VAD Dead in New Vrindavan?

November 14, 2004

Almost Heaven: Leadership, Decline and the Transformation of New Vrindaban

by E. Burke Rochford, Jr. and Kendra Bailey

Posted November 2, 2004

Editors' note: The article below by Professor Burke Rochford and Kendra

Bailey of Middlebury College is a draft copy of a paper reporting on

community development in New Vrindavan, and was commissioned by New

Vrindavan management.

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I can remember when I was struck with the concept of Srila Prabhupada

wanting a new Vrndavana when I came in 1973. I sold myself out to that

dream. The dream turned into a horrific nightmare for so many, through no

fault of their own. I pray to give myself like that again. But instead I am

hiding in a little closet even while I remain here [at New Vrindaban].

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An important if underdeveloped focus of sociologists interested in the fate

of new religions is in the factors that influence their success, decline,

and failure.1 Such an oversight is especially conspicuous given that new

religions are prone to rapid and radical changes that promote organizational

transformation.2 Rodney Stark has formulated the most comprehensive model

addressing success and failure in new religions yet, as he acknowledges, his

model “has not yet influenced the case study literature. . . .”3 This paper

addresses two elements of Stark’s model—authority of leadership and the

presence of a committed labor force. We consider how each of these factors

in combination influenced the development of the New Vrindaban community, a

renegade Hare Krishna community located in West Virginia.

Stark argues that no religious movement can expect to attain success without

effective leaders whose authority is acknowledged as legitimate by

followers.4 Moreover, rank and file members must perceive themselves as part

of that system of authority.5 Stark further posits that religious movements

grow to the extent that they sustain a motivated religious labor force,

especially one comprised of committed missionaries devoted to seeking

converts.6 This paper describes and analyzes how a crisis of authority at

New Vrindaban brought about an exodus of community residents, financial

decline, and the ultimate transformation of the community’s purpose. Today

New Vrindaban is fragmented and struggling to survive, even while serving as

a place of pilgrimage for many Indian Hindus.

After clarifying the data and methods used for this research, the paper is

divided into three sections. The first provides a brief social history of

the New Vrindaban community and its controversial charismatic leader

Kirtanananda Swami. The second details how leadership problems resulted in

numerical decline and growing financial problems that transformed New

Vrindaban into an institution of pilgrimage. The third section details how

the community’s membership responded to the leadership’s emphasis on

pilgrimage at the expense of community building.

Data and Methods

Data for this paper were collected over the course of 11 years (1993-2004).

In 1993, the senior author visited New Vrindaban during a period when some

of the events reported here were taking place. Thereafter fieldwork was

conducted in the community on nearly a yearly basis for several days at a

time. Interviews were completed with two of the community’s leaders,

approximately a dozen residents, and countless other devotees who once lived

at New Vrindaban. The later interviews were informally conducted with former

New Vrindaban devotees living in communities affiliated with the

International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).

In the summer of 2003, the senior author was asked by the leadership and

some residents of New Vrindaban to conduct a survey to assess the views,

concerns, and hopes of the local congregation. The questionnaire was

designed in collaboration with five community residents who read drafts and

made suggestions for revision. Questionnaires were distributed within the

immediate New Vrindaban community as well as among congregational members

living in the surrounding area. To assure confidentiality, completed

questionnaires were mailed directly to the senior author. The survey yielded

36 respondents, 60% (N=22) of whom were full-time residents; 17% (N=6)

involved congregational members; and, 22% (N=8) while associated with New

Vrindaban had little or no involvement in the life of the community.

Respondents in the majority were married (54%) and/or had one or more

children (59%). One third (34%) worked within the New Vrindaban community

while over half (54%) were either self-employed or worked for a non-devotee

business. Although eleven of those surveyed became residents of New

Vrindaban during the 1970s the majority joined after 1995. The median length

of residence at New Vrindaban for the sample as a whole was seven years.

