India's National Security Doctrine

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National Security Doctrine >Sun, 5 Jan 2003 09:49:07 -0800 > >NATIONAL

SECURITY DOCTRINE >B.RAMAN >Any national security doctrine (NSD) of India has

to cater to the possibility of threats from two sources--- China and Pakistan.

> >2. The threat from China was rated high till 1988 because of the unresolved

border dispute between the two countries, the clandestine military and nuclear

assistance given by the Chinese Government to the Pakistani Armed Forces in

order to keep the Indian Security Forces preoccupied on two fronts and the

support extended by the Chinese intelligence agencies to the tribal insurgent

groups of India's North-East. The border dispute had led to a war between the

two countries in 1962.Between 1967 and 1979, many of these insurgent groups

went to Yunnan in China vis North Burma and were trained and armed by the

Chinese intelligence. > >3. The visit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Indian Prime

Minister, to China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiao-peng set in motion

the process of improving the bilateral relations.In 1988 and thereafter, the

two countries agreed on a number of confidence-building measures, set up a

joint working group to discuss the border problem on a sustained basis and

decided not to let the pending border dispute come in the way of an improvement

in the relations in the economic, cultural and other fields. The Chinese

intelligence, which had already started reducing its clandestine assistance to

the tribal insurgent groups from 1979, totally stopped it after 1988. > >4.

Despite this, China continues to pre-occupy the attention of India's national

security managers due to the following reasons: > > >The very slow progress of

the talks on the border issue giving rise to misgivings that it probably wants

to keep this issue alive till it has totally pacified Tibet to its

satisfaction. Though there is no more unrest in Tibet, which has been

developing economically, the Dalai Lama still enjoys a large following there.

The Chinese are determined that when the present Dalai Lama dies, his successor

would be a man of their choice. They apprehend that this could give rise to

serious unrest, which could be exploited by theTibetan diaspora in India and

elsewhere. By keeping the border issue alive, China wants to retain a pressure

point which it can exploit should India show reluctance to keep the Tibetan

refugees under control. In national security matters, the Chinese, unlike the

Indians, work on a long-term basis and try to develop today options which they

may need years hence should circumstances so warrant. >China's continued

clandestine assistance to Pakistan in the military nuclear field and in the

acquisition of a missile-based delivery capability.Even as Beijing was entering

into an agreement with Rajiv Gandhi on improving bilateral relations, it was

secretly entering an agreement with Islamabad for assistance in the missile

field. >China's decision in 2001 to assist Pakistan in the construction of the

Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast, which would reduce Pakistan's present

dependence on the Karachi port, which is within easy reach of the Indian Navy,

and give the Pakistani Navy a greater operational flexibility. >5. The threat

from Pakistan has always remained and will continue to remain of a very high

order due to the following reasons: > >Pakistan's inability to reconcile itself

to the loss of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and its obsessive urge to gain control of

this territory by hook or by crook. >Its equally obsessive urge to avenge its

defeat at the hands of India in 1971 and its loss of the then East Pakistan.

>The predominant role of the revenge-seeking Pakistani Army in its national

security management, with practically no role for an elected political

leadership in this matter. >Its refusal to work for a reduction of tension and

for the improvement of relations in other fields till a negotiated solution

could be found to the Kashmir question. >The complexes and the feelings of

insecurity from which the Pakistan Army suffers vis-a-vis its Indian

counterpart. >The role of the pan-Islamic extremist elements in moulding

perceptions towards India, whether in the civil society or in the national

security apparatus. > >6. Its 1971 defeat at the hands of India brought home to

Pakistan the ground reality that it could never hope to achieve its territorial

objective through a conventional war on India. It, therefore, embarked upon a

policy of waging a proxy war through the use of terrorism as a weapon against

the Indian State. Pakistan had been using terrorism against the Indian State

since 1956 when the Naga insurgency broke out. Whereas its use of terrorism

against India before 1971 was a defensive measure to keep the Indian Security

Forces preoccupied with internal security duties so that they could not pose a

threat to it, its use after 1971 was an agressive measure having the dual

objective of continuing to keep the Indian Security Forces bleeding and

preoccupied with internal security duties and achieving its strategic objective

of annexing J&K without the direct use of its Army in a conventional war. > >7.

