sribhshya-adhyaya2-padha2-samudhayadhikarahnam2-2-3

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samudhAyADHikaraNam-2-2-3

 

 

 

suthra-17-samudhAya ubhayahEthukE api thadhaprApthih-2-2-17

 

 

 

Even with the aggregate with two causes it is unestablished.

 

 

 

After refuting the atomic theory of the nyayavaiseshika the buddhist

realist school who also believe that the atoms are the cause of the

world is taken up. There are four schools of Buddhism first two being

realists and the other two being idealists and nihilists. The realists

belong to the hinayana sect of buddhism while the other two belong to

the mahayana school. The realist theory is taken up now and refuted.

 

 

 

Ramanuja himself classifies the four schools of buddhism by saying, 'the

chathurviDhAh;kechith pArthiva Apya thaijasa vAyaveeya

paramAnusangGHAtharupAn bhoothabouthikAn bAhyAn

chitthachaaittharupAmscha abhyantharAn arTHAn prathyaksha anumAna

siddhAnabhyupayanthi'.

 

They are of four kinds.

 

Some hold the view that all external things, elements and their

products, and all internal like mind and the mental experiences are all

made up of the four atoms of earth,water,fire and air and they are

perceptible and inferrable and real.( vibhAshikas)

 

'anyE thu bAhyAn arTHAn sarvAnprthivyAdheen vijnAna anumEyAn vadhanthi.'

 

Others say that the external things like earth etc. are also only

inferred.(sauthrAnthikas)

 

'aparE thu-arTHa sunyam vijnAnamEva paramARTHa sath, bAhyArTHAsthu

svapnArTHa kalpAh ithyAhuh.'

 

Yet others say that the reality is only ideas with no corresponding

things outward which are all like things seen in a dream.(vijnAnavAdhins

or yOgAchAras)

 

'ThrayOpyEthe svApyupagatham vasthu kshaNikam AchcchakshathE.'

 

All three of them hold the view that all things experienced are

momentary. That is, they do not accept a permanent soul or any permanent

entity like AkAsa.

 

The fourth school ,says, Ramanuja, consider everything as

non-existent'sarvasunyam.'(mADhyamikas or sunyavAdhins)

 

 

 

The suthra refutes the view of the first two, sarvAstivAdhins, the

realists who consider everything as the product of the aggregates of

atoms and real.

 

 

 

According to the realist schools, there are four kinds of atoms

corresponding to that of earth possessing the qualities of

smell,taste,colour and touch , of water which has all the qualities

except smell,of fire which has got only colour and touch , of air with

touch alone. These atoms join in aggregates and produce the four

elements which further forming aggregates to become bodies, sense organs

and sense objects. The self is only the flow of ideas, imagined as the

agent of action and enjoyment. This is how the whole empirical world is

created.

 

 

 

The suthra refutes this theory saying that the theory of the aggregates

of the atoms forming the elements and the aggregates of the latter

forming the bodies, sense organs etc., both are untenable. As everything

has only momentary existence it is impossible for the atoms to combine

to form an aggregate. Similarly the elements being momentary cannot form

aggregates.Even the ideas being imagined as the knower, is not possible

as the known is lost in a moment and so is the knower,and the one who

perceives is not the one who knows, as both are momentary.Even if it is

said the flow of ideas are continous the idea that exists this moment is

not the one that appears in the next moment. That is, the cognisor and

the experincer are not the same.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-18-itharEthara prathyayathvAth upapannam ithi chEth na, sanGHAtha

bhAva animitthathvAth-

 

2-2-18

 

If it is said that this could be explained through successive causality,

no ,because they cannot be the cause of aggregation.

 

 

 

It is argued by the opponent that though all things are momentary

avidhya or nescience is the cause of everything. Avidhya consists in the

wrong notion of permanence in things that are momentary. From this

avidhya springs the samskaras which are mental impressions like raga and

dvesha.From these arise vijnAna or consciousness through provocation of

the mind and from this chittha , mind and chaittha , mental , the name

and form like earth and other elements possessing rupa, rasa, ganda and

sparsa, colour,taste,smell and touch and from these the shadAyathana or

sense organs from which the body called sparsa and from that vEdhana or

feelings arise.This is how Ramanuja explains the theory of the wheel of

causation of the buddhists called pratheethya samuthpAdha. According to

Ramanuja from feelings,vEdhana,the cycle of samsara starts again with

avidhya.But the buddhista add five more to the cycle,thrishNA, desire.

upAdhAna, clinging towards the object of desire, bhAva,beginning of

existence,which causes janma,birth,succeeded by jarAmaraNa,old age and

death.All these cannot happen without the aggregates and hence the

theory of aggregates is proved.