Growth, Leadership, and Sources of Decline

New Vrindaban was established in 1968 by two of the early disciples of Swami

Prabhupada, the founding guru of ISKCON. Kirtanananda Swami responded to an

advertisement in The San Francisco Oracle for people to help establish a

religious community in the hills near Wheeling, West Virginia. With his

friend Hayagriva he visited the owner of the property to assess the

possibility of establishing ISKCON’s first farm community. Initially they

met with stiff resistance from the owner who was determined to develop a

community, as he said, that was available “for everybody wanting to learn

the Truth.”7 After several failed attempts to secure a lease on a portion of

the property, the owner finally relented after he encountered legal

problems. The 99-year lease on 130 acres of land was the beginning of what

Prabhupada called New Vrindaban. In time the community was able to purchase

the property as well as a number of other adjacent ones. Thereafter,

Kirtanananda Swami, later known as the guru Bhaktipada, held a firm grip on

the leadership of the community.8

New Vrindaban’s early days were difficult. Under the motto of “Plain Living

and High Thinking,” Kirtanananda and a handful of other devotees carved

fields and pasture out of the wilderness to grow crops and provide grazing

areas for cows. The goal from the start was to build a self-sufficient

community based on spiritual principles. But there was more. Prabhupada

envisioned New Vrindaban much like its namesake in India. He had a vision of

seven temples built on the surrounding hilltops. The first “temple” the

community built was meant as a residence for Prabhupada. Prabhupada’s Palace

of Gold was dedicated on September 2, 1979, nearly two years after

Prabhupada’s death. The New York Times declared the palace “America’s Taj

Mahal” and the Washington Post called it “Almost Heaven.”

Kirtanananda saw Prabhupada’s Palace as one piece of what he called a “Land

of Krishna” theme park, or a spiritual Disneyland, capable of attracting

large numbers of visitors. In fact, New Vrindaban did become a major tourist

attraction. Busloads of tourists descended on New Vrindaban in the early and

mid-1980s and Prabhupada’s Palace became a major tourist attraction in the

state of West Virginia. The Wall Street Journal reported: “The flow of

traffic into this coal and manufacturing outpost [Moundsville] on the banks

of the Ohio used to be as slow as the river on a dusty summer day. But now,

a daily confluence of buses packed with gawking tourists is a common

sight.”9 The palace attracted over 100,000 visitors in 1982 and climbed to

nearly 500,000 between 1983 and 1985.10 One of ISKCON’s gurus who visited

New Vrindaban in 1985 stated, “When I was Prabhupada’s personal secretary in

1977, he introduced the phrase ‘cultural conquest.’ He told me dozens of

times during this period that this is the way to preach in Americ. . . ..

I’ve always been convinced that the project—and especially after seeing the

master plan that Bhaktipada [Kirtanananda] inspired—will make America the

first Krishna conscious country.”11

After humble beginnings, New Vrindaban grew to approximately 600 residents

in the mid-1980s. Many devotees were drawn to the community because of the

palace project and Kirtanananda’s vision for New Vrindaban. Others came to

live in what they thought would be a self-sufficient farm community focused

on realizing Krishna Consciousness. Funds for the palace and related

projects, as well as to support the community generally, came largely from

traveling sankirtan teams comprised of devotees selling various products in

public locations (e.g., candles, hats, records, stickers supporting sports

teams), or who solicited funds for fictitious charities. Distributing

Prabhupada’s books was largely discontinued when it became obvious that

selling products in public—a practice known as “picking,” could raise larger

sums of money.12 New Vrindaban devotees solicited funds throughout North

America and ultimately the world, generating millions of dollars each year

in support of the community’s ambitious building projects.13

Things changed dramatically for Kirtanananda and New Vrindaban after May 22,

1986 when a former resident of the community was murdered near the Los

Angeles ISKCON temple. Steven Bryant (Sulochana das) had been on a crusade

of sorts after Kirtanananda allegedly initiated his wife without his

consent. He ultimately blamed Kirtanananda for ruining his marriage. To

those at New Vrindaban, Bryant was a disgruntled devotee out to get

Kirtanananda. In fact he had gone to local authorities with allegations of

drug smuggling, child abuse and fraud at New Vrindaban.14 Thereafter Bryant

became one of the early challengers to the legitimacy of Kirtanananda and

the other gurus who succeeded Prabhupada. His manuscript, The Guru Business,

exposed the corrupt activities of ISKCON’s successor gurus and argued

forcefully that the latter had usurped their positions of power, rather than

being appointed by Prabhupada. Following his murder, law enforcement and

ISKCON’s leadership began to take more seriously Bryant’s accusations

against Kirtanananda. This only intensified a few months later when Bryant’s

killer Thomas Drescher (Tirtha) was found guilty of a 1983 murder of another

New Vrindaban resident Charles St. Denis (Chakradhari) and was sentenced to

life in prison. By now many within ISKCON, as well as local law enforcement

officials began to wonder if Kirtanananda had himself been behind the two

murders.

Bryant’s murder set off an extensive government investigation by the FBI,

the Internal Revenue Service, and the police in Los Angeles and in West

Virginia. As the Marshall County (West Virginia) Sheriff proclaimed, “This

is the beginning of the end of New Vrindaban as we now know it.”15 The end

certainly did seem near after FBI and Internal Revenue agents, in

conjunction with local police, raided the community on January 5th 1987.

Moreover, several months earlier, on September 15, 1986, a federal grand

jury met to investigate a possible connection between members of New

Vrindaban and the deaths of Bryant and St. Denis. In April of 1987, John

Hubner and Lindsey Gruson published an article in Rolling Stone magazine

titled “Dial Om for Murder” wherein they presented evidence suggesting that

Kirtanananda was behind the murders of both devotees. A year later the two

authors published the book, Monkey on a Stick: Murder, Madness, and the Hare

Krishnas.

