do not ignore china

[Guest guest]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EA11Df03.htmlPakistan, China underpin

India's security doctrineBy B Raman Any national security doctrine of India has

to cater to the possibility of threats from two sources - China and Pakistan.

The threat from China was rated high until 1988 because of the unresolved

border dispute between the two countries, the clandestine military and nuclear

assistance given by the Chinese government to the Pakistani armed forces in

order to keep the Indian security forces preoccupied on two fronts, and the

support extended by the Chinese intelligence agenciesto the tribal insurgent

groups of India's Northeast. The border dispute led to a war between the two

countries in 1962. Between 1967 and 1979, many of these insurgent groups went

to Yunnan in China via north Myanmar and were trained and armed by the Chinese

intelligence. The visit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Indian prime minister, to

China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiaoping set in motion the process of

improving bilateral relations. In 1988 and thereafter, the two countries agreed

on a number of confidence-building measures, set up a joint working group to

discuss the border problem on a sustained basis and decided not tolet the

pending border dispute come in the way of an improvement in relations in the

economic, cultural and other fields. The Chinese intelligence, which had

already started reducing its clandestine assistance to the tribal insurgent

groups from 1979, totally stopped it after 1988. Despite this, China continues

to pre-occupy the attention of India's national security managers due to the

following reasons: The very slow progress of the talks on the border issue,

giving rise to misgivings that Beijing probably wants to keep this issue alive

till it has totally pacified Tibet to its satisfaction. Though there is no more

unrest in Tibet, which has been developing economically, the Dalai Lama still

enjoys a large following there. The Chinese are determined that whenthe present

Dalai Lama dies, his successor will be a man of their choice. They appreciate

that this could give rise to serious unrest, which could be exploited by the

Tibetan Diaspora in India and elsewhere. By keeping the border issue alive,

China wants to retain a pressure point which it can exploit should India show

reluctance to keep the Tibetan refugees undercontrol. In national security

matters, the Chinese, unlike the Indians, work on a long-term basis and try to

develop today options that they may need years hence should circumstances so

warrant. For example, China's continued clandestine assistance to Pakistan in

the military nuclear field and in the acquisition of a missile-based delivery

capability. Even as Beijing wasentering into an agreement with Rajiv Gandhi on

improving bilateral relations, it was secretly entering an agreement with

Islamabad for assistance in the missile field. Another example is China's

decision in 2001 to assist Pakistan in the construction of the Gwadar port on

the Balochistan coast, which will reduce Pakistan's present dependence on

Karachi port,which is within easy reach of the Indian navy, and give the

Pakistani navy a greater operational flexibility. The threat from Pakistan,

meanwhile, has always remained and will continue to remain of a very high order

due to the following reasons:

Pakistan's inability to reconcile itself to the loss of Jammu and Kashmir and

its obsessive urge to gain control of this territory by hook or by crook. Its

equally obsessive urge to avenge its defeat at the hands of India in 1971 and

its loss of the then East Pakistan. The predominant role of the

revenge-seeking Pakistani army in its national security management,

withpractically no role for an elected political leadership in this matter.

Its refusal to work for a reduction of tension and forthe improvement of

relations in other fields until a negotiated solution could be found to the

Kashmir question. The complexes and the feelings of insecurity from which the

Pakistan army suffers vis-a-vis its Indian counterpart. The role of the

pan-Islamic extremist elements in molding perceptions towards India, whether in

the civil society or in the national security apparatus. Its 1971 defeat at the

hands of India brought home to Pakistan the ground reality that it could never

hope to achieve its territorial objective through a conventional war on India.

It therefore embarked on a policy of waging a proxy war through the use of

terrorism as a weapon against the Indian state. Pakistan had been using

terrorism against the Indianstate since 1956 when the Naga insurgency broke

out. Whereas its use of terrorism against India before 1971was a defensive

measure to keep the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security

duties so that they could not pose a threat to it, its use after 1971 was an

aggressive measure having the dual objective of continuing to keep the Indian

security forces bleeding and preoccupied with internal security duties and

achieving its strategic objective ofannexing Jammu and Kashmir without the

direct use of its army in a conventional war. Until Pakistan achieved a

military nuclear capability in the late 1980s, which was subsequently openly

demonstrated in the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998, it kept its proxy war

restricted to the training and arming of Indian separatist groups, whether in

Punjab or Kashmir, which had taken to arms against the government of India due

to various grievances. The acquisition of the military nuclear capability made

the Pakistani military leadership conclude that the possibility of an

Indian-imposed conventional war in retaliation for its proxy war had been

reduced considerably, if not largely eliminated, and hence itcould further

escalate its proxy war by training, arming and infiltrating into India its own

nationals under the guise of jihadi volunteers from different pan-Islamic

organizations to intensify the jihad against India. Until 1995, the role of

thesemercenaries was largely confined to Jammu and Kashmir, but since then

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence has been using them in other parts of

India too.

