NOTES ON MANDUKYA UPANISHAD AND KARIKA

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"kuntimaddi sadananda" <kuntimaddisada

NOTES ON MANDUKYA UPANISHAD AND KARIKA: INTRODUCTION 3

 

 

 

Reality of the perceived world:

 

It is important to note that in all perceptions, we have only

attributive knowledge of the objects and thus the world, but no

substantive knowledge of world. The substantive of the world is nothing

but Brahman, which is perceived not as Brahman but as something other

than Brahman. We do not (cannot) see Brahman as Brahman (conscious

entity), but see the Brahman as varieties of objects, which do not have

any substantive of their own other than Brahman. The reality of the

world is provided by the reality of Brahman.

asti bhati priyam rUpam nAmam chaityanca pancakam|

adhyatrayam brahma rUpam, jagatrUpam tathadvayam||

'Existance, being known, being likable, form and name are the five

aspects of an object. Of which the first three are expressions of

Brahman and the next two constitute the world', says the author of

dRik-dRisya viveka. 'Taking something other than what it is' is called a

superimposed error or adhyaasa. Thus, there is an inherent error in all

perceptions when we perceive and conclude that there is a separate world

'out there'(that includes the concept of 'out there' too). Because

there is a strong confirmation by our intense experience of the world of

objects - filling the stomach with food, sweating because of solid

weight lifting, etc.,- it appears that there is a solid material out

there as the world of objects. For this specific reason only mADUkya

gives an exhaustive account of the dream world of objects. In the

dream, the dream food fills the dream body and dream solid

weightlifting causes sweating of the dream body, etc, and thus there is

an intense sense of reality for a dream subject about his dream world.

Hence, intense experience itself does not fulfil the criteria for

reality of the dream objects, since both the subject and the objects of

experience are all resolved into one waking mind. Thus we learn know

that dream pramAta and dream prameyams and dream pramANas all arise from

the waking mind supported by the consciousness that I am. Similarly,

scripture declares that sarvam khalu idam brahman - the whole world of

objects are nothing but Brahman. Therefore, the perceiver, feeler,

thinker, the knower, the pramAta in the waking world, the objects of

experience and knowledge, prameyam, and the means of knowledge, pramANa

are all supported by Brahman, the consciousness. Hence Krishna says

brahmArpaNam brahmahaviH bramhAgnou brahmaNAhutam|

brahmaiva tena gantavyam brahma karma samAdhinA|| B.G 4-24

>From the point of our discussion the above sloka means, the perceiver,

the perceived and perceiving all in essence is Brahman only. There

cannot be anything else other than Brahman. At the same time in

Brahman, there are no internal differences, i.e. there is no perceiver,

perceived and perceiving. Just as in the dream, the creator, created

and the relation between the two, are all integrated into one mind

(corresponding to a waker) supported by consciousness that I am, one can

say in the waking world too, the tripuTi, the perceiver, perceived and

perceiving all arise from one total mind supported by consciousness.

Consciousness identified with total mind is called Iswara.

 

Let us bring all the facts that we have gathered from the above analysis

and from Vedic statements.

a). Brahman is existence-consciousness-limitless and is not only

efficient cause but material cause of the universe as well. In fact,

all causes rests in Brahman since he is one without a second. However,

the concept of cause-effect itself gets dissolved in Brahman as will be

noted in the upaniShad.

b) Braham being infiniteness is attributeless, and therefore cannot be

objectifiable.

c) Only objects can have attributes or conversely any thing that has

attributes is an object.

d) Therefore Subject 'I' also has no attributes since it cannot be an

object. It being sat chit ananda swaruupa, its analogy with Brahman is

exact. This upanishad in fact establishes the identity of the two.

e) Being material cause, Brahman is substantive for all objects.

f) Inert objects with Brahman, the consciousness principle, as

substantive is illogical, yet that appears to be the case, when we

perceive the world of objects.

g). Close examination of the perception process of an object indicates

that we can only gain attributive knowledge and not substantive

knowledge. This also agrees the above fact that Brahman, who is

incomprehensible, is substantive for all the objects.

h). Since we don't perceive the objects per se and inert objects cannot

exist in reality with conscious entity as their substantive, the

existence of the objects out there is more an assertion than a fact

since there is nothing other than Brahman which is infinite and all

pervasive consciousness.

i). 'That we experience the world; therefore it is real' is an incorrect

assertion. What we experience need not be true (just as one experiences

sunrise and sunset), and the truth of that experience need to be

investigated further.