In the midst of his legal troubles, Kirtanananda undertook a radical change

at New Vrindaban: the de-Indianization of Krishna Consciousness.

Kirtanananda had believed for some time that the cultural elements of

Krishna Consciousness made it difficult to appeal to Americans and other

Westerners. Kirtanananda said, “We’re not interested in Indian culture as

such. We’re interested in what is productive for Krishna

consciousness—whatever is useful.”16 Some of the changes Kirtanananda

instituted included: devotees wearing Franciscan type robes, men wearing

beards, interfaith preaching and conferences, silent chanting, Western music

including the use of a pipe organ and other western instruments, and English

in temple worship in place of traditional Bengali and Sanskrit. Moreover,

life-sized images (murtis) of both ISKCON’s founder Prabhupada and Jesus

Christ were placed side-by-side in the temple.17 Although many community

members accepted these innovations, others did not and left the community.

Thirteen interfaith conferences held at New Vrindaban brought some new

recruits to the community yet, in the end, nearly all them left with bitter

feelings toward Kirtanananda. Two protest demonstrations occurred at New

Vrindaban in 1991, and 1993, by interfaith members claiming that

Kirtanananda had defrauded them.18

On March 16, 1987 at ISKCON’s annual leadership meetings in Mayapur, India,

Kirtanananda was excommunicated from ISKCON.19 A year later New Vrindaban

and its satellite temples and centers were expelled from ISKCON.20 Freed

from ISKCON interference, Kirtanananda continued to add elements of Western

and Christian culture to Krishna Consciousness. The community reorganized

itself under the name the Eternal Order of the Holy Name, League of Devotees

International.21

In May 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Kirtanananda on three counts of

violating the RICO statute for illegally using copyrighted and trademark

logos during fundraising, six counts of mail fraud, and two counts of

conspiring to murder. The government also sought forfeiture of all

properties owned by New Vrindaban. After a three-week trial, Kirtanananda

was convicted on the RICO and mail fraud counts but the jury failed to reach

a verdict on the murder charges. While in jail, Kirtanananda made a motion

to appeal the case and awaited a bail hearing. He subsequently hired Allen

Dershowitz to represent him in the Court of Appeals. In July of 1993, his

1991 conviction was overturned when the Appeals Court ruled that the

District Court had wrongly allowed evidence of child molestation and other

irrelevant matters to be presented, unduly prejudicing the jury.

Despite the court proceedings, many of Kirtanananda’s disciples remained

loyal to their guru, interpreting the legal proceedings as just further

evidence of persecution on the part of local, state, and federal

authorities.22 This changed dramatically in September 1993 however when

Kirtanananda was caught in an inappropriate sexual encounter with a young

adult devotee male while driving back to West Virginia after attending the

Parliament of the World’s Religions centennial celebration in Chicago. When

confronted by two senior Godbrothers, Kirtanananda confessed to his sexual

indiscretions. Later that day however he denied the charges when a group of

distraught disciples came to see him. The following day at an open community

meeting Kirtanananda emphatically stated his innocence. At this point many

left the community, their faith in Kirtanananda shattered. Others left in

fear, as a portion of Kirtanananda’s disciples were irate toward those they

saw as spreading lies about their spiritual master. Many of those who chose

to remain at New Vrindaban lost trust in Kirtanananda’s authority. As a

consequence, a growing number of residents openly rejected Kirtanananda’s

interfaith experiment and returned to strictly following Prabhupada’s

practices of Krishna Consciousness. Because some residents remained

committed to Kirtanananda, New Vrindaban essentially split into two camps.

Under pressure, Kirtanananda finally terminated his six-year interfaith

experiment in July 1994 and New Vrindaban returned to the traditional

Indian-style of dress, worship, and religious practices advocated by

Prabhupada.23

Kirtanananda’s second trial took place in 1996 after he refused a plea

bargain by the government. This time however Thomas Drescher, who was

serving a life sentence for murdering Bryant and St. Denis, decided to

provide incriminating evidence against his former guru. At the trial

Drescher admitted that he had carried out both murders under Kirtanananda’s

order. Following Drescher’s testimony, Kirtanananda agreed to plead guilty

to one count of federal racketeering and was sentenced to 20 years in

prison. In 1997 the sentence was reduced to 12 years because of

Kirtanananda’s failing health. Kirtanananda’s few remaining interfaith

followers left New Vrindaban and relocated to his New York City temple,

called the “Interfaith Sanctuary.” Eight years later, on June 16, 2004

Kirtanananda was released from federal prison in North Carolina. He now

resides with a handful of committed disciples and followers at the Sri Sri

Radha Murlidara temple in New York City. The Executive Officers of ISKCON’s

North American governing board issued a warning prohibiting Kirtanananda

from visiting any of ISKCON’s temples or communities.24

The Changing Fortunes of New Vrindaban

Kirtanananda’s legal problems, religious deviations, moral failures, and

imprisonment had a devastating affect on New Vrindaban. As one might expect,

the community lost a considerable number of residents beginning in 1986 when

Kirtanananda began his interfaith experiment and his legal problems

initially emerged. A mass exodus followed in the aftermath of the January

1987 FBI led raid on the community. Still others departed when

Kirtanananda’s sexual indiscretions became public, in 1993, and the

community divided into two antagonistic camps. Many who left during this

period rejoined ISKCON.

