Guest guest Posted October 29, 2004 Report Share Posted October 29, 2004 SRIMATHE RAMANUJAYA NAMAHA The following are some perspectives which adiyaL finds to be having some relevance in the current discussions on Kaliyan’s salvation, the questions by Srivilliputtur Sundarrajan and on the question whether there is any freewill or initial volition for the jivatma. There is no deliberate attempt to combine them all. But when an attempt was made to look into the pramanas (if any) to understand Kaliyan’s salvation described by Sri Sundarrajan in his mails, adiyaL found herself meandering through various concepts and had clubbed them as the title of this mail. This mail is not to validate or question any notion expressed by others so far on these topics. The perspectives are being just highlighted and it is for the readers to deduce or define or even brush them aside …in the way they think fit (1) Salvation – Mukthi –Release. All these are being talked about by different sruti texts and by Purvacharyas. But that which has been talked by Gitacharyan is being taken by adiyaL as the foremost among all pramanas, since they have been mouthed by Bhagwan Himself. Bhagwan has minced no words while revealing His mind as to whom He casts His vote. It is the gyAni who is brimming with Sattwic qualities. A concerted reading of the Gita reveals that the end (or the desire for Release) is as important as the means to attain it. The end does not justify the means, but the means applied in the right direction takes one to the end. (2) The above inference is also supported by verse 3-4-51 of Brahma sutras. This is seen by this writer as a daring, strong and important verse stating that Release is not automatically guaranteed at the end of the birth in which the chetana does the meditation that has for its fruit, Release. This meditation, in our understanding is prapatti. The presence of impediments in the form of deeds delay the Release. After telling in the previous sutra that scriptures do declare that worldly prosperity arises only when the obstructions in hand are removed, the same logic is taken further into the question of Release in the 51st sutra as thus: “ Similarly, there is no rule as to the fruit of final Release, because the meditation has that condition (of granting fruit in the absence of obstruction); has that condition.” The translation of Ramanuja Bhashyam for this sutra by Swami Vireswarananda is as follows:- “This topic deals with meditation that has for its fruit, Release. Meritorious deeds are aids for such meditation. There is no rule that the final Release takes place immediately. When there is no obstruction, the state of Release may occur immediately, otherwise not. Here also a doubt may arise: The deeds which are the means of generating the meditation leading to Final Release might be stronger than other deeds, and otherwise there is no obstruction. Even in that case, offences formerly committed against the Knowers of Brahman may exist, and therefore there is a chance of obstruction. The repetition of the last words of the sutra shows the close of the chapter.” Another pramana to support this view is from Katohpanishad (II-24) which runs thus:- “One who has not turned away from evil conduct, who is not tranquil, who is distracted, or whose mind is not content, can never attain Him through Knowledge.” So, deeds in thought and action are to be guarded well, though one may be qualified for Release by means of Knowledge in the form of bhakti. Yet another pramana that deeds committed later can not be wiped out by good deeds done earlier is taken from Sundara khandam wherein Hanuman tells Ravana that all his past glorious good deeds can not save him from the misdeed of abduction of Sita because they (past good deeds) protect one from the bad deeds committed before the good deeds were done and that they can not protect him from the bad deed (abduction) done afterwards –thereby implying that any good deed in the form of propitiation done after the bad deed and with the aim of reducing the effect of bad deed alone is capable of protecting him from the bad effect of abduction. The propitiation in Ravana’s case is surrender to Rama’s feet and returning Sita. That vidhi or karma or destiny is very powerful from which it is very difficult to escape – is something acknowledged by Sita piratti Herself in sargam 37. (That BG gives the prescription to wriggle oneself out of this is another topic by itself) (3) Going by this sutra, our questions around sahetuka –nirhetuka kripa of the Lord seem to get a valid explanation. Coming to the sutra mentioned in point (2), it is to be understood that the jiva which is quite eligible for Release has to be born again if there are impediments to Release. When such impediments are gone through by the jiva in the same birth itself, the prospect for Release arises and he attains it. Suppose the jiva has to take another birth to live-out the effects of particular karma, and he attains Release after such karmas are over, one may not necessarily get to see how this jiva which is otherwise seen as an ordinary being, attains Release. This gives rise to an appearance that either god is impartial to some and blesses that jiva for no reason at all (nirhetukam). But a close reading of Vedartha sangraha reveals what exactly is meant by the Mundaka vachan that ‘the atman is attained by one whom He chooses’. This choice is not arbitrary or from out of the blue. It is only after the jiva is qualified to attain Him, that he is chosen by Him. The reading of verse 251 of VS reveals that “he becomes the object of greatest love to the Lord in whom has arisen supreme love for the Lord. The Bhagwan says, ‘I am ineffably dear to the