NOTES ON MANDUKYA UPANISHAD AND KARIKA: INTRODUCTION 4

[Guest guest]

Hari OM! PraNAms to everyone.

 

We will resume the series after a long gap. Meanwhile we had a two-day

spiritual camp on Mandukya Upanishad organized by Shree Ram Chandran on

behalf of Chinmaya Mission Washington Regional Center (CMWRC), where we

completed the Agama prakaraNa. Starting from July 10, I will be taking

‘Gita Navaneetam’ talk series at CMWRC, thanks to Shree Ram Chandran

again. The Mandukya Upanishad camp discourses (12hrs) will soon become

available in MP3 format, which can be obtained once they are ready.

Shree Subbu brought to our attention the 8 CDs of H.H. Swami

Paramaarthanandaji’s on the Upanishad and karika. I have listened to

the talks and they are worth the treasure. My talks follow very closely

His discourses on the Upanishad as indicated in my introduction and the

basis for both is essentially the Chinmaya Mission teachings on the

upanishad.

 

We start our series now. We present below some of the conclusions that

we have reached and also present additional points that are relevant

based on the discussions we had in the list(s).

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1. All objective knowledge is attributive knowledge, since senses can

only gather attributes and not substantive or substantial of the

objects. That some daarshanikas state that senses also gather

substantive knowledge along with the attributes, but that is only an

assumption and not a fact. The mind, however, makes an inference that

there is an object ‘out there’ with those attributes that the senses

have gathered. It is true that this inference should be based on

‘vyaapti’ or a relation establishing the attributes and the object.

This vyaapti is established as the child grows with the knowledge

involving transactions (hence, it is only transactional knowledge) not

only with the senses (jnaanedriyas) but also with organs of action,

karmendriyas. Exactly an identical situation arises in the dream state,

as we shall see, and for this reason only the Mandukya is revered as the

most important upanishad. It is similar to the fact that I transact

with the ring differently from the bangle or necklace without knowing

the substantive of the ring, bangle or necklace. It is not that objects

do not have the substantives, if so the objects cannot exist. What is

to be recognized is that the attributes that one gathers through the

senses do not truly belong to the substantive. Hence, Krishna says

(B.G.9:4&5):

 

mayA tatam idam sarvam jagat avyakta mUrtinA|

mastAni sarva bhUtani na cha aham tEshu avasthitaH||

na ca mastAni bhUtAni pasyamE yOgamaishvaram|

bhUtabhRinna ca bhUtastO mamAtmA bhUtabHAvanaH||

 

I pervade this entire universe in an unmanifested form. All beings are

in me since I support them as the very material cause. However, I am

not involved in their modifications and attributes. In fact, if one

inquires further, they do not have any existence in me (since they are

only names and forms without any substantiality of their own). Arjuna

look at my glory. I myself providing the entire support for all the

beings, yet without directly involved in their trials and tribulations.

Those do not affect me.

 

This is one of the powerful statements of Krishna, which appear to have

an inherent contradiction. He says first that the beings are all in Him

and in the very next sloka, He appears to contradict His own statement

by saying that they are not in Him. This is the essence of adyArOpa

apavAda that advaita emphasizes. It is similar to gold says first that

all ornaments are in me as I pervade this entire universe of

gold-ornaments. However, the attributes, trials and tribulations of

these ornaments do not belong to me (na ca aham teshu avasthitaH). The

ring’s attributes, its date of birth or date of death are different from

those of bangle and necklace. These changing attributive knowledge do

not belong to the gold, which remains as the substantive in all their

changes without getting unaffected by these changes or avasthas. Once

one is settled with that understanding, Gold can declare further, for

those who want to inquire more deeply, these rings, bangles and

necklaces do not even exist in me. Essentially, I remain all the time

as gold without any rings, bangles and necklaces in me and gold as I

was, gold as I am and gold I will be. In fact, I have never transformed

myself into rings, bangles or necklaces. Look at my glory, I remain as

gold, but appear to exist in varieties of forms with varieties of names.

This is what is called transformation less transformation or

creationless creation or as Shree Goudapaada comments as ajAti vAda.