Community census data indicate dramatically the affect of Kirtanananda’s

downfall. In July of 1986, New Vrindaban had 377 adults; that number dropped

to 131 in July of 1991. In the span of five years New Vrindaban lost a total

of 246 adult members, a reduction of 65%.25 In 1998 a reported 30 devotees

resided in temple owned buildings, although many more lived independently in

the surrounding area. In 2004, approximately 50 devotees resided full-time

within the temple community, with an equal number living independently on

land purchased from the community.

New Vrindaban not only lost the biggest portion of its full-time membership

however. It also lost the great majority of the community’s many Indian

Hindu supporters. Beginning in the early 1980s, New Vrindaban developed an

active membership program directed at Hindus in the U.S. and in India. As a

holy dham, numerous Hindu pilgrims came to New Vrindaban to worship. These

Hindu supporters represented an important source of funds. Yet many were

baffled and alienated by Kirtanananda’s interfaith experiment and mounting

legal problems. Some were reportedly outraged when they realized their

financial contributions to build a Vedic style temple were instead being

used to build the “Cathedral of the Holy Name.” This outrage intensified

when Kirtanananda publicly stated, “I do not care about Indian people.” One

Indian supporter subsequently wrote to Kirtanananda, “I was extremely

distressed by your ridiculous remarks about Indian. . . .. If you have such

racial inner feelings about Indians, you should realize that Indians do not

need you for the spiritual knowledge but you need them for the Lakshmi

[money] all the time.”26

New Vrindaban’s financial troubles deepened when funds derived from

traveling sankirtan parties essentially dried up following Kirtanananda’s

1991 conviction. Out on bail awaiting an appeal of his case, the court

barred him from residing at New Vrindaban after an ISKCON leader warned of

possible violence should Kirtanananda be allowed to return. As a result, the

considerable funds raised by his disciples were given directly to

Kirtanananda. Without sankirtan revenues and contributions from Hindu

pilgrims, New Vrindaban’s communal structure rapidly disintegrated.

Beginning, in 1990, householders were required to independently support

their families. Many purchased property from the community or in the

surrounding area and set up their own households. Householders working at

New Vrindaban were paid salaries and stipends. Desperate for funds the

community supported itself initially by selling off construction and other

equipment such as bulldozers and printing presses when Palace Press closed

down. Thereafter the community raised funds by selling parcels of land from

its extensive holding. By 1998, the community retained about 1400 acres of

what was once a property of over 3000 acres. Several small businesses

emerged in 1996 but two of them collapsed in 2001. Due to a shortage of

funds, the community’s extensive dairy operation began downsizing, in 1995,

by limiting breeding and allowing older cows to naturally die off. In 1999

the community’s day school closed. Financial pressures intensified in 2000

when New Vrindaban was named a defendant in a child abuse case filed in

Dallas, Texas, by former devotee students who attended ISKCON schools,

including the one at New Vrindaban.27

As financial problems grew worse and members of the community scattered, the

leadership initiated an effort to actively encourage Hindu pilgrims to

return to New Vrindaban. This was made possible by the abandonment of

interfaith, in 1994, and the imprisonment of Kirtanananda in 1996. In

addition, ISKCON and New Vrindaban formally renewed their relationship

beginning in 1998. Hindu pilgrims thus once again began regularly visiting

the community and contributing much-needed funds. No longer a functioning

community, New Vrindaban refocused its mission and became an institution of

pilgrimage. While perhaps a financial necessity, the emphasis on pilgrimage

has nonetheless been controversial. Centering the community’s mission on

pilgrimage effectively undermined the remaining remnants of community at New

Vrindaban. Among full-time and congregational members surveyed in the fall

of 2003,28 three-quarters (73%) agreed that, “New Vrindaban is more

concerned with pilgrims of Indian decent than with its local congregation.”