man of knowledge and he is also dear to me.” Therefore in reality, only knowledge that is of the nature of supreme bhakti is the means for attaining the Bhagwan.” The Lord takes such a person into His abode and not others. This shows that the Lord does not hand-pick someone not entitled for such attainment. But it might seem so for others around him, for, we do not know what this person’s karma was like and what his bhakti was/is like. Suffice it to say that He is Just and Right always. He can not be even dreamt of having made adharmic choices/ decisions. (4) This must set at rest the questions whether the Lord is partial to some jivas. Sutras 2-1-34 &35 make it amply clear why and how the Lord can not be said to be partial or cruel, since it is karma which is controlling the jivas. Ramanuja bhashyam to the 34th sutra says this in many words. When a man becomes bad by bad deeds and good by good deeds, it is assumed that He as the controller makes all this happen. But no, “The Lord is only the operative cause in the creation of beings. The main cause is the past karma of the beings. Just as rain helps different seeds to sprout, each according to its nature, so the Lord is the general efficient cause in bringing the latent efficient tendencies of each individual to fruition. Hence He is neither partial nor cruel.” (5) Similar view that it is the prakruthi sambhandam and karma sambhandam that decide the action of the individual is stressed strongly by Gitacharyan in verses 18-60 & 61. “O Arjuna, bound by your own duty born out of your own inner disposition¸ and HAVING NO CONTROL OVER YOUR OWN WILL, you will be compelled to do that very thing which you now desire not to do through delusion.” So where is the question of free volition or even initial volition? (6) Vedopanishath do not support anywhere even a minute prospect for free volition. If volition is ascribed to the jiva, that runs counter to the ‘existence, infinity…’ of Brahman of taiitriya upanishad, which Ramanuja finds as an authentication for material cause for everything. It also runs counter to the sarira-sariri bhava. At one level the soul has a relationship with the body as AdhAra (supporter), niyanta (controller) and seshi (master). Similarly Brahman has a relationship with jivas whom It has as Its body by supporting, controlling and by mastership. “ He abides in the heart of every being, spinning them round and round, mounted on a wheel as it were, by His power.” (BG 18-61) (7) But whenever and wherever the talk of free volition (initial only) comes up in Ramanuja’s writings, one finds that it is invariably in reply to a question whether the injunctions such as satyam vada and dharmam chara are meant for the In-dweller who is Brahman, or addressed to the jiva and on whom wrests the moral responsibility for the actions. (Brahma sutra- bhashyam `2-3-41, Gita bhashyam 18-15 and vedartha sangraha 124). This confusion is being answered by Ramanuja himself in quite a few places by quoting the famous example of two birds sitting on the same tree, one eating the fruit of karma and the other shining without eating. (Of these two, one eats the sweet fruit with relish, while the other looks on without eating. – sve upa – IV –6) “There are two, one the Ruler and the other the Ruled” (Sve I –9). Karma doesn’t touch the Brahman though he is the material and efficient cause of all that happens. Because He is the knower and knows why all this happens and what makes this happen and how He makes this happen. When the jiva too realises this, he attains Brahman hood. (8) It is interesting to note that invariably all the granthas of purvacharyas which reflect Ramanuja Hrudhayam do not prescribe to this view on initial volition. Then why do we still muse upon this clause is a mute question. Looking at this clause, this writer wishes to deal with it at 3 levels. (1) If one were to pick out this particular view from his bhashyam which is more in the nature of explaining a particular sutra or verse, how do we treat other controversial notions such as Brahma sutra's version of shudras not being entitled to know brahma vidya and the authentication of animal sacrifice in yajnas. Ramanuja does not counter these views but instead had only justified them in consonance with the said sutras. While we do not give importance to these views and Ramanuja himself had not promoted these views, why should there be importance to the view on initial volition which anyway is devoid of sruti pramana? (2) The very idea of initial volition is confusing as to which action is meant here. A person does numerous actions in a day which include even eating, speaking etc. What is the description for what constitutes the initial one for an action and a will to do it? For, everything seems to originate by virtue of prakruthi and karma sambhandam. In the analogy of the child refusing to write as directed by the mother, there may seem outwardly a freewill on the part of the child in having refused to write. But suppose the child hits its own eye by the pen it had in its hand while trying to free the hand from its mother, how would we justify the pain or hurt to its eye? Suppose the mother beats the child in an impulse that the child had disobeyed her, how would we justify the pain and distress to the child? If karma (vidhi) is the answer to these 2 questions, by the same logic it is karma or the mix of thri-gunas in its mental constitution that are the causes for the child’s initial impulse to repel its mother – free volition has no place in this. Thus it is absolutely difficult to prove initial volition in any of the actions in day to day life. (3) This brings us to look into the possibility of whether the initial volition