sribhashya-adhyaya2-rest of the padha 1

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itharavyapadhEsAdhikaraNam-2-1-7

 

 

 

suthra21-itharavyapadhEsAth hithAkaraNAdhidhOshaprasakthih-2-1-21

 

 

 

The 'other' (individual soul) being stated (as nondifferent from

Brahman) the defects of not doing what is benificial will accrue.(to

Brahman)

 

 

 

This suthra is of the nature of poorvapaksha. An objection is raised on

the basis of the texts such as 'thathvamasi','ayam Athma brahma,'etc.

declaring identity of the individual soul with Brahman. The opponent

says that if the soul is identical with Brahman, the latter would be

responsible in creating a world not conducive to welfare to its own

self as the world contains the thApathraya,namely,,

Adhidaivika,Adhibouthika and AdhyAtmaika , the three ills arising out of

destiny, elements and own attitude and actions.

 

 

 

The sruthi texts denoting the difference have been relenquished by those

who profess identity. (This critcism seems to be directed against

advaitin.) If it is said that the difference is due to adjuncts, upADHi,

which is denoted by the differential texts while the natural

identity(the view of the bhEdhAbhdhavAdhin) is stressed by the texts of

identity,the opponent puts a question . If Brahman is aware of the

identity it could not have created the world full of suffering for

itself and if Brahman is unaware, it will be against the sarvajnathva,

omniscient nature of Brahman. If the difference is due to

ajnAna,ignorance, it should be real difference if the soul is the abode

of ajnAna, and ajnana cannot rest with Brahman, who is self-illumined,

the light of which when concealed by ajnana will result in self

destruction of Brahman who is of the nature of light.

 

The next suthra answers this objection.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-22-aDHikam thu bhEdha nirdhEsAth-2-1-22

 

 

 

Because of the difference stated Brahman is something more.

 

 

 

The sruthi refers to brahman as being something more than the individual

soul by texts such as 'ya Athmani thishTan Athmanah antharah yam AthmA

na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmAnam antharO yamayathi sa tha AthmA

antharyAmyamrthah, (Brhd.3-7-22) He who is in the Atman and whom Athma

did not know etc. and in the passage 'dvAsuparNA' it is said 'thayOh

Ekah pippalam svAdhu atthi,' of the two birds, Brahman and the

individual self, the latter eats sour and sweet fruit, meaning that it

experiences joy and sorrow while the other,Brahman looks on, without

being affected. Hence Brahman is different from the individual self.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra -23-asmAdhivath cha thadhanupapatthih-

 

2-1-23

 

 

 

Identity is impossible as in the case of stones etc.

 

 

 

Just as the stones,logs and other inanimate things are different from

Brahman in the same way the individual self is also different. The

nature of Brahman, says Ramanuja, is 'niravadhya- nirvikAra-

nikhilahEyaprathyaneeka-kalyAnaikathAna-svEtharasamsthavasthuvilakshaNa-\

ananthajnAnAnandhaikasvarupa- nAnAvidha anantha mahAvibhoothi

brahmasvarupa,'

 

faultless, changeless,free from all evil,abode of auspiciousness, of

infinite bliss and has such multivarious glory as His svarupa. Both

the insentient objects and the sentient souls are different from

Brahman because of, the imperfections of the insentient and joy and

sorrow experienced by the sentient soul. The non-difference of the cause

and effect is true in respect of Brahman and the world, on account of

the world, devoid of names and forms existing in subtle state , which

is denoted by the causal state of Brahman, the same when manifested in

gross state with names and forms is Brahman in the state of effect. This

is what is expressed by the sathkAryavAdha by the passage beginning with

'sadhEva soumya idham agra Aseeth. Thus ends the

itharavyapadhEsADHikaraNam.

 

 

 

 

 

UPASAMHaRA DHARSANadhIKARAnAM2-1-8

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-24-upasamhAra dharsanAth na ithi cheth, na , ksheeravath

hi-2-1-24

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If it is said that Brahman cannot create without external aid, it is not

so, as can be seen in the case of milk.

 

 

 

After establishing that Brahman,the innerself of all, having the chit

and achit as HIs body is not in any way hampers His omniscience,

infallible will and being different from everything, now, this suthra

shows that the creation by mere will is not in any way inappropriate.

 

 

 

The opponent says that in the world it is always seen that the agent of

production, who represents the efficient cause, is able to produce

anything only with the help of external materials such as clay ,gold

etc. the material cause is always different from the efficient cause

and hence Brahman cannot be both material and efficient cause.