Hence, Ch. Up. says creation is just like gold becoming into ornaments

- ‘vaachArambhanam vikaarO nAmadhEyam’. The samanvaya or coherency is

obvious to those who are keen in knowing the truth of advaita that

Krishna is emphasizing through the apparent contradictions.

 

Thus, from Vedas we learn that Brahman is the substantive for all

objects, nay, for the world itself. (sarvam khalvidam brahma). Mandukya

matra 2 reinforces this statement. Braham being substantive, it is not

available for knowledge by the senses, reinforcing our conclusion

independently that objective knowledge can only be attributive

knowledge.

 

2. Scriptures define Brahman using converse statement ‘prajnAnam

brahma’,‘satyam jnaanam anantam brahma’ etc, which makes them as

necessary and sufficient ‘qualifications’ for brahman or swarUpa

laxaNas for Brahman. Swaruupa laxaNas are necessary and sufficient

qualifications for any object.

 

3. Brahman being infinite cannot have attributes since attributes

differentiate one object from the other or to put this in more general

form, Brahman does not have sajaati, vijaati, swagata bhedas. Hence

even the swarupa laxanas that are discussed are only used by the

scriptures as ‘upaaya’ for Upadesha or means of communicating that which

cannot be communicated. Mandukya is going to reinforce this with the

statement that turiiyam is avyapadesyam, indescribable.

 

4. Only objects have attributes, and are known only through the

attributes since substantive is Brahman. Conversely, that which has

attributes is only an object that is finite.

 

5. Subject ‘I’ also cannot have attributes, since it is a subject and

not an object. Subject cannot be objectified. Hence, there can be only

one subject in the universe and everything becomes an object of

knowledge for the subject ‘I’. Subject has to be a conscious entity and

being ekam eva advitiiyam (one without a second), the identity of

subject I, which is sans attributes, and Brahman, which is also sans

attributes, is again established. Samanvaya or self-consistency is

again obvious.

 

SwarUpa laxaNa of an object: SwarUpa laxaNa is the same as the

necessary and sufficient qualification of an object that differentiates

the object from all other objects in the universe. On critical

analysis, we will find an object cannot have swarUpa laxaNa since its

swarUpam, which is the same as its substantive, is nothing but Brahman.

Taking the example of sugar we showed the sweetness is only a necessary

qualification but not sufficient qualification. There is no particular

qualification that can be identified as its swarUpa laxaNa. One can say

collective qualifications together define the sugar as different from

other objects, but none of them can be necessary and sufficient

qualification to define sugar. One can says sugar is that which has

sugariness which is different from saltiness of the salt. But this is

only a circular definition since we have to define sugariness as that

which sugar has; and sugar is that which has sugariness. (In the tarka

shaastra, cow is used as an illustrative example. Cow is that which has

cow-ness (gotvam) and cow-ness is that which cow has.) This ambiguity in

defining any object arises again from the fact that the object has no

substantiality of its own. When we analyze naama and naami (name and

the object the name stands for), or padam and padaartham (word and its

object) in the discussion of Om-kaara, we will bring this issue again.

For transactional purposes (vyAvahArika satyam), we can define sugar as

C12H22O11 as its swaruupa, but we recognize that it is nothing but an

assemblage of different elements, without having a substantive of its

own. There is no sugariness left if we separate the carbon, hydrogen

and oxygen to examine the substantive of the sugar further. Even these

elements have no substantive of their own as we try to examine further

they are assemblage of more fundamental particles; electrons, protons

and neutrons. We are yet to find the fundamental particles of matter

since we come to a deadlock at quantum level as the very investigation

to find the answer affects the system being investigated. Other than at

transactional level where sugar differs from salt, the fundamental

differences in term of substantives dissolve. Sugar is different from

salt, even though both are made of the same fundamental particles,

electrons, protons and neutrons. Ring is different from necklace, even

though both are made of the same substantive, gold. The properties

belong to the assemblage but not to substantives. The luminosity of the

ring and bangle comes from gold. It is borrowed luminosity from its

substantive. Similarly world exists and its existence comes from its

substantive, Brahman – essentially a borrowed existence. Hence ring can

cease to exist when it is melted to form a bangle. But existence

persists in and through the changing names and forms. In fact, errors

in perception are possible only because the knowledge of objects are

only attributive and substantive. We now analyze the errors in

perception.

