Fw: sribhashya-mahasiddhanta-Per ception does not show 'sat' only and sat and perception not identical

July 8, 2006

The argument that sense perception shows only'sat' is criticised.

Sense perception does not show mere existence in which case all perceptions will be of the same thing. But we see things differently as 'this is a pot,;'this is a cloth,' etc. When a thing is perceived its jati is also perceived so that there is no doubt about either the entity or its jati. If only the existence is perceived how can one proceeding to buy a buffalo returns empty handed on seeing only a cow there, asks Ramanuja. Moreover, seeing a horse the cognition that this is not an elephant arises out of the memory of having seen an elephant to be different from a horse. Besides if all perceptions see only the existence then a man who is blind can see with his ear and the deaf can hear with his eye etc..because the sense preception is the same and there is no bhedha between that of the eye and the ear.

Then Ramanuja proceeds to show that 'sat,' that is, existence alone does not become the object of any sense organ. The eye sees an object possessing colour,rupa, the ear hears the sound as being the attribute of the object heard, the skin cognises the particular touch of the object.

If Brahman, nirvisesha chinmathra, can be perceived as 'sat,' it becomes an object of perception that belies the declaration of the vedas that Brahman is athindhriya, beyond cognition by senses. Sruthi says, 'yathO vAchO nivarthanthE aprApya mansA saha,' (Kena.) Brahman will then cease to be self-proved and will become prameya, known, which makes it jada, insentient and nAsya, perishable as according to advaitin that which is prameya, object of cognition, is so.

Therefore,says Ramanuja:

'vasthusamsTHAnarupajAthyAdhilakshaNabhedhavisishtavishayameEva pratyaksham.' That is, the perception is of a thing distinguished by the attributes like jati, form,colour etc. only.

Advaitin's contention that since 'sat' alone is perceived as being common to all objects, the visesha, difference,being not perceived as we go from one object to another and hence apAramArthya, not real, is criticised by Ramanuja. We say that one knowledge is sublated by the subsequent knowledge when there is conflict between the two as in the case of rope and the snake. But in seeing one object after another there is no conflict.The bheda, difference between the rope and the snake vanishes when the knowledge of the rope arises because both cannot exist at the same place and time. But when we see a pot and a cloth subsequently the presence of one does not exclude that of the other. So the difference of a pot from a cloth and vice versa still persists. If 'sat' is said to be real because it is found in every perception, and by 'sat' the advaitin means the sattha, existence in general, such inference requires no proof as in the case 'I exist because I live.' If 'sat refers to the existence of the particular thing perceived then the hetu, reason given,that it is found in all perceptions is not tenable because the existence found in a pot is not that of a cloth.

The advaitin says that the perception, anubhuthi is real because it is found in all experiences and hence there can be no vishayavishyibhava, object-subject relatinship between anubhuthi and 'sat'. therefore anubhuthi is 'sat.' Here it should be remembered that the term 'sat' and Brahman,are synonymous and denote attributeless consciousness in advaita.The two terms, 'sat' and perception are used by the advaitin in the absract sense, meaning the absolute existence and absolute perception and not that of objects in general.Since both are real because of their persistence they should be identical as there cannot be two reals in advaita philosophy. But Ramanuja summarily dismisses this saying that' sat' is the object of anubhuthi and hence cannot be identical.