On Bhagavad Ramanuja's siddhanta wrt Gaudiya Vaishnava siddhanta

[Guest guest]

Haribol all,

Below is a Q and A found in sanga magazine (of Swami B.V Tripurari,

www.swami.org/sanga). Following that is a response from Shri Anand (posted here

with permission from him), a devotee of the Sri-Vaishnavite order, who tries to

point out the fallacies in BVT's arguments and presents his opinion on the

topic. I thought this will be an interesting piece for this egroup and generate

some useful discussions that will help learn more about Sri and Gaudiya

Vaishnavism. I apologise for the length but hope the interesting subject matter

compesantes for it.

in your service,

Aravind.

On Bhagavad RAmAnuja's siddhAnta wrt GauDiya VaishNava siddhAnta

Q (posted on Sanga). Some devotees teach that the visistadvaita (qualified

oneness) philosophy of Ramanujacharya is the same as the acintya-bhedabheda

(inconceivable simultaneous oneness and difference) philosophy of Sri Caitanya

Mahaprabhu. My question is if the two philosophies are the same in tattva then

where is the acintya (inconceivability) to be found in Sri Ramanuja’s

philosophy. That philosophy clearly explains the relationship between the

object and quality as the dehi and deha, but Gaudiyas seem to say there must be

some inconceivability in this. Where is this inconceivability?A (By Swami B.V.

Tripurari). The philosophy of the Gaudiya sampradaya and that of the Ramanuja

sampradaya are not the same. Ramanuja, for example, attributes internal

distinction (svagatabheda) to Brahman, whereas the Gaudiyas do not. For

Ramanuja, Brahman's qualities (as he views them)--the jivas, and the world--are

not the same as that which they qualify (Brahman). However, neither can these

qualities exist outside of that which they qualify. Thus the two are not

different from one another either. In Ramanuja's view, a special relationship

exists between Brahman, the jivas, and the world. He calls this relationship

aprthak-siddhi, or inseparability. With this term Ramanuja seeks to logically

explain the identity and difference of Brahman.It appears that in reality

Ramanuja finds it difficult to describe the relationship of identity and

difference but accepts both of them. Indeed, according to Ramanuja himself

(Sribhasya 2.2.12), aprthak-siddhi is not strictly a relation, although his

followers such as Vedanta Desika sometimes speak of it as such. Thus through

careful examination both scholars and acaryas of other sampradayas came to

conclude that acceptance of Ramanuja's term aprthak-siddhi really involves

forgoing logic. In this regard, the Gaudiya acaryas have determined that this

logical shortcoming of Sri Ramanuja's metaphysic is resolved with the concept

of acintya, or inconceivability with regard to the nature of ultimate reality

and its being simultaneously one and different.Thus the Gaudiyas feel that the

metaphysic of acintya-bhedabheda tattva better explains the nature of ultimate

reality, and that this explanation is an improvement on the efforts of Ramanuja

and others. Ramanuja and others have struggled to come to grips with the fact

that the concepts of either oneness or difference are inadequate to

comprehensively explain the nature of the Absolute.The Gaudiyas have concluded

that Brahman is both one and different simultaneously, and that this is

possible because the Absolute possesses inconceivable power (acintya-sakti).

Others have developed terms such as anirvacaniya (Sankara), aprthak-siddhi

(Ramanuja), svabhavika (Nimbarka), visesa (Madhva), and samavaya (Vallabha) to

bring logic to bear on the oneness and difference of Brahman, when in reality

the simultaneous oneness and difference of the absolute is acintya

(inconceivable). Indeed, careful study of these other doctrines of Vedanta

reveals that they implicitly acknowledge the acintya-sakti of the Absolute but

are unable to identify it as such.Therefore, the Gaudiyas lay claim to

accepting the nature of the Absolute (and scripture) "as it is" with regard to

its oneness and difference. In this way they have sought not to inordinately

impose the limits of logic on the nature of being, but rather accept it for

what it is and attribute its nature to the acintya-sakti, or the

inconceivability of God.

***********************

Response from a Sri-Vaishnavite

SrI:

SrImatE rAmAnujAya namaH

SrImatE nigamAnta mahAdESikAya namaH

namO nArAyaNa!

Dear all : This is aDiyEn's response to one who posed

the question based on some GauDiya VaishNava who

had written about our siddhAnta.

-------------------

Please go through my comments patiently ...

--

> " It appears that in reality Ramanuja finds it difficult to describe

> the relationship of identity and difference but accepts both of

them.

> Indeed, according to Ramanuja himself (Sribhasya 2.2.12), aprthak-

> siddhi is not strictly a relation, although his followers such as

> Vedanta Desika sometimes speak of it as such.

In the cited VEdAnta SUtra (2.2.12), samavAya sambandha as

postulated by VaiSEshika school of thought is criticized because

it will lead to infinite regress. It is not clear as to

what the author wants to convey by stating the above.

SamavAya sambandha (Relation called Inherence) is postulated

by VaiSEshikas as the relationship binding the inseperable

entities [they state that it exists in five cases - dravya

(substance) and guNa, vyakti and jAti etc]. This relationship

is introduced by them to explain as to why two entities exist

always together inseparably. Hence, it is also to be noted that

samavAya sambandha and the relata [entities which are related]

always exist together. This gives rise to the question - "By the

above logic, it will be necessary to postulate another (second)

samavAya sambandha to account for the inseparable existence of

the entity and the samavAya sambandha postulated atfirst. This

will lead to the acceptance of third samavAya sambandha and

so on - ad infinitum. How to resolve this fallacy ? ".

