India-Pakistan '71 War: A Modern War

[Guest guest]

The India-Pakistan War

Of 1971: A Modern War

 

CSC 1984

 

SUBJECT AREA History

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/KRG.htm

 

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

 

 

Author: KYLE, R.G., Major, Royal Canadian Artillery

 

Title: Indian-Pakistan War of 1971: A Modern War

 

Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College

 

14 March 1964

 

 

This paper examines the origins, conduct and results of

 

the war between India and Pakistan of 1971 from which the

 

nation of Bangla Desh emerged. The study compares the

 

development of religion, culture and economy in East and

 

West Pakistan which led to the frustration of Bengali

 

nationalism within the "Islamic Nation" founded in 1947.

 

The role of the military government from 1958 to 1971 is

 

also examined to show how its activities further alienated

 

the people of East Pakistan and contributed to both the

 

rebellion there and the weakening of its own military

 

capability.

 

The second part of the study examines the development

 

of guerrilla war in East Pakistan between March and December

 

1971. The Political and Military organization of the

 

insurgents is analysed along with the counter-insurgency

 

actions of the government forces. The effects of the war on

 

India and the policies that nation developed to deal with it

 

are also analyzed. The roles played by the United States,

 

China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations in the

 

conflict are studied.

 

The study goes on the analyze the military operations

 

of India and Pakistan during the fourteen days of

 

conventional war between them. Finally, conclusions are

 

drawn concerning the conditions which precipitated the

 

conflict and the reasons for the success of the Bengali and

 

Indian forces.

 

No primary sources of information were available for

 

this study. Therefore, the author relied heavily on

 

articles in military journals as well as several books on

 

the subject.

 

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR

 

 

 

The India-Pakistan War of 1971

A Modern War

 

 

 

Major Rodney G. Kyle, Royal Canadian Artillery

 

 

2 April 1984

 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Development and Education Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

Introduction 1

 

Chapter

 

I. Origins of the Conflict 2

 

II. Rebellion and Repression 18

 

III. The 14-Day War: 3-16 December 1971 38

 

IV. Conclusion 55

 

Appendices

 

I. Map of West Pakistan-India Frontier 1971 57

 

II. Map of East Pakistan 1971 58

 

Bibliography 59

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

This study is concerned with a guerrilla war fought by

 

two peoples who had joined together enthusiastically to form

 

the new nation of Pakistan just twenty-five years before.

 

It is also concerned with the short, violent conventional

 

war fought by India and Pakistan which resulted in the birth

 

of the new nation of Bangla Desh. The conflict was

 

influenced by both the legacies of ancient India and the

 

contemporary interests of world politics. The study may

 

interest the reader concerned with the techniques of modern

 

guerrilla and conventional war, but the study should also

 

lead the reader to conclude that we cannot understand modern

 

conflict without understanding the historical environment in

 

which it occurs.

 

Unfortunately no primary sources of information were

 

available for this study. Information was gathered from

 

military journals and several books on the subject.

 

I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Donald F.

 

Bittner, USMCR, staff historian of the Marine Corps Command

 

and Staff College for his help in finding source material

 

and his many helpful suggestions to improve a very rough

 

first draft. A special thanks also must go to Mrs. Pam

 

Lohman who had to transform this work to typescript. Any

 

errors, however, are entirely the responsibility of the

 

author.

 

CHAPTER I

 

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

 

 

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was a result of

 

Islamic nationalism of the Moslems of India. Islam had been

 

introduced to the Indian sub-continent following the Afghan-

 

Turkish conquest in the 13th century. A large part of the

 

native population in the area of East Bengal was peacefully

 

coverted from Hindu to Islam in the following two centuries.

 

In the 16th century the Moslem sultanate of Bengal was

 

absorbed into the north Indian Mughal empire. The Moslem

 

rulers of the empire were non-Bengali. Their culture was

 

based on Arabic and Persian influences, and the Urdu

 

language. Socially, Bengal was divided into a Bengali

 

Moslem peasantry and a Persianized Urdu speaking ruling

 

class. 1/

 

In 1764 the English East India Company succeeded the

 

Mughals as the government of Bengal. The British rule

 

encouraged the rise of the Hindu commercial class in Bengal

 

while the former Urdu-speaking Moslem rulers and landowners

 

were displaced from their positions of power. In this

 

climate Bengali culture during the 19th century developed in

 

a new direction led by the Hindu elite and influenced by the

 

emerging middle-class of Bengali-speaking Moslems. The

 

Bengali-speaking Moslems became increasingly conscious of

 

their ethnic identity and nationalism throughout the 19th

 

century. For their part, the British were gradually

 

loosening restrictions on local institutions and government:

 

Hindu dominated schools and the secular university of

 

Calcutta played their part in developing Bengali identity

 

among the Bengali-speaking Moslems. To counter the

 

continuing loss of position and status, in 1906 the Urdu-

 

speaking Moslems established the first modern political

 

movement among the Moslems of India called the All-India

 

Moslem League. 2/

 

The concept of a separate state of Pakistan did not

 

develop until the 1930's when India grew closer to self-

 

government. By 1937 there were two political parties in

 

Bengal which formed a coalition provincial government. The

 

first was a radical peasants and tenants party backed by

 

Bengali-speaking Moslems, while the other was the more

 

conservative Moslem League representing the Urdu-speaking

 

Moslems. This government proposed the "Pakistan Resolution"

 

calling for the regions of Northwest and Eastern zones of

 

India where there was a Moslem majority to be grouped into

 

independent states that would be autonomous and sovereign.

 

A federation of 12 to 14 states with strong local

 

governments was envisioned.

 

Bengal became a war zone during World War II. As well,

 

in 1943 a famine took more than two million lives. The

 

destruction and sacrifices of these catastrophes increased

 

the nationalism and solidarity of the Moslem population in

 

Eastern India. Support for the "Pakistan Resolution" and

 

the Moslem League swelled. On August 14, 1947, the nation

 

of Pakistan was created from the regions of India having a

 

Moslem majority. Two states, Bengal in the East and Punjab

 

in the West, were divided into Hindu and Moslem regions.

 

Only the Moslem sections were included into Pakistan.

 

Pakistan itself had two wings separated by 1,000 miles of

 

Indian land.

 

The partition of Bengal led to the restoration of power

 

to the traditional Urdu-speaking Moslems who had led the

 

Moslem League. However, this elite could only be sustained

 

by the active support of the Urdu-speakers who controlled

 

West Pakistan. While the Moslem League had sustained Moslem

 

nationalism in Bengal during the previous decade, it could

 

not provide a focus and support for the nationalism which

 

continued to be a potent force among Bengali Moslems. 3/

 

In East Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking Moslem middle-

 

class was an important social force. This class comprised

 

small land owners, professionals and traders. They had a

 

deep loyalty to Bengali culture, and respect for

 

parliamentary tradition and the rule of law. In West

 

Pakistan, land holdings were larger and concentrated in the

 

hands of fewer people. Power was essentially vested in a

 

plutocratic and feudal system. West Pakistan had a

 

population of 42.9 million in an area six times larger than

 

East Pakistan: East Pakistan had a population of 50.8

 

million (1961 census). The two parts of Pakistan were

 

separated by about 1,000 miles and, because of hostilities

 

with India, it was impossible to maintain land or air

 

communications across the intervening Indian territory. Air

 

and sea communications routes were 3,000 miles around the

 

southern tip of India. The two wings of Pakistan had

 

a religious belief in Islam in common, but the significant

 

geographic and social differences increasingly divided the

 

two wings. 4/

 

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was to be an

 

Islamic nation. However, the political institutions of the

 

new nation and the way they would function were left

 

undefined. The East and West wings could not agree on a

 

constitution defining the political institutions before the

 

deadline date for independence. The constitution was left

 

to be sorted out by the new nation itself, but the different

 

political traditions and aspirations of the East and West

 

wings were to be the source of serious, continuing friction.

 

The British had ruled India (including the territories

 

making up Pakistan) with a strong central government under

 

the Viceroy. However, the province of Bengal had developed

 

a provincial democratic parliamentary system much more

 

advanced than that of the northwestern provinces. For a

 

viable constitution these two traditions had to be

 

reconciled within the concept of the Islamic nation. As

 

well, the British since 1905, had designed the provincial

 

representative institutions on the basis of separate

 

electorates for members of the main religious groups --

 

Moslem and Hindu. West Pakistan had the majority of Moslems

 

(42.9 million) in the new nation since about one fifth of

 

the population (10 million of 50.8 million) of East Pakistan

 

was Hindu. If Pakistan was to continue the tradition of

 

separate electorates, then West Pakistan would dominate.

 

But if a single electorate was constituted, then East

 

Pakistan would dominate while owing its control to its Hindu

 

minority. Thus, from the beginning, the Islamic nation

 

concept involved friction between the nationalism and power

 

of different cultural and social communities within the

 

state. 5/

 

For the next seven years, the National Assembly in

 

Karachi wrestled with the drafting of a constitution.