 

Error in the perception:

 

Errors can occur in the cognition and recognition process when the input

data from senses are incomplete or inadequate. The incomplete data from

the senses could be due to defectiveness of the senses (for example

color blindness), or inadequate environment for senses to operate to

their full potential (ex. inadequate illumination). The recognition

based on partial data can result in erroneous conclusions about the

object that is perceived. Hence, partial data can give rise to

erroneous cognitions. (Mandukya is important only because it takes total

human experience rather than partial experience of waking state to

arrive at the truth). Perceiver may not recognize the error in his

perception and thus in his knowledge, unless the defects in the

perception are recognized or unless he learns from others (Apta vAkyam)

who could perceive the object correctly. For learning to take place, he

should have the faith or trust in their knowledge. Some aachaarayas

claim that in gathering attributes by the senses, senses gather the

substantive also. That this is only an assumption is obvious when one

perceives a snake where there is a rope. In the perception of the snake

where there is a rope, what senses have gathered are all the attributes

that are common to both rope and snake but not those that differentiate

the two. Here the defect is due to incomplete knowledge of the

attributes of the object, which are sufficiently deterministic to

distinguish the object from an elephant or tiger but not sufficiently

deterministic to differentiate a snake from a rope. Error therefore

arises since senses only bring in attributes and not substantives; and

mind is making a judgment call about the object perceived, based on the

limited attributes that the senses have gathered.

 

Thus, perception of a snake ‘out there’ where there is a rope is an

error or adhyaasa. Here, it is a subjective error about the object

perceived. Let us call this as subjective objectification. Those who

knew the truth that it is a rope and not a snake, also knew that the

other person’s cognition of a snake and therefore his knowledge based on

partial data is erroneous or adhyaasa, and is bhrama and not pramaa.

However, from the reference of the person who is seeing a snake, he has

a valid knowledge or pramaa of the snake ‘out there’, since he has no

reason to suspect that it could be a rope and that his cognition is

bhrama. He may die with that knowledge that it was a snake, if he has

no further input that is trust worthy, to negate his knowledge of the

snake. From his reference, the object out there is a snake, period.

>From his reference, is it pramaa or bhrama? From his reference, snake

knowledge is a valid knowledge, since he could see that it is five feet

long and when he accidentally stepped on it, it was soft like a snake.

Thus, the sense of sight and sense of touch, both confirmed that it is a

snake. It is most likely to be a snake since it is in the middle of

forest where the snakes roam around. Thank God, it did not bite him.

However, the fear and the anxiety that arose because of that knowledge

are as real as the object itself that he perceived. If he is a high

blood pressure patient, he could have died out of that shock. If he had

concluded that it is rope instead of snake, he would have lived equally

happily with that knowledge, irrespective if whether the object is

really a snake or a rope. From his reference, whatever knowledge he has

gained is valid knowledge until it is contradicted by another experience

related to that object. We conclude therefore that without

contradictory experiences, the knowledge (of snake or rope) remains as a

valid knowledge. There is no other validation process available for him

other than contradictory experience from another pramANa (for example,

such as aapta vAkyam).

 

>From this, we arrive at several important conclusions. First, the

objective knowledge is relative, since it is only an attributive

knowledge without any substantive knowledge. Second, when there is

incomplete or defective information about the attributes of the objects,

there could be an error in the recognition of the object. The erroneous

knowledge is taken as valid knowledge and it is not recognized as

erroneous unless additional trustworthy information or datum is

available. Without such additional information, the knowledge remains

as valid in the mind of the perceiver. Third, this knowledge is

subjective since error arises due to incomplete input from the senses of

the perceiver, the subject. Therefore, the error exists in the mind of

seer of the snake and not in the minds of the seers of rope. For the

seer of the snake the snake is real, while for the seers of the rope,

the rope is real. Interestingly, the error is recognized as an error

only when the two minds, the seer of the snake and seer of the rope

interact. Otherwise, both have relatively valid knowledge from their

references. Relativity in the valid knowledge comes from the fact that

the mind is involved in the formative knowledge. Without the mind,

there is no knowledge of the object ‘out there’.