VaiSEshikas resolve this by stating that it is the very nature

of the samavAya sambandha to always be found with the relata,

and hence there is no need to accept further samavAya

sambandhas. To this, we VEdAntins reply that there is no need

to postulate an unseen samavAya sambandha, for it is the very

nature of the entities to exist inseparably [like Substance

and its attribute]. Hence, the entities are said to be

apRuthak-siddha, if they are inseparable, which is by their

very nature.

Though samavAya sambandha is an internal relation between,

for example in Substance and the attribute, it is superfluous -

since the Substance and its attribute by itself accounts for

their inseparable existence. In this sense, apRuthak-siddha can

be termed to be of the type "svarUpa sambandha" as held by

NyAya-VaiSEshika school. This by itself is an internal relation

sufficiently explaining the inseparable nature of two entities

like Dravya (Substance) and its guNa (attribute).

Basically, the characteristic of the "relation" is to create

the empirical usage that the two entities are related. If the

relata by themselves can provide such usage, there is no need

to postulate a new relation to account for it.

For detailed discussions, please refer SwAmi VEdAnta DESika's

Tattva-muktA-kalApa with his own commentary SarvArtha-Siddhi

and further commentaries till SrI "Abhinava DESika" UttamUr

VIrarAghavAchArya. Since I feel that the author will not be

able to comprehend the direct texts, he can read the excellent

book by SrI SMS Chari on Fundamentals of ViSishTAdvaita, based

on Tattva-muktA-kalApa.

> Thus through careful

> examination both scholars and acaryas of other sampradayas came to

> conclude that acceptance of Ramanuja's term aprthak-siddhi really

> involves forgoing logic.

Infact, acceptance of it is only logical. Acceptance of

samavAya sambandha only does not appeal to logic. This is

the siddhAnta of Sage VyAsa, the writer of the SUtras as

well. More to follow ...

> In this regard, the Gaudiya acaryas have

> determined that this logical shortcoming of Sri Ramanuja's

metaphysic

> is resolved with the concept of acintya, or inconceivability with

> regard to the nature of ultimate reality and its being

simultaneously

> one and different.

This is quite funny. Whatever logically established as in

SAstras is done away with and an illogical siddhAnta is brought

in - Is this a way to "resolve" things ? If Bhagavad RAmAnuja

is said to have forgone logic, is the explanation involving

inconceivability (achintya) with logical contradiction of

simultaneously being one and different any better ? It has to

be noted that, if at all the term "achintya" may have any

significance in this context, there has to certainly be a

logical contradiction. When there is no logical contradiction

in this context, there will be nothing to be given up as

inconceivable. Since, Bhagavad RAmAnuja has clearly explained

the issue, there is no achintya in that case.

> Thus the Gaudiyas feel that the metaphysic of acintya-bhedabheda

> tattva better explains the nature of ultimate reality, and that this

> explanation is an improvement on the efforts of Ramanuja and others.

> Ramanuja and others have struggled to come to grips with the fact

> that the concepts of either oneness or difference are inadequate to

> comprehensively explain the nature of the Absolute.

The author has well displayed his ignorance regarding the

siddhAnta of Bhagavad RAmAnuja. As questioned above, is it

an improvement ? By the way, it is evident as to who is

struggling to understand Bramhan and finally giving up to be

filled with contradictions and safely covering up one's

inability by explaining Bramhan to be achintya in the above

sense. This is akin to how advaitins cover-up their siddhAnta

by attributing inconceivability to their pet "mAyA" - No one

should question on that - The repeated answer is "mAyA" will be

both true, false etc - anirvachanIya.

> The Gaudiyas have concluded that Brahman is both one and different

> simultaneously, and that this is possible because the Absolute

> possesses inconceivable power (acintya-sakti)".

Now, what is meant by this statement ? With whom is this

Bramhan different and non-different ? Anyway, lets take the case

of Bramhan being one and different with it's jn~Ana [knowledge].

<<Since Bramhan is all-knower, it has to have jn~Ana>>. Bramhan

being one and different with Chit (JIvAtman) and achit will also

be considered next to this.

In the former case, it will then mean that Bramhan is one and

different with it's jn~Ana because it has achintya Sakti, as

stated by the author. If so, how are Bramhan and its achintya-Sakti

related ?

Is it that Bramhan and its achintya-Sakti are related through

samavAya sambandha since they are inseparable ? - This is

rejected by the Bramha SUtra 2.2.12 itself.

One may consider that Bramhan and its achintya-Sakti to be

actually simultaneously non-different and also different. If

so, it should be due to another achintya Sakti - ad infinitum.

Hence, to be rejected.