 

 

 

The suthra refutes this saying that the concept of successive causality

cannot be the cause of aggregation. Avidhya causing the sense of

permanency in things that are not, and the subsequent causes of avidhya

cannot be responsible for forming of aggregates, no more that the

misconception of the shell as silver can cause the formation of

aggregates of shell.Moreover the perceiver of the momentary things as

permanent, is himself momentary and there is no permanent subject to

whom the avidhya and its effects like samskaras,such as desire etc will

belong . Ramanuja says that those who do not accept a permanent abode of

samskaras have no right to assume the permanency of samskaras,

'samskArAsrayam sTHiramEkam dhravyam anabhyupagacchathAm

samskArAnuvritthirapi na sakyam kalpayithum.'

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-19-uttharOthpAdhE cha poorvanirOdhAth-

 

2-2-19

 

 

 

Because of the cessation of the previous one at the origination of the

next.

 

 

 

The preceding existence being momentary ceases to exist when the

subsequent existence arises and hence cannot be the cause of the

first.Otherwise if the origination comes about from non-existence

anything may be the cause of anything else, like the pot having

momentary existence can give rise to a cow etc. Even if it is said that

the momentarily existing thing can be the cause of only something

belonging to the same species, then the pot that exists momentarily will

be the cause of all subsequent pots. Moreover the thing perceived being

momentary no cognition is possible in the next moment when the thing no

longer exists.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-20-asathi prathijnA uparOdhou yougapadhyam anyaTHA-2-2-20

 

 

 

If the cause is nonexistent it will be contrary to the proposition.

Otherwise there will be simultaneity.

 

 

 

The difficulty cannot be surmounted by saying that the effect could be

produced without the cause.According to the sauthranthika school of

buddhism perpetual cognition is said to result from four kinds of

causes, Alambanaprathyaya, aDHipathi prathyaya, sahakAri prathyaya and

samananthara prathyaya.

 

 

 

Alambanaprathyaya-In the cognition of the object the object should be

present.

 

aDHipathi prathyaya-The sense organ should be in contact with the sense

object.

 

sahakAri prathyaya-The light which illumines the object

 

samananthara prathyaya-The impression of earlier perception to recognise

the object.

 

 

 

Ramanuja says that if there can be effect without a cause everything may

originate from everything else and everywhere and always. Further the

proposition of the four causes will also be contradicted. The principle

of aDHipathi prathyaya requires that the sense organ should perceive the

object which is momentary. If the effect comes into being before the

cause is destroyed in order that it is perceived it would result in

simultaneity of the cause and effect, which does not happen as they are

not perceived simultaneously and the concept of momentariness should be

given up. If the momentariness of objects is retained then the contact

of the sense organ and the cognition must be simultaneous.

 

suthra-21-prathisankhyA aprathisankhyA nirODha aprApthih

avicchEdhAth-2-2-21

 

 

 

Prathiasankhya is not estalished because of the absence of interruption.

 

 

 

The theory of origination of the buddhists has been refuted in the

foregoing suthras and now their theory of destruction is shown to be

untenable.

 

 

 

According to buddhism the destruction is of two kinds,

prathisankhyAnirODHa and aprathisankhyAnirODHa. The former is the

destruction which is perceived such as when the pot is broken by a

hammer. The second kind is that which is not perceived because of the

momentariness of things. that is, an object is destroyed every moment

and another originated in its place but the destruction is not seen and

hence appears to be continous like the flame of a lamp.

 

 

 

The suthra refutes this because of the impossibility of such a

destruction. Ramanuja says that the impossible of complete destruction

has been proved in the suthra 'thadhanyathvam' (BS.2-1-14) it was shown

that the origination and destruction is only different states of one and

the same permanent substance which proves the oneness of cause and

effect. When a pot is smashed it exists as potsherds etc. in another

form. Even in the case of flame the light extinguished exists in another

form but being too subtle, is not perceived.

 

 

 

suthra-22-ubhayaTHA cha dhOshAth-2-2-22

 

 

 

In bothcases it is defective.

 

 

 

Neither origination from nothing nor destruction into nothing can be

proved.If the effect originates from nothing it will also be nothing as

the effects like pots and ornaments are seen to be of the same nature of

their causes. If the dsetruction is absolute, the world when destroyed

will pass into nothingness and the origination of the world again will

be impossible and even if it is possible a world out of nothingness will

not be real. So in either case the theory of the sauthranthika buddhism

is untenable.