Pakistan looks on its nuclear arsenal and its missile delivery capability not as

a weapon of deterrence to deter India from using its nuclear capability against

it, but as a weapon of intimidation to prevent India from retaliating against

it through its armed forces for its proxy war and as a weapon of psychological

pressure by creating fears of a possible nuclearholocaust and thereby moving

the rest of the world, particularly the US, to exercise pressure on India on

the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Its consistent refusal to to the no

first use of nuclear weapons declaration and its repeated reiteration of its

readiness to make first use of its nuclear weapons to prevent the Indian army

from over-running its largecities and crushing its army are part of its

intimidatory tactics. The nuclear threat from Pakistan is compounded by the

presence of pan-Islamic jihadi elements which justify the use of the weapons of

mass destruction to protect Islam, if necessary. The possibility of the

nuclearization of terrorism originating from the terrorist hub of Pakistan is a

matter of great concern not only to India, but also to the international

community as a whole, confronted with the threat of pan-Islamic jihadi

terrorism. Since President General Pervez Musharraf seized power on October

12, 1999, Pakistan has embarked on a policy of over-projecting its nuclear and

missile capability in order to reassure its own population of the adequacy of

its capability and to intimidate India and prevent a retaliatory conventional

strike against its proxy war. Defense doctrine objectives The objectives of

India's national defense doctrine vis-a-vis China are twofold and simple:How to

prevent a repeat of 1962, by maintaining an adequate level of conventional

military capability to deter any Chinese temptation to enforce its territorial

claims against India by force? How to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent

against it? The objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan are manifold and much more

complex:

How to find a controlled retaliatory response to Pakistan's proxy war without

allowing the response to degenerate into a war involving the use of nuclear

weapons? How to neutralize the Pakistani attempts to intimidate and demoralize

the Indian population through over-projection of its nuclear and missile

capability and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric?

Whereas any war with China will most probably be fought in Indian territory, any

war with Pakistan will be in Pakistani territory. How to prevent India's

overwhelming conventional superiority from pressing the panic button in

Pakistan's military leadership and triggering off a nuclear response? How to

achieve India's military objectives in the shortest time possible before

international intervention comes in the way of the further conduct of the war?

In response to these questions, a number of possible options have figured in

the debate on national security in recent months. Among the various options and

suggestions considered were:

Greater transparency about India's nuclear and missile capabilities to reassure

our own population and to have a sobering effect on Pakistan's adventurist

generals. A public announcement of India's nuclear command and control

mechanism. Discarding India's no first use of nuclear weapons policy. India's

readiness and ability to fight a limited conventional war without allowing it

to escalate into a nuclear confrontation. A counter-terrorism doctrine to

exploit Pakistan's vulnerabilities through covert action to make it pay an

increasingly prohibitive price for its proxy war. Cooperative action through

other concerned powers to prevent Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction

capabilities from falling into the hands of itsterrorists. The announcement by

the government of India of India's nuclear command and control mechanism and

the contoursof its nuclear doctrine on January 4 was the necessary first step

in this direction. The no first use policy has been reiterated, but in a

nuanced form by underlining that India's nuclear capability is meant to deter

not only a nuclear strike, but also a strikewith chemical or biological

weapons. India's capability and determination for a massive retaliatory

response has been reiterated. However, the nuclear doctrine by itself will not

complete the national security doctrine unless it is supplemented by a

counter-terrorism doctrine to enable India to exercise its right of active

defense against the Pakistani use of terrorism as a weapon to achieve its

strategic objectives. Such a doctrine should have a mix of carefully-controlled

overt and extensive,sustained and deniable covert actions. The national security

managers should now devote themselves to this task. It brooks no delay. B Raman

is Additional Secretary (ret), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and

presently director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai; former member of

the National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India. He was also

head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research & Analysis Wing, India's

external intelligence agency, from 1988to August, 1994. (©2003 Asia Times

Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content (AT) atimes (DOT) com for

information onour sales and syndication policies.) Jan 11, 2003

Discover your Indian Roots at - http://www.esamskriti.comTo mail -

exploreindia (AT) vsnl (DOT) net.Long Live Sanatan / Kshatriya Dharam. Become an

Intellectual KshatriyaGenerate Positive Vibrations lifelong worldwide.Aap ka

din mangalmaya rahe or Shubh dinam astu or Have a Nice DayUnity preceedes

Strength Synchronize your efforts, avoid duplication.THINK, ACT, INFLUENCE, to

Un write back.Create Positive Karmas by being Focussed, controlling

senses, will power & determinationNever boasts about yr victory and

successKnowledge, Wealth, Happiness are meant to be sharedBe Open Minded, pick

up what yu like from the world

 

Stop cribbing, ACTION is what the Indian scriptures talk aboutTake the battle

into the enemy camp, SET THE AGENDA, be proactiveIn an argument, no emotions,

be detached, get yr facts right, then attack with the precision of a missile