 

In both pramaa and bhrama, the relative reality of the object is

established by the attributive knowledge, and not by the

object-knowledge per sec. A magician is successful with his show only

because the knowledge of the object is based on the attributive

knowledge than the substantive knowledge. By distorting the attributes

that the audiences perceive, he can manipulate their sense input to

provide a false image of an object.

 

In the case of snake perception, the error lies in the seer of the snake

and not with the seer of the rope. We call this as subjective error or

praatibhaasika just to differentiate from relatively more objective

errors. In the case of subjective error, the factors responsible for

the error are limited to the individual. This is in contrast to the

perception of the mirage water where the factors responsible for the

error are outside the individual mind. When the seer of the snake

gets additional data and confirms by subsequent perception that it is a

rope, the relative knowledge of the snake is replaced by a more valid

knowledge of a rope. Once one recognizes the error and sees the rope as

a rope and not rope as a snake, the snake vision is eliminated since the

creation of the snake is subjective. Thus, praatibhaasika errors are

limited to the individual. The dream objects and dream world come under

this category, as we shall see when the upaniShad discusses the dream

experiences.

 

Error therefore occurs whenever we do not perceive the substantive of an

object as it is, but we know there is an object out there based on the

attributive knowledge gained through sense input. In the case of the

subjective error like snake, we do not see the substantive rope and

therefore project, based on the attributes that senses have gathered,

that there is a snake out there. GoudapAda points out that some may see

the rope as a snake or crack in the earth or a water streak on the

floor. In principle in this subjective objectification or

praatibhaasika, depending on one’s samskaara, the projection of

appropriate superimposed object such as snake, crack or steak of water

occurs. The knowledge of each of these objects is relative knowledge

relative to the perceiver of those objects. The cause for projection for

these objects or cause for error is the lack of correct or complete

attributive knowledge of the substantive (called as adhiShTAnam).

Non-apprehension or ignorance of the rope as a rope is the causes for

misapprehension of the rope as snake or crack or streak of water. Here

ignorance is not some positive quantity capable of projecting the snake

or crack. Here ignorance is the absence of correct knowledge of the

truth of the object due to defective or incomplete sense input. As

discussed before, whatever the sense input the mind has collected is

integrated by forming an image of the object in the mind and the

cognized image is compared with the images stored in the memory that

have similar attributes (sAdRisyam) for recognition of the object as a

snake or crack or streak of water. There has been extensive research

that is being done to evaluate how the mind selects images from the

memory whether it is by series or by parallel processing. For example,

for a word ‘pit’ – several meanings for the word are possible. When we

hear the word ‘pit’, mind has the capacity to select the meaning

depending on the context the word is used or the familiarity in the use

of the word for a given perceiver. For the one who digs holes all the

time, the word ‘pit’ would bring in the image of a hole in the ground,

while for a fruit seller ‘pit’ would mean a seed in the fruit. The

reader of a story may select different meanings for the word depending

on the context it is used. The point is the projection and recognition

is done by a mind supported by the conscious entity. The image

projected depends on mental ‘samskaara’ at that time, which includes

both the habitual thinking and contextual thinking. Hence, error is

related to partial ignorance (hence partial truth also), which forms a

root cause for the mind to project an object, a snake, a crack, or a

streak of water, where the rope is. The substantive or material cause

for the snake-projection is rope only, at the out set. However, in

reality, it is the mind supported by conscious entity. Without the mind

present, there is neither a snake nor a rope. If the senses can bring

all the attributes of the object correctly then the errors in

recognition of object are minimized. If there is no sense-input at all,

no attributive knowledge, that is complete ignorance, there is no

knowledge of existence of any object. Then also, there is no

deterministic error, since there is no deterministic perception. We

will discuss this aspect also when the upaniShad addresses, the deep

sleep state.