Supposing that the achintya-Sakti by itself is capable of

making itself to be simultaneously one and different with

Bramhan, there won't be any need to postulate another

achinta-Sakti. If so, now, Bramhan will simultaneously be

one and different with it's jn~Ana due to its achintya-Sakti

wherein, this achintya-Sakti will also be simultaneously

one and different with Bramhan. Hence, it can be said that

Bramhan's jn~Ana is also simultaneously one and different

with it's achintya-Sakti. What a mess ! Infact, in this

case, one will actually be embracing Jaina's theory of

sapta-bha~ngi well criticized by VEdAntins, which makes the

achintya-ness reach its peak !!

The best way for a GauDiya will be to state that Bramhan and its

achintya-Sakti are apRuthak-siddha as in ViSishTAdvaita parlance,

so that Bramhan is simultaneously one and different with it's

jn~Ana. If so, apRuthak-siddha as in Bhagavad RAmAnuja's siddhAnta

as logically perfect has to be admitted! There is no forgoing of

logic by Bhagavad RAmAnuja in accepting it between Bramhan and it's

attributes which includes chit and achit.

The appropriateness of the siddhAnta that Bramhan is actually one

and different with it's jn~Ana, divine-form etc need not be

debated for now. Infact, SrI BaladEva [GauDiya's commentator to

Bramha SUtras] borrows the concept of ViSEsha, as postulated by

SrI AanandatIrtha (Madhva) to explain the non-difference of

Bramhan and its attributes like jn~Ana. This is to come out of

the mess created by the illogical achintya.

Now, lets move onto the case in which Bramhan is considered to

be simultaneously one and different with chit (JIvAtman) and

achit, due to its achintya Sakti. Again, Bramhan is then

understood to be apRuthak-siddha with its achintya-Sakti. The

question now is, why is the one-ness between Bramhan and

jIvAtman being spoken off simultaneously, when they are

categorically stated to be different and also that Bramhan

is the controller of the jIvAtman ? If it is said that the

one-ness is due to their similarity in the quality of their

svarUpa like being jn~Ana and aananda, then it is a clear

logical distinction perfectly conceivable. There is no need

for a special "achintya Sakti" to explain the above.

If it is said that Bramhan and jIvAtman are actually

non-different in their svarUpa itself [ie. One and the same

entity], but are also different in their svarUpa [ie. different

entities], then we need to resort to something like achintya

Sakti, because there is a direct logical contradiction.

Advaitins also say that Bramhan and jIvAtman are non-different

in their svarUpa, but everything else other than Bramhan is an

illusion/effect of illusion. This is not acceptable to GauDiyas.

SrI BhAshkara has propounded a type of "BhEda-abhEda" school

wherein the svarUpa of Bramhan and jIvAtman are held to be

non-different. The limiting adjunct (upAdhi) is the avidyA in

this school, and it is not illusory. Like how aakASa [which

is all-pervading actually] present in a upAdhi like a pot is

same in its svarUpa/nature from the aakASa outside the pot,

the all pervading Bramhan is also said to be limited by

upAdhis [non-sentient in nature] to give rise to innumerous

jIvAtmans. Such a transformation of Bramhan into chit and achit

from the state of PraLaya is attributed to its pariNAma-Sakti

[Power of transformation]. The main flaw in this school is that

Bramhan being essentially non-different from jIvAtmans, will be

the actual one suffering the samsAric afflictions. This can't

be escaped since everything is accepted to be real.

If GauDiyas want to stick with their achintya-Sakti theory,

they have to hold on to non-difference between Bramhan and

jIvAtmans in svarUpa itself. The above criticism will equally

hold good for them as well. If it is said that jIvAtmans are

eternally different from Bramhan and hence they are not

non-different in their svarUpa, then a precise logical

explanation based on SAstras needs to be provided for what

is meant by Bramhan being non-different from jIvAtman ie.in

what sense it is said so, while they are fundamentally

different.

ViSishTAdvaitins explain it based on the inseparable nature

(apRuthaksiddhi) of Bramhan and jIvAtmans - which is explained

as SarIra-SarIri bhAva.

Lets consider the usage "nIlO ghaTaH" [nIlaH ghaTaH] ie.Blue Pot.

Here, one-ness between two entities is spoken off. This is an

example of samAnAdhikaraNa sentence wherein the words denoting

various entities occur in the same vibhakti ie.cases. This

usage refers to the Pot which is inseparably qualified by the

blue colour. A very subtle point has to be noted. When the word

Blue is used separately in a sentence, it simply refers to the

colour Blue. But, when the same word Blue is used in a

samAnAdhikaraNa sentence, it refers to the entity which is the

aadhAra/support inseparably qualified by this colour blue. If

the usage is Blue Pot, the word Blue in this sentence does not

merely give the meaning "Blue" - But it actually refers to the

substance which is the aadhAra inseparably qualified by this

colour blue. The actual substance which is the aadhAra is

obtained from the next word viz. Pot. If the usage is Blue Jar,

the substance which is inseparably qualified by the blue colour

is Jar. The usage "Blue Pot" does not mean the direct equation

of the identity in the svarUpa of Blue and Pot ie. It is not to

explain the one-ness in the sense of Blue = Pot. It is illogical

since Blue and Pot are actually different in their svarUpa.

Hence, the above is the *direct* meaning of such samAnAdhikaraNa

sentences as explained in Sanskrit grammar.

The abhEda Srutis in Upanishads are similarly so as above in

advocating the one-ness between the Bramhan and jIvAtman. For

instance, "aham bramha" does not mean "I, the jIvAtman = Bramhan".