 

However, by 1952 Bengali nationalism was reasserting itself

 

in a number of political parties, the most important being

 

the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman.

 

In provincial elections in 1954 the conservative Moslem

 

League was swept from power in East Pakistan by a coalition

 

of Bengali nationalist parties. When the new government

 

leader, Fazlul Haq, of East Pakistan made a speech

 

supporting the reunification of the old province of Bengal,

 

the national government in Karachi dismissed the provincial

 

cabinet and imposed Governor's rule. Any large increase of

 

non-Moslem population in East Pakistan (such as that of West

 

Bengal) would have further unbalanced the power between East

 

and West Pakistan as well as brought a real threat of war

 

with India. With the endless constitutional debate and

 

steady deterioration of the cohesion of Pakistan, the

 

President of Pakistan dismissed the National Assembly.

 

Under threat of imposition of military rule a cabinet with

 

members drawn from various sections of political opinion was

 

appointed and tasked to frame a constitution.

 

By 1956 a constitution had been drafted which included

 

the concept of parity and equal status between the two

 

communities of East and West Pakistan. This concept had the

 

support of most leaders in East Pakistan. While the

 

arrangement did not go as far as the original resolution of

 

1937 which called for "autonomous and sovereign" states, it

 

did maintain a political balance between East and West.

 

However, West Pakistan comprised fourteen states of the old

 

India of which the Punjab was the largest it would dominate

 

the affairs of West Pakistan: the politicians in the West

 

could not agree to accept this arrangement. Although the

 

constitution was proclaimed law, elections were never held.

 

In 1958 the President, Islamabad Mirza, abrogated the

 

constitution, and he was soon deposed by the Army Chief of

 

Staff, General Ayub Khan, who proclaimed martial law. The

 

army had moved to fill the power vacuum created by the lack

 

of workable political institutions. 6/

 

The military government of General Ayub concentrated

 

power toward a central executive government. A new

 

constitution was proclaimed in 1962 replacing sovereignty of

 

the people with the sovereignty of Allah. Effective

 

electoral power was given to an equal number of nobilities

 

from both wings of the nation, but the national and

 

provincial legislatures were given only minor powers. Most

 

powers were concentrated in the presidential executive

 

located in Karachi. General Ayub had created an autocratic

 

government in the tradition of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.

 

The Bengali movement for autonomy of East Pakistan was left

 

virtually without influence or power.

 

In the period 1960-1970, the Bengali's felt dominated

 

economically as well as politically by West Pakistan. East

 

Bengal lacked natural resources, was remote from main trade

 

routes, and was limited by a large expanding population

 

which was difficult to feed. The main exports were jute and

 

tea. Traditionally, these crops were exported to West

 

Bengal in exchange of manufactured goods. After partition

 

in 1947, the economic dependence on West Bengal was shifted

 

to West Pakistan. Here the central managers controlled the

 

foreign exchange earned by the exports as well as foreign

 

aid and foreign investment. In West Pakistan, the per

 

capita income was 61% higher than in East Pakistan. The

 

Bengalis resented the faster growth and higher incomes of

 

the West. They tended to blame the much higher proportion

 

of West Pakistanis in the civil and armed services and many

 

of the professions for diverting wealth to the West which

 

was generated in the East.

 

As resentment was growing, India and Pakistan went to

 

war over Kashmir in 1965. This conflict ended in stalemate

 

but it demonstrated the vulnerability of East Pakistan. The

 

complete cessation of economic activity with India hurt East

 

Pakistan and reinforced the Bengalis sense of economic

 

domination from West Pakistan. 7/

 

The resentment toward West Pakistan fed growing support

 

for the Awami League. By 1967 the League had adopted a six-

 

point manifesto aimed at economic and political autonomy for

 

East Pakistan. According to the manifesto the central

 

government should only retain control of foreign affairs and

 

defense while the provincial government should control

 

economic, taxation, trade and foreign aid policies.

 

The economic expansion in West Pakistan was also

 

producing social strains there. Radical socialists competed

 

with the traditional land-owning elites on which the

 

government and army were based. By 1968, strong support for

 

Ali Bhutto's radical Peoples Party emerged in the West wing.

 

The party's support was based on social justice for the

 

"common man" and hostility toward India. It was also

 

opposed to any action which would reduce the political and

 

economic status of West Pakistan.

 

In the rising tide of opposition to his policies,

 

General Ayub called a conference of political leaders to

 

resolve the most pressing conflicts. However, no settlement

 

was reached. General Ayub resigned on 26 March 1969 to be

 

replaced by General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the

 

army. The constitution was again suspended. Pakistan had

 

reverted back to the position it was at in 1958.

 

General Yahya quickly promulgated a set of decisions

 

aimed at reducing political tensions in both wings of the

 

country. The first addressed the major grievance of East

 

Pakistan: national elections would be held by December 1970

 

based on a common electorate in both wings to give East

 

Pakistan a majority of seats. The second regrouped the 14

 

political regions of West Pakistan into four provinces more

 

equal in political power to the Punjab. Later General Yahya

 

expanded on these decisions with an outline for the transfer

 

of power from military government to constitutional

 

institutions.

 

a. A new constitution had to be prepared by

 

the national assembly within 120 days after being

 

called into session.

 

b. The constitution had to conform to certain

 

principles which included: a provision that the

 

territorial integrity and national solidarity of

 

Pakistan should be respected; and a federation

 

should be established in which provinces would

 

have maximum autonomy but, the federal government

 

would have adequate powers to carry out its

 

responsibilities for external and internal affairs

 

and to preserve the independence and territorial

 

integrity of the country.

 

c. To ensure that the constitution conformed

 

to the principles, it had to be approved by the

 

President.

 

With these decisions, General Yahya probably intended

 

to achieve some popular support for the military regime

 

after the long period of confusion of General Ayub's rule.

 

The guidelines for the constitution also gave protection to

 

the central power of armed forces. With the cooperation of

 

the Bengali members, the army could thwart Mr. Bhutto's

 

radical Peoples Party in West Pakistan. 8/

 

These guidelines were generally acceptable to the

 

civilian political leaders in both the East and West. As

 

the election approached, the two most active parties were

 

Sheikh Mijib's Awami League and Ali Bhutto's People's Party.

 

The results of the election, however, sent shock waves

 

through the nation. Of the 313 total seats in the assembly,

 

the Awami League took 167, a solid majority, all from the

 

East. Mr. Bhutto's party took 85 seats, all in the west. 9/

 

The Islamic parties of the old elite were decisively

 

defeated in both wings, and with this defeat went any hopes

 

the old elite and the army had of influencing the actions of

 

the assembly. With a parliamentary majority the Awami

 

League did not need the army or the old traditional parties

 

to win support for a draft constitution reflecting the

 

Bengali concept of autonomy within Pakistani federation.

 

Admittedly, President Yahya would have final approval of the

 

constitution, but the results of the election clearly

 

reflected an overwhelming demand for reform. The President

 

could draw little comfort from the opposition of Ali Bhutto

 

in the Assembly. The Peoples Party was equally anxious to

 

draft a constitution which limited the traditional powers of

 

the army and the Moslem elites. Again power was split

 

between the two geographic regions of the nation. 10/

 

The strong position of the Awami League persuaded many

 

supporters that there need be no retreat from the manifesto

 

adopted four years earlier demanding virtual economic

 

sovereignty for East Pakistan. This degree of autonomy was

 

unacceptable to the military government as well as Ali

 

Bhutto's party. There was stalemate again.

 

The military government of General Yahya was highly

 

centralized but not particularly sensitive to the political

 

currents of the civil population. Senior officers held key

 

positions in both the civil and military administrative

 

systems. These systems were largely parallel and often

 

competitive for power. At the top, Yahya held the offices

 

of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Chief Martial Law

 

Administrator, President and Supreme Commander, Minister of

 

Defense and Minister of foreign Affairs. Yahya

 

theoritically had enormous scope for initiative, but the

 

elite of the army had considerable power which Yahya had to

 

take into account along with the political factions of the

 

country. Within the army, opinion generally belonged in one

 

of three positions: the center, including Yahya, hoped to

 

transfer power to a civil government headed by Sheikh Mujib

 

(Awami League) while retaining a special position for the

 

armed forces; the right, including many senior officers,

 

hoped to retain the power of the armed forces and opposed

 

any move toward more autonomy of the provinces and the

 

social policies of Mr. Bhutto's People's Party; finally, the

 

left, including many junior officers, combined a strong

 

nationalist feeling with social opinion leaning toward Mr.