 

 

 

The suthra refutes this by citing the example of milk. It is seen that

the milk changes into curd without any extraneous matrial. Similarly

water turns into ice without any external aid. Any substance that is

added to milk for instance to make curd out of it is only to hasten the

process. Likewise Brahman becomes the world, by itself.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-25-dhEvAdhivadhapi lOkE-2-1-25

 

 

 

Even like the devas in their own worlds.

 

 

 

As the devas create by their will in their own worlds Brahman can also

create through his will. upasamhAradharsanADhikaraNam ends.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

krthsnaprasakthyaDHikaraNam-2-1-9

 

 

 

suthra-26-krthsnaprasakthih niravayathva sabdakOpO vA-2-1-26

 

 

 

Brahman becoming the world is against the declartion of the sruthi that

Brahman is without parts.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This again is a poorvapaksha suthra. The opponent says that if Brahman,

said to be without parts from the texts like 'Eka Eva adhvitheeyam '

etc. becomes the world, it would mean that either it has parts which

become the sentient and the insentient or the whole Brahman is

transformed into the world.In either case it will oppose the texts that

say Brahman is without parts, one only without a second etc. hence

Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. This objection is

 

set aside by the next suthra.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-27-sruthEsthu sabdhamoolathvAth-2-1-27

 

 

 

Ther is no discrepancy because of the powers of Brahman declared in the

scriptures.

 

 

 

Brahman is declared by scriptures to be without parts and also of

possessing wonderful powers. So it cannot be generalised on the basis of

worldly experience becuase in the case of matters beyond the sensory

perception scripture alone is the authority.

 

 

 

suthra-28-Athmanichaivam vichithrAsch hi-2-1-28

 

 

 

The self also has different properties that the insentient matter.

 

 

 

It is seen in the world that fire and water have special characterestics

different from each other and so is the sentient self is different from

the matter and possesses special powers. Similarly Brahman has supreme

powers. In Vishnupurana ParAsara answers the question,

'nirgunasyApramEyasya suddhasyApyamalAthmanah kaTHam sargAdhi

karthrthvam brahmaNObhyupagamyathE, how can the creation be attributed

to Brahman who is attributeless,immeasurable and pure,' as

follows.'sakthayah sarva bhAvAnAm achinthyajnAna gOcharah, yathO athO

brahmaNah thAsthu sargAdhyA bhAva sakthayah, bhavanthi thapathAm

sreshTa pAvakasya yaTHOshNathA.' The numerous powers of Brahman beyond

all thought are the nature of Brahman as the heat is to the fire which

makes the actions like creation possible.

 

 

 

The sruthi also says, 'kim svidvanam ka u sa vrkhsha Aseeth yathah

dhyAvAprthivee nishtathakshuh,' which is the woods, what is the tree

from which the heaven and earth were created and supplies the answer as

'brahma vanam brahma sa vrksha AseedhyathodhyAvAprthivee

nishtathakshuh,' Brahman is the woods and the tree from which the heaven

and earth were fashioned. Hence the general observations do not hold

good in the case of Brahman whose power is supreme and different from

all else.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-29-svapakshadhOshAccha-2-1-29

 

 

 

Brahman as the cause is indisputable because of the defects of the view

of the opponent also.

 

 

 

The objection that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because of

being devoid of parts holds good on the part of the oppnents also.

PraDHAna of sankhya and the atoms of naiyayika are also without parts.

This difficulty cannot be surmounted by the sankhyan contention that

the three guNas are the parts that combine to produce the world, says

Ramanuja, because if the gunas are constituents of praDHAna they must be

included under the thathvas giving rise to evolution, but they are not

specified so, and if praDHAna is the effect of the guNas then the claim

that praDHAna is the primal cause will be disproved.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-30-sarvOpEthA cha thaddharsanAth-2-1-30

 

 

 

Brahman is denoted as being endowed with all powers.

 

 

 

The powers of Brahman is confirmed by the sruthi texts such as 'para

asya sakthih viviDhaiva srooyathE svAbhAvikee jnanabalakriyAcha, His

poweres are supreme and His knowledge , might and action are

spontaneous.'(Svet.6-8) and that Brahman differs in nature from all

else is denoted by the text 'apahathapApmA vijarOvimrthyuh vishOKO

vijiGHathsO apipAsah, free from evil,oldage,death,grief,hunger and

thirst,' and then 'sathyakAmah sathyasankalpah, of infallible will and

wish,' which shows His supreme power.(Chan.8-1-5)

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-31-vikaraNathvAth na ithi cheth thadhuktham

 

1-2-31

 

 

 

If it is objected on account of being without organs, it has been

explained.