Actually, jIvAtman is suffering in this samsAra and Bramhan

is blemishless. Both of them can't be same in their svarUpa.

Advaitins resort to "secondrary meaning" and *not* the direct

meaning, while explaining the one-ness between Bramhan and

JIvAtman through these abhEda Srutis. How it is so is not

relevant now. The *direct* meaning of this samAnAdhikaraNa

sentence will be I,the jIvAtman is an inseparable attribute

of Bramhan - this is the one-ness spoken off here. This is

the way Upanishads explain the apRuthaksiddha nature of

Bramhan and jIvAtman and that, jIvAtman does not exist external

to Bramhan by being not inseparably united ie. Bramhan and

jIvAtman are actually internally related and form an Organic

Whole, and it is not that Bramhan and JIvAtman are linked

through external relation.

Note that, BRuhadAraNyaka Upanishad by itself claims the

jIvAtman to be SarIra of Bramhan. The actual meaning of this

word SarIra is explained well by Bhagavad RAmAnuja to take into

account all sorts of usages of this word including that of Sruti

apart from worldly usages. SwAmi VEdAnta DESika finally

summarizes that any Substance with jn~Ana [ie. Either Bramhan

Or JIvAtman] if present inseparably united (apRuthak-siddha)

with a dravya (substance), then the latter will be the former's

SarIra.

It is the genius of Bhagavad RAmAnuja in explaining

the direct meaning of such abhEda Srutis. There can't be

any great harmonizer of Upanishads in the true spirit of

Bramha SUtras, than Bhagavad RAmAnuja. Where is the logic

forgone ? Where is Bhagavad RAmAnuja "struggling" ? Infact,

logic finds its place in this system in perfect accordance

with SAstras, and its the stroke of genius in Bhagavad RAmAnuja

to be revered for in so easily resolving the most complex issue

in VEdAnta.

The above analysis holds good for non-difference between

Bramhan and achit as well. Bramhan is jn~Anamaya in svarUpa.

achit is actually jaDa and not jn~Anamaya in svarUpa. Obviously,

these two can't be non-different in their svarUpa. But,

Upanishads do speak about the non-difference between Bramhan

and achit. For instance by "sarvam khalu idam bramha", one-ness

between idam sarvam [All of this in the Universe = Chit +

Achit] and Bramhan is stated. The direct meaning is that,

all of this [chit and achit] are inseparable attributes of

Bramhan.

While bhEda Sruti explains that the svarUpa of Bramhan is

different from that of Chit and achit, abhEda Sruti rejects

the notion that they are externally related and explains that

they are actually internally related as inseparable attributes.

This is made possible by the Srutis which clearly explain the

nature of chit and achit to be SarIra of Bramhan ie. in being

supported by Bramhan [bramhan is the ground/aadhAra of chit

and achit], controlled by Bramhan etc.

If GauDiyas provide some logically conceivable explanation like

this for the non-difference between Bramhan and Chit + achit

as stated in abhEda Srutis [whether it is acceptable based on

SAstras is another issue], then there is nothing inconceivable

ie.No need to postulate some achintya Sakti to be responsible for

this nature of relationship between Bramhan and Chit + achit.

Otherwise, when a logically conceivable explanation based on

SAstras perfectly harmonizing everything is available in the form

of ViSishTAdvaita, a philosophy hanging with incoceivability in

the nature of ultimate reality hardly has any value.

SrI AC BhaktivEdAnta SwAmi who founded ISKCON, has stated in

many of his books that jIvAtmans are *fragmented* parts and parcel

of Bramhan. This is unacceptable to even SrI BaladEva. Bramhan

is immutable and one can't cut parts of it to form jIvAtman

so as to think about some one-ness between the two.

One has to atfirst understand as to what is meant by jIvAtmans

are different from each other. There are innumerous jIvAtmans

as distinct entities. Every jIvAtman is jn~Ana-maya since it

shines for itself, giving the notion of "aham" ie. "I". The

characteristic by which a jIvAtman manifests unto itself [giving

the notion of I] is called "Pratyaktvam" and hence jIvAtmans are

also referred as "Pratyak-aatmans". All jIvAtmans invariably

have this notion and hence are separate individuals distinct

from one another. Bramhan also being jn~Anamaya in its svarUpa

has the notion of "I". Hence, Lord KRushNa refers to Himself

as "aham" / "I". In this sense, Bramhan is different from

JIvAtmans. If they are same in their svarUpa, the notion of I

will be same and two distinct entities can't be obtained.

This does not do justice to the bhEda Srutis which categorically

explain Bramhan and jIvAtmans to be distinct individuals. Once

this logical distinction is accpeted, there will be no room to

introduce "achintya-Sakti" to account for the abhEda Srutis.

 

Lets take the philosophy of BhEda-abhEda as explained by

SrI YAdavaprakASa. The all-pervading Bramhan transforms into

ISvara, Chit and achit in those parts of it which are with the

respective Saktis viz. ISvara-Sakti, Chit Sakti and achit Sakti.