 

Bhutto's party. The left and the right grew toward a

 

consensus opposed to any concession to the Awami League

 

which would weaken the power of the central government. 11/

 

General Yahya appears to have been unable to reconcile

 

the widely differing views both within the armed services

 

and the various political factions. Although Sheikhs

 

Mujib's party had decisively won the election and therefore

 

felt it had the right to form the national government, it

 

could do nothing until the President called the assembly

 

into session. This Yahya refused to do until the Sheikh

 

softened his stand on autonomy as stated in the Awami

 

Leaguer's manifesto. The League, sensing power, refused to

 

give any concession. Talks between President Yahya, Bhutto

 

and the Sheikh continued through January 1971, but no

 

agreement was reached. Finally, on February 13, 1971 Yahya

 

summoned the Assembly to meet on March 3, 1971. Bhutto

 

immediately announced his party, with 85 seats, would

 

boycott the session unless all parties reached a consensus

 

on an outline constitution before the Assembly met. On

 

March 1, 1971, President Yahya agreed with Mr. Bhutto and

 

announced that the Assembly session was postponed

 

indefinitely. 12/

 

The postponement of the Assembly session was followed

 

by widescale rioting and demonstrations throughout East

 

Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib called a series of general strikes

 

to demonstrate that East Pakistan would be ungovernable

 

unless the Assembly was called into session. 13/ It is

 

unlikely that the civil disorder came as a surprise to the

 

government for it had been reinforcing the military

 

garrisons in East Pakistan since mid-February. However,

 

throughout March, Yahya and Mujib engaged in a complicated

 

series of negotiations in which some concessions were made.

 

But on March 25, 1971, Yahya suddenly broke off talks and

 

left for Islamabad. At the same time the army, which had

 

been brought up to strength of 40,000 in the East, moved

 

against the Bengali police, Bengali-manned army units and

 

other paramilitary forces. Sheikh Mujib was arrested along

 

with many other Awami League leaders. Newspaper offices

 

were seized and university halls attacked and occupied. It

 

seemed that Yahya had used the last session of negotiations

 

as pretext to allow time for the army to be brought up to

 

sufficient strength to overwhelm Bengali opposition. 14/

 

The drive for political and economic autonomy of the

 

Bengali people entered a new phase. The efforts to win

 

power through the election process and parliamentary system

 

were a complete failure. The central military government

 

was incapable of reconciling the aspirations of the Bengalis

 

with social reform pressures of the West Pakistanis and the

 

traditional elitism of the Urdu-speaking Moslems. Military

 

repression of the Bengali nationalist movement followed.

 

The Bengali Moslems had a common religion with the Urdu-

 

speaking Moslems of the West, but social and political

 

traditions, as well as language and economic base, were

 

quite different. When Pakistan was formed as an Islamic

 

nation in 1947, there was no consensus on the form its

 

political institutions should take. The Moslem states in

 

the West were governed by traditional elitists who

 

considered strong federal government essential to preserve

 

Islamic ideals. The Bengali Moslems' aspirations for more

 

democratic institutions responsive to regional politics

 

would not be accommodated by those in the West. At the same

 

time, demands for social reform in the West by lower-classes

 

went unheeded.

 

After more than ten years of political stalemate, the

 

armed forces, in particular the army, seized power to break

 

the political deadlock. The officers of the army were

 

largely drawn from the traditional Moslem elite of the West.

 

Their administration was highly centralized and emphasized

 

the economic development as well as the social welfare of

 

the West and the Urdu-speaking traditional Moslems. This

 

administration only added to the frustration of the Bengalis

 

who increasingly saw East Pakistan as an economic and

 

cultural colony of the West. Indeed, the poorer classes of

 

people of the West also became increasingly disaffected as

 

they received little benefit from the economic and social

 

policies of the army administration. By 1971, after 12

 

years of military rule, Pakistan was even further from

 

political unity than it was in 1958.

 

The years of military rule also had a deleterious

 

effect on military capability. Government administration

 

detracted from the professional education of the officers as

 

well as the combat training of the army as a whole.

 

Political factions appeared in the army which probably

 

detracted from the cooperation and trust essential to an

 

effective military force. When open conflict erupted in

 

March 1971, the armed forces were forced to disarm and

 

remove Bengali officers and men. These actions must have

 

had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of the

 

services' war fighting capability.

 

In summary, the common religion of Islam could not

 

overcome the deep divisions of geography, culture and

 

political goals. Pakistan moved toward insurrection and

 

war.

 

ENDNOTES

 

(Chapter I)

 

 

1/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India,

Pakistan and Bangla Desh. (New York: Praeger, 1975)

p. 9.

 

2/ Ibid., p. 10.

 

3/ Ibid., p. 14.

 

4/ Ibid., p. 15.

 

5/ Ibid., p. 16.

 

6/ Ibid., p. 18.

 

7/ John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3rd ed.,

(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.

 

8/ Jackson, pp. 22-23.

 

9/ Ibid., p. 24.

 

10/ Robert LaPorte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disinte-

gration of a nation," Asian Survey. 12, No. 2 (Feb 1972),

p. 100.

 

11/ Jackson, pp. 25-27.

 

12/ LaPorte, p. 100; Jackson, pp. 27-28.

 

13/ Jackson, p. 28.

 

14/ Ibid., p. 33.

 

CHAPTER II

 

REBELLION AND REPRESSION

 

 

When Pakistan's army struck on the night of March 25,

 

1971, all Awami League leaders were arrested, killed or fled

 

into exile to India. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown to

 

West Pakistan to await trial on unspecified charges.

 

President Yahya stated in a radio broadcast the next day

 

that the Sheikh's "action of starting his non-cooperation

 

movement is an act of treason." 1/ Disorder and confusion

 

reigned in Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan. Many

 

civilians were killed as the army struck violently to clear

 

barricades in the cities. The Dacca University was shelled

 

and occupied; this resulted in many casualties. Police and

 

Bengali soldiers in Dacca were disarmed and detained. 2/

 

The army became an army of West Pakistanis and was viewed by

 

Bengalis as an occupying force.

 

Outside Dacca the army attacked Bengali officers and

 

men of the armed forces. The army then moved against other

 

paramilitary organizations such as the police, border

 

security forces and the militia. In some cases, the attacks

 

lasted several days but almost everywhere there were heavy

 

Bengali casualties and destruction. The Bengali military

 

and police units were scattered throughout the country and

 

many members began to withdraw toward the borders sabotaging

 

bridges and rail links where possible. The actions were

 

brutal and had elements of a cultural war: the army

 

attacked Bengalis, while Bengalis murdered members of the

 

Urdu-speaking minorities. By the end of April 1971, the

 

army had secured the major towns in East Pakistan and

 

organized resistance ceased. However, the nucleus of an

 

armed and trained guerrilla force had escaped into India and

 

to remote areas on the border. At the border Indian units

 

welcomed the fleeing Bengalis but India played no part in

 

the resistance at that time. 4/ As April drew to a close,

 

the attack by West Pakistan on the Eastern wing had

 

successfully stopped the immediate possibility of armed

 

revolt. However, the population was subdued but remained

 

passively hostile. The army reacted to this hostility with

 

increasing brutality and destruction of civilian property

 

continued. Civilian refugees began to pour into India.

 

As news of the uprising and repression in East Pakistan

 

spread in India, there was considerable public pressure on

 

the Indian Government to intervene. On March 29, 1971, the

 

Indian parliament passed a resolution pledging sympathy and

 

support for the people of East Bengal in their struggle for

 

the transfer of power to their legally-elected

 

representatives. The parliament expressed confidence that

 

"... the historic upsurge of 75 million people of East

 

Bengal will triumph." 5/ This resolution represented a

 

change in Indian policy toward Pakistan. Previously, India

 

had respected the unity of Pakistan in order to protect her

 

own unity, which had been also threatened by regional

 

factions and demands for autonomy.

 

Indian support to the rebels in the following weeks

 

consisted of assisting voluntary efforts to help the East

 

Pakistan cause and of encouraging escaped Bengalis to form a

 

provisional government. India, however, withheld formal

 

recognition of this government-in-exile. These cautious

 

actions were probably the result of military advice that

 

India would not be prepared for military action till after

 

the monsoon season ended in September. 6/

 

In response to India's statement of support for the

 

Bengalis, Pakistan protested that India was interfering in

 

Pakistan's internal affairs. The apparent object of this

 

diplomatic effort was to gain international support to

 

oppose any Indian intervention. But on April 2, 1971,

 

Russia publicly appealed to Yahya to quickly put an end to

 

the repression in East Pakistan. Islamabad replied that the

 

situation was under control and normal routine was being

 

established. Also on that date, the United States expressed

 

concern for the human suffering and the need for multi-

 

national assistance. President Nixon was probably concerned

 

that the balance of power in Asia would be upset and he was

 

anxious not to jeopardize the effort to develop closer

 

relations with China. 7/ The U.S. needed a stable Asia and

 

support of China to implement the planned withdrawal from

 

Vietnam.

 

Although slow in coming, on April 13 China expressed

 

support for President Yahya's efforts. Chou En-lai stated

 

that should India attack Pakistan, China would fully support

 

the Pakistani people and government to safeguard "State

 

Sovereignty" and national independence. The phrasing was

 

important as it did not state full support for the unity and

 

integrity of the nation as Pakistan wanted. From April

 

onwards, China provided economic and military assistance

 

appropriate to their statement of support; that is,

 

sufficient to guarantee only that in a war with India the

 

Western wing would survive, but not necessarily the Eastern

 

wing. Both India and the Soviet Union had long standing

 

disputes with China. China's interests would be served by

 

continuing to have Pakistan interposed between the U.S.S.R.