Fifty-five percent agreed strongly with the statement. The emphasis on

pilgrimage at the expense of rebuilding New Vrindaban as a community has led

some of the few remaining householders to relocate to other ISKCON

communities. As one husband and parent commented:

Not one single American grhasta [householder] couple has been able to stay

doing full-time service over the past several year. . . .. I am in the

process of moving away. It should be noted that I am merely relocating my

family to another [iSKCON] community. We are leaving NV [New Vrindaban]

because there is no vision that includes us. I don’t want to live in a

spiritual “Disneyworld.” I want to live in a nice neighborhood with a nice

temple. Originally my wife and I had hopes of self-sufficiency but that is

not even on the map at NV [New Vrindaban] right now.

Although serving the many Hindu pilgrims who visit New Vrindaban does not

require an extensive labor force to oversee the temple, the lodge for

guests, tours at Prabhupada’s Palace, and the like, the community’s

management has faced ongoing labor shortages. Given the relatively low wages

offered, and lingering hostilities toward the community’s management team,

few devotees have stepped forward to work. As one devotee stated forcefully,

“Unfortunately, I do not see a change in attitude in the leadership. This

attitude of using devotees in a utilitarian way is NV’s [New Vrindaban’s]

greatest failure.”

Unable or perhaps uninterested in rebuilding the community, the leadership

essentially became managers of a business, albeit a spiritually based one.

This shift has left many longstanding members of the community vulnerable

and in some cases feeling out of touch with the community’s new purpose.29

As one devotee noted:

They could stop making an effort to drive away devotees who do not “fit

into” the management’s vision and become more hospitable to all residents.

They should stop perpetuating a culture of fear and embrace some of the

ideas of those people who have dedicated their lives to the project. The

management is out of touch.

Another comments:

The management could cultivate a mood of service towards the devotees.

Currently, I find the upper management to be distant, untrustworthy, and

cold. The worst part of New Vrindaban for a resident is the

unpredictability. The management may decide at any moment to give you and

your family a “hard time.” Generally, this is referred to as the “squeeze.”

If they don’t see you as useful they drive you away. I think all of this

makes the senior members feel much safer if they remain at a distance. The

new people pick up the “vibe” and then the whole thing goes to hell.

One focus of hard feelings has been the temple president who returned in

2000 to manage the community, after leaving with his family in the aftermath

of Kirtanananda’s legal troubles. Previously he had served as Kirtanananda’s

“right hand man” in his role as temple president. For some, his close

association with Kirtanananda in itself makes him suspect. Yet many complain

about his reportedly high salary and the fact that he and his family choose

not to live on the property.

[Name of temple president] receives a rumored $60K salary every year. Many

senior members of the community as well as less senior ones mention this to

me as a great disparity, given the amount of money given to other full-time

grhastas working in the community.

When asked on the questionnaire, “How much trust do you place in the present

New Vrindaban leadership?” a quarter of those surveyed (26%) indicated that

they were “very distrustful.” An additional 40% suggested that they were

“distrustful” or “somewhat distrustful” of the leadership. Moreover,

one-third (34%) responded that differences with the present leadership

represent a “major influence” on their willingness to become more involved

in the community. Another third (31%) reported that differences with the

leadership had some influence on their desire to be involved. Finally, when

asked, “What changes could be made at New Vrindaban that would make you more

welcome and comfortable in the community,” over half (53%) of the total

responses (N=62)30 made reference to the leadership: the need for management

to be more responsive to the community (19%), leaders becoming more involved

in the community’s spiritual programs thus serving as role models (18%), and

the need for better or new management (16%). As one resident of New

Vrindaban commented:

People are fried out by the present leadership and so they disconnect

themselves from the programs offered by the community. Despite the fact that

a lot of structural changes have been made, the interactions between the

leader and members have fallen as time passes on. Devotees feel they should

be treated like devotees and be appreciated for whatever little service they

perform.

Given the prevailing resistance to the management, and the overall lack of

available labor, New Vrindaban has undertaken a strategy used by other

ISKCON communities in North America and, for that matter, by many private

companies looking to cut labor costs. New Vrindaban’s management began

importing devotee foreign nationals from India, South America, Eastern

Europe, and other locations with the promise that they could ultimately

secure U.S. residency. In a December 3, 2003 posting on a devotee website,

New Vrindaban advertised for devotee workers. While requesting “recent

references” from senior devotees interested, the advertisement ended with,

“Foreign-citizen devotees can inquire about obtaining religious visas and

plane fare to move here.”31 As one devotee stated:

Almost all of the families doing full-time service are being sponsored for

immigration by the temple. The families are often very poor and work lots of

hours. Most do not have plans to stay on after their paperwork is completed—

supposedly 2 or 3 years. (his emphasis)

One longtime resident of New Vrindaban who refers to the devotee immigrants

as “R1 Visa slaves,” commented:

As for my own case, I am quite willing to do temple service in exchange for

my [temple-owned] apartment. That seems fair to me. But that is not what

they want from me ultimately, I don’t believe. Why have one old lady in a

temple apartment when they can import a family and have two much more useful

and unbiased eager servants? I think that all that is really wanted from me

is to be gotten out of the way as soon as possible.