Till Pakistan achieved a military nuclear capability in the late 1980s, which

was subsequently openly demonstrated in the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998, it

kept its proxy war restricted to the training and arming of Indian separatist

groups, whether in Punjab or J&K, which had taken to arms against the Govt. of

India due to various grievances. The acquisition of the military nuclear

capability made the Pakistani military leadership conclude that the possibility

of an Indian-imposed conventional war in retaliation for its proxy war had been

reduced considerably, if not largely eliminated, and hence it could further

escalate its proxy war by training, arming and infiltrating into India its own

nationals under the guise of jihadi volunteers from different pan-Islamic

organisations to intensify the jihad against India. Till 1995, the role of

these mercenaries was largely confined to J&K, but since then Pakistan's

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been using them in other ! >parts of

India too. > >8. Pakistan looks upon its nuclear arsenal and its missile

delivery capability not as a weapon of deterrence to deter India from using its

nuclear capability against it, but as a weapon of intimidation to prevent India

from retaliating against it through its armed forces for its proxy war and as a

weapon of psychological pressure by creating fears of a possible nuclear

holocaust and thereby moving the rest of the world, particularly the US, to

exercise pressure on India on the J&K issue. Its consistent refusal to

to the no first use of nuclear weapons declaration and its repeated

reiteration of its readiness to make first use of its nuclear weapons to

prevent the Indian Army from over-running its large cities and crushing its

Army are part of its intimidatory tactics. > >9. The nuclear threat from

Pakistan is compounded by the presence of pan-Islamic jihadi elements which

justify the use of the weapons of mass destruction to protect Islam, if

necessary. The possibility of the nuclearisation of terrorism originating from

the terrorist hub of Pakistan is a matter of great concern not only to India,

but also to the international community as a whole, confronted with the threat

of pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism. > >10. Since Gen.Pervez Musharraf seized power

on October 12,1999,Pakistan has embarked on a policy of over-projecting its

nuclear and missile capability in order to reassure its own population of the

adequacy of its capability and to intimidate India and prevent a retaliatory

conventional strike against its proxy war. > >11.The objectives of India's NSD

vis-a-vis China are two-fold and simple: > > >How to prevent a repeat of 1962,

by maintaining an adequate level of conventional military capability to deter

any Chinese temptation to enforce its territorial claims against India by

force? >How to maintain a credible nucleat deterrent against it? >12. The NSD

objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan are manifold and much more complex: > >How to

find a controlled retaliatory response to Pakistan's proxy war without allowing

the response to degenerate into a war involving the use of nuclear weapons? >How

to neutralise the Pakistani attempts to intimidate and demoralise the Indian

population through over-projection of its nuclear and missile capability and

irresponsible nuclear rhetoric? >Whereas any war with China will most probably

be fought in Indian territory, any war with Pakistan will be in Pakistani

territory. How to prevent India's overwhelming conventional superiority from

pressing the panic button in Pakistan's military leadership and triggering off

a nuclear response ? >How to achieve India's military objectives in the

shortest time possible before international intervention comes in the way of

the further conduct of the war? >13. In response to these questions, a number

of possible options had figured in the debate on national security in recent

months. Amongst the various oprtions suggested/considered were: > >Greater

transparency about India's nuclear and missile capabilities to reassure our own

population and to have a sobering effect on Pakistan's adventurist Generals. >A

public announcement of India's nuclear command and control mechanism.

>Discarding India's no first use of nuclear weapons policy. >India's readiness

and ability to fight a limited conventional war without allowing it to escalate

into a nuclear confrontation. >A counter-terrorism doctrine to exploit

Pakistan's vulnerabilities through covert action to make it pay an increasingly

prohibitive price for its proxy war. >Co-operative action through other

concerned powers to prevent Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction capabilities

from falling into the hands of its terrorists. >14. The announcement by the

Govt. of India of India's nuclear command and control mechanism and the

contours of its nuclear doctrine on January 4,2002, was the necessary first

step in this direction. The no first use policy has been reiterated, but in a

nuanced form by underlining that India's nuclear capability is meant to deter

not only a nuclear strike, but also a strike with chemical or biological

weapons. India's capability and determination for a massive retaliatory

response has been reiterated. >15. However, the nuclear doctrine by itself will

not complete the national security doctrine unless it is supplemented by a

counter-terrorism doctrine to enable India exercise its right of active defence

against the Pakistani use of terrorism as a weapon to achieve its strategic

objectives.Such a doctrine should have a mix of carefully-controlled overt and

extensive, sustained and deniable covert actions. The national security

managers should now devote themselves to this task. It brookes no delay.

(5-1-03) > >(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat,

Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,

Chennai. E-Mail: corde (AT) vsnl (DOT) com ) > > >

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