 

 

 

The objection is raised based on the declaration ' na thasya kAryam

karaNam cha vidhyathE, there is no effect nor any instrument for Him,'

and Ramanuja says that the answer has been already given in the suthra

'sruthEsthu sabdamoolathvAth,' (BS.2-1-27) the power of Brahman being

based on the sruthi which shows the difference of Brahman from all else.

The text 'pasyathyachakshuh srNothyakarNah,' proves that Brahman has no

need for sense organs being omniscient and omnipotent.This is the end of

krthsnapraskthyaDHikaraNam.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

prayOjanathvADHikaraNam-2-1-10

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-32-na pryOjanavathvAth-2-1-32

 

 

 

Brahman is not the cause because of the absence of motive.

 

 

 

This suthra is one of poorvapaksha. The opponent says that even though

Brahman may be endowed with supremer powers there is no motive for His

creating the world, being Himself avApathasamastha kAma, one who has no

unfulfilled desire. Usually things are produced in the world either for

one's own use or for that of others. The first alternative is shown to

be absent because Brahman is avApthasamasthakAma and the second also can

be disproved. If Brahman creates for others it must be as an anugraha or

for showering grace in which case He would not have created this world

full of sorrow, as He is full of mercy.

 

he next suthra replies to this.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-33- LOkavatthu leelAkaivalyam-2-1-33

 

 

 

The creation is a leela, a sport as in the world.

 

 

 

A a king who has everything undertakes some action as a mere sport, so

also Brahman creates ,sustains and annihilates this world as a mere

sport.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-34-vaishamya nairGrNye na,sApEkshathvAth thaTHA hi

dharsayathi-2-1-34

 

 

 

Partiality and cruelty cannot be, considering other reasons, also

declared by sruthi.

 

 

 

An objection is raised based on the previous suthra that if the creation

is a mere sport for Brahman He will be charged with partiality and

cruelty in creating a world full of inequalities and making the beings

suffer. But the scripture declares that Brahman takes into consideration

the karmas of the souls in creating the different conditions of the

beings in the world. 'sAdhukAree sAdhurEva bhavathi pApakAree pApo

bhavathi,,'a man becomes good by good work and bad by bad work.'

('Brhd.3-2-13)

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-35-na karma avibhAgAth ithi cheth na,anAdhithvAth upapadhyathEcha

apyupalaBhyathE cha-2-1-35

 

 

 

If it is said that there was no karma in the beginning , itis not so

because karm is anAdhi, beginningless, which is reasonanbe and according

to scritures.

 

 

 

The objection that in the beginning only Brahman alone existed and hence

no karma can be attributed to the first being created, is answered that

the inividual souls and their karma are beginningless. the sruthi

confirms this by saying 'na jAyathE mriyathE va vipaschith. The sentient

soul is neither born nor dies,'(KatO.1-2-18) and 'sooryAchandhramasou

DHAtha yaTHA poorvam akalpayath, (Brhd.3-4-7) the creator created the

sun and the moon as before. In the Bhagavatgita we find he verse

'prkrthim purusham chaiva viddhyanAdhee ubou api, know that the

prakrthi, insentient nature and purusha, the sentient self to be

beginningless.

 

 

 

Ramanuja concludes the argument by saying, 'athah sarvavilakshaNathvAth

sarvasakthithvAth leelaika prayOjanathvAth kshEthrajnakarmAnuguNyEna

vichithrasrshtiyOgAth brahmaiva jagathkAraNam.' That is, Brahman alone

is the cause of the world, because of being different from all,being all

powerful, having sport as the sole purpose and created the world in

accordance with the karma of the individual souls.

 

 

 

 

 

Suthra-36-sarvadharmOpapatthescha-2-1-36

 

 

 

Because all the attributes are proved in Brahman.

 

 

 

Since all the attributes essential for being the cause of the world are

proved in Brahman which are shown as being absent in praDHAna or atoms,

Brahman is the cause of the world of the sentient and the insentient.

 

Thus ends the prayojanathvADHikaraNam.

 

 

 

 

 

The end of te first pAdha of the second aaDhyAya of sribhAshya