We conclude based on all the above information that inert entity cannot

exist since what exists is only Brahman, which is all-pervasive

conscious entity. Since we do experience the world, we cannot say that

the world does not exist either, since its existence is sustained by the

real, which is Brahman. Experience by itself is not a proof of the

reality of an object. We cannot 'experience' Brahman. Hence, we call

the existence of the world is only mithya, from the point of inherent

internal differences among the objects. From the existence point, the

world is still real since the existence is due to Brahman. When I am

conscious of the world, the world is supported by the consciousness that

I am. Here I, the subject as pramAta, the world, the object as prameya

and the being conscious of through a pramANa, all are arising through

the mind supported by consciousness that I am. The world should be real

looking from Brahman, as shruti statement - 'sarvam khalu idam brahma'

indicates that from the vision of the Vedas, internal differences that

objectify the world will dissolve, since Brahman is satyam, jnaanam,

anantam. This is similar to the fact that from gold point the existence

of all ornaments as separate countable entities has no relevance.

 

Mandukya brings out this fact through the analysis of the dream world.

In the dream, we experience the dream world consisting of both dream

jiivas and dream jagat but all arising from the mind and in the mind,

due to the presence of a dreamer I, who is a conscious entity. Thus the

existence of the dream world is again supported by Brahman, the

conscious entity, since I am conscious of the world

 

>From the waker's point the dream is unreal, while from dreamer's point

the dream is real. In the same way in the waking state, the waking world

appears to be real to the waking mind, and only when I am awakened to

the higher state of consciousness, what mAnDukya upaniShad calls as

caturta pAda or turiiyam, the world will be resolved into Brahman that I

am. Dream world is as real as the dream subjects similarly the waking

world as real as the waker's mind that perceives the world. From

absolute point, the world is resolved into oneself. Therefore, the

question of reality of the world has to be addressed from the point of

reference. From absolute reference there is no world just as from gold

point there are no ornaments- all are nothing but gold - gold it was,

gold it is and gold is will be. Any arguments about the reality of the

world are akin to two dream subjects arguing about the reality of the

dream world. If one is dreaming a blazing fire of a building and as a

firefighter he is putting out the fire using the water- hose while many

spectators are watching, all that appear to be real. Fire is different,

the building is different, the firefighter and the water-hose are

different and the spectators, who are watching the operation some

praising and some criticizing, all appear to be real. A dvaitins may

come, question how I can be the firefighter, and at the same time the

building that is being burned. I am the subject and that is the inert

object. How can I be the object, the inert building out there that is

under fire?, etc. Only when he awakened to the higher state all the

subject-object distinctions, all sajaati, vijaati swagata bhedAs resolve

into one mind, the waker's mind. Substantive for all the objects in the

dream are provided by the waker's mind. It is the material and

intelligent cause for the dream world. However, as long as one is

dreaming, the dream world appears to be external to the dream subject

and is real in its frame of reference. mADUkya emphasizes the

similarities of these worlds of experiences, waking world and dream

world - To emphasize this similarity, the mantras in fact run

essentially parallel, as we shall see when we come to the mantra

portion.

 

Advaita Vedanta, therefore, does not negate the relative reality of the

world from the reference of the waker, but negates only from the point

of pAramArthika satyam, absolute truth. The world is as real as the

mind that perceives the world, even if, from the mind's point, it is

only attributive knowledge. From the absolute point, the mind that

perceives and the perceived world all resolve into homogenous mass of

consciousness that one is, where the perceiver, perceived and perceiving

all resolve into undifferentiated Brahman, turiiyam. In this respect,

analogy with the dream world is exact. There are, however, some slight

differences between the two states, which we will bring them out later.

 

The concept of mithya:

 

Relative reality is called mithya in order to differentiate it from

absolute reality. Mithya is that which appears to be there but upon

analysis, it resolves to its substantive. Every mithya should have

something that is substantive which must exist. That substantive must

be transparent to the perceiver for one reason or the other. In the

case of the world, the senses cannot grasp the substantive, since they

can only grasp the attributes. It is the mind that makes a judgment

call that there is an object 'out there' with such and such attributes

based on only the attributive knowledge and the experience associated

with that object. All further transactions are done with that knowledge.

 

When the mind does not function, question can be raised whether the

objects 'out there' exist or not. Who is going to prove their existence

or non-existence? Without a mind supported by a conscious entity,

existence and the knowledge of its existence cannot be established. In

mathematical language, it becomes an indeterminate problem (similar to

the famous Schrödinger's cat problem in physics2) and in Vedantic

terminology, it can be grouped under anirvachaniiyam or inexplicable.

