Guest guest Posted April 23, 2004 Report Share Posted April 23, 2004 --- Sanjay Achharya <sanjaya2@o...> wrote: > Wed, 21 Apr 2004 19:40:30 -0400 > Sanjay Achharya <sanjaya2@o...> > Fwd: Is the US trying to > "peacefully pre-empt the Indian nuclear > deterrent"? > (Recipient list suppressed) > > If this is true it has major implications on India's > security. I hope our > ministers are aware of their own strategy and its > consequences and have a > game plan ready. > > Sanjay > > > > >Dear Sanjay Achharya: > > > >The contents of this article of Bharat Karnad in > the ASIAN AGE is troubling? > > > >EXCERPTS: > > > >***US establishing a military presence in Pakistan, > virtually controlling > >the Pakistani air space out of its main base in > Jacobabad, and wresting > >control from a harried and pressured General Pervez > Musharraf and the > >Pakistan Army of the most critical part of the > Pakistani nuclear arsenal — > >the nuclear component of the nuclear weapons. The > awarding of "major > >non-NATO ally" status to that country, in the > event, is a sop to dampen > >the growing resentment within the Pakistani > establishment. > > > >***Pakistani government has, however, been > permitted to ballyhoo the > >fiction of readily available nuclear weapons for > the purposes of dealing > >with the "threat" from India. > > > >***it would not do to broadcast this last > development because it will lose > >Washington powerful leverage with the Indian > government. Better, from the > >American (and, in the circumstances, also the > Pakistani) point of view, to > >reinforce the mindless Indian fixation with the > "nuclear threat" from > >Pakistan to keep India alarmed, distracted and > contained to South Asia — > >something that was originally achieved by China's > assisting Pakistan to go > >nuclear and the US government's providing it > protection against its own > >strong non-proliferation laws. > > > >***A part of the US agenda to effectively nuclear > disarm the subcontinent > >has been achieved vis-à-vis Pakistan. Washington is > now turning its > >attention to New Delhi with the intent of > peacefully pre-empting the > >Indian nuclear deterrent. A partial victory has > already been scored. > >Ashley Tellis, formerly senior adviser to the US > ambassador in India, has > >revealed the deal cut in the 19 rounds of the > Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh > >talks held post-Pokharan-II, whereby India agreed > not to resume nuclear > >testing, change the present "de-alerted, de-mated" > nuclear posture, or > >develop intercontinental ballistic missiles in > return for promises of > >transfer of high-technology, like civilian advanced > reactors, and > >technological collaboration in space. Senior Bush > administration officials > >admit that the "glide path" is a diplomatic ploy > and no real high-value > >technology will be in the pipeline, at least not > until Washington gains > >real confidence in India, which may be the same as > New Delhi's doing what > >it is asked to do by the US. > > > >***But there's one "high tech" project the US is > very keen India join, > >namely, missile defence. It is a device to hasten > the de-nuclearisation of > >India. How so? New Delhi's rapturous welcome of the > anti-ballistic missile > >defence concept mooted by President Bush provided > the opening. > > > >***an interim missile defence solution is on offer > — theatre missile > >defence (TMD) based on the Aegis radar on board US > Navy destroyers, > >presumably patrolling off the Indian coast. The > Aegis is expected to give > >real time warnings of missile launches from > Pakistan and even China > >whereupon the inordinately expensive Arrow > interdictor missiles (Israeli > >Arrow or the American PAC-3) that India will be > persuaded to buy at great > >cost, can be fired. Assuming the radar, sensors and > the communications > >interlinks work as they are supposed to, the > question to ask is: will > >Indian military personnel be manning the Aegis > radar and its links to > >Indian nuclear operations complex? Of course, not. > In which case, will not > >India's security become hostage to US interests in > Pakistan and the region > >as a whole? > > > >***whether it is the Aegis TMD or the NMD India > will to, the > >United States will notch up a singular > counter-proliferation success. What > >the US could not wangle in the Commission on > Disarmament in Geneva over > >forty-odd years of arm-twisting in the negotiations > on the > >Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test > Ban Treaty — India's > >right to a meaningful nuclear deterrent in line > with those of the > >so-called NPT-recognised nuclear states — will be > peacefully ceded by New > >Delhi. India will end up becoming an American > client-state, like Pakistan. > > > >***Washington will argue that insofar as the > Pakistani nuclear threat has > >been negated, there is little need for India to > continue having a nuclear > >arsenal of its own, let alone to augment it in any > way. This is how the > >logic of New Delhi's oft-expressed fear of > Islamabad starting a nuclear > >affray, is going to be turned against India. > > > >I have no doubt India's seasoned diplomats will > tread their way most > >carefully in future discussions with the United > States - and not walk into > >a trap. India MUST be recognized as a nuclear power > in its own right de > >facto if not de jure. There should be no question > of India ever having to > >surrender its independent nuclear deterrent as long > as China is not > >willing to de-nuclearize and China will not agree > to de-nuclearize unless > >the other 4 powers agree to de-nuclearize. > > > >Ram Narayanan > > > > > ><http://www.asianage.com/>http://www.asianage.com/ > > > >ASIAN AGE, APRIL 21, 2004 > > > ><http://www.asianage.com/main.asp? layout=2&cat1=6&cat2=42&newsid=97680>After > > >Pak, India > > > >- By Bharat Karnad > > > >India-Pakistan talks on nuclear confidence and > security building measures > >(CSBMs) are to begin on May 25. To understand what > is at stake and what > >can reasonably be agreed upon by the two countries, > there is first the > >need to be clear about the interests and intentions > of the third player in > >this fandango — the United States. > > > >Nothing spooks the US more than nuclear weapons in > the hands of other than > >the five so-called Non-Proliferation Treaty > (NPT)-recognised nuclear > >weapon states. The mere suspicion that Saddam > Hussein was angling for an > >atom bomb led to Iraq's being Bushwhacked. > > > >The strategy of pre-emption and preventive war, > articulated by US > >President George W. Bush, has provided > justification for this action. > >According to it, any and all threats to the US, > however remote, are to be > >nipped in the bud by whatever means, including war. > And weapons of mass > >destruction (WMDs), especially of the nuclear > variety, are perceived by > >Washington as posing the greatest threat to US > security and world order. > >Over the years, Republican and Democratic Party > administrations alike have > >supported strong counter-proliferation measures > when more peaceable ones > >have not worked. > > > >But the American fear of proliferation, whatever > the rhetoric, turned > >serious only after the trauma of 9/11. How else to > explain Washington's > >turning a Nelson's eye over the previous two > decades to China's supplying > >nuclear weapon design and production technology and > missile wherewithal > >(directly and via North Korea) to Pakistan, and to > Islamabad's > >barely-disguised build-up of the Kahuta > centrifuges? It served the US > >interests to have Pakistan as a "frontline state" > helping the US discomfit > >the Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan and > later fight Osama bin > >Laden and his Al Qaeda cohort there, whence its > nuclear transgressions > >were forgiven, that is until now. > > > >Pakistan has been "outed" as a nuclear rogue > supplier for a reason. The > >conjunction between the Islamabad-run nuclear > "grey" market and the Al > >Qaeda brand of uncompromising terrorism has > conjured up the spectre of > >jihadis exploding smuggled "radiological dispersion > devices" or, worse, > >"suitcase bombs", in the heart of Manhattan. The > Russian secretary for > >national security, General Alexander Lebed, > visiting Washington in 1997, > >revealed that 132 of these bombs are missing from a > total of some 300-odd > >in the ex-Soviet inventory. It was too real a > danger for the George W. > >Bush administration to ignore. > > > >This, as much as the fight against the Al Qaeda, > has led to the US > >establishing a military presence in Pakistan, > virtually controlling the > >Pakistani air space out of its main base in > Jacobabad, and wresting > >control from a harried and pressured General Pervez > Musharraf and the > >Pakistan Army of the most critical part of the > Pakistani nuclear arsenal — > >the nuclear component of the nuclear weapons. The > awarding of "major > >non-NATO ally" status to that country, in the > event, is a sop to dampen > >the growing resentment within the Pakistani > establishment. > > > >Islamabad acquiesced in this arrangement because it > was confronted with > >Hobson's choice: either allow its nuclear weapons > to be neutered in this > >way, or face the prospect of the Pakistani weapons > being publicly and > >forcefully eliminated. General Musharraf chose the > former course. A > >careful content analysis of various statements by > General Musharraf and > >Abdul Sattar in the aftermath of 9/11, when he was > foreign minister, > >carried out by this writer — which because of space > constraints cannot be > >detailed here — and other supporting evidence, like > the movement of US and > >Israeli (and even Indian) Special Forces at the > time, substantiates this > >thesis. Pakistani government has, however, been > permitted to ballyhoo the > >fiction of readily available nuclear weapons for > the purposes of dealing > >with the "threat" from India. > > > >Besides, it would not do to broadcast this last > development because it > >will lose Washington powerful leverage with the > Indian government. Better, > >from the American (and, in the circumstances, also > the Pakistani) point of > >view, to reinforce the mindless Indian fixation > with the "nuclear threat" > >from Pakistan to keep India alarmed, distracted and > contained to South > >Asia — something that was originally achieved by > China's assisting > >Pakistan to go nuclear and the US government's > providing it protection > >against its own strong non-proliferation laws. > > > >A part of the US agenda to effectively nuclear > disarm the subcontinent has > >been achieved vis-à-vis Pakistan. Washington is now > turning its attention > >to New Delhi with the intent of peacefully > pre-empting the Indian nuclear > >deterrent. A partial victory has already been > scored. Ashley Tellis, > >formerly senior adviser to the US ambassador in > India, has revealed the > >deal cut in the 19 rounds of the Strobe > Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks held > >post-Pokharan-II, whereby India agreed not to > resume nuclear testing, > >change the present "de-alerted, de-mated" nuclear > posture, or develop > >intercontinental ballistic missiles in return for > promises of transfer of > >high-technology, like civilian advanced reactors, > and technological > >collaboration in space. Senior Bush administration > officials admit that > >the "glide path" is a diplomatic ploy and no real > high-value technology > >will be in the pipeline, at least not until > Washington gains real > >confidence in India, which may be the same as New > Delhi's doing what it is > >asked to do by the US. > > > >But there's one "high tech" project the US is very > keen India join, > >namely, missile defence. It is a device to hasten > the de-nuclearisation of > >India. How so? New Delhi's rapturous welcome of the > anti-ballistic missile > >defence concept mooted by President Bush provided > the opening. It did not > >help that India's interest in missile defence is > Pakistan-oriented (as is > >much of its military effort), evident from the > Indian interest in the > >short-range Russian S-300 and the Israeli Arrow > anti-ballistic missile > >systems for point and small area air defence. > > > >A constituency for plugging into the US missile > defence within the > >civilian, defence science and military > bureaucracies is sought to be > >created. A number of Indian teams have already been > conducted around the > >Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico where the > prototypes of the > >National Missile Defence (NMD) radar, sensors, > "kill" vehicles, etc., are > >being designed and tested. A favourable consensus > is also sought to be > >generated amongst the intelligentsia through > friendly press commentaries. > > > >However, NMD is some ways off, if ever, from > getting off the ground. So, > >an interim missile defence solution is on offer — > theatre missile defence > >(TMD) based on the Aegis radar on board US Navy > destroyers, presumably > >patrolling off the Indian coast. The Aegis is > expected to give real time > >warnings of missile launches from Pakistan and even > China whereupon the > >inordinately expensive Arrow interdictor missiles > (Israeli Arrow or the > >American PAC-3) that India will be persuaded to buy > at great cost, can be > >fired. Assuming the radar, sensors and the > communications interlinks work > >as they are supposed to, the question to ask is: > will Indian military > >personnel be manning the Aegis radar and its links > to Indian nuclear > >operations complex? Of course, not. In which case, > will not India's > >security become hostage to US interests in Pakistan > and the region as a whole? > > > >The problem will be exacerbated if the > comprehensive missile defence > >becomes feasible. Then there will be even greater > American pressure to buy > >into this supposedly impenetrable missile defence > cover. > > > >But whether it is the Aegis TMD or the NMD India > will to, the > >United States will notch up a singular > counter-proliferation success. What > >the US could not wangle in the Commission on > Disarmament in Geneva over > >forty-odd years of arm-twisting in the negotiations > on the > >Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test > Ban Treaty — India's > >right to a meaningful nuclear deterrent in line > with those of the > >so-called NPT-recognised nuclear states — will be > peacefully ceded by New > >Delhi. India will end up becoming an American > client-state, like Pakistan. > > > >There is an implicit guarantee, moreover, that with > the US military > >ensconced inside Pakistan (and with or without the > American control of the > >latter's nuclear assets), Islamabad will be unable > to activate its nuclear > >weapons in a crisis or start a conventional war or > do anything that makes > >crossing the nuclear threshold by either Pakistan > or India possible. By > >factoring India's access to US missile defence into > this equation, > >Washington will argue that insofar as the Pakistani > nuclear threat has > >been negated, there is little need for India to > continue having a nuclear > >arsenal of its own, let alone to augment it in any > way. This is how the > >logic of New Delhi's oft-expressed fear of > Islamabad starting a nuclear > >affray, is going to be turned against India. > > > >Tomorrow: How to maintain nuclear peace > > > >Bharat Karnad is Research Professor at the Centre > for Policy Research and > >author of Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security > > > Photos: High-quality 4x6 digital prints for 25¢ ph/print_splash --- End forwarded message --- Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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