Despite the fact that a substantial number of devotee immigrants live and

work within the community, they apparently are not considered part of the

community by the leadership, as indicated by the following report:

In a recent closed meeting of about 20 devotees and Radhanath Maharaja [New

Vrindaban’s present spiritual leader] not one person aspiring for a green

card was invited. This despite the fact the meeting was to discuss community

issues. I think this indicates that no one really sees these people as part

of the intimate “community.” However people in this category make up about

one-third of the immediate temple community.

Being little more than hired employees from the perspective of the

community’s leadership, it is hardly surprising that few devotee immigrants

remain at New Vrindaban after receiving their green cards. Moreover, as one

community member stated, “People coming for a green card really don’t

strengthen the community. They create a transient atmosphere, especially for

those of us who want to stay and create something permanent for our

families.”

Conflicted Goals: Pilgrimage and Community Building

New Vrindaban no longer exists as a spiritual community with devotees living

and working together in pursuit of common goals. Rather it now operates

largely as a pilgrimage business requiring cheap and reliable sources of

labor to further that purpose. Yet many full-time residents and

congregational members continue to hold out hope that New Vrindaban can

reclaim its original purpose. As one devotee of twenty years stated, “The

community needs spiritual management as shown by Srila Prabhupada, not

business management, thinking of New Vrindaban as some kind of business.” It

is this clash of vision and goals that has produced ongoing alienation and

conflict between management and current and former members of the community.

Tables 1 and 2 present findings that indicate how residents and members of

the New Vrindaban congregation remain committed to serving and developing

the community. Table 1 reports mean scores for how respondents’ rank ordered

what they considered the community’s most important responsibilities.

Clearly, maintaining the deities, serving the existing congregation, and

providing for the community’s cows are significant priorities. Less

importance is placed on providing for the needs of the community’s pilgrims

and other guests. Moreover, as the findings further indicate, maintaining

Prabhupada’s Palace and improving the community’s buildings and

infrastructure are deemed less important community responsibilities. The

latter of course are central to maintaining the community as an attractive

place for Indian pilgrims. Finally, expanding the congregation through

preaching and distributing Prabhupada’s books had relatively less

importance.

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Table 1. Which of the Following Do You Consider New Vrindaban’s Most

Important Responsibilities as a Community? (Mean Scores and Standard

Deviations)

Mean Std. Deviation

Maintaining the Deities 2.16 (32) 1.53

Serve the Existing Congregation 3.34 (32) 2.59

Providing for the Community’s Cows 3.47 (32) 1.83

Providing for the Community’s Guests 4.45 (31) 2.29

Expand the Congregation by Preaching

and Making Devotees 5.13 (31) 2.16

Maintaining Prabhupada’s Palace 5.16 (32) 1.72

Improve and Maintain the Community’s

Buildings and Infrastructure 5.41 (32) 2.05

Book Distribution 5.71 (31) 2.13

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Findings in Table 2 underscore the significance of community to those

surveyed. Mean scores are reported for eight community-related items that

devotee respondents ranked ordered with respect to the community’s most

immediate needs. Community building and maintaining the local congregation

are viewed as the most significant and immediate needs. Respondents seek

more economic development and employment opportunities, expanded social

services for devotees in need, community-based schooling and spiritual

training for children, and a “community minister” to help tend to the varied

needs of the broader community. Structures and opportunities promoting

devotee interaction were considered less immediate needs, perhaps because

there are ample occasions to socialize within the community already.32

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Table 2. Which of the Following do You Believe are New Vrindaban’s Most

Immediate Needs? (Means Scores and Standard Deviations)

Mean Std. Deviation

Economic Development,

Employment Opportunities 3.10 (30) 2.37

Expand Social Services for Devotees in Need 3.60 (30) 2.33

Community Elementary School 3.93 (28) 2.04

Community Minister to Tend to the

Needs of the Broader Community 4.00 (27) 2.50

Sunday School and/or Spiritual

Education for Children 4.07 (27) 1.73

Community Center 4.74 (27) 2.25

New Vrindaban “Town Meetings” 5.54 (26) 2.30

More Community Social Gatherings 5.92 (26) 1.85

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>From the perspective of the management, devotees living in and outside of

the temple community are regarded as problematic precisely because their

goals are at cross-purposes with the mission of pilgrimage. As a

consequence, the management has been portrayed as being largely unresponsive

to community members. Seventy-one percent of those surveyed agreed with the

statement, “My input into the development of the community seems unwanted by

the leadership.” Three quarters (76%) disagreed with the statement, “Temple

management in recent years has become more responsive to devotee needs and

concerns.” Moreover, while the community board of directors had disbanded

prior to the survey, 85% of the respondents agreed nonetheless that, “The

community board should represent the diverse views of the local

congregation.” Fifty percent agreed strongly with the statement.

