Doubt and Krishna-Consciousness (was Fall of the Jiva & OOP)

[Guest guest]

Hare Krishna. Dandavats.

 

On 15 Mar 1999, Payonidhi Dasa wrote:

 

> Dear Prabhu

> PAMHO

> AGTSP

> I know for sure there is devotees that have some doubts on the jiva

issue,and

> we can discuss it.As far as Ramanujacarya being quoted,there is nothing

wrong

> with that,he is certainly a bonafide vaisnava.Yes maybe it would seem more

> correct to quote Baladeva Vidyabhusana,it does not matter much.

 

As far as Shrii Raamaanuja is concerned, his status as a "bona fide" Vaishnava

is not germane to the discussion. There are "bona fide" Vaishnavas who

disagree with us on many cardinal points. So quoting from someone outside of

our sampradaaya does not seem particularly wise to me, especially when the

latter does not clearly advocate fall-vaada.

 

Besides, regardless of what other Vedaanta commentaries say, the important

point is what *our* Vedaanta commentary says. If Raamaanuja supports

fall-vaada, as is alleged by the OOP authors, what use is that to us if

Baladeva does not? While we must be respectful to all aachaaryas, we must

ultimately be faithful to our own. Quoting from Raamaanuja's commentary while

sidelining Baladeva's strikes me as suspiciously evasive, no offense intended.

 

 

What concerns me is the following point from Baladeva's commentary.

Admittedly, I have not read enough of OOP to remember if this was dealt with

sufficiently by them. But in any case, here it is.

 

First the context. In the second adhyaaya, first paada, 10th adhikaraNa, the

suutras are attempting to explain that the Lord is never partial or cruel (I

am quoting here from the translation done by Rai Bahadur Srisa Chandra Vasu).

It is stated first:

 

vaiShamyanairghR^iNyena na saapekShatvaat tathaa hi darshayati || 2.1.34 ||

 

There exist no partiality and cruelty in the Lord, because the pleasure and

pain, suffered by beings, has regard to their karmas, and so also the

scriptures declare (vedaanta-suutra 2.1.34).

 

Then the next suutra:

 

na karmaavibhaagaaditi chennaanaaditvaat || 2.1.35 ||

 

(They theory of karma) cannot (explain the inequalities and cruelty seen in

this universe, because when the creation first started) there was no

distinction (of souls and consequently) of karmas. This (objection however) is

not valid, because there is no beginning of creation (vedaanta-suutra 2.1.35).

 

Baladeva's commentary follows:

 

"An objector may say your theory of karma only pushes the difficulty one step

back. No doubt, it explains to some extent the inequalities and sufferings of

Jiivas in their present life. They may be the results of acts done in the past

life. But since in the beginning of creation, there were no Jiivas, nor where

their acts, they must have been created with inequalities, in order to act

differently. If they had been created all equal, there is no reason to hold

that their acts would have been different. The Shruti also says "the Being or

the God (Sat) alone existed in the beginning, one only without a second"

(Chaandogya, 6.1). This shows that when the creation started, there was no

karman or jiivas, distinguishable from Brahman. He alone existed, all in all.

To this objection, raised in the first half of the suutra, the next half gives

the answer, by saying 'this is not so, because of the beginninglessness.' The

karmas and the Jiivas are beginningless, just like Brahman, and this is the

theory adopted by the author. Thus there is no fault, because every subsequent

karma is motived by the tendencies generated by the past karmas."

 

Note here the importance of Baladeva's reasoning. He is saying that one must

accept that the jiiva's karma is beginningless, because if they had a

beginning, the puurva-pakshin's argument that God is partial suddenly has

merit. The point, however, is that God is NOT partial, because the inequality

of different jiivas is due to their different karmas, which are beginningless.

Thus, God is not at all at fault because of their inequality.

 

Later on, Baladeva defends against the objection that the theory is "tainted

with the fault of regressus in infinitum." He gives the example of the seed

and the tree - which came first? He also argues that God's omnipotence is not

in any way compromised by virtue of the fact that He created the world

according to the karma of the jiivas - He does so out of compassion, even

though He could have done so with total disregard for their previous karma.

 

So if karma is beginningless, then it is difficult to see how there can be a

fall at any time. This is the reasoning which I believe is adopted by other

Vaishnava aachaaryas who also do not advocate a fall theory.

 

What is your

> doubt in this matter?Srila Jiva Goswami has also very clearly dealt with the

> fall of the jiva in his Paramatma Sandarbha,

 

Really? I have the entire Paramaatmaa Sandarbha, with both Sanskrit and

English translation. I would appreciate it if you could point me to the

relevant verses for my enlightenment.

 

similarly the same has been done

> in the Jaiva dharma by Bhaktivinoda Thakura.

 

I do not have Jaiva Dharma, but what I have seen quoted from it does not seem

to support the ISKCON position on the jiiva's origins.

 

It is very simple also if no one

> fell ,then where did the jivas come from?Obviously the answer must be

> Krsna.Jivera svarupa hoya krsnera nitya dasa,if the soul is eternally a

> servant of Krsna,before he was conditioned he must have been a servant

> no?

 

A very reasonable point. All I am saying is that we cannot selectively take

some statements that we like and ignore others. This has to be reconciled with

other statements like the one given by Baladeva above, unless there is no

problem in believing that the aachaaryas have simply taken different and

mutually contradictory positions on this issue. *I* for one, have no interest

in entertaining the possibility that Baladeva was not faithful to his

predecessors on this point, or on ANY point. So if it seems that there is a

contradiction, a deeper examination of the statements and issues involved will

be most beneficial.

 

Otherwise the conditioning is also eternal,and it is never defined that

> way.

 

Well, Baladeva did refer to the "beginningless" karma of the jiiva. How much

more explicit does it need to be than that? I think the OOP authors took the

position that "karma" here could refer to either material or spiritual

activities (I don't remember for sure -- feel free to correct me since I'm

assuming that you have studied OOP and are conversant with its reasoning and

conclusions).

 

The problem is this: the word "karma" is not typically meant to mean both

spiritual activity and material activity. This is obvious from

Bhagavad-Giitaa, when its use in the former context is explicitly qualified:

janma karma cha me divyam evam yo vetti tattvataH -- One who knows about the

Lord's karma does not again come to this material world because His karmas are

not like our karmas. Almost every other instance I have seen of the word has

been in reference to the jiiva's activites which cause bondage.

 

Besides, if karma can mean spiritual activities, then how is that reconciled

with Baladeva's reasoning that karma is what causes the inequality of the

living entities with regards to their positions in the material world?

Remember that he says that it is due to karma that some people suffer while

others enjoy.... clearly this has to be material activities.

 

> Hope to hear from you on this issue.

> YS

> ]Payonidhi das

 

warm regards,

 

-- Krishna Susarla