Prabhupada Knew that US Plotted War Against India

[Guest guest]

Prabhupada Knew that US Plotted War Against India

Prabhupada: Because America is aiming to start the war from India.

Devotee: Oh!

( S.P. Morning Walk Conversation (World War III) April 4, 1975,

Mayapur)"

....In the last fighting between India and Pakistan, as soon as

President Nixon sent their Seventh Fleet on the India Ocean, Bay of

Bengal, almost in front of India... This was illegal. But very puffed-

up, America. So sent the Seventh Fleet, maybe to show sympathy to the

Pakistan. But immediately our Russian friend also appeared there. And

therefore, America had to come back. Otherwise, I think, America

would have attacked on behalf of Pakistan."[Prabhupada lecture

London, August 6, 1973]

 

NEWSFLASH FROM MAY 7, 2005 30 YRS LATER

Nixon plotted war against India in 1971

http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=46310

Press Trust of India

Posted online: Saturday, May 07, 2005 at 1653 hours IST

Updated: Saturday, May 07, 2005 at 1715 hours IST

 

Washington, May 7: Fearing that Soviets might get involved in the

1971 Indo-Pak war, then US President Richard Nixon had wanted China

to make coordinated military moves in support of Pakistan, according

to documents released by the State Department.

 

The Nixon administration was not prepared to involve itself in a war

on the Indian sub-continent. Nor did it pay much attention to Indian

concerns about "the carnage in East Pakistan" and the problems of

refugees in West Bengal, said a State Department press release giving

the gist of the papers on the Bangladesh War of Liberation, released

yesterday.

 

But, the signing of the India-Soviet Union Treaty of Peace,

Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971, while not a mutual

security treaty, was viewed in Washington as a blank check to India

in its confrontation with Pakistan, it said.

 

The US policy included support of Pakistan in UN and pressure on

Soviets to discourage India, with hints that US-Soviet detente would

be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply.

 

At Nixon's instruction, his assistance for National Security Affairs

Henry Kissinger met China's ambassador to the UN Huang Hua to suggest

that Beijing make coordinated military moves in support of Pakistan.

The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the soviets

responded militarily, the US would support China in any confrontation

with Soviet Union.

 

When the Chinese asked to meet Kissinger in New York two days later,

the White House assumed the worst and concluded that China had

already decided to take military action against India, the release

said.

 

There was serious contemplation in the White House that the crisis

might lead to nuclear war, but the general conclusion was that a

regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet

Union against China, the US and Pakistan was more likely.

 

When the meeting took place, the Nixon White House learned that

China's message had nothing to do with military moves in support of

Pakistan. For his part, President Nixon realised that "Russia and

China aren't going to war."

 

In mid-December, Pakistani military forces surrendered in East

Pakistan.

 

With US encouragement, Pakistan accepted an Indian cease-fire offer

that would dramatically alter the Indian subcontinent, the release

noted.

 

Tracing the history of the war, the volume released by the State

Department described political crisis triggered by the electoral

success of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, led by Sheik

Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League and the announcement by Pakistan

President Yahya Khan on March 1,

 

1971, that the scheduled meetings of the newly elected National

Assembly would be postponed indefinitely.

 

The announcement was met initially by popular demonstrations by the

Awami League and the dispatch of additional troops to Dhaka by

Pakistan's martial-law government. On March 15, Rahman announced that

he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan and 10 days

later the Army arrested him and moved to suppress what it viewed as

a "secessionist" movement, the release said.

 

The United States was loath to intervene in Pakistan's internal

affairs, especially since Islamabad was Nixon's secret conduit for a

diplomatic opening to China, according to the release.

 

The Pakistani Army's campaign against Bengali dissidents eventually

led the US consulate in Dhaka to send a "dissent channel" message to

Washington, which called for the United States to condemn

the "indiscriminate killings."

 

When Indian officials such as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi came to Washington, the Nixon administration

counselled non-intervention, but assumed that India planned to go to

war, the release said.

 

President Nixon had also warned Soviet officials not to encourage

India and informed New Delhi that if it started a war with Pakistan,

the United States would cut off aid, it said.