It is like the sea-water transforming itself into waves, foam

and bubbles. In SrI BhAshkara's theory, Bramhan is by nature

non-different from JIvAtman, but becomes different due to

upAdhi. But, in YAdavaprakASa's theory, Bramhan is by very

nature both different and non-different from JIvAtman. This

self-contradiction will amount to the acceptance of Jaina's

Saptabha~ngi, which is not acceptable actually to

SrI YAdavaprakASa himself. This theory of Jainas well criticized

by VEdAntains is as follows [applicable to the difference/

non-difference etc between Substance and attribute] :

* May be, is

* May be, is not

* May be, is and is not

* May be, is inexpressible

* May be, is and is inexpressible

* May be, is not and is inexpressible

* May be, is, is not, and is inexpressible

This is perhaps a better version of the achintya theory, if

inconceivability is the objective to be established in the

nature of Ultimate reality !

Detailed criticism of these systems of BhEda-abhEda can be

read from SrI Bhagavad RAmAnuja's VEdArtha Sa~ngraha and

SrI SudarSana SUri's SrutaprakASika - commentary to Bhagavad

RAmAnuja's SrI BhAshya.

It has to be noted that Bhagavad RAmAnuja didn't introduce

any new philosophy. He clearly states in VEdArtha Sa~ngraha

that he follows only the siddhAnta held by Sages from distant

past.

Some important rishis whose writings were utilized/quoted by

Bhagavad RAmAnuja are :

a. Sage BOdhAyana : In tattvaTeeka, SwAmi DESikan identifies him

to be same as Sage Upavarsha. He wrote an extensive VRutti

ie.gloss on Brahma SUtras.

b. Sage TaNka (alias BrahmAnandin, vAkyakAra) : Wrote "vAkyas" -

very short notes on CHAndOgya Upanishad.

c. Sage dramiDa : Followed Sage TaNka's vAkyas and commented

upon CHAndOgya Upanishad, called as "dramiDabhAshya".

d. Sages GuhadEva, KaparDin and BhAruchi.

-

Lets now take up another issue in GauDiya Philosophy. They

talk about three features of Ultimate Reality as viz.

BhagavAn, ParamAtman and Impersonal Bramhan. They cite the

following verse from SrImad BhAgavatam to derive their theory.

Lets evaluate the soundness of their theory.

vadanti tat tattva-vidaH tattvam yat jn~Anam advayam |

bramha iti paramAtma iti bhagavAn iti SabdyatE || (1.2.11)

The following is the summary of what has been rightly explained by

the SrI VaishNava AchArya SrI VIrarAghavAchArya :

The previous verse ".....jIvasya tattva-jijn~AsA na arthaH ...."

(1.2.10) states that, the objective of a jIvAtma is

"tattva-jijn~Asa" ie.Knowledge of the "Tattva" / Enquiry into

Tattva. The next verse (1.2.11), states as to which "Tattva" it is.

< Note: Basically it is the Bramhan. The very first sUtra in VEdAnta

SUtras state about the "Bramha jijn~Asa" >.

anvayam in English :

tattva-vidaH : Wise-Men knowledged about this Tattva

vadanti : say

tattvam : tattvam <The jijn~Asa of which is a jIvAtman's

objective>

tat : as that

advayam : <advayam :

jn~Anam a-dvayam = advitIyam => No equal Or Superior ;

a-avayam = No avaya-bhEda => No internal

distinctions through various parts {ie.No

distinctions in its essential nature <svarUpa>

anywhere ; ex:Not like a body which has various

distinctions like ear,nose,hand, etc};>

<jn~Anam :

jn~Ana svarUpa (DivyAtma-SvarUpa) possesing

jn~Ana (dharma-bhUta-jn~Ana)>

advayam jn~Anam => jn~Anam which is advayam

yat : which is

SabdyatE : sounded so

bramha iti : as Bramha <Not the four-headed bramha>

paramAtma iti : as ParamAtman

bhagavAn iti : and as BhagavAn.

anvayam in Sanskrit :

yat advayam jn~Anam bramha iti paramAtma iti bhagavAn iti SabdyatE

tat tattvavidaH tattvam vadanti

This verse simply states that the Tattva- The Supreme Entity,

is the "advayam-jn~Anam", which is denoted by the Sabdas Or words

ParamAtman, Bramhan and BhagavAn. These three words are the SAmAnya

(General) and ViSEsha (Particular) Sabdas for denoting the Supreme

Reality which is the "advayam jn~Anam". For instance, in Upanishad

statements like "sat Eva sOmya idam agra aaseet", "bramhavA idam

agra aaseet", "aatmavA idam agra aaseet" and "ekO ha vai nArAyaNa

aaseet", which state about the Jagad-KAraNa entity {which existed

before PraLaya}, the words Sat, Bramha, aatma and nArAyaNa denote

the same entity which is the Supreme Reality {Note: Bramhan is

defined in the sUtra "janmAdyasya yataH" -Brahman as that from

which proceeds the jagat, gets maintained and dissolved}. "sat"

which means "Existence" can refer God,chit and achit. Hence, it

is a "sAmAnya" {General} Sabda. The word "Bramhan" can denote any

of the three entities while primarily it refers to Supreme Entity.

"Aatma" can refer both jIvAtma and God-the ParamAtma, and also

manas {mind}. Hence, it is a sAmAnya Sabda. NArAyaNa Sabda is a

ViSEsha Sabda, since it denotes only the Supreme Reality-God.

