sribhashya-adhyaya2-padha-1-arambhanadhikaranam-2-1-6-Poorvapaksha

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ArambhaNADHikaraNam-2-1-6

 

 

 

suthra-15-thadhananyathvam ArambhaNa sabdhAdhibhyah-2-1-15

 

 

 

The non-difference is known from the texts beginning with the word

'ArambhaNam.'

 

 

 

After answering the criticism of sankhya of the causality of Brahman and

establishing that Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the

world, now the view of Naiyayika, logicians, is taken up.

 

 

 

According to the naiyayaikas the cause is totally different from the

effect and hence this school is diagonally opposite to that of sankhya.

the arguments to show that the effect is different from its cause are

given as follows:

 

1.buddhibhEdha the cause and the effect are two different concepts.

 

2.sabdhabEdha -the cause,thanthu, the thread and the effect. pata the

cloth are called by different names.So are the clay and the pot etc.

 

3.kAryabhEdha- the purpose is different for both. Water is not carried

by clay nor the hut is constructed by pot.

 

4.kAlabhEdha- the cause belongs to the past and the effect to the

present.

 

5. AkAra bhEdha -the form is also different.

 

6.sankhyAbhEdha- difference in numbers, the lump of clay being one and

the pots are many and the cloth is one while the threads are many.

 

7.kAraka vyApara vyarThyam- If the cause and effect are one then there

is no need of the process of transformation of the cause iinto effect.

 

If the effect which is eternally existent in the cause requires a causal

operation to make it manifest, then as manifestation requires another

manifestation it will run into infinite regress or if the effect is

independent of manifestation it will be perceived eternally. In simple

terms what this means is that if the effect exists already in the cause

then it must be perceived without the causal operation, the need of

which proves that the effect is something produced anew. To the argument

that if the causal operation is for producing something which did not

exist before then the process of weaving can produce a pot, naiyayaika

replies that it is not so. The cause has the potentiality to produce

only that effect which it is capable of. What they mean is this. The

potency of producing a pot exists in the clay but the pot produced, that

is, the effect, is something new and not a mere transformation of the

cause.

 

 

 

Advaitin here interrupts and says that there is identity between the

cause and the effect because the cause alone is true as claimed in the

text 'vAchArambhaNam vikArah nAmadDHEyam mrtthikEthyEva

sathyam,'(Chan.6-1-4) because the effect is only an appearance due to

avidhya. As the clay alone is real and the pot etc. are only names and

forms , similarly, the attributeless Brahman alone is real and the

effect, the world is unreal. It cannot be said that while in the case of

shell-silver and rope-snake which are proved to be unreal by later

sublation the things of the world are not sublated. Since it is only the

clay etc which persists throughout while the effects like pot are

destroyed, it is said to be real. Similarly the cause, Brahman alone is

real and the effect the world is unreal. But it is not unreal in the

sense of a non-existing thing like the horn of a hare and hence it is

said to be sadhasadhvilakshana, or anirvachaneeya,undefinable.

 

 

 

Advaitin further says that only to show that the cause alone is real it

is said that clay etc are only real and the effects, pot etc. are unreal

but stricitly speaking even the causal substances in the world are

unreal as Brahman alone is real. This is confirmed by the texts such as

'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thathsathyam,(Chan.6-8-7) all this has that

as self and that is true,' 'nEha nAnAsthi kimchana,(Brhd.4-4-19) there

is no plurality,' 'Yathra hi dvaithamEva bhavathi thadhitharaitharam

pasyathi, yathra thu asya sarvam Athmaiva abhooth thath kEna kam

pasyEth.(Brhd.2-4-13) where there is plurality there one sees another,

but when all became the self how one will see and whom?'

 

 

 

It could not be argued that the perception denies this because the

sruthi is the stronger means of cogntion of the two. The unreality of

the world does not make the individual soul also unreal because it is

identical with Brahman as could be seen by texts such as 'anEna AthmanA

anupravisya nAma rupe vyAkaravANi(Chan.6-3)I will enter with this self

and make name and form,' 'Eko dhevassarvabhoothEshu goodah sarvavyApee

sarva bhoothAnthrAthmA, that self is hidden in all beings , pervading

all and the self of all (Svet.6-11) 'nAnyathO asthi dhrashtA ,'

(Brhd.3-3-23) there is no other seer.

 

 

 

The opponent of advaitin, here, naiyayika, says that if Brahman is the

self of all, the joy and sorrow of any one embodied being will be

experienced by all and besides there will not be any distinction between

the teacher and student and released and bound souls etc.

 

 

 

This is explained away by the advaitin saying that the individual souls

are only the reflections of Brahman as the faces reflected in the

mirror. As the defects of the mirror seem to adhere to the face

reflected, the joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure etc. only belong to the

reflection on account of the reflecting medium, namely avidhya.in

reality the individual self is not different from Brahman and not

different from each other and free from impurities but seem to be so

because of the limiting adjuncts due to avidhya.

 

 

 

Advaitin is questioned whether the illusion of the difference and the

imperfections of the reflection is due to the avidhya or to the

individual self or Brahman.It cannot be avidhya which is insentient. It

cannot be the individual soul as the existence of the individuality of

the soul is itself the effect of avidhya. If it is Brahman then it would

be the abode of avidhya, which is contrary to the sruthis. Moreover to

say that Brahman, which is pure, non-differentiated and self-illumined

is affected by avidhya and sees plurality in itself is contrary to all

valid means of knowledge. There can be no valid argument to contradict

that the cause is different from the effect on the basis of the

unreality of the effect.

 

 

 

The argument that the cause alone is real because it persists while the

effect is unreal because it is perceived and destructible is not sound,

says the naiyayika. It has been proved earlier that the absence in one

place and time does not preclude the presence of the object elsewhere at

different time. And, the quality of being perceived and being

destructible is not the criterion for proving that it is unreal but it

only shows its being not permanent. A thing is unreal only if it is

sublated at the same place and time and hence the pots and other things

as well as the individual self are real only.

 

 

 

If everything else except Brahman is unreal then even the scriptural

learning is futile as the scritures also belong to the realm of avidhya

and all endeavour to attain release will also be in vain as it is based

on the knowledge of the scriptures. So is all the reasoning, put forth

to prove that Brahman is undifferentiated, as it is based on avidhya.

The vedic declarations are claimed to be true on the basis of the

absence of any sublation but that alone cannot prove the validity

because if there is a later declaration by some authority that

everything is a void, that will be taken to be true in the absence of

any later sublation.Hence the conclusion is that the effect is real and

different from the cause and, the world, the effect is real and

different from Brahman, its cause.

 

 

 

Thus the poorvapakshin rests his argument and the the refutation of it

by the suthra is explained by Ramanuja.