 

On November 22, when the war began, the Nixon administration cut off

economic aid to India, and Nixon himself decided to "tilt" toward

Pakistan.

 

When Nixon learned that Indian war plans were designed to

liberate "Bangladesh" and to destroy Pakistan's military armoured and

air strength, he ordered the US carrier enterprise and its escorts

into the Bay of Bengal, the release said.

 

Date : 2005-05-08

US State department acknowledges pro-Pakistan tilt in the 1971

Bangladesh war, says it was trade off for Pakistan acting as `secret

conduit to China

>From M Rama Rao - Reporting for Asian Tribune from New Delhi

 

 

 

 

 

Noting that Richard Nixon has ordered: "To all hands. Don't squeeze

Yahya at this time," the State Department publication answers the

question why was Nixon so concerned not to squeeze Yahya.

 

 

New Delhi, 08 May (Asiantribune.com): For the first time since the

1971 war between India and Pakistan, the United States has conceded

that it was pro-Pakistan during the war that led to the emergence of

Bangladesh. "The United States was loath to intervene in Pakistan's

internal affairs especially since Pakistan was President Nixon's

secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to the People's Republic of

China", the State Department said in an official document.

 

The report, part of the ongoing official record of U.S. foreign

policy, presents key documentation on the Nixon Administration's

policy immediately prior to and during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

Included in this volume is full coverage of the "tilt" toward

Pakistan by President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National

Security Affairs Henry Kissinger. Under the title "Foreign Relations

Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 discloses "Nixon himself decided

to `tilt' toward Pakistan. This pro-Pakistan policy included support

of Pakistan in the United Nations and pressure on the Soviets to

discourage India, with accompanying hints that U.S.-Soviet détente

would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply".

 

Another disclosure: Pakistani army's campaign against Bengali

dissidents eventually led the U.S. Consulate in Dacca to send

a "dissent channel" message to Washington, which called for the

United States to condemn the "indiscriminate killing." However, the

Nixon Administration was not prepared to involve itself in a civil

war on the Indian subcontinent. Nor did the Nixon Administration pay

much attention to Indian concerns about "the carnage in East

Pakistan" and the problems of refugees in West Bengal.

 

Observing that India's concerns and sensitivities were `accorded

scant sympathy in the White House', the report claims "With U.S.

encouragement, Pakistan accepted an Indian cease-fire offer that

would dramatically alter the Indian sub continent".

 

The report states at one stage US feared that China could intervene

in the India-Pakistan conflict and use its nuclear arsenal even.

 

"At the President's instruction, Kissinger met with People's Republic

of China Ambassador to the United Nations Huang Hua to brief him on

the crisis and U.S. actions, and to suggest that China make

coordinated military moves in support of Pakistan.

 

The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the Soviet Union

responded militarily, the United States would support China in any

confrontation with the Soviet Union. When the Chinese asked to meet

with Kissinger in New York 2 days later, the White House assumed the

worst and concluded that China had already decided to take military

action against India.

 

There was serious contemplation in the White House that the crisis

might lead to nuclear war, but the general conclusion was that a

regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet

Union against China, the United States, and Pakistan was more likely.

When the meeting took place, the Nixon White House learned that

China's message had nothing to do with military moves in support of

Pakistan. For his part, President Nixon correctly realized

that "Russia and China aren't going to war."

 

Noting that Nixon has ordered: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at

this time, the State Department publication answers the question why

was Nixon so concerned not to squeeze Yahya thus: "On May 7,

Kissinger entertained Ambassador Joseph Farland on Nixon's

instructions in Palm Springs, California, Only Farland was to know

about the cover Pakistan was providing for this initiative, or that

President Yahya had facilitated it with the Chinese leaders. Whatever

disclaimers Nixon and Kissinger later published with regard to the

motives that drove their policy during the South Asian crisis, the

desire to protect their channel to China clearly ranked near the top".

 

"India had emerged from the crisis confirmed as the pre-eminent power

on the subcontinent, and Soviet support for India during the crisis.

http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=14369

- Asian Tribune -