 

2 (In a thought experiment, a cat was placed in an enclosed radiation

chamber and the chamber was radiated. The question that was posed is

whether the cat was alive or dead. Solving Schrödinger's equation gives

the probability that cat alive or dead was 50% - similar to a lady being

50% pregnant. The probability shifts to 100% either way only when a

conscious entity interferes with the system - that is someone had to

open the chamber and find out whether the cat was alive or dead. Thus,

only with the conscious entity, the existence of object and hence the

knowledge of its existence becomes a deterministic problem. Wagner

tried to solve this problem by enclosing a man along with a cat. The

problem remained the same since an outside conscious entity had to

interact or communicate in some way with the man inside the chamber to

make the problem into a deterministic problem - Conclusion is without a

mind supported by a conscious entity present, the existence of the world

cannot be established, entirely in agreement with the Mandukya

Upanishad).

 

Additionally, if anything exists, it cannot be separate from Brahman,

since that will violate the limitlessness of Brahman. If any object

exists, then that object's existence has to be supported by Brahman's

existence because of two reasons: a). Brahman is all pervading

existence and b) Brahman is the material cause for Jagat, which includes

all objects. Shruti says - yatOvA imAni bhUtAni jAyante, yena jAtAni

jIvanti, yat prayam tyabhisam vishanti, .tat brahmeti - That from which

the whole universe arises, by which it is sustained and into which it

goes back is Brahman - Thus Brahman becomes adhiShTAnam or substantive

for all objects. We can now define an object. An object such as a pot

is defined as 'prAgAbhAva pratiyOginI' that is, its existence is counter

to its absence in the past as a pot. The presence of an object pot 'out

there' implies that there was a time when the pot was not there. Hence

pot is not real since real can never be absent at any time. This is

true for any 'created object' or creation in general. Existence of a

creation now implies that there was a time when there was no creation.

Confirming this sruti says existence alone was there in the beginning

and it is one without a second. All these imply that objects have no

independent existence and their existence (or their sustenance) is

provided by Brahman only as their material cause. It also follows that

since Brahman is not an inert material but of the nature of

consciousness itself, objects have no inert material as substantive,

either. That it appears to be so is the wonder of the creation. That

power because of which it appears to be so is called as mAya. Krishna

says in Gita:

'mayAtatamidam sarvam jagat avayakta mUrtinA|

mastAni sarvabhUtani na cAham teShu avasthitaH|| 9-4.

'na ca mastAni bhUtAni pasyam me yogamaiswaram|

I pervade this entire universe in an unmanifested form. All beings are

in me, but I am not in them. And in fact, there are no real beings in me

either, Arjuna, look at my glory!" Thus, the beings appear to be there

and they rise in me - but if one enquires further, the appearances are

only supported by me, but I am not involved in those appearances. And

in fact, there is no reality for those appearances, either. This is all

the power of my maya. Look at my glory, Arjuna.

 

The apparent world is supported by Brahman, who is real. At individual

mind level or vyaavahaarika level, the perceptions are real and

therefore the objective world or the inert world is as real as the mind

that perceives the world. When the mind realizes that the substantive

of the whole world is nothing but Brahman that I am, the perceived

duality is recognized as only mithya, and not absolutely real.

 

Similar problem occurs in the dream state where material world appears

to be real relative to a dreamer but not real from the point of a waker.

Hence Vedanta PariBASha states that "antaHkaraNa vRittou jnAnatva

upacArAt", it is a mental thought pattern figuratively spoken as the

knowledge of an object.

 

>From ontological point, we define that which is eternal, unchanging and

that which has independent existence is real or sat. (GaudapAda

addresses these issues in the second Chapter of the kArika). Brahman

fulfils these criteria; hence, it is sat-swarUpa. We define unreal as

that which has no locus for existence at any time. A typical Vedantic

example is son of a barren woman. There is no locus for defining such a

son. Thus, unreal has no locus for existence at any time therefore can

never be experienced. With these two extremities clearly defined, we do

have a third type, which does not fall in either of the two extremities.

That which appears to be there but upon further inquiry it is not what

it appears to be, and some thing different from what it appears to be.

