still another a Chef. Some individual Americans may even spend time

in each of these diverse occupations through the course of their

careers. Tocqueville interpreted this very commendable American

phenomenon as "classlessness" [xxxvi] while Swami Vivekananda

praised Americans[xxxvii] as "Karma Yogis"[xxxviii] and "True

Vedantins"[xxxix] for the very same quality. Americans take this

psychographic dexterity as a given[xl] both in themselves and among

others, viewing its absence as abnormal and as a shortcoming.

Historically in India, these four professions would rarely have come

together in the same family because they

typify "Brahmin", "Kshatriya", "Vaishya" and "Shudra" trades

respectively[xli]. The sooner this dubious interpretation of

the "Chatur Varna"[xlii] construct gets shed in India, the better

for the national interest. Till then, these misinterpretations will

color outsiders' perceptions of India, though they will not impair

truly insightful deductions about the Indian republic.

Achievements of Indians and Indian-Americans in the Sciences and in

Business are slowly making their way into the greater American sub-

conscious. Characterization of Indians as being "a Math-Wiz"[xliii]

and as being "well off"[xliv] is a fairly common phenomenon in 21st

century America. In due course, Indians and Indian-Americans will

get credit for being good, hard working, law abiding members of

the "Service Professions" as well, as long as a modicum of Indian

immigration to the U.S. continues. Sections of the extreme right in

America have always complained about "demographic forward

deployment"[xlv] by various other cultures, though an overwhelming

majority of Americans are broad-minded and friendly to Indians.

But, of real relevance in the national quest to "win respect" are

not these "Brahmin", "Vaishya" and "Shudra" accomplishments. The

issue is to unmistakably demonstrate "Kshatriya" prowess to the

Americans, without even remotely confronting them directly.

Needless to say, this "Kshatriya" component of national respect will

have to be won not on the North American continent, but in the sub-

continental neighborhood.

The American Example

The U.S. itself can serve as a very appropriate role model for an

India seeking to establish itself as a legitimate Great Power. From

the time of the American Revolution to the time it burst onto the

world stage as a major player during World War I, the U.S. can be

seen as having undergone a century-long rite of passage as an

emerging nation.

Significant events constituting this passage include

· The trans-oceanic victory against the Barbary Pirates in

the early 1800s[xlvi]

· American steadfastness against Britain and Canada in the

War of 1812[xlvii]

· Demonstration of American national strength in prosecuting

war with Mexico over Texas and in pressing home the advantage

afterwards in terms of advantageous territorial absorptions [xlviii]

· U.S. resolve in contravention of international law and

custom during the civil war naval action against the CSS Florida in

Brazilian territorial waters outside of Bahia[xlix]

· American initiative in leveraging the USS Maine incident

to wage an inter-oceanic war with a weakened Spain, resulting in the

acquisition of a major Pacific foothold in the Philippines, apart

from Caribbean strongholds in Puerto Rico and Cuba[li]

The most notable characteristic of these demonstrations of America's

strength and its gift for independent action is the relative economy

of effort in terms of personnel and materiel losses. In other

words, the price paid by the American citizenry to support their

national efforts to carve a place for themselves among the great

powers of the day was well within acceptable bounds (the American

Civil War was an entirely different matter in terms of losses, but

that conflict was more about impressing one's fellow countrymen).

The will and the way

The Indian nation state has also shown its own sense of purpose and

resolve several times since its very infancy. These instances

include

· Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon's integration of the princely

states[lii] into the Indian Union in the face of British obduracy

during 1947-49

· The liberation of Goa[liii] in 1961 from NATO[liv] member

Portugal's yoke

· The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 despite the pressure

of the Nixon-Kissinger nuclear threats[lv]

· The grant of full and proper statehood[lvi] to Sikkim in

1975 despite international opposition

· The forceful gate-crashing of the Nuclear Weapons Powers

Club in 1998 through the testing of multiple designs of fully-

weaponized nuclear devices at Pokhran[lvii]

Even so, India has thus far not shown the world that it is fully

capable of truly breaking its geopolitical shackles once and for

all. Though national resolve has been amply demonstrated, national

strength and power have not yet been undeniably unsheathed.

A two-pronged strategy

Indian military prowess will impress the American-led International

Community if India repeatedly does two things:

a) Demonstrate capabilities that they have not demonstrated

Avid observers of Indian military affairs will note that the Indian

Armed Forces quite regularly demonstrate cutting-edge capabilities.

Some examples include the Indian Army's domination of the Siachen

glacier[lviii],[lix] since the mid-1980s, the Indian Navy's

innovative towing of Osa class Missile Boats to attack Karachi in

1971[lx], and the Indian Air Force improvising mechanisms to attack

ultra-high altitude surface positions during the Kargil conflict in

1999[lxi]. The hoodwinking of American intelligence agencies[lxii]

to pull off undetected the Shakti-98 series of nuclear tests at

Pokhran[lxiii] can also be regarded as a superb feat involving

coordination between multiple Indian security agencies.

Indians need to aggressively highlight these capabilities to

international audiences notwithstanding the near complete denial of

free access to credible global media resources. Word-of-mouth and

asymmetric information dispersal strategies should be used to create

some space[lxiv] for highlighting Indian military prowess and

competence.

The ultimate objective though should still be to receive official

acknowledgement from mainstream opinion-leaders and media. That

will occur only when demonstrations of Indian power and national

will become so awesome that they cannot be effectively ignored any

longer. Acceptance, albeit grudging [lxv], of India's nuclear

assets and capabilities is indicative of such a desirable

progression.

b) Defeat enemies that they dare not fight

It is almost axiomatic that in the post World War-II era, the U.S.

never picks fights with nations bigger in size than the American

state of Texas[lxvi]. Members of the "axis of evil"[lxvii], Taliban-

led Afghanistan, the now-defunct Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia,

Granada, Libya, Vietnam, and Cuba are all illustrative examples of

this "rule".

Unfortunately, present realities dictate that India cannot afford to

pick such insignificant enemies. In the foreseeable future, India's

serious adversaries are all bound to be large states with burgeoning

populations, nuclear capabilities and acknowledged fighting

abilities. Further, these opponents will almost universally be

charged by ideological zeal and other intangible but strong

motivations.

Indian policy-makers have been forced to consistently pick

the "lesser evil" between total war and an imperfect peace while

keeping in view the greater national good. Those observers pre-

disposed towards a weak Indian republic have chosen to interpret (at

least in public) this deliberate choice as lack of will, ability or

both.

India must disabuse them of such illusions at a time of its own

choosing.

Knowledgeable Indians can come up with multiple scenarios that will

enable India to accomplish both a) and b). But, the overriding

consideration must be for Indians to undertake these endeavors fully

independently, meaning India acting alone.

Even a minimum amount of overt co-operation with the International

Community in pursuing these national projects will result in

unsolicited and undesirable hogging of credit [lxviii], [lxix]

for "tutelage" and "direction" by actors other than India. More

significantly, such cooperation may seriously hamper future Indian

efforts to re-shape the country's geopolitical landscape to its own

advantage, thus defeating the whole purpose.

References