Similarly, in this verse, the Sabdas Bramhan,ParamAtman and

BhagavAn have the sAmAnya-ViSEsha sambandha, with one being more

specific to the other.

This verse has nothing to do with the existence of three separate

features Bramhan, ParamAtman and BhagavAn as various aspects of

the one supreme-reality, which is defined as the "advayam jn~Anam".

Upanishads refer the Supreme-Reality as "Bramhan" in many places

and IthihAsa-purANas, pAn~charAtra refer the supreme-reality as

"ParamAtman" and "BhagavAn" too. This fact is used in this verse.

It is clearly stated to be "iti SabdyatE" denoting that the

same entity [advayam jn~Anam] is referred by three different

words (Sabdas).

Now that the Supreme-Reality is "advayam jn~Anam", what is the

distinction spoken off between BhagavAn, ParamAtman and Impersonal

Bramhan by the GauDiyas ?

There are many instances wherein SrI AC BhaktivEdAnta SwAmi conveys

that "Impersonal Bramhan" of GVs is the "Attributeless Bramhan"

conceived by advaitins. For instance, kindly look into his purport

to verse 12.5 of SrI Bhagavad GItA, wherein he writes "....There is

evidence in the Vedic Literature that worship may be saguNa and

nirguNa - of the Supreme possesing or not possesing attributes. .".

The purport clearly drives home this point and also look into the

purport for verse 12.1. If it is so, how can this nirviSEsha

Bramhan be same as BhagavAn and ParamAtman, as held so

fundamentally ? How is this nirviSEsha Bramhan related to BhagavAn?

If it is related, then it ceases to be nirviSEsha / nirguNa !

If it is unrelated, it becomes a distinct entity apart from

BhagavAn and hence they can't be same. Ultimate reality is

immutable since it is "jn~Anamaya" - One can't cut it into

pieces. Even assuming that somehow it is cut to form the Impersonal

Bramhan, it will still be pratyak having the notion of "I" - It

can't be nirviSEsha. Also, there is nothing called nirviSEsha

Bramhan in reality - Refer SrI-BhAshya and SrI VEdAnta DESika's

SatadUshaNI.

Sometimes, he also says that Impersonal Bramhan is the effulgence

of BhagavAn. Actually, the light emanating from Lord's divine body

is a property of the Suddha-Sattva tattva {in being luminous}. But

that light by itself is not a part of the "Bramha tattva / Supreme

Tattva". Hence they can't be fundamentally same. Also, what is

then the relationship between this sort of Impersonal Bramhan

and BhagavAn ? If they are non-different in all aspects, then one

should not speak of the other as the different feature of BhagavAn.

Also, Ultimate relaity is actually all-pervading. Effulgence

is something which "flows" - Basically it contradicts the

all pervading nature of the Ultimate reality.

Lets see some questions which the GauDiya VaishNavas (GVs)

need to ponder over ....some are in addition to those things

as explained above.

Do GVs accept that all these three features of Supreme Reality (SR)

are eternal ?

What is exactly the ParamAmta feature < Is it the all pervading

jn~Ana with all kalyANa guNas Or only the four-handed feature of

SR seated in the body of various species => Not all-pervading ? >.

Does it mean that only after PraLaya the ParamAtma manifestation

comes into play ?

What is the substance BhagavAn ? Is it jn~Ana with various

attributes/Saktis like ParamAtma feature, Impersonal Bramhan

feature,chit,achit ...Or Is it jn~Ana with all these attributes/

Saktis, but essentially non-different from its Saktis too ?

Does it pre-suppose achintya-Sakti for the BhagavAn to be

simultaneously be different and non-different from ParamAtman

and Impersonal Bramhan ?

What is the exact definition of Sakti <ex:What is meant by

jIvAtmans are a particular type of Saktis of BhagAvan - If this is

an acceptable statement> ? How are BhagavAn and Sakti related ? Is

Sakti a relation that exists between BhagavAn and other Substances

like JIvAtman ? Or Is it that the very substances like jIvAtman

etc are themselves the Saktis? - If so how are BhagavAn and these

Saktis related ? Why are they called as Saktis of BhagavAn ?

What is "achintya-bhEda-abhEda"? If bhEda implies the difference

in the essential nature of the substances like Supreme Reality(SR),

chit and achit, What is implied by the "abhEda" aspect ? Is it

because BhagavAn and His Saktis are basically non-different, though

they are treated as different with different essential natures of

thier own ? - If so what is the nature of such treatment ? - Is it

that a jIvAtma conceives only the difference due to its association

with mAyA while there is non-difference too simultaneously between

a substance and its attributes ? Or Is it because of the

non-separable nature of the Substance and its attributes, that the

abhEda statements can be understood using the samAnAdhikaraNa

principle of Sanskrit {Interpretation of ViSishTAdvaitins} ?

Is it that Supreme Reality (SR) in association with a particular

Sakti is cognized as "BhagavAn", and SR with another Sakti is

cognized as "ParamAtman" etc {ie. SR + one of its specific Sakti

is BhagavAn etc}, Or Is it that BhagavAn is one Sakti of SR,

ParamAtman is one another Sakti of SR, Impersonal-Bramhan is one

Sakti of SR, chit is one another Sakti of SR etc Or Is it that

"BhagavAn" by Himself is the SR and BhagavAn's various Saktis are

ParamAtman,Impersonal Bramhan, Chit etc ?