 

and India. Should West Pakistan cease to exist, then China

 

would be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. On the other

 

hand, continuing rivalry between Pakistan and India over

 

East Pakistan would divert India's attention away from her

 

border with China. Thus survival of West Pakistan was

 

important to China, while the dispute in East Pakistan would

 

add to the rivalry between India and West Pakistan to ensure

 

that India's attention would be diverted from her Northern

 

border with China.

 

At the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant asked

 

Pakistan to allow United Nations relief agencies to act in

 

East Pakistan while recognizing that the situation was an

 

internal matter of Pakistan. President Yahya firmly refused

 

any outside intervention. 9/ He probably believed that his

 

policy of counter-insurgency was sufficient to reestablish

 

control.

 

By May 1971, organized resistance in East Pakistan had

 

been crushed. Pakistan diplomacy appeared successful as

 

most countries viewed the affair as an internal problem.

 

However, the flow of refugees into India had turned to a

 

flood. India claimed that the refugees (mostly Bengali

 

Moslems) were arriving at a rate of 60,000 per day and

 

now totaled 1.5 million. These people moved mostly into

 

West Bengal and were costly to India in food and clothing;

 

furthermore, they were causing a severe economic dislocation

 

in a province already impoverished. In this situation,

 

India could do little more than provide indirect support to

 

the Bengali government-in-exile and provide sanctuary,

 

training and arms for the guerrilla forces. Diplomatically,

 

India stressed that whether or not the problem was an

 

internal one for Pakistan, the refugees were becoming an

 

internal problem for India: Pakistan must be responsible

 

for developing conditions for the safe return of the

 

refugees. 10/

 

India's diplomatic efforts began to get results.

 

Britain and the United States declared no new aid would be

 

extended to Pakistan until the government in Islamabad

 

cooperated with international relief agencies; however,

 

United States aid already approved would continue.

 

Pakistan's economy was weak. There was a shortage of

 

foreign exchange and exports from East Pakistan had slowed

 

significantly. 11/ Pakistan needed aid and needed the

 

return of the economic base of East Pakistan.

 

Thus in mid-May Pakistan informed the United Nations of

 

its willingness to accept relief aid if the activity was

 

coordinated by Pakistani officials. Within a week Yahya

 

appealed to the refugees to return and announced he would

 

soon reveal a plan for the orderly transfer of power to the

 

representatives of the people. Refugee reception centres

 

were set up and a general amnesty announced on June 10,

 

1971. The shift in Pakistani policy eased tensions in East

 

Pakistan. Many influential members of the Awami League

 

signed a declaration accepting the concept of national unity

 

and supporting the reintroduction of separate electorates

 

for Hindus and Moslems. To gain support of the right-wing

 

factions of the army, Yahya proposed that a new constitution

 

be drafted by a committee of experts rather than the

 

National Assembly. Although India now reported more than

 

six million refugees, the flow slowed considerably and she

 

was being pressured to accept international assistance for

 

the repatriation of refugees. 12/

 

By June, India had become distrustful of United

 

Nations' actions to repatriate refugees. When Pakistan

 

shifted ground to accommodate United Nations' actions, India

 

rejected the proposal for posting United Nations observers

 

on her border. 13/ India was probably concerned that East

 

Pakistan would return to the pre-crisis situation with

 

little or no gain toward self-determination of East Bengal.

 

Public opinion in India's turbulent eastern provinces also

 

favored severing Pakistan's link with East Bengal as an

 

opportunity to weaken a dangerous enemy. India, therefore,

 

insisted that Pakistan must come to a political solution of

 

the crisis founded on self-determination for East Bengal

 

before social and economic aid should be extended. On the

 

other hand, the United Nations' approach was to put social

 

and economic recovery in place before a political solution

 

should be attempted. The United States clearly supported

 

the U.N. approach which would return the South Asian balance

 

of power to the pre-crisis condition.

 

During May and June, leaders of the Awami League who

 

had fled to India continued to develop the Bangla Desh

 

movement (as they now called East Pakistan) politically and

 

militarily. The government-in-exile was nominally headed by

 

Sheikh Mujib, but because he was under arrest in West

 

Pakistan, the real head was Tajuddin Ahmid, the prime

 

minister. 14/

 

The stated goal of the movement was the independence

 

of East Pakistan; its unannounced objective was to gain

 

political power for the Awami League. 15/ To this end, the

 

government-in-exile tried to exclude Bengalis representing

 

left-wing and communist movements. The government-in-exile

 

remained composed principally of Awami League members but

 

its military arm, the Mukti Fanj, eventually incorporated

 

armed groups organized by other political factions. 16/

 

The government-in-exile pursued three broad strategic

 

programs to achieve its goal. These were:

 

(a) organizing the support of the population of East

 

Pakistan;

 

(b) gaining favorable international support; and,

 

© disrupting the economic strength of Pakistan

 

through attacks on the lines of communication in East

 

Pakistan.

 

To translate the disaffection of the Bengalis into

 

supportive action for the Bangla Desh movement, an

 

underground was organized to publicize its goals. Insurgent

 

propaganda emphasized the atrocities of the Pakistani army

 

and described the army as an occupation force restoring the

 

colonial rule of West Pakistan. This program succeeded to

 

get support in the form of volunteers as well as

 

information, supplies and concealment in the rural areas.

 

In the urban areas, the Bengalis were encouraged to boycott

 

schools, offices and factories to further disrupt the

 

economy. The insurgents also used terror tactics to

 

intimidate civil servants and factory managers to keep their

 

facilities closed. Furthermore, Bengali leaders who openly

 

supported Pakistan unity or collaborated with the army were

 

assassinated selectively to discourage others. 17/

 

To influence the international community, the main

 

effort emphasized recognition for the Bangla Desh government-

 

in-exile. Many Bengalis who were with Pakistani foreign

 

missions defected and set about publicizing the legitimacy

 

of the Bangla Desh movement. Although not initially

 

successful in obtaining formal recognition, these diplomats

 

developed popular sympathy for the Bangla Desh movement.

 

The Mukti Fanj was used primarily in an offensive role

 

to attack the lines of communication and to disrupt the

 

military and economic strength of East Pakistan. The

 

monsoon season of June to September favored guerrilla

 

tactics. Two-thirds of the country was water soaked

 

limiting mobility to roads, railways and river craft. The

 

roads and railways ran close to the border, crossing many

 

bridges vulnerable to attack. The India-East Pakistan

 

border itself was 1,400 miles long with no natural

 

obstacles. The interior of East Pakistan could be reached

 

easily by guerrillas from the border area by river and delta

 

channels. 18/

 

The Mukti Fanj mounted small, deep raids from their

 

sanctuaries in India and remote border enclaves.

 

Detachments of the Pakistani army were attacked causing

 

casualties which were duly reported by the foreign press.

 

These reports conflicted with Pakistani claims that the area

 

was under control and thus tended to undermine international

 

support for Pakistan. However, the attack on communications

 

was much more successful and had immediate effects.

 

Railways were largely inoperable beyond 30 to 50 miles from

 

Dacca. Roads were cut isolating the principal towns and

 

ports. The Pakistani army was left isolated in the urban

 

areas while the major export crops of jute and tea could not

 

be moved from the rural areas to markets. 19/

 

As July closed, the military situation in East

 

Pakistan was worsening. The monsoon was restricting army

 

mobility while the Mukti Fanj (renamed the Mukti Bahini)

 

mounted an increasing number of small raids aimed at

 

sabotage and terror. The army was forced to conduct

 

viscious counter-insurgent tactics which increased the

 

hostility of the disaffected population.

 

After a lull in June, refugees in large numbers again

 

poured into India. President Yahya continued to press for

 

the United Nations to force India to withdraw her support to

 

the Bangla Desh rebels and to decrease border tension to

 

induce more refugees to return home. He also stated that if

 

India tried to seize a base in East Pakistan for rebel

 

operations there would be general war. This was followed by

 

reports of Pakistani military build-up along the West

 

Pakistan border with India. 20/

 

Pakistani diplomacy at the United Nations, supported by

 

the U.S. was having an effect. U Thant recommended raising

 

substantial relief aid for East Pakistan. The resources

 

would be allocated for the refurbishment of transportation

 

systems as well as food and clothing. India remained

 

opposed to this plan as well as the U.N. proposal for

 

representatives on the border to facilitate passage of

 

refugees back to East Pakistan. It is now clear that India

 

was determined to see East Pakistan independence and would

 

not agree to any measures which increased West Pakistan's

 

strength there. By continuing to support the Bangla Desh

 

movement, India was becoming increasingly isolated at the

 

U.N. Her policy also implied eventual direct military

 

intervention since she could not support the enormous number

 

of refugees and ignore public support for intervention

 

indefinitely. 21/

 

Up to the end of July, the Soviet Union had tried to

 

maintain a balanced approach to India and Pakistan in an

 

effort to increase her influence on the sub-continent.

