sribhashya-Mahasiddhantha-criticism of anubhuthi being self proved and eternal.

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Anubhuthi as self proved

 

Advaitin say that anubhuthi is svayamprakasa, self-proved. The reason

given for this is that if anubhuthi is not self proved it has to

depend on another to prove its existence, like a pot. This means, as

perceptions reveal an object like pot it does not need any other

means to reveal itself. If it is not self-proved it ceases to be

perception.

 

Ramanuja disagrees with this argument saying that in that case past

perceptions known through memory and the perceptions of others known

through inference will not be termed as perceptions. Unless the

perception of others are admitted to be known the meaning of words

and their connections will not be perceived and one will not be able

to infer the knowledge of the acharya and approach him for learning.

 

'Anubhuthithvam nAma,' says Ramanuja ,'varthamAnadhasAyAm svasatthayA

Eva svAsrayam prathi prakAsamAnathvam,' perception is that which

illumines its object by its very existence when it is present. The

objects like pot lack this attribute hence they are not

perceptions.So to say that, if perception depends on another to prove

its existence, it will not be different from objects of perception

like pot, is not correct. Even if the perception needs no proof for

its existence its ceasing to be perception could result as in the

case of skyflower of which there is no perception, ananubhuthithva,

the nonexistence of it does not need any other proof. If it is said

that in the case of skyflower the ananubhuthithva, nonperception, is

due to its being 'asat', nonexistent, whereas in the case of pot the

nonperception is due to ajnAnaavirodhithvam,not inimical to

ignorance, which means that the lack of knowledge about the pot, is

the cause. But Ramanuja says that it is not agreeable to cite two

different causes for the two nonperceptions and the same reason

ajnAnaavirodhithva is the cause in both cases.

 

The view that anubhuti is eternal is criticised.

 

The argument of the advaitin that there is no prior nonexistence,

prAgabhAva of anubhuthi and hence it is anaAdhi, has no beginning, is

refuted by Ramanuja saying, 'yatthu svthassisddhAyAh samvidhah

prAgabhAvAdhyabhAvAth uthpatthih nirasyathE - thaddhandhasya

jAthyandhEnayashtih pradheeyathE,' it is like one blind man giving a

staff to one who is born-blind, that is blind leading the blind.Just

because there is no one to perceive the prior nonexistence it cannot

be negated. The prior nonexistence of anubhuthi is perceived by

anubhuthi itself because perception is not restricted to the present

but extends to the past and future, except when the perception is

caused by the contact of sense organs with the sense objects, that

is, when we see a pot, the perception of it is with reference to that

particular object at that particular time and place. In the case of

memory, inference, vedic and yogic perception, what belongs to the

times other than the present is perceived.

 

Advaitin says that prAgabhAva, prior nonexistence of anubhuthi cannot

be proved by any pramANa since it cannot be cognised by sense

perception being nonexistent, nor by inference because the hetu,

like the smoke which is the reason for the inference of fire, is

not there. And there is no vedic text can be quoted in this matter.

So on the basis of the absence of any pramANa the prior nonexistence

of perception cannot be proved.

 

Ramanuja says, 'YadhyEvam svathssiddhathva vibhavam parithyajya

pramANAbhAve avaroodascheth yOgyAnupalabdhyA Eva abhAvah samarTHithah

ithi upasAmyathu bhavAn.' If the advaitin strives to prove that

perception is eternal having recourse to the absence of pramAna

rather than on the ground that perception is self-proved, the reply

would be in reference to yOgyAnupalabDHi. That is, if a thing exists

it must be capable, yOgya, of cognition. So anubhuthi if ever existed

prior to its cognition it would have been cognised. Hence It did not

exist.

 

The perception of a pot for instance shows its existence only at the

time of perception and not always. So perception is limited by time.

If it is eternal the object of cognition will also become eternal.

which is not the case. Similar is the case of cognition through any

other means of knowledge like anumAna, inference.

 

Advaitin may argue that what is meant by perception being eternal

has no reference to that of objects but anubhuthi in

general,nirvishaya samvid.( samvid and anubhuthi are synonymous

here.)

 

Advaitin says that an objectless perception is found in deep sleep,

intoxication and swoon but this is refuted by Ramanuja on the basis

of yOgyAnupalabDHi. If there is such pereption it would have been

remembered when awakened from such states. Since it is not the case

there is no such thing as objectless perception, nirvishayasamvid.

 

It cannot be argued that just because it is not remembered you cannot

say that there was no perception because we do not remember

everything previously experienced even in the waking state. Ramanuja

replies that only when there is a strong reason like leaving this

body, all experience is forgotten. So when there was no remembrance

of any experience whatsoever denotes only the absence of it.

 

Advaitin might argue that the reason for the lapse of memory of the

experience of perception is sleep is due to the absence of objects

and the 'I' factor in sleep. Presence of objects and the notion

of 'I' is necessary for the remembrance and they are also necessary

for having an experience in the absence of which there can be no

perception. It will be explained later that even in the state of

sleep the 'I'continues to exist. But that experience is of the Self

which will be shown to be savisesha. Here the absolute perception

devoid of all objects is only refuted. If it is said that the

experience of the Self is the absolute perception it is not

acceptable because even that is an attribute of the Self as will be

shown later.

 

So the argument that since anubhuthi cannot prove its own prAgabhAva

it should be eternal is wrong.Moreover what is eternal must have no

end. Advaitin says that since anubhuthi is not originated it suffers

no change and hence it has no end. This is not tenable says Ramanuja,

because there is vyabhichAra in prior nonexistence, prAgabhAva, of

things produced, like pot, their prior non existence has no beginning

but it ends when the thing is produced.

 

To evade this difficulty advaitin may define the term change as being

that of a bhAvapadhArTha, a positive entity. That is , the changes

that occur in positive object like pot is denied to be present in

anubhuthi. The changes which result in the destruction or end of the

positive entity like pot is not present in prior nonexistence, which,

though having no beginning , has an end. Ramanuja overrules this by

saying that avidhya according to advita is a bhAva padharTHa which

has no origination being anAdhi but it ends when the knowledge of

Brahman arises.But to the argument that the changes in avidhya are

said to be mitThyAbhootha, unreal, Ramanuja says that even the

changes in objects like pot are unreal according to advaita.Hence

anubhuthi cannot be proved to be eternal.