This is true for all objects in the world, since they appear to exist

only at a relative level, either in the waking state or dream state,

etc. Objective knowledge is only a relative knowledge and that is what

any pramaaNas can provide. PramANas are applicable only in the relative

field. The reason is objects have no independent existence but only a

dependent existence. Anything that has dependent existence is defined

as mithya. MAnDUkya Upanishad is going to establish that only the

self-conscious entity is alone self-existent entity since anything that

is not self-conscious becomes an inert entity. Existence of inert

entity can only be established by another, which must be a

self-conscious entity. Hence we define an inert entity as 'anya adheena

prakAShatvam, tat jaDam' or 'anya adheena satvatvam, tat jaDam' - that

is whose existence and awareness of its existence depend on the

existence of another, which has to be self-existent and self-conscious

entity. Hence, mithya can also be defined as that which has dependent

existence or relative existence or temporal existence. Since mithya is

neither satyam (that which is eternal and therefore free from

modifications) nor asatyam (never experienced at any locus), it is

defined as sat asat vilaxanam. There are criticisms against the mithya

concept of advaita, wherein critics argue that which is not sat has to

be asat and that which is not asat has to be sat. Therefore, there is

nothing like that which is sat asat vilaxanam. The basis of their

criticism is the presumption on their part that which is not sat has to

be asat and that which is not asat has to be sat. The criticism is

invalid since advaita defines clearly indicating what is sat and what is

asat. That which is eternal is satyam. In addition, Brahman alone

satisfies the requirement. That which has no locus for experience at

any time is asat, as in the case of son of a barren woman. Mithya does

not fall under either of the two categories. Shankara in fact provides

a definition for mithya in his commentary on the MAnDUkya kaarika that

is 'anything that is seen is mithya'. Sat cannot be 'seen' or perceived

since it is not an object for perception and asat cannot be seen since

it is nonexistent. From the above analysis, it is obvious that any

object that is seen is only an attributive knowledge of the object and

not knowledge of its substantive, which is Brahman. Hence, all

attributive knowledge is only relative knowledge and is mithya. Every

mithya must have a substantive that is not seen, which cannot be

anything other than Brahman, since Brahman is one without a second.

Absolute knowledge is knowledge of Brahman, which is the substantive for

all, which is real in absolute terms, which cannot be known by any

pramaaNa. PramaaNa is a means of knowledge for a pramAta, the knower to

know prameyam, an object. The three (tripuTi) are mutually exclusive and

therefore are limited. Brahman being one without a second, cannot have

these internal distinctions. Hence, it is called aprameyam, not an

'object' for knowledge through any pramaaNa. 'Then how Vedanta can

become pramaaNa for knowing Brahman?' is an interesting question which

we will take up later.

 

In nature, there are several examples that can illustrate the concept of

mithya jnAnam. The most famous example is the mirage water in a desert.

It appears to be there, but upon inquiry, it is not what it appears to

be, but is different from what it appears to be. Since it is

experienced, it appears to be real to the experiencer. Only upon

analysis, one recognizes the falsity in that appearance. In this case,

even after knowing that it is false, the appearance can continue but the

knowledge that it is false remains with the knower. "Can you drink a

mirage water?" A dvaitin asked. If he does not know that it is false

water, he may fall for it. Until he gets another shocking experience

that there is no water there. The two contradictory experiences then

confirm that the water that he saw was indeed false. Obviously the

false water cannot quench his real thrust. Of course, real water can

quench his real thirst just as, the real water in his dram world could

quench his real thrust in his real dream-world. That does not make the

water in his dream any more real than the subject in his dream who was

thirsty. In addition, when one closely inquires about the mirage water

and gains additional input for the senses, his previous sense input is

falsified. The example is intended to illustrate the false appearances

due to sense input with out the substantive input. The interesting

aspect of this example is that even though one knows it is false, one

can continue to see the mirage water, and this mirage-jnAni does not

fall for it anymore.

 

In one way or the other, all errors that mind commits essentially fall

into the mithya category. All of them are experienced and therefore

appear to be real to the experiencer based on the knowledge of their

experience. For the experiencer, relative to a particular situation,

they appear to be real but upon inquiry, they are not what they appear

to be. Let us take the famous example of perception of a snake where

there is a rope. Snake perception appears to be real, relative to the

perceiver of the snake, but upon proper inquiry, he will find that it is

not what it appeared to be, and is different from what it appeared.

Thus, rope is the adhishhTaana or supporting entity for the snake that

was experienced. Snake has a dependent existence since it depends on

the existence of a rope, and relatively rope has independent existence

since it does not depend on the existence of the snake. Snake we call it

as mithya while rope is relatively satya or relatively real. Thus, that

which is experienced but can be negated upon inquiry is called mithya.

It does not fall under the category of really real (satyasya satya) and

but it is still experienced hence cannot come under the category of

unreal (like son of a barren woman). Hence mithya is sat asat vilaxNam,

that which does not fall under the category of real nor under the

category of unreal. All mithya should have dependent existence while

that which supports or sustains has higher degree of reality. At this

point is instructive to examine the errors in perception.

 

This is taken up next.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda