sribhashyam-mahasiddhantha-Criticism of the view that sense perception is nullif

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Criticism of the view that sense perception is nullified by the sruthi

Advaitin says that the sense perception which shows diversity is due

to a defect and can be explained otherwise, anyaTHAsiddha, because it

is sublated by the testimony of the veda. Ramanuja asks him to

explain what is this defect. If this defect is due to

anAdhibedhavAsana, the beginningless avidhya, causing the perception

of difference, by the reason that it is anAdhi there could not have

been any experience to the contrary. So one cannot be sure that it is

a defect. If it is argued that the bhedhavAsana is sublated by the

sruthi texts denying all differences, Ramanuja says that it is a case

of anyOnya AsrayaNA, and therefore cannot be valid proof. That is,

the sruthi texts deny difference because the perception is defective

and the perception is defective because the sruthi denies it.

Moreover if sense perception is wrong because of anAdhi vAsana, the

sasthra is also affected by the same defect because it is made up of

words which are in their turn made up of root and prefixes etc. which

denote bhedha only.

Advaitin may come up with the reply that sruthi sublates prathyaksha,

sense perception, as it is later. that is,at first one sees the

difference and then by reading the sruthi text, understands that it

is unreal. But merely because it is later, a knowledge cannot be

taken as defectless. A person experiencing fear on mistaking a rope

as a snake will not become fearless by mere words unless he

experiences that it is only a rope. So too mere sravaNa of sruthi

texts is not enough to sublate the experience of the difference as

the texts themselves are contaminated by the same defect, being based

on difference. That is why manana and nidhidhyAsana is prescribed.

Then Ramanuja questions the basis for the conclusion that sasthra is

not afflicted by any defect but sense perception has a defect.He says

that there can be no proof for this statement. Anubhuthi which is

self-proved and devoid of differences cannot cognise this because it

is said to be unconnected with any object of perception and hence not

connected with sastra either. Sense perception proving the point is

of course ruled out as claimed to be defective and for this reason no

other pramAna can provide proof as they all depend on prathyaksha.

Advaitin accepts that the sasthra is also under the realm of

ignorance based on difference, but the bhedha cognised in prathyaksha

is sublated by the veda while the Brahman, the 'sat' and

adhvitheeya,' without a second, is not found to be sublated. Hence

the difference is unreal and Brahman alone is real.But Ramanuja

says 'abhAdhithasyApi doshamoolasya apaAramArthyanischayAth.' Just

because a knowledge is not sublated it cannot be assumed as real. One

who is affected by eye defect and sees two moons and has never

encountered another without defect will continue to have the

defective vision. Just because his knowledge is not sublated it

cannot be taken as real.

Ramanuja says that it could be argued thus: brahmajnAna arising from

the sasthra, which is itself unreal, being under the influence of

avidhya must also be unreal Hence it is possible to forward a

syllogism in the form ' brahma miThyA

asathyahethujanyajnAnavishayathvAth, prapanchavath,' Brahman is

unreal being the subject of the knowledge rising out of unreal cause.

Advaitin gives a reply that as in the example of elephant seen in the

dream, even though the knowledge may be unreal being under the realm

of avidhya, it may lead to the real knowledge of Brahman as the

dream elephant signifies some real event that is going to happen.

Ramanuja refutes this saying that the knowledge in the dream is not

unreal but only the object experienced is. No one denies their

experience and the knowledge of the dream but only that 'darsanam

thu vidhyahtE arthA na santhi,' the perception was real but only the

objects seen were unreal. The experience of fear or joy on seeing a

magic show is real though the objects that caused the feelings are

unreal. So are the effects experienced in the illusion of a serpent

in a rope real, such as being bitten and the possible death due to

suspected venom. Similarly the face reflected on water is seen as

being in it though it is not.

In all these instances the perception is real because it originates

and does the work expected but the objects are not real for the same

reason. Moreover the objects are only sublated by subsequent

perception but not the experiences.

Advaitin comes up with yet another example of unreal giving rise to

real knowledge. The symbols denoting letters give rise to the

knowledge of the sound eventhough the symbols are not real. That is,

the symbol 'ka' represents the letter 'ka' and gives rise to the

respective sound. Advaitin says that the symbol representing the

particular sound is not real but it gives rise to a real sound. But

Ramanuja says that the symbol is real, which gives rise to real

sound and hence the cause of the sound is the symbol only and hence

real. In the case of a word say, gavaya giving rise to the knowledge

of the entity called gavaya is due to its similarity to the cow

and hence it is the sAdrsya, likeness that produces the knowledge and

not the word and the sadrsya is real.

Here it needs explanation as to what is meant by the reference to

gavaya. It is usually found in the work on epistemology. One sees an

animal in the forest similar to a cow and he has heard that such an

animal is called gavaya and that it is similar to a cow So on the

basis of the sadrsya the knowledge about gavaya arises through the

perception of that entity.This is what is referred to here and

upamAna which depends on sadrsya is a valid means of knowledge in

advaita but in visishtadvaita there are only three pramANas, namely,

perception, inference and verbal testimony, that is, prathyaksha,

anumana and sabda.

Therefore if the unreality of the scriptures is accepted, as it is

under the realm of avidhya as claimed by the advaitin, it cannot

produce real knowledge of Brahman.