 

However, when the United States and China moved toward

 

closer mutual relations and both supported the Pakistani

 

position, Moscow concluded Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

 

Cooperation with New Delhi on August 9. The Treaty had

 

little effect on India militarily, but it gave support for

 

her position at the United Nations Security Council. The

 

Soviet Union opposed every proposal for any kind of

 

intervention which might allow Pakistan to get a political

 

settlement unacceptable to India, i.e., denial self-

 

determination for the people of East Pakistan. 22/

 

During August, President Yahya continued to try to win

 

some support within the population of East Pakistan as well

 

as satisfy the "hard-liners" in West Pakistan. On August 9,

 

Yahya announced that Awami League members who would support

 

Pakistani unity would be allowed to take their seats in the

 

National Assembly, while the remainder of the unfilled seats

 

would be filled by by-elections to be held at end-November.

 

About half the Awami League delegates elected in December

 

1970 signed a document agreeing to this move. Yahya also

 

announced that Sheikh Mujib would be tried by military court

 

on charges of "waging war against Pakistan." These two

 

proposals were a key compromise of the political factions of

 

Pakistan. 23/

 

In September more positive aspects of Yahya's plan

 

emerged. General Tikka Khan, who was the prime proponent

 

for military repression, was replaced as Governor of East

 

Pakistan by a civilian, and press censorship was officially

 

lifted. On September 5, a general amnesty was granted to

 

all civilians and members of the armed forces alleged to

 

have committed crimes since March 1. A number of detainees,

 

mostly politicians aligned with the Awami League were

 

released. 24/ These moves were countered by the government-

 

in-exile which remained committed to complete independence.

 

the Mukti Bahini intensified its propaganda aimed at the

 

Bengali population. As well, assassinations of candidates

 

standing for election were increased. For her part, India

 

would not provide assistance for refugees wanting to return

 

to East Pakistan. These actions were largely successful in

 

discouraging any popular Bengali support for the authorities

 

in Dacca and Islamabad. Candidates failed to stand for 18

 

out of 78 seats of the Assembly available and no significant

 

number of refugees returned from India. 25/

 

India also increased its support to the Mukti Bahini

 

military operations by providing artillery fire across the

 

border for the guerrillas and stopping the Pakistani army

 

from pursuing them into Indian territory. With their lines

 

of withdrawal more secure the guerrillas undertook deeper

 

raids into East Pakistan to destroy bridges, roads and army

 

posts. The increased military activity put further pressure

 

on the army to repress the actions and divereted effort from

 

rebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil order.

 

On October 12, Pakistan proposed to India mutual troop

 

withdrawals and posting of United Nations observers in the

 

border areas. Although India refused, Pakistan went ahead

 

and withdrew its army to stronger positions 10-12 miles

 

behind the border. 26/ This action was indicative of the

 

success of the guerrillas in their attacks against the

 

isolated Pakistani outposts.

 

At the same time Pakistani diplomacy emphasized the

 

requirement for United Nations action to restrain India from

 

supporting the rebels of East Pakistan. Pakistan continued

 

to argue that India was interfering in her internal affairs.

 

New Delhi's position was that the problem was not an "India-

 

Pakistan" problem, but strictly a Pakistani one for

 

Islamabad to correct. Therefore, United Nations' action was

 

inappropriate Pakistan had only to create conditions in

 

East Pakistan of peace and security for the refugees to

 

return home. 27/ While New Dehli's argument had a

 

legalistic logic, it must have been clear that Pakistan

 

could not create conditions of peace while fighting

 

guerrillas armed and trained in India. India obviously had

 

little desire to see East Pakistan survive as a province of

 

her rival in Islamabad.

 

While the Soviet Union consistently supported Indian

 

positions at the United Nations, in October Moscow pressured

 

New Delhi to soften her policy on Bangla Desh independence.

 

As a result, the Indian Foreign Minister announced that

 

India was committed only to a political solution acceptable

 

to the already elected representative of East Pakistan.

 

With many of these representatives in exile, their leader,

 

Sheikh Mujib, under arrest in West Pakistan it would have

 

been unreasonable that these representatives would demand

 

anything less than political automony for East Pakistan. In

 

any case, President Yahya refused to negotiate with them.

 

India returned to her previous position of demanding self-

 

determination for Bangla Desh. New Delhi had won a

 

propaganda victory and persuaded the Soviet Union to

 

continue to support her, all without any material or

 

political cost.

 

While Pakistan probably could have restored order

 

eventually in East Pakistan, President Yahya realized he had

 

little hope of prevailing without outside help if India

 

invaded there. He, therefore, tried to persuade China to

 

increase her commitment to the security of all Pakistan:

 

this the Chinese refused to do. Peking remained committed

 

to support Pakistan only to the extent required to ensure

 

the survival of West Pakistan as a nation. Despite public

 

pronouncements from Islamabad that China would supply all

 

the weapons Pakistan would need in a future conflict with

 

India, the Indians never appeared to be in any doubt as to

 

the true nature of China's commitment. When war came in

 

December, several Indian divisions were withdrawn from the

 

Sino-Indian border and moved into East Pakistan. 28/

 

As November drew to a close, Pakistan could no longer

 

tolerate Indian military actions in the border area.

 

Shelling and tank fire from the Indian army continued to

 

inflict casualties on Pakistani posts and provide support

 

guerrilla operations. Islamabad viewed the conflict as

 

India's responsibility and this was endorsed by the United

 

States who, on November 30, suspended licenses for arms

 

exports to India. 29/ On December 3, 1971, Pakistan struck

 

India with air and ground attacks across the border from

 

West Pakistan.

 

The period from March to September was marked by the

 

rapid deterioration of the political situation in East

 

Pakistan. When confronted by demands of the elected

 

representatives of the Awani League for economic and

 

political automony, the central military government in

 

Islamabad reacted with a ruthless and brutal repression

 

which ultimately failed. Islamabad appears to have

 

seriously underestimated the strength and the organization

 

of the Bengali nationalist movement embodied in the Awami

 

League. Faced with the arrest of over half its leadership,

 

the remaining Awami League leaders went into exile in India

 

with even firmer resolve to win independence. From there

 

they were able to quickly transform the party organization

 

into a credible government-in-exile with a military arm to

 

prosecute guerrilla warfare. The actions of the Islamabad

 

government worked to the advantage of the Bengali resistance

 

by providing the elements of a successful revolution.

 

By arresting and detaining Bengali leaders Islamabad

 

indicated to the world at large and the Bengalis, in

 

particular, that no political compromise was possible. The

 

ruthless and brutal purge of Bengalis from the armed forces

 

succeeded in sending a trained and dedicated cadre of

 

soldiers into exile in India where they were available to

 

the Bangla Desh government-in-exile as a cadre for the

 

guerrilla force. At the same time, Pakistani military

 

operations caused such destruction and intimidation of

 

civilians that millions also fled to India where they were

 

available and willing to support the Bangla Desh movement.

 

Little attempt was made by the Pakistan government to

 

encourage these refugees to return home. It is possible

 

that the Islamabad government consciously followed a policy

 

of forcing large numbers of civilians out of East Pakistan

 

in order to reduce the population to below that of West

 

Pakistan. This would ensure that in future governments West

 

Pakistan would hold a majority of seats in the National

 

Assembly and could protect its privileged position in the

 

nation. In any case, these destitute refugees provided a

 

large pool of manpower opposing the West Pakistani

 

government.

 

India saw the conflict as an opportunity to weaken her

 

major rival in South Asia. Pakistan had humiliated India in

 

the war over Kashmir in 1965. India at that time had had to

 

divide her forces between East and West while maintaining

 

considerable forces on her northern border with China. New

 

Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.

 

Breaking East Pakistan from the remainder of the nation

 

would greatly simplify her defense problem. India,

 

therefore, adopted the policy of supporting the Bangla Desh

 

movement while preparing her own armed forces for war with

 

Pakistan should intervention be necessary. The independence

 

of East Pakistan was pursued consistently and with skill

 

throughout the period.

 

Indian public opinion largely supported New Delhi's

 

policy. The burden of millions of refugees in India's most

 

populous and impoverished region was costly and caused

 

social unrest. Furthermore, most Indians saw Pakistan as a

 

threat which would lead to war eventually in any case.

 

When India's goal appeared in danger of being thwarted

 

by United Nations' intervention, New Delhi quickly found the

 

necessary Security Council veto by concluding a treaty with

 

the Soviet Union. This treaty did not place any military

 

obligation on either party, but only pledged cooperation.

 

For the Soviet Union the treaty demonstrated to the world

 

its increasing influence in South Asia while for India the

 

treaty gave her what she needed most -- an ally with veto

 

power in the Security Council.

