confusion - planned or deliberate

[Guest guest]

http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/06gp.htm

Confusion or deliberate dissonance?June 06, 2003

When knowledgeable Americans are asked to define the contents of the Bush

administration's foreign policy, the usual reply one gets is: 'Whose foreign

policy do you want me to define? Is it the foreign policy of Colin Powell's

State Department or that of Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon'?

Diplomatic observers across the world would perhaps voice similar sentiments if

they were asked to define the contents of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's

recent initiative to make his 'third and last' effort to resolve differences

with Pakistan. There was no reference to ending cross border terrorism when

Vajpayee spoke at a public rally in Srinagar.

The same evening, BJP President Venkaiah Naidu, asserted that a dialogue with

Pakistan could commence only if cross border terrorism ended. Subsequent

statements by senior government functionaries on this subject have often been

mutually contradictory.

Some government dignitaries have indicated that dialogue could commence, but not

be meaningful unless cross border terrorism was ended. Others have suggested

that there was no point in any dialogue unless Pakistan ended cross border

terrorism and dismantled its entire infrastructure of terrorism.Vajpayee hit

the headlines in both India and Pakistan when he told the German newspaper Der

Speigel that he would quit office if his Pakistan initiative for peace failed.

He added he was prepared to make 'serious compromises' in any negotiations with

General Pervez Musharraf on the Kashmir issue. This was rather odd because

Musharraf has made it clear that the person who refers to him as 'my boss,'

Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali will conduct talks with India.

Within 48 hours of these momentous announcements by Vajpayee, Deputy Prime

Minister L K Advani asserted on May 29: 'We have defeated Pakistan in four wars

in the past and are also confident of defeating Pakistan in the proxy war waged

by it. We have won these wars on our own and we will win the proxy war thrust

on us without anyone's help.' Asserting that 'there is no question of

recognising the LoC as the international border,' Advani reiterated that the

whole state of Jammu and Kashmir including Pakistan occupied Kashmir and areas

ceded by Pakistan to China are an integral part of India.Advani paid handsome

tribute to our intelligence agencies on May 29, asserting that they had busted

175 Inter Services Intelligence cells in the country. He also spoke of the

successes achieved in weeding out Pakistani jihadis in Operation Sarp Vinash in

the Surankote area of the Jammu sector. Reports from Surankote indicated that

over 300 well-trained Pakistani jihadis have been operating since 1999 from a

vast hilly area of over a hundred square kilometers within our territory, 35

kilometres from the LoC.

There are also reports suggesting that a similar situation prevails in the Doda

sector and elsewhere in both the Jammu region and the Kashmir valley. What we

are now being informed in bits and pieces is that significant areas of our

territory have been under the control of Pakistani jihadis for nearly four

years. High government functionaries have used strong terms like 'pre-emptive

strikes,' 'hot pursuit' and 'coercive diplomacy' as characterising our

determination to get tough with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

Yet, for four years Pakistani intruders have actually held large tracts of

territory on our side of the Line of Control, with the government unable or

unwilling to throw them out. People would naturally like to know why these

intrusions were not cleared for nearly four years and whether this was just

another case of 'intelligence failure.'Vajpayee's readiness for 'serious

compromises' on Jammu and Kashmir comes at a time when there is a vigorous

debate in Pakistan on whether or not they should accept a Kashmir settlement

based on the 'Chenab Solution.'

According to Pakistan's former foreign secretary Niaz Naik, he had proposed this

'solution' to R K Misra [the senior Indian journalist who was brokering a

settlement on Kashmir with Naik] in an effort at 'back channel diplomacy'

before the Kargil conflict.

The 'Chenab Solution' involves shifting of the Line of Control to the Chenab

river. Pakistan would get control of the entire Kashmir valley including

Srinagar and the Kargil sector, while India would retain portions of the Jammu

region in such a 'solution.' While we have denied that any such 'solution' was

discussed or accepted, Naik appears to have told a large number of Pakistanis

and foreigners that neither Misra nor other high government figures rejected

his proposal when he mooted it in 1999. He has claimed that Indian

interlocutors, in fact, showed interest in his proposal when he visited

Delhi.While gullible Indian visitors to Pakistan may come back deeply impressed

by the sincerity of [Pakistan Foreign Minister] Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri and

bogus assertions of Pakistan's Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz that Pakistan had

a higher rate of growth than India in 2002-2003, that Pakistan has actually

registered a 'double digit' rate of growth of per capita income and received

more FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] than India in this period, the real test

of Pakistan's intentions will have to be judged by its actions on the ground.

Kamran Khan, a Pakistani journalist with close connections with the military

establishment, recently reported: 'Two people who have spoken to Musharraf in

recent weeks said he indicated that he had no intention of abandoning what

Pakistanis call the freedom struggle in Kashmir. This suggests that any shift

in infiltration is likely to be more tactical than strategic.' Kamran Khan adds

that a senior Pakistani security official told him that in their assessment

'India's resolve to bear the military and economic costs of the Kashmir

conflict is diminishing.'

Thus, while there is undoubtedly some thinking in Pakistan about the need to

review current policies of 'bleeding' India, it would be dangerous to presume

that this reflects the thinking of the all powerful military

establishment.There is an almost universal feeling in Pakistan that while

Vajpayee favours 'serious compromises' on the Kashmir issue, Advani reflects

the hardliners views in the ruling establishment. Pakistanis believe they can

use these 'differences' to their advantage. What the Pakistanis may not

understand is that in a democratic establishment differing nuances provide

political space and flexibility in the conduct of policy.

But despite this, New Delhi will have to take a number of measures to correct

the widespread impression in the military establishment in Pakistan, that the

prime minister's initiative flows from a lack of political will in India to

bear the military, economic and international costs of Pakistan's jihad in

Jammu and Kashmir. Military leaders in Pakistan do not respect those they

believe are weak.There is just too much attention on the prime minister's

Pakistan initiative in our media and diplomacy. This invariably gives the

Pakistani military establishment the feeling that we are buckling under their

pressures. There is thus a need to focus much greater attention on issues like

regional economic integration, our response to the post-Iraq war developments,

our relations with neighbours other than Pakistan and our interaction with

major power centres like the US, Russia and European Union.

We reduce our stature in the world by appearing to suffer from a Pakistan

fixation and indeed a Pakistan obsession. The normalisation process that has

just commenced is going to be long drawn out and full of ups and downs. We

should proceed in a measured manner with this process, but get Pakistan out of

our headlines.

G ParthasarathyConverting Knowledge into Value. We are innovative & focussed in

our approach, believe there is always a better way of doing things and look at

the cause not the effect.

 

Sanjeev NayyarSurya Consulting348, Tardeo A/C Market,Mumbai 400 034.

 

Cell 9821112693, Tel 91 22 2351 1888, tel fax 2351 1021.Email -

suryacon (AT) vsnl (DOT) com, MSN - suryacon (AT) hotmail (DOT) com