sribhashya-mahasiddhantha-sapthavidhaanupapatthi-1.asrayaanupapatthi

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The seven anupaptthis

 

1.Asraya anupapatthi

 

It is said that avidhya creates illusion. Ramanuja asks, 'sA hi

kimAsrithya bhramam janayathi? na thAvath jeevamAsrithya,

avidhyAparikalpithathvAth jeevabhAvasya; nApi brahmAsrithya; thasya

svayamprakAsajnanasvarupathvena avidhyAvirODHithvAth; sA hi jnanabhAdhya

abhimatha. what is the substratum of avidhya? it cannot be the

jeeva,individual self which itself is the product of avidhya. Neither

could it abide in brahman which is jnAna svarupa and self-illumined and

hence contrary to avidhya which is said to be removed by jnAna.'

 

Advaitin contends that it is the knowledge of brahman as jnAna svarupa

which removes avidhya and not the jnAna which is svarupa of Brahman.That

is , avidhya exists in the absence of the jnAna that Brahman is

jnAnasvarupa.At the rise of this jnAna avidhya is removed and hence the

jnAna which is the svarupa of Brahman can coexist with avidhya as it is

not opposed to avidhya, not being the subject of knowledge. The subject

of jnAna is Brahman as the jnAnasvarupa and not the jnAna, which is HIs

svarupa.

 

But Ramanuja refutes this saying 'jnAnasvarupam brahma ithyanEna

jnanEnabrahmNi yah svabhAvah avagamyathE sa brhmaNah svayamprakAsathvena

svaymEva prakAsatha ithi avidhyAvirOdhithve na kaschithviseshah

svarupathadvishayajnAnayoh ithi,' as Brahman is svayamprakAsa,

selfproved, the knowledge of Brahman as He is appears by itself.That is

it does not require another to reveal it like a pot. Hence the knowledge

that is the nature of Brahman, svabhAva and the knowledge of Brahman are

of the same nature and it cannot be said that while one is opposed to

avidhya the other is not.

 

Further this knowledge of Brahman as jnAnasvarupa cannot be experienced

as Brahman is anubhuthi according to the theory of advaita and does not

need another anaubhuthi,perception, as in the case of shell-silver, to

reveal itself. So the jnAna which is the svarupa of brahman is opposed

to avidhya and hence avidhya cannot rest on Brahman.

 

Advaitin next comes up with the argument that the knowledge which is

opposed to avidhya has not Brahman as its subject but the unreality of

everything other than Brahman. Ramanuja asks whether the avidhya to

which this knowledge is opposed is about the real knowledge of Brahman

or about the reality of the universe. It cannot be the former, says

Ramanuja, 'na thAvath brahmayATHAthmyajnAna virodhi athadvishayathvAth,'

because it is said that Brahman is not the subject of the knowledge

which removes avidhya. 'PrapanchamithyAthvajnAnam thatsathyathva rupa

ajnanEna vrudhyathE,'the knowledgethat the world is unreal is opposed to

the ignorance that the world is real in which case the ajnAna about the

nature of Brahman will persist.

 

It may be argued that the ignorance of Brahman is due to the

non-perception of Brahman as adhvitheeya, one without a second and when

the knowledge that everything else except Brahman is unreal arises,

avidhya being removed, the svarupa of Brahman shines itself. Ramanuja

says that if this svarupa refers to the svarupajnAna then its being ever

present, the notion that Brahman has a second, sadhvitheeya, will not

arise at all and there is no need for its being removed. If on the

other hand being adhvitheeya is not the svarupa of Brahman but its

attribute which is not known due to avidhya it goes against the advaidic

contention that Brahman is attributeless. Therefore Brahman being jnAna,

is opposed to avidhya which cannot abide in Him.