 

 

 

suthra-23-AKasE cha AVISeSHaTH-2-2-23

 

In the case of AkAsa also not being different from others.

 

AkAsa is not a separate element according to buddhism. This is refuted

by the suthra saying that AkAsa is also proved to be a positive entity

as like earth and other elements the cognition of AkAsa is not sublated

and is real.By the expressions 'there flies the eagle, there flies the

hawk' etc denotes the difference in spaces in the AkAsa.

 

 

 

Akasa cannot be mere non-existence of earth and other things because the

non- existence,abhAva must be either antecedent, prAgabhAva or

subsequent,praDHvamsAbhAva or mutual, anyOnyAbhAva or absolute,

athyanthAbhAva.The first is the non-existence of a thing before its

origination and the second is its non-existence after destruction.The

mutual nonexistence is when we say 'a pot is not a cloth' The last one

is the non-existence of a thing in the past, future and present

 

 

 

AKasa cannot be the antecedent nonexistrence of things like earth etc.

because when they come into existence there would not be any space at

all on the absence of AkAsa. Neither can it be subsequent non-existence

for the same reason as the whole world will be without space. Mutual

nonexistence is also impossible in which case there should not be any

space between two things, but there is. Absolute non-existence is not

AkAsa as the earth and other things are not non-existing

absolutely.Moreover the non-existence of a thing is the countercorrelate

of a thing which exists.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-24-anusmrthEscha-2-2-24

 

 

 

Because of recognition.

 

 

 

The theory of momentariness is rejected because of recognition. A thing

seen is remembered and it is recognised as such when perceived again. it

cannot be said that as in the case of a flame the recognition is due to

similarity.In the perception of a flame, it is known to be momentary and

different through valid means of cognition but a pot is not cognised as

such. Moreover for the buddhists even the perceiver is momentary and if

so, a thing perceived by one person cannot be recognised by another.

Those who claim that the recognition is due to similarity must

necessarily accept a perceiver who is not momentary.

 

 

 

The opponent may say that the momentariness is proved by perception and

inference in as much as the thing seen a present moment is different

from the one seen in the past moment as the two have had existence in

different times. Moreover, says the buddhist, the momentariness can be

proved through existence and purposefulness.What does not exist and not

purposeful like the horn of the hare is not momentary on account of

non-existence.

 

 

 

But Ramanuja says that the very arguments given to support the

momentariness serve only to prove the contrary. That which exists and

serves a purpose is permanent while those which are not so like the horn

of a hare are not permenent because they do not exist.Also the

perception does not prove the difference of the present object from the

past but only that of the time.

 

 

 

Further the purposefulness will only disprove the momentariness as the

thing which perishes in a moment cannot serve any purpose.When it is

seen that at the last moment of existence of an object like pot, the

destruction is due to a visible cause such as hammer,it means that the

object continues to exist till that moment. Also the destruction is not

total but only a change of the state of existence.Therefore the theory

of momentariness cannot explain the recognition, more so because the

cogniser is different from the recogniser, both being momentary.

Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying that the opponent cannot prove

his theory at all because the speaker himself is momentary!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-25-nAsathO adhrshtathvAth-2-2-25

 

 

 

Not from non entity as this is not seen.

 

 

 

The theory of momentariness is common to both vaibhAShikas and

sauthranthikas for whom the external things are real. But to the latter

the reality is not perceived due to momentariness but inferred. They now

come with an argument that even though a thing perishes it leaves its

impression behind, which causes cognition as in the case of the

cognition of blueness continues even after the blue thing perishes.They

argue that the prior state of knowledge is not always necessary for the

subsequent knowledge as otherwise the knowledge of yellowness will not

arise after that of blueness.So the knowledge of external objects are

through inference which can arise evenwhen the object is non-existent at

the moment of cognition.

 

 

 

This view is refuted by the suthra saying that cognition cannot arise

from non-existence because it is not perceived.Ramanuja explains this as

follows: It is not the common experience that a thing, when it ceases

to exist, leaves its attributes on another. Even a reflection lasts only

as long as the image remains in front.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-26-udhAseenAnAm api chaivam siddhih-2-2-26

 

 

 

And thus there will be attainment without effort.

 

 

 

This suthra refutes both the realistic schools of buddhism by saying

that if everything is momentary,the result would be attained without

effort as the one who experiences the result would be different from the

one who acts.Therefore the doctrines of these two schools are untenable.

 

Thus ends the samudhAyADHikaraNam.