What is meant by devotees in the most advanced stage of ecstacy/

prEma bhakti think that they {ex:Gopis} are non-different from

BhagavAn ? Do they realize their "abhEda" aspect of being

non-different from BhagavAn {ie. Sakti and the Possesor of Sakti

are both different and non-different in their essential nature

=> Now, they realize their non-differenceness, though previously

they experienced the differenceness ?}. If not, what is that

"non-differenceness" experienced ? - The internal relationship

of being a specific Sakti of BhagavAn Or Essentially same as

BhagavAn ?

Since in SrI VaikUNtham/Goloka the maximum jn~Ana and ecstacy is

obtained, will all the muktas be immersed in the realization of

being non-different from BhagavAn {as Gopis experienced here

itself as stated by GVs}? If the basic philosophy is that Both

Difference and Non-Difference are equally there in the essential

nature between a Substance and its attribute, {BhagavAn and His

Sakti jIvAtman}, then one as a mukta <with topmost jn~Ana> should

be experiencing both these contradicting things simultaneously

and not only one aspect individually - Is it not ? Does it mean

that a mukta also has some achintya Sakti to experience illogical

things ? If so, what is the relationship between mukta and the

achintya Sakti ?

Lets close here .....

It would be best if the author takes care to read enough of

Bhagavad RAmAnuja's siddhAnta before airing such views in public.

Probably he can atfirst read atleast those books in English by

SrI SMS Chari, like VaishNavism, Fundamentals of ViSishTAdvaita,

Philosophy of the VEdAnta SUtras, Philosophy of the Upanishads.

Its upto the dispassionate reader to judge as to which

Philosophy is incomplete and who is "struggling" to understand

the purport of SAstras !

aDiyEn rAmAnuja dAsan,

anantapadmanAbhan alias Anand.

****************************************

 

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[Guest guest]

I don't have time to go through an extensive review of this posting,

but there were a few points I wanted to touch on. Gerald Surya

already touched on a few relevants points, and Aravind has a response

from BV Tripurari that he is awaiting author's permission to cross

post here.

 

First off, I think it is generally a good idea to avoid criticizing

anything (especially another Vedaanta school) unless one has a good

idea what one is talking about.

 

I know Anand (the author of the rebuttal to BV Tripurari Swami)

fairly well; he's probably one of the most orthodox Vaishnavas

anywhere I have ever met. Unlike many Vaishnavas, he prefers to live

in India in spite of having had the opportunity to settle here, and

his views on many aspects of Vaishnava dharma are very conservative,

and in that sense, probably more true to Srila Prabhupada's own

ideals than what many of his followers in the West have managed to

follow. I just wanted to point this out since, there is a tendency

among many immature devotees to reject criticism by finding real or

imaginary faults in the person offering it. This would be a definite

mistake in Anand's case.

 

It pretty much goes without saying that few people will take

initiation in, and serve the devotees of, any sampradaaya in which

they do not have the greatest faith. Having said that, if some

criticism is made of the philosophical doctrine of that sampradaaya's

aachaarya, it is only fair to expect representatives of that

sampradaaya to write back in kind. That is precisely what has

happened here, with BV Tripurari stating something to the effect that

some aspects of Raamaanuja's doctrine do not fully or logically

explain some things, i.e. "Thus through careful examination both

scholars and acaryas of other sampradayas came to conclude that

acceptance of Ramanuja's term aprthak-siddhi really involves forgoing

logic." Try to imagine how you would feel if someone else had said

this about Srila Prabhupada, and you can then understand Anand's

reaction.

 

Thus, I am not going to defend BV Tripurari's comments. However, I

would like to address some of what Anand has said. As far as I can

tell, the following is the summary of some of his points of

contention with respect to Gaudiiya Vaishnava philosophy (achintya

beda abeda tattva):

 

1) That Gaudiiyas have done away with a logical explanation of the

relationship between two things and instead introduced an "illogical"

explanation, by citing the Achintya shakti of the Lord.

 

A: Of course, everyone knows that "inconceivable" does not

necessarily mean "illogical." Being inconceivable simply means being

beyond the understanding of conditioned, mortal beings. In fact, when

considering that one is dealing with the omniscient, omnipotent, and

omnipresent Lord, it is only logical to assume that He is achintya.

One can begin to understand Him and some things about Him by

referring to shaastra, but this does not mean that everything about

Him can be explained using logic that can be comprehended by us.

 

2) That Gaudiiyas use the Achintya shakti of the Lord as an excuse to

refrain from explaining some things, somewhat akin to the way

Advaitins use "anirvachaniiya" (neither existing nor not existing) to

explain how maayaa can exist when in fact only Brahman exists in

their doctrine.

 

A: I disagree with this as well. While I don't doubt that one might

wrongly use "achintya" to avoid answering a question with which he is

not familiar, Srila Baladeva Vidyaabhuushana does not rely on the

concept very frequently in his Vedaanta commentary. When a

relationship can be explained in a way that can be ade clear to

conditioned living entities, it is done so. But Gaudiiyas do not

assume that everything can be fully understood by the conditioned

living entities.

