Time to woo India?US

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Subj: Time to woo India?

12/20/02 5:56:12 AM Pacific Standard Time

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An insightful analysis in AEI's December, 2002 issue of *National

Security Outlook* by defense and security expert, Thomas Donnelly.

 

Excerpts:

Perhaps the most alluring partner for the United States in the coming

century is India. Although underreported in the American press at the

time, one of the major initiatives of the early Bush administration

was an opening to New Delhi undertaken by Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Armitage.

 

First and foremost, India is a strong democracy. Not only is India the

world's largest democracy, but it is an increasingly stable one. It

also arguably boasts the world's largest Muslim population--more than

120 million--that is genuinely free; democracy in Turkey, for

instance, is limited in comparison.

 

As its democracy has deepened, India has become, haltingly, a more

decent society...... "today's India," observes Ralph Peters in the

U.S. Army War College journal Parameters, "is to a far greater degree,

the story of the dog that didn't bark, of the hundreds of millions of

Hindus and Muslims (as well as those of other faiths) who do not kill

each other and who, despite seductive prejudices, work together as

Indians first, whether in the government, in the military, or in

business."

 

India's government also has behaved remarkably responsibly over the

past year, even at the height of tensions over Kashmir. The Vajpayee

government has seemed to understand the Bush administration's need for

a temporary accommodation with Pakistan; New Delhi's patience can only

buttress its case as a reliable and stable future partner.

 

Moreover, the Indian military is a serious force, not simply on land

but in the Indian Ocean. It is saddled with too much Soviet-style

equipment, but it has a professional officer corps and is firmly under

civilian control. And the "problem" of nuclear weapons in South Asia

is overwhelmingly a problem of Pakistan; that is, the real danger is

the regime's instability, not the balance of armaments.

 

President Bush has rightly framed the post-September 11 "war on

terrorism" as a struggle to stabilize and democratize the Islamic

world. That is an immense undertaking, one clearly intimidating to

Europeans.

 

But their weakness should send us in search of new partners--perhaps

beginning in New Delhi but not ending--lest we dance alone.

Ram Narayanan

 

http://www.aei.org/nso/nso14664.htm

 

NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK, December 2002

 

TIME TO WOO INDIA? By Thomas Donnelly

 

Now that the United Nations has approved a new resolution on Iraq, one

with disarmament provisions that Saddam Hussein apparently accepts,

the diplomatic dances between the United States and its European

allies have entered a new phase: the quick,

swing-your-strategic-partner square dance hoped for by the Bush

administration has given way to the sort of elaborate minuet favored

in continental capitals.

 

This may suit the immediate moment, but it is not a propitious sign

for the future. The cheek-to-cheek relationship between America and

her principal cold-war partners has soured, with perhaps a permanent

breakup in the offing. Even if U.S.-European affairs can be patched

up, it is time for the Bush administration to play the field and come

up with some new geopolitical partners: "Young, fit, sole superpower

seeks like-minded democracies for long-term relationship. You must be

willing to use military power, even preemptively. Turn-offs: rogue

regimes, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, ethnic

cleansing. Turn-ons: life, liberty, pursuit of happiness."

 

The key element in any set of new alliance partnerships will be the

nature of our potential partners--specifically, their firmly

democratic character. Absent a Soviet-style, superpower enemy, the

United States need not tolerate the unsavory regimes it sometimes made

common cause with during the cold war. Almost equally important is the

willingness to use power in the cause of freedom. But beyond these

basic questions of compatibility lie the new strategic considerations

shaped by the war on terrorists and terror-loving states in the

greater Middle East and by concerns over the future of China, still

the most likely candidate as a great power rival--or "future peer

competitor," in Pentagonese.

 

In light of those standards, it shouldn't come as a big surprise that

the traditional European "great powers" no longer look so attractive

as strategic partners. Since 1945, neither Germany nor France has

played a large role outside Europe. Great Britain, by contrast,

retains some of the trappings and attitudes of the Empire. British

military forces remain very professional and are generally well

equipped, but the British army numbers less than 110,000 soldiers.

Russia shares many American concerns in the Islamic world and about

China, but its transition to democracy is far from complete. Yet,

ironically, of the nineteenth-century European great powers, our

former enemy might well be the most likely candidate for future

strategic partnership.

 

Smaller eastern European nations can help compensate for some of the

weaknesses of the great powers. In general, easterners are far less

ambivalent about the exercise of American power than western

Europeans. Southeastern Europeans, in particular, are ready to do what

they can to help in a war on their doorsteps; Bulgarians and Romanians

are in fact hoping to provide a home to future NATO or U.S. bases in

the region. Both have opened their own bases and airspace for use in

operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and invested part of what

little military investment funds they have to begin to improve their

facilities to NATO standards.

 

Still, in a theater of war that stretches from the eastern

Mediterranean to Southeast Asia, these are but marginal contributions.

And in a struggle that promises to last decades, something more than

an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" will be needed to secure a

lasting victory. The United States must look further afield to find

its strategic true love.

 

India's Allure

 

Perhaps the most alluring partner for the United States in the coming

century is India. Although underreported in the American press at the

time, one of the major initiatives of the early Bush administration

was an opening to New Delhi undertaken by Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Armitage. While there is much work to do to repair past

decades of rancorous relations between India and the United

States--and to overcome many misconceptions, such as the perceived

danger of India's nuclear program--a sound basis for future

cooperation exists.

 

First and foremost, India is a strong democracy. Not only is India the

world's largest democracy, but it is an increasingly stable one. It

also arguably boasts the world's largest Muslim population--more than

120 million--that is genuinely free; democracy in Turkey, for

instance, is limited in comparison.

 

As its democracy has deepened, India has become, haltingly, a more

decent society. Despite the epic violence of the past and the

intermittent violence that continues to plague the country, "today's

India," observes Ralph Peters in the U.S. Army War College journal

Parameters, "is to a far greater degree, the story of the dog that

didn't bark, of the hundreds of millions of Hindus and Muslims (as

well as those of other faiths) who do not kill each other and who,

despite seductive prejudices, work together as Indians first, whether

in the government, in the military, or in business."

 

That might sound like faint praise, but when one considers the Islamic

extremism that daily threatens the fragile order in Pakistan (or in

Bangladesh), or India's own bloody past, contemporary India does

indeed seem a remarkably tolerant society. "Hindu fundamentalism,"

while sporadically violent, has no Osama-like terrorist leader nor an

al Qaeda-like network. Nor is it a rejection of modernity.

 

India's government also has behaved remarkably responsibly over the

past year, even at the height of tensions over Kashmir. The Vajpayee

government has seemed to understand the Bush administration's need for

a temporary accommodation with Pakistan; New Delhi's patience can only

buttress its case as a reliable and stable future partner.

 

Moreover, the Indian military is a serious force, not simply on land

but in the Indian Ocean. It is saddled with too much Soviet-style

equipment, but it has a professional officer corps and is firmly under

civilian control. And the "problem" of nuclear weapons in South Asia

is overwhelmingly a problem of Pakistan; that is, the real danger is

the regime's instability, not the balance of armaments.

 

President Bush has rightly framed the post-September 11 "war on

terrorism" as a struggle to stabilize and democratize the Islamic

world. That is an immense undertaking, one clearly intimidating to

Europeans.

 

But their weakness should send us in search of new partners--perhaps

beginning in New Delhi but not ending--lest we dance alone.

 

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI. AEI print index #14656