is in fact the volition that could have possibly existed at the beginning-less beginning. That is, imagine a situation when God had just created the manifest world and body for the jiva and the jiva is equipped with gunas (as per the combination that went into its making) and indriyas to do action. How would the first action that is going to trigger the karma- cycle take place? Does God, having empowered the jiva remain a witness or the jiva begins action on its own volition? This seems to be a credible scenario to justify initial volition, for, everything that is going to happen after the initial volition will be the result of the previous one and the question of volition would not arise from then onwards. Thus the wheel of karma would be put on the move. But here again this writer thinks that our siddhantam does not favour free volition for the jiva at this initial level. This is for 2 reasons. Taking cue from PBA swamy in his vyakhyaanam for Acharya hrudhayam 1-12, it is being said that karma is something that is ‘vandhEriya ondru’ Karma is not anAdhi (beginingless) because if it is anAdhi, we can not call it as something ‘vandhEriyadu’. It is ‘vandhEri’ because it will be removed by God someday. If it is something that can be removed someday, it is only too logical to assume that it was formed one day. Based on this explanation by PBA swamy, this writer thinks that since it is said as ‘vandhEri’ and not as anything else, it is something that has come to cling to the soul and not the other way round. That is, it is not acquired by the soul, in which case such acquisition would be due to action by its volition. Though agreeing that a jugglery of words has been attempted here, this writer thinks that by the term ‘vandhEri’ it is logical to assume that karma has come to cling to the jiva who soon after creation comes under the control of gunas. It is the gunas which make him take the first action as also the subsequent ones. The BG supports this view. It is for another reason also this volition theory is not acceptable. While discussing the admissibility of Pancharathra system (Brahma sutras) as an authoritative text, a discrepancy is brought to the fore that the contention found in this system that Samkarshana, the jiva originates from Vasudeva runs counter to the Vedic proposition that jivas are not created ones. Ramanuja relies on Vyasa’s authentication of the system as being reflective of vedas and contends that vyasa can not be wrong. That leaves him to defend this discrepancy on some other logical basis. He does this by quoting Chandogya which says ‘ that fire willed… It created water’ by which it is meant that the Lord Himself, so far as embodied in fire creates water. Similarly, the Pancharathra doctrine also has to be understood when it says that the mind originates from Vasudeva. Similarly, when Ramanuja mentions about initial volition, the Lord’s words ‘nimittha mathram bhava’ (be an instrument alone) is understood to be holding the key and any thought by the jiva as the doer (by virtue of a thought of volition to do) must be nothing other than the resultant of the guna-mix initially and karma-bhandham (too) thereafter. For, (of the numerous references about His being the controller of the jiva in embodiment) He is the manas among sense organs and consciousness in the living beings (BG 10-22) So any volition at the initial time must have had the Lord as the manas, as the cause. “ The lord of the body (the self, i.e., the jiva) does not create agency, nor actions, nor union with the fruits of actions in relation to the world of selves. It is only the inherent tendencies that function.” (BG 5-14) “It is the result of the conjunction of the self with Prakruthi” (Gita bhahyam) that generates and that is generated by the flow of past karma. Though the Lord remains as the bird that shines without eating the fruit, the other bird, the jiva by thinking that it has volition starts getting karma and eats it too. So any injunction like satyam vada and dharmam chara (Ramanuja’s dilemma) is directed to the one to whom the karma clings (vandhEri) and who is under the influence of thri-gunas and not to the In-dweller who waits for the opportune moment to lift the jiva by ‘dadaami buddhi yogam’. Before concluding here is a piece from Brihadaranyaka upanishad from chapter 3 in which sage yagyavalkya replies to the queries of Vidagdha after Gargi concludes her questions. To the question by Vidagdha on what does the ‘self’ depend, the sage answers as follows: “In each person’s body, an appearance of self is created by the outgoing faculty of expression, which is projected from within the heart towards the external world.” Q - ‘on what does this outgoing faculty depend? A - “ On the in-drawing faculty of observation, which takes perception into the mind. Q – ‘On what does this in-drawing faculty depend? A – “ On the discerning faculty of interpretation which reflects back and forth between observation and understanding, thus interpreting the meaning of perceptions. Q – “ On what does this discerning faculty depend? A – “ On the integrating faculty of understanding, which assimilates meaning into the heart and which coordinates expression as it is projected outwards from the heart.” Vidagdha remained silent now. So Yajnavalkya continued, “But surely the enquiry doesn’t end here. A further question remains to be asked. What is that fundamental principle from which all experience is projected and into which all perception and meaning are assimilated?” None answered. But we know, thanks to our acharyas, thanks to numerous works that they have bequeathed to us….. Regards, AdiyaL by name Jayasree. 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