Summary and Conclusion

This study has demonstrated how New Vrindaban’s founder Kirtanananda Swami

lost legitimacy resulting in mass defection, the loss of vital sources of

funding, and goal transformation. New Vrindaban faced decline and possible

failure precisely because Kirtanananda, and the community he led, lost

legitimacy in the eyes of the membership. It may have only survived because

the community was able to create a niche for itself by becoming a place of

pilgrimage for Indian Hindus. In so doing however, New Vrindaban essentially

gave up the task of sustaining a viable residential community.

Charismatic leadership has been central to the emergence and development of

new religions.33 Charismatic authority is based upon a relationship of high

emotional intensity. This is readily translated at the group level into high

levels of organizational commitment, religiosity, and task performance as

followers seek to realize the goals of the leader and his or her

organization.34 Yet as Weber makes clear, charismatic authority is

inherently unstable and subject to routinization.35 Charismatic leaders thus

face the ongoing task of sustaining their legitimacy in collaboration with

their followers. As this implies, the actions of leaders have the potential

for reinforcing or undermining their authority.36 To sustain authority,

leaders must continually display their virtues and prowess as leaders.37

This demands that they produce or otherwise sustain the appearance of new

successes.38 This becomes all the more critical in situations where the

authority of a leader is under challenge. For new religions and their

charismatic leaders, success is often measured in terms of recruiting new

members.39

In the midst of serious legal problems and resulting challenges to his

authority, Kirtanananda refashioned Krishna Consciousness by blending it

with Christianity and other religious systems. Such a radical shift in

doctrine was meant to attract new recruits loyal to Kirtanananda’s

leadership while pushing out dissenters. Yet as we have seen, this tactic

largely backfired as relatively few new recruits were brought into the

community, while hundreds of longstanding members defected over the course

of several years. This left New Vrindaban’s communal way of life vulnerable

and the community rapidly disintegrated. Community stability was further

compromised when Kirtanananda’s sexual indiscretions became public, in 1993,

and a further round of defections occurred.

The repeated examples of corrupt and immoral activity by Kirtanananda

eventually erased any claims to authority he may have had. Ideological

work40 meant to restore Kirtanananda’s legitimacy proved too imposing in the

face of overwhelming evidence of indiscretions. Moreover, given the

community’s transformation to an institution of pilgrimage, New Vrindaban no

longer retained the spiritual authenticity capable of integrating members

into a functioning community. Community members who remained no longer

perceived themselves as part of a legitimate system of authority. While

pilgrimage clearly stood as an important element of the original community’s

mission, it was seen as emblematic of the spiritual purity of the devotee

way of life. Now economic necessity has overwhelmed the spiritual ideals

upon which New Vrindaban was originally based.

As we suggest above, Weber considered charismatic authority as inevitably

subject to routinization evolving into either traditional or rational-legal

forms of authority. As Dawson suggests, when this evolution fails to occur

in a charismatically led group, it will either cease to exist or implode and

become unstable.41 This latter path of development produces the potential

for confrontation and even violent behavior. Kirtanananda’s charismatic

authority was never subject to institutionalization while he retained

leadership at New Vrindaban. He retained almost complete control over the

community and those who were a part of it. Given this fact, the question

remains as to why New Vrindaban did not experience open conflict and

violence between supporters and opponents of Kirtanananda’s leadership? Such

a possibility clearly existed, especially in 1993 when tensions escalated

after allegations of Kirtanananda’s sexual impropriety became a contested

issue.

One answer is suggested by Hirschman’s exit-voice hypothesis.42 Exit and

voice represent two forms of expressing dissent. The potential formation of

insurgent groups is closely related to the micro-ecology of aggrieved groups

as they exist within organizations or communities.43 If circumstance afford

dissenters little chance of successfully securing change, their only options

are to exit, or lower their voice and give in. If, on the hand, there is a

likelihood of success, or the benefits of confrontation outweigh projected

costs, insurgents may chose to stand and fight. A critical situational

determinant that influences exit options is the degree to which members can

obtain an acceptable and parallel situation elsewhere. If such an option

exists, the risks and costs associated with confrontation appear menacing.

The latter scenario played a critically important role in lessening the

potential for violent confrontation at New Vrindaban. The exodus of large

numbers of residents disillusioned by Kirtanananda’s authority was greatly

facilitated by the availability of ISKCON communities willing to absorb

them. Without the availability of this exit strategy, it is possible, and

perhaps likely, that tensions would have escalated to the point where

dissenters to Kirtanananda’s rule would have collectively organized in an

attempt to seize power from within. The availability of ISKCON however made

it possible for dissenters to readily switch devotional communities, rather

than seriously consider the possibility of contested struggle.