 

The concept of "anirvachaniiya" is itself an illogical one, and has

no basis in shaastra. But inconceivability "achintyatva" is logically

present in Bhagavaan and has shaastric support for it. There is no

basis for comparing the two.

 

3) That Gaudiiyas do not fully explain what is meant by oneness and

difference.

 

A: Of course, the simple answer is that the Lord is one and different

from his various shaktis, which make up everything else: the living

entities, the spiritual realm, and the manifested material universes.

This is why the Gaudiiya siddhaanta can explain statements in shruti

like "everything is Brahman" while at the same time explaining

statements to the effect that Brahman is supreme and transcendental

to everything else. Such statements are contradictory, as one implies

oneness and the other implies difference. That is, unless, one

accepts difference and non-difference as two facets of the same

relationship.

 

4) That the Gaudiiya concept of Lord being different and nondifferent

from His qualities is incorrect, because of Vedaanta-suutra 2.2.12

which rejects such a relationship in the Vaiseshika doctrine.

 

A: In the Vedaanta-suutra (2.2.13 in my edition of Govinda bhaashya),

the exact same arguments against the Vaiseshika doctrine of samavaaya

is also given by Srila Baladeva. It makes no sense that Srila

Baladeva would so criticize the Vaiseshika doctrine if the same

criticisms applied to his own doctrine. VS 2.2.12-13 applies to the

Vaiseshika doctrine of a material thing and its qualities. It has

nothing to do with the Lord and His nondifference from His qualities.

 

In VS 3.3.39 this subject is taken up in more detail. Baladeva

explains bR^ihadaaranyaka upaniShad 4.4.19: "By the mind alone it is

to be perceived there is in it no diversity. He who perceives therein

any diversity, goes from death to death." One might think that such a

text is explaining that Brahman is without attributes. But the

reverse is true; Brahman not only has attributes, but those

attributes are a part of His essential nature. Hence, there is no

internal difference in Him, and the text of BU 4.4.19 is consistent

with this. Adopting this view is only logical, given the very clear

statement of BU 4.4.19: One must either take the position that the

attributes of the Lord are separate from Him, or are nondifferent

from Him. Gaudiiyas accept the latter.

 

5) That contemporary Gaudiiya Vaishnavas (i.e. Srila Prabhupada)

differ from previous Gaudiiya Vaishnavas (i.e. Vedaanta commentator

Srila Baladeva) on some points, implying inconsistency and

irregularity in the siddhaanta.

 

A: In fact, there is no difference between the two, but often times

people try to imagine differences. This is probably because there are

no real qualified translations of the Govinda-bhaashya in

publication, while Srila Prabhupada's works, although faithful and

without blemish, may not meet the exacting criteria of rigorous

English usage by those who are looking to find fault with it.

 

In particular, much is made of Srila Prabhupada's vs Srila Baladeva's

views on the issue of the jiivas vis-a-vis Bhagavaan. Anand wrongly

assumes a difference because Srila Prabhupada states that jiivas

are "fragmented parts and parcel of Brahman." Anand thinks that Srila

Prabhupada is saying that the jiivas were cut off from Brahman and

hence became individual jiivas; this is simply wrong. There is no

basis in any of Srila Prabhupada's writings for thinking like this.

On the contrary, one need only look at Srila Prabhupada's purport to

BG 2.12 in which he *clearly* and *directly* affirms that the

distinction between the two is *eternal.*

 

By "fragmented part and parcel," Srila Prabhupada is trying to

explain the relationship between Brahman and jiivas in a language

like English that is not given well to explaining such lofty

philosphical concepts.

 

That jiivas are amshas of God is stated by Vyaasa in his suutras:

 

a.msho naanaa vyavadeshaadanyathaachaapidaasakitavaaditvamadhiiyata

eke || VS 2.3.41 ||

 

The soul is a part, because the Lord is described as having manifold

relations with the soul, and also because some texts record him as

identical with Brahman, like slaves and fisherman, etc. (govinda

bhaaShya 2.3.41)

 

Srila Baladeva then explains that the soul is amsha (part) of the

Lord just as rays of the sun always accompany the sun, and yet are

separate from it, and also dependent on it.

 

"Fragmented part and parcel" is a phrase used by Srila Prabhupada to

bring out fully the flavor behind the Sanskrit word "amsha" as it is

understood in the Vedaanta, without giving rise to misunderstandings

that maayaavaadiis are likely to have. Specifically, by using such a

phrase, he is trying to say several things:

 

1) "Fragmented:" - that jiivas are atomic, as opposed to omnipresent,

in size (see VS 2.3.18)

 

2) "part:" - that jiivas are part of God (clearly stated in VS 2.3.41

and hence not a point of dispute)

 

3) "and parcel:" - that jiivas are of the same quality (albeit

minutely) as God (clearly implied by BG 7.5 which explicitly equates

the jiiva-bhuutas with Lord's paraam prakriti or superior

nature/energy)

 

Thus, there is no contradiction at all with what Srila Baladeva

Vidyaabhuushana has written. In fact, like any good aachaarya, Srila

Prabhupada is merely explaining in more detail what Srila Baladeva

has already said!

 

yours,

 

- K