 

The Awami League which formed the leadership of the

 

Bangla Desh movement was thus provided all the essential

 

elements to prosecute its guerrilla war for the independence

 

of East Pakistan. The league had safe havens in India from

 

which to organize politically and militarily. The arrest

 

and detention of the popular leader, Sheikh Mujib, provided

 

tangible and symbolic evidence of the persecution of the

 

Bengalis by the West Pakistani. The widespread destruction

 

of personal property and the economic deterioration in East

 

Pakistan gave the Bangla Desh movement an enormous pool of

 

manpower willing to resist the Pakistani authorities. The

 

Bengali soldiers who had escaped formed a trained and

 

dedicated nucleus for a guerrilla force. Finally, the

 

support of India in form of arms and training allowed the

 

guerrillas to move to the offensive quickly and effectively.

 

By December, it became apparent to Islamabad that it

 

was not regaining control of East Pakistan. The guerrillas

 

were striking deeply into East Pakistan in greater strength.

 

India was deploying raids across her border with East

 

Pakistan to support the guerrillas. Pakistan, therefore,

 

mounted an attack on December 3 aimed at destroying as much

 

Indian combat power as possible before she herself was

 

attacked by India.

 

ENDNOTES

 

(Chapter II)

 

 

1/ "Presidents Broadcast," Pakistan Affairs, Special

Issue, (Washington), No. 18, March 31, 1971.

 

2/ Robert Laporte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disin-

tegration of a Nation," Asian Survey, 12, No. 2 (February

1972), p. 102.

 

3/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakis-

tan and Bangla Desh, (New York, Praeger, 1975), pp. 34-35.

 

4/ Ibid., p. 35.

 

5/ Bangla Desh Documents, (New Dehli: Government of

India, 1971), p. 672.

 

6/ Jackson, p. 38.

 

7/ Ibid., p. 42.

 

8/ Ibid., p. 173.

 

9/ Ibid., p. 43.

 

10/ David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Asset-

tion," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2., February 1972, p. 91.

 

11/ Jackson, p. 48.

 

12/ Ibid., pp. 52-54.

 

13/ Ibid., p. 61.

 

14/ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Stra-

tegies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement," Asian

Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1972, p. 187.

 

15/ Ibid, p. 193.

 

16/ Jackson, p. 57.

 

17/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 195.

 

18/ Jackson, p. 59.

 

19/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 196. See also Chopra, p. 59

and Jackson, pp. 60-61.

 

20/ Jackson, p. 68.

 

21/ Ibid., p. 69.

 

22/ Ibid., p. 73.

 

23/ Ibid., p. 80.

 

24/ Ibid., p. 81.

 

25/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 198.

 

26/ Jackson, p. 92.

 

27/ Ibid., p. 82

 

26/ Ibid., p. 96.

 

29/ Stroessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3d ed., St.

Martin's Press. New York, 1982, p. 134.

 

CHAPTER III

 

THE 14-DAY WAR: 3-16 DECEMBER 1971

 

 

When general war opened on December 3, India and

 

Pakistan had unequal military capacities. India had

 

developed an arms industry with aid from the Soviet Union

 

and the West which was capable of producing major weapons

 

such as tanks and aircraft. India also had received and

 

continued to have access to military equipment from Moscow.

 

On the other hand, Pakistan's industry was much less

 

developed. She had been unable to get arms when cut-off by

 

the West and Russia in the summer of 1971. China had

 

provided military supplies, but these could not redress the

 

imbalance. 1/

 

The relative strengths of the armed forces of the two

 

countries are shown in Table 1. It must be noted that India

 

maintained considerable army forces guarding the Himalayan

 

border with China which reduced the forces available for

 

combat with Pakistan. 2/

 

Early in the counter-insurgency phase of the conflict,

 

Pakistan had purged Bangali units from the armed forces.

 

Many Bengalis who belonged to predominantly West Pakistan

 

units had defected: those who remained were not trusted and

 

the combat effectiveness of Pakistani units suffered as a

 

result. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was particularly

 

affected because many of the ground crew had been Bengali.

 

Click here to view image

 

The officer corps of all three Pakistani services had

 

been politicized, especially at the general officer level,

 

by years of military government. The need for political

 

balance in the government often overrode the requirements

 

for ability in many senior military appointments. This

 

resulted in poor leadership and incompetence as well as lack

 

of cohesion and trust. By 1971, the chiefs-of-staff system

 

had been modified so as to be almost unrecognizable. Yahya

 

Khan retained control of army operations in addition to his

 

duties as President and supreme Commander of all the

 

services. The structure was overly centralized and

 

dominated by the army. Not surprisingly, communications and

 

cooperation were poor between General Headquarters co-

 

located with the army at Rawalpindi, and the PAF and navy

 

located at Peshawar and Karachi respectively. 3/

 

The Indian system emphasized the distinction between

 

government and the armed services. Each service had equal

 

status and was controlled by a civilian minister of the

 

cabinet responsible to parliament. The service chiefs were

 

members of a chief-of-staff committee. A joint planning

 

staff provided coordination. This system was well-suited to

 

respond to civilian management. 4/

 

Pakistan's strategy tried to involve the United

 

Nations to prevent India from intervening militarily. But

 

when it became apparent that this strategy could not prevent

 

war, Pakistan attacked from the West. Yahya probably

 

considered East Pakistan indefensible in the long run, but

 

he hoped to gain sufficient Indian territory in the West

 

which could be traded for East Pakistan territory in the

 

negotiations following the cease-fire. The land battle in

 

the West was thus crucial for Pakistan.

 

Indian strategy was to act quickly in the East to

 

decisively defeat Pakistani forces there while defending

 

Indian territory in the West. This strategy reduced the

 

danger of China intervening as it clearly did not threaten

 

the existence of West Pakistan. 5/ A quick decision in the

 

East would ensure an independent nation in East Bengal

 

before international action could be mobilized to separate

 

the Indian and Pakistani armies there and preclude the

 

decision India sought.

 

When the PAF struck at 1747 on December 3, Pakistan

 

attempted to disable the superior Indian Air Force (IAF) by

 

a preemptive strike. Airfields at Amritsar, Srinagar,

 

Avantipur, Pathankot and Faridkot were attacked; however,

 

the strike failed to achieve any significant success. The

 

IAF had dispersed their aircraft to hardened shelters on a

 

large number of airfields where only a direct hit could

 

damage them. The late afternoon forced the attack to be

 

brief as it could not be sustained in darkness. Not only

 

were too few airfields struck for too short a time, but only

 

30 percent of the available aircraft were used. The

 

aircraft may have had a low serviceability or the PAF may

 

have attempted to save aircraft since they could not be

 

easily replaced. In any case, from this raid onwards, the

 

IAF dominated the air-war. 6/ On December 4, the IAF flew

 

over 500 sorties on tactical and strategic targets in

 

Pakistan. In 14 days of war, the Western Air Command of IAF

 

alone flew over 4,000 sorties. 7/ The IAF claimed 94

 

aircraft, while the PAF claimed 81. This air campaign

 

demonstrated again the value of mass and boldness: the IAF

 

influenced the war significantly with relatively small

 

losses while the PAF flew far fewer sorties with greater

 

losses and less effect. 8/

 

The border between West Pakistan and India followed no

 

natural topographical feature, but it had been inherited on

 

the basis of the old pre-1947 borders. There Pakistan

 

deployed ten infantry divisions, two armoured divisions,

 

various brigades and almost all its combat aircraft. The

 

general deployments are shown in Appendix I. The order of

 

battle of the Indians has not been disclosed, but it was

 

probably comparable. 9/

 

On December 3, the Pakistani 26 Infantry Brigade

 

attacked east from Kahuta toward Punch in northern Kashmir.

 

They had made virtually no progress against Indian ground

 

defenses and heavy air attacks when the offensive was

 

terminated two days later. On December 9, a second attack

 

toward Punch was again thwarted by IAF bombing. The Indians

 

then made a series of small attacks which secured several

 

Pakistani posts north and west of Punch. Further north in

 

the area of Kargil, the Indians secured all the Pakistani

 

outposts which overlooked the Zoji La Pass. These actions

 

were conducted at night at elevations above 16,000 feet at

 

sub-zero temperatures. 10/

 

To the south, the area of Chhamb was an important

 

communication link to all parts of Kashmir. The II (Pak)

 

corps attacked on December 3 with four infantry and one

 

armored brigade with eight artillery regiments in support.