Endnotes

David Bromley and Phillip Hammond, The Future of New Movements. (Macon, GA:

Mercer University Press, 1987); Rodney Stark, “How New Religions Succeed: A

Theoretical Model,” 11-29 in Bromley and Hammond, 1987; Rodney Stark, “Why

Religious Movements Succeed or Fail: A Revised General Model,” Journal of

Contemporary Religion 11, no. 2 (1996):133-146; Bryan Wilson, “Factors in

the Failure of New Religious Movements,” 30-45 in Bromley and Hammond 1987.

Barker, “What are we Studying?,” Nova Religio 8, no. 1 (2004):88-102.

Stark, “Why New Religious Movements Succeed or Fail,” 133.

Stark, “Why New Religious Movements Succeed or Fail,” 139.

Stark, “Why New Religious Movements Succeed or Fail,” 140.

Hayagriva Dasa, The Hare Krishna Explosion: The Birth of Krishna

Consciousness in America (1966-1969). (New Vrindaban, WV: Palace Press,

1985), 231.

Kirtanananda Swami was known as “Bhaktipada” after 1979 in recognition of

his guru status. The honorific title can be translated as “he at whose feet

the bhaktas (devotees) sit.” To avoid confusion, the name “Kirtanananda”

will be used throughout the paper, except where others have referred to

“Bhaktipada” in quoted material.

Seth Lubove. 1985. “Hare Krishna Temple Turns a Tiny Town into a Tourist

Stop.” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 1985, 1.

Henry Doktorski. The Great Experiment. Sacred Music and the Christianization

of the New Vrindaban Hare Krishna Temple Liturgies. (Unpublished manuscript,

2003), 264.

Shrila Rameshvara.Maharaja, “The Spiritual World Has Descended.” Brijabasi

Spirit, (summer, 1985), 19.

E. Burke Rochford, Jr. Hare Krishna in America. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers

University Press, 1985), 200.

The “New Vrindaban Community Income Statement for the Year 1984” indicated

that sankirtan devotees collected $2,853,899 or 71% of all revenues

generated that year (Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 276).

John Hubner and Lindsey Gruson. “Dial Om for Murder.” Rolling Stone, April

9, 1987, 54.

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 261.

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 67.

This was not Kirtanananda’s first attempt. In 1967 he sought to westernize

the devotees’ style of dress and appearance in defiance of Prabhupada.

Kirtanananda grew a beard and preached to the devotees in New York that the

practice of men shaving their heads and wearing dhoti, tilak (clay markings

on the forehead and body), and sikha (tuft of hair at the back of a male’s

head) were impediments to spreading Krishna Consciousness in America.

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 271.

ISKCON GBC Resolutions, 1987.

ISKCON GBC Resolutions, 1988.

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 267.

Kirtanananda also aggressively asserted that persecution was behind his

legal problems. In fact he undertook a year long “First Amendment National

Freedom Tour” where he defiantly claimed government persecution. He visited

numerous cities and spoke to millions of radio listeners and TV viewers

(Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 263).

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 299.

Anuttama das. “Kirtanananda Swami’s Release From Prison.” Chakra website,

June 20, 2004. (Available at

http://www.chakra.org/announcements/AOtherJun20_04_02.html)

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 263.

Doktorski, The Great Experiment, 268.

Children of ISKCON, et al. vs. ISKCON, et al. (Available at

http://www.wturley.com)

It is worth noting that none of the survey respondents became residents of

New Vrindaban between 1984 and 1994, a period that roughly corresponds to

Kirtanananda’s legal problems, interfaith experiment, and ultimate downfall.

Although the emphasis on pilgrimage at the expense of community building has

been a source of concern, it has also been New Vrindaban’s greatest success,

according to those surveyed. When asked what New Vrindaban’s greatest

successes have been, forty-three percent of the responses praised the many

preaching efforts directed at pilgrims and other visitors to the community.

Respondents often indicated more than one change they would like to see

occur at New Vrindaban, thus the total N of 62.

Dipika.org. “Opportunities at New Vrndavana.” Posted December 8, 2003.

(Available at http://www.dipika.org/2003/12/index.htm)

Eighty-three percent (N=29) of those surveyed indicated that they had

visited one or more times with friends within the community within the past

month. Seventy-nine percent (N=28) attended one or more Sunday feasts within

the community. The latter are largely social events.

Barker, “What are we Studying?;” Lorne Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic

Legitimacy and Violent Behavior in New Religious Movements,” 80-101 in David

Bromley and J. Gordon Melton, Cults, Religion, and Violence (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2002); E. Burke Rochford, Jr., “Social Building

Blocks of New Religious Movements: Organization and Leadership,” in David

Bromley, Teaching New Religious Movements (New York: Oxford University

Press, forthcoming).