 

Even when one sees the rope as a rope, there is still an error, since as

it was pointed out that it is an objective error rather than subjective

error. Since rope is seen as a rope by everybody, we call this

relatively more objective than the subjective error involved in the

perception of snake. Error, we said, arises when we have incomplete

information about any object. Because of the partial ignorance and

partial knowledge, mind makes a judgment call about the object based on

the information currently available. In the perception of the rope as a

rope, incomplete information arises because of different type of sense

limitations. Here the limitation of senses is related to their

incapacity to provide the substantive knowledge but only providing an

attributive knowledge, since substantive of the rope is Brahman, which

cannot be perceived by senses. Since everybody sees the object as a

rope, the limitation of the senses in each individual is Universal

limitation, and the error that arises because of the lack of correct

substantive knowledge of the object, we call it as vyaavahaarika satyam.

It means a transactional reality. The praatibhaasika satyam pertains

to individual mind while the vyaavahaarika satyam pertains to all minds

collectively. This classification is only relative but the errors in

both cases are somewhat similar, taking something for something else,

atasmin tat bhudhiH, which Shankara calls it as adhyaasa or a

superimposed error. In the case of a snake vision, it is the

superimposition of the knowledge of the snake where the rope is. In the

case of rope, it is the superimposition of knowledge of rope where

Brahman is. The farmer is called subjective error and the later is

called objective error. One has limited transaction, where the snake

perception causes fear in the mind of the perceiver who acts

accordingly. If many people are seeing the rope as a snake, the snake

knowledge will remain in the minds of each one of them until each mind

is convinced that it is a rope and not a snake. Those who are convinced

will take the rope as rope, while those who are not yet convinced, will

still take rope as a snake. Similarly, in the vyavahaara satyam, the

rope knowledge will remain as rope until those that are seeing rope have

the vision of the substantive, Brahman. Here the knowledge of the

substantive is not perceptual but through Veda PramaaNa, since Brahman

cannot be perceived. Here the error is universally based, just as the

case of the vision of mirage. Hence, even after knowing that it is not

real, one can see the mirage but one knows that what is seen is not real

but only mithya. Similarly even gaining the knowledge of Brahman, the

attributive knowledge of objects can still remain as long as the mind

and senses are operating, but there is no confusion that what is seen is

real. Whatever is seen is taken as false or mithya. Thus for an

ignorant person, the false is taken as real while for jnaani false

remain as false while the substantive of the false is recognized as

Brahman which is real.

 

Thus, just as the ignorance of rope causes the mind to create the snake

in the mind of the perceiver, the ignorance of Brahman causes the mind

to create the perception of the objects as real in the minds of the

perceiver. The former is an error at microcosm level while the later is

an error at macrocosm level, which will be explained later. The

realities, however, are relative in both cases. The snake is real for

the perceiver of the snake, rope is real for the perceiver of the rope,

and Brahman is real for the knower of Brahman. The first is called

praatibhaasika, the second is vyaavahaarika and we can call the third as

paaramaarthika. All are valid knowledge in their plane of reference,

but only difference is the Knowledge of Brahman alone is absolute

knowledge since Brahman alone is absolutely real based on Veda PramaaNa.

Just as praatibhaasika knowledge is negated at the vyaavahaarika level,

the vyaavahaarika knowledge is negated at the paaramaarthika level. We

noted that the knowledge of the snake remains as valid, until a doubt

arises about its validity when the perceiver of the snake is exposed to

the perceiver of the rope. When he investigates further using

appropriate means (such as using a torch light) because of the faith in

the word of his preceptor (the knower of the rope), he discovers that

what he is seeing is not a snake but a rope. Similarly, the knowledge

of the rope as valid or real remains unless one is exposed to a teacher

who is aware that what is seen is not really a rope but Brahman only.

With that faith in the teacher, if he investigates using appropriate

means, that is using Vedanta PramaaNa, he discovers that what he is

seeing as the world of objects is nothing but Brahman only. We reach

another important conclusion; at any level, the perceived objects and

thus the perceived world are taken as real until the reality of the

perceptions are investigated using appropriate means of knowledge,

pramANa.

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Hari Om!

Sadananda