 

After four days, they had succeeded in driving two Indian

 

infantry battalions out of their prepared defense to

 

positions across on the east bank of the Munnawar Tawi

 

River. Two days later the Pakistanis took the town of

 

Chhamb and established a bridgehead on the east side of the

 

river. On December 10 the Indians counter-attacked, sending

 

the Pakistanis back across the river. In the next two days,

 

units of II (Pak) Corps recrossed the river two more times

 

only to be forced to withdraw. By December 12, when the

 

sector stabilized, the Indians estimated they had lost 17

 

tanks and 440 men killed while the Pakistanis had lost 36

 

tanks and 1350 men killed. 11/

 

In the Punjab, the Sialkot-Shakargarh salient juts into

 

India. The Indians launched an attack there to relieve

 

pressure on the Chhamb area. They attacked the salient on

 

two axes: one from the north to cut the road between

 

Shakargarh and Zafarwal, the other from the east with

 

Shakargarh as the objective. Good Pakistani defensive

 

positions and extensive mining made progress slow, but by

 

the time of the cease-fire on December 16, the Indians had

 

secured about 1000 square kilometers of the salient. 12/

 

South of the Shakargarh salient in the area of Dera

 

Baba Nanak and Fazilka, the Indians expected a major

 

Pakistani offensive. Both sides fought local engagements in

 

effort to gain favorable position. However, no major

 

offensive was attempted. Although the 1 (Pak) Armoured

 

Division was available to strike, lack of air cover probably

 

kept it from entering the battle. 13/

 

Actions in the Sind-Rajasthan sector were aimed a

 

drawing strategic reserves of both sides down from the other

 

northern sectors. A Pakistani force of one infantry

 

brigade, supported by a reinforced armoured regiment,

 

crossed the border near Ramgarh on December 4. Without air

 

cover, the Pakistanis were caught in the open and lost an

 

estimated 34 tanks and 100 other vehicles in one day before

 

withdrawing. 14/ On December 5, while Pakistani armour was

 

being destroyed north in the desert, the Indians captured

 

Gadra and moved southwest on to Nagar Parkar and the Rann of

 

Kutch. This advance had possibilities of cutting the main

 

north-south lines of communication through Hyderabad to

 

Karachi. Indian progress was slow, but by the time of the

 

cease-fire 11 days later they had advanced to Naya Chor

 

and had captured 4,700 square kilometers of Pakistani

 

land. 15/ Its quite probable that the Indian advance in the

 

Rann of Kutch was deliberately slow in order not to

 

threaten seriously West Pakistan and thus arouse Chinese

 

military intervention.

 

At the time of cease-fire the Pakistanis had not

 

achieved any of their objectives. They had no large tracts

 

of Indian territory to use as bargaining chips for East

 

Pakistan. India had been able to deploy similar military

 

strength to a battle which, for them, was defensive. Indian

 

air superiority allowed them flexibility while negating any

 

Pakistani local ground concentration.

 

The 14-day war was the first full-scale Indian naval

 

war. India's fleet was much superior to that of Pakistan

 

and was well prepared when war came on December 3. The

 

Indian navy was able to defend the coast while blockading

 

East Pakistan and attacking shore targets in support of

 

ground operations. 16/

 

Pakistan's surface fleet had neither air cover nor

 

weapons to defend against India's missile boats. Therefore,

 

it stayed in Karachi harbour while submarines were given the

 

task of destroying India's aircraft carrier and cruiser.

 

They were unsuccessful: on December 4, Dafne-class

 

Pakistani submarine was sunk by a carrier escort in the Bay

 

of Bengal while a second submarine was sunk off Visakhapatna

 

harbour. The only Indian loss was the frigate Kukri sunk by

 

a sumbarine in the Arabian Sea on December 9. 17/

 

India's main naval support effort was in the Bay of

 

Bengal where a carrier task force blockaded the sea

 

approaches to East Pakistan. Six merchant ships and

 

"numerous" small craft were captured. Carrier based

 

aircraft struck assembly points of small boats in the Ganges

 

delta area, preventing the escape or reinforcement of

 

Pakistani army elements. The establishment of air

 

superiority early in the war allowed the ships freedom to

 

maneuver to attack shore targets at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar,

 

Chalna, Kulna and other economic and military targets. 18/

 

These actions had a significant effect on the collapse of

 

East Pakistan.

 

But the decisive theater of the war was East Pakistan

 

shown on the map at Appendix 2. The area is divided by

 

three major river systems into four parts with Dacca, the

 

capital, at the center. The Jamuna River runs north to

 

south cutting the country in half. West of the Jamuna the

 

Padma (Ganges) River flows west to east to join the Jamuna

 

west of Dacca. South of the Padma lies the South-Western

 

Sector with the major towns of Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna and

 

Chalna. To the north of the Padma the North-Western Sector

 

contains the towns of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Rajshahi.

 

The Surma-Meghna River flows southwest from Sylhet joining

 

the Jamuna south east of Dacca and dividing the remainder of

 

the country into the Northern Sector and Eastern Sector.

 

India deployed six infantry divisions and various

 

supporting troops on all sides of East Pakistan. Supporting

 

the Indian force were eight battalions of Mukti-Bahini and

 

many irregular Bengali soldiers. 19/ To force a quick

 

decision, India had to strike deep toward Dacca. Since the

 

trafficability of most of the region is poor, the combat

 

forces were lightly equipped but they were well trained and

 

were reinforced with engineers to assist in river crossings.

 

The Indian forces were deployed as follows: II Corps

 

comprising of two infantry divisions was tasked to advance

 

eastward through the South-Western Sector in the general

 

direction of Dacca; XXXIII Corps with one infantry division

 

and two brigades was tasked to attack to the Bogra area in

 

the Northwestern Sector and then on to Dacca; 101

 

Communications Zone with one brigade was to strike south

 

through the Northern Sector toward Dacca; and, IV Corps in

 

the Eastern Sector had three divisions with missions to

 

advance westward to Dacca. 20/

 

Opposing the Indians, Pakistan deployed five divisions

 

with two armoured regiments and supporting artillery. The

 

forces were deployed forward in strong points based on towns

 

near the border with light forces screening to the border.

 

In the Southwestern Sector the Indian II Corps advanced

 

on three axes. Nine (I) Division struck southeast bypassing

 

Jessore to the south then moved on the Kulna, Chalna and

 

Barisal. A second element of 9 (I) Division passed north of

 

Jessore on December 5 and, moving cross-country, took

 

Jheneida two days later. A third column composed of 4 (I)

 

Division moved eastward on the right bank of the Padma and

 

took Kushtia with its important railway bridge after heavy

 

fighting on December 11. The Pakistani forces based in

 

Jessore withdrew piecemeal without a fight when they found

 

themselves cut-off by the advancing Indian columns. By

 

December 15, the resistance in this sector had

 

collapsed. 21/ The Indians had demonstrated that they could

 

move rapidly across the marshy ground and numerous streams.

 

Good training and assistance of Mukti-Bahini guides allowed

 

them to outflank the major strong points which then

 

crumbled.

 

In the Northwestern Sector, XXXIII (I) Corps advanced

 

southeast on three axes, bypassing strongly defended areas

 

at Hilli, Dinajpur and Rangpur. Bogra was capatured on

 

December 13, cutting-off the defenders further to the north.

 

In this sector the Indians again proved they could move

 

quickly around static defenses to cut the routes of

 

withdrawal and reinforcement. Even though the Pakistani

 

army continued to fight from their strong points they could

 

not stop or eject the Indians. 22/

 

The Northern Sector provided the best approach to

 

Dacca for there are no major river obstacles. However, the

 

Indians used only two brigades in this sector. This force

 

took Jamalpur early, but was held up at Mymensingh until

 

December 11 before moving south to Tangail, 46 miles from

 

Dacca. The Indians dropped a parachute battalion into

 

Tangail on December 11 to cut the withdrawal route of

 

Pakistani forces to the north. On December 12, resistance

 

at Tangail crumbled and by December 16 Indian units were in

 

the outskirts of Dacca. 23/

 

In the Eastern Sector three Indian divisions faced two

 

Pakistani divisions. The 8 (I) Division advanced southwest

 

from Karimgan, reaching Maulvi Bazar on December 6. The

 

Pakisani garrison at Mualvi Bazar withdrew to Sylhet where

 

the elements continued to fight for some days. Meanwhile,

 

the main force of 8 (I) Division continued to Ashuganj on

 

the Megna River. The 57 (I) Division struck west from

 

Akhaura reaching Ashuganj on December 9. The 23 (I)

 

Division bypassed Comilla with one column moving south

 

toward Chittagong while the main body proceeded west to

 

reach the Megna River. Four days later the Indians were

 

within 12 kilometers of Dacca. 24/ After artillery had

 

fired on Dacca on December 15, the Pakistanis requested a

 

cease-fire and, on December 16, General Niazi, commander of

 

Pakistan's forces in Dacca, signed an unconditional

 

surrender. The war ended and Bangla Desh was a reality.

 

At the beginning of December, Islamabad had realized

 

that the Indians were massing to attack into East Pakistan.

 

Although Pakistan had approximately 40,000 troops deployed

 

there, the preceeding months of guerrilla war had taken its

 

toll. The Pakistani army's morale there had been weakened

 

by terrorist activity and the consistent hostility of the

 

civilian population. The terrain itself reduced mobility

 

and forced the army to deploy in strong points near the

 

larger towns where they would control the major road and

 

railway networks. These strong points were not mutually

 

supporting and there were insufficient forces to fill the

 

gaps between them. At best the Pakistani forces could delay

 

the likely Indian attack to gain sufficient time for an

 

international intervention to pressure India to stop. If,

 

as was entirely possible, no international intervention

 

materialized, then Pakistan would need to take Indian

 

territory elsewhere which could then be traded for the

 

return of East Pakistan during cease-fire negotiations. To

 

do this Yahya had to mount a swift, violent offensive into

 

India from West Pakistan. In the 14-day conventional war

 

Pakistan's strategy completely failed for a number of

 

reasons.

 

Firstly, the Pakistani forces needed air superiority

 

and they failed to achieve it. The PAF tried a surprise pre-

 

emptive attack on the Indian Air Force (IAF), but through

 

poor intelligence and planning failed to strike Indian

 

airfields in sufficient numbers or depth. IAF operations

 

were never seriously challenged. In the following days of

 

the war, the PAF could not or would not provide sufficient

 

sorties to gain even local air superiority to support the

 

ground forces even though aircraft were available. It is

 

probable that the PAF command thought it necessary to avoid

 

loss of aircraft so they would be available to counter an

 

Indian offensive into West Pakistan should it arise. It

 

appears that the Pakistani high command were not aware of

 

Yahya's objectives of gaining Indian territory as a defense

 

for the integrity of Pakistan as a whole.

 

Secondly, the Pakistani army attacked along a very

 

broad front of the western Indian border. But nowhere did

 

they mass sufficient forces to ensure a rapid breakthrough.

 

Generally, the points of attack were in terrain unsuited for

 

wide maneuver and hence mobility and speed could not be

 

developed to gain significant amount of Indian land.

 

Although battles were fiercely contested at battalion and

 

brigade level, the attacks were only loosely coordinated at

 

the corps and army level, and hence, lacked unity.

 

Thirdly, the effect of the Indian naval blockage was to

 

completely isolate West from East Pakistan. Combined with

 

Indian domination of the air, there was no possibility of

 

reinforcing or withdrawing army forces in East Pakistan.

 

This could only have further reduced morale and the will of

 

the soldiers there to resist. As well the Indian navy was

 

able to carry the war directly to Karachi while the

 

Pakistani navy could not venture out without risking

 

irreplaceable losses.

 

The Pakistani navy was simply not equipped to take on

 

the missiles and aircraft of the Indian fleet in order to

 

protect its own or commercial ships. Thus, West as well as

 

East Pakistan was isolated from its major sea supply routes.

 

The state of the navy was indicative of the neglect for

 

reality of the military government in Islamabad.

 

Lastly, the Army in East Pakistan underestimated the

 

ability of the Indians to move forces through the sodden

 

terrain of Bengal. The Pakistanis had deployed in strength

 

in the towns while leaving the rural areas relatively

 

unprotected. The Indian army, supported by Bengalis with

 

local knowledge, quickly outflanked these strong points.

 

With no strategic reserve available, the Pakistanis could

 

not block the Indian's advance. When the strong points were

 

surrounded, there was simply no place for the defenders to

 

go and they surrendered in thousands. 25/ The speed of the

 

Indian advance helped relieve Indian's logistic effort of

 

improving roads, bridges and railways necessary to move

 

large quantities of supplies for slower, more deliberate

 

operations. Their forces were lightly equipped to move

 

quickly through to Dacca.

 

In summary, the conventional phase of the war was one

 

of limited objectives by both sides. However, the

 

Pakistanis could not properly coordinate their strategy or

 

their forces to realize success. On the other hand, the

 

Indians produced a simple but flexible plan which they

 

executed with determination and skill. East Pakistan fell

 

much more quickly than Islamabad had anticipated and there

 

was no time for international intervention. In the West the

 

Indians defended successfully while making minor gains in

 

the South. Their actions were entirely consistant with

 

their objective of ejecting Pakistan from Bengal without

 

inviting intervention from other nations, particularly

 

China.

 

 

ENDNOTES

 

(Chapter III)

 

 

1/ Jackson, p. 107.

 

2/ Accounts vary. At least eight mountain divisions

remained guarding India's northern border. See Jackson, p.

107; Chopra, pp. 53-54; and Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistan

War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,"

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 14, May 73,

pp. 186-187.

 

3/ Jackson, p. 108.

 

4/ Ibid., p. 108.

 

5/ Ravi Rikhye, "Why India Won: The 14 Day War," Armed

Forces Journal, 109, April 1972, p. 39.

 

6/ Sir Robert Thompson, ed., War in Peace, (New York:

Harmony Books), 1982, p. 225.

 

7/ Jackson, p. 122.

 

8/ Thompson, p. 225.

 

9/ Ibid., 226.

 

10/ Jackson, pp. 116-119.

 

11/ Rikhye, p. 40.

 

12/ Ibid., p. 40.

 

13/ Jackson, p. 120.

 

14/ Thompson, p. 227. See also Jackson, p. 120.

 

15/ Jackson, p. 121.

 

16/ Kaul, p. 188.

 

17/ Ibid., p. 191.

 

18/ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

 

19/ Jackson, p. 133.

 

20/ Ibid., p. 133.

 

21/ Chopra, p. 56.

 

22/ Ibid., p. 56.

 

23/ Ibid., p. 58.

 

24/ Jackson, p. 142.

 

25/ Chopra, p. 58.

 

CHAPTER IV

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

 

The course of events which shaped the conflict between

 

India and Pakistan in 1971 had their origins in history made

 

many years before. The concept of a single Islamic nation

 

on the Indian sub-continent had brought the peoples of East

 

and West Pakistan together in the aftermath of British

 

colonial rule. But the concept was not powerful enough to

 

hold the nation in the face of differing race, language,

 

culture and geography.

 

When the autocratic rulers in the western wing denied

 

the democratic aspirations of the Bengalis while continuing

 

a policy of apparent economic domination, resentment was

 

inevitable. The established rulers had fashioned a severely

 

centralized government which was incapable of harmonizing

 

the political and social forces emerging in the western as

 

well as the eastern wing of the nation. Consequently

 

military repression of the Bengalis was implemented without

 

a serious attempt to rectify the causes of the grievances.

 

The millions of refugees who poured into India caused

 

serious economic and social problems in one of her most

 

unstable slates, West Bengal. The Indian government, with

 

considerable support from the public, seized this

 

opportunity to decisively weaken her most dangerous rival.

 

By skillfully managing her diplomatic affairs, while

 

encouraging the Bangla Desh movement, India won time to

 

prepare for military intervention while preventing wider

 

international intervention damaging to her aim. And clearly

 

her aim was to reduce the power of Pakistan by promoting the

 

autonomy of East Bengal.

 

China considered Pakistan, in particular West Pakistan,

 

vital to restricting Soviet influence on the sub-continent.

 

Should both India and Pakistan be drawn into the Soviet

 

sphere, China's borders would be threatened on all sides.

 

With India and Pakistan rivals, the threat to China from

 

India would be much reduced. For similar reasons, the

 

Soviet Union was initially trying to steer an even course in

 

the India-Pakistan dispute. However, when rebuffed by Yahya

 

in July 1971, Moscow quickly saw the chance to increase her

 

influence with India.

 

When conventional war finally came in December,

 

Pakistan found herself unable to defend the east or

 

successfully gain in the west. Pakistan's complete failure

 

in the air was most damaging. Her armies and navy lacked

 

information available from reconnaissance. Both the army

 

and navy could not maneuver without incurring damaging

 

losses from the Indian Air Force.

 

In the end, India prevailed because she was able to

 

maintain the initiative both politically and militarily,

 

guided by a simple but realistic and flexible strategy.

 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

Bayley, David H. "Inida War and Political Assertion."

Asian Survey VII, No. 2 (February 1972): pp. 87-96.

A political and social analysis of India during the

crisis of 1971.

 

Chopra, Maharay K. "Military Operations in Bangla

Desh." Military Review, LTT, No. 5 (May 1972)

pp. 51-60.

A good description of the military operations from

an Indian viewpoint. Includes map.

 

Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan

and Bangla Desh. New York: Praeger Publishers,

1975.

A thorough discussion of the history of Bengal

nationalism and the international politics of the

1971 crisis.

 

Kaul, Ravi. "The Indo-Pakistan War and the Changing

Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean." U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings (May 1973): pp. 173-195.

A detailed description of naval operations of the

war from the Indian point of view.

 

LaPorte, Robert Jr. "Pakistan in 1971: The Disinte-

gration of a Nation." Asian Survey XII, No. 2,

(February 1972). pp. 97-108.

A political analysis of Pakistan during the 1971

crisis.

 

Rashiduzzaman, M. "Leadership, Organization, Strate-

gies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement."

Asian Survey XII, No. 3 (March 1972): pp. 185-200.

 

Rukhye, Ravi. "Why India Won: The 14-Day War."

Armed Forces Journal, 109 (April 1972) pp. 38-41.

An analysis of the success of India in war 3-16

December 1971. Gives force ratios and deployments

of India and Pakistan.

 

Thompson, Sir Robert. ed. War in Peace: Conventional

and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945. New York: Harmony

Books, 1982.

Provides short summary of the background and conduct

of the war. Includes maps.

 

Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War. 3d ed.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

 

 

Chapter 5 provides analysis of the political cur-

rents and leaders involved in the 1971 crisis. In-

cludes bibliography.