sribhashya-adhyaya2-padha2-adhkaranas4and5

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upalabDhyaDHikaraNam-2-2-4

 

 

 

suthra-27-nAbhAva upalabDHEh-2-2-27

 

 

 

Non-existence is not true because of experience.

 

 

 

The two hinayAna schools of buddhism have been refuted by the foregoing

adhikaranam. Now the yOgachAras or vijnAnavAdhins, one of the two

schools of mahayAna buddhism is refuted by this suthra.Both the two

branches of buddhism are similar as far as the theory of momentariness

is concerned but to the hinaYana buddhists the external things are real

while for the mahAyAna schools they are not. While the mADHymikas or

sunyavadhins follow the middle path the yOgAchAras declare that no

external objects exist in reality and all that exists is consciousness.

Ramanuja calls them vijnAnamAthraasthithvavAdhins and starts refuting

their view in this suthra which says that the non-existence of external

things is not accepted because they are experienced.

 

 

 

Ramanuja says that it is not possible to deny the existence of the

external objects because they are experienced. The cognition in the form

of "I know the pot" serves as a means to realise the object in the

practical sense. It is ridiculous,says Ramanuja, to claim that the

knowledge alone is real when the very verb 'jna', to know, is related

to a subject and an object.This fact is also confirmed in the worldly

experience. Here Ramanuja equates the buddhistic view with that of

advaitin, whom he calls pracchanna bauddha, buddhist in disguise,

though he appears to support the veda and says that the claim that only

consciousness is real has been refuted already in the cricicism of

advaita.

 

 

 

Further , Ramanuja declares that the contention of the vijnAnavAdhin

that the sahOpalamBHa or the simultaneous perception of the object and

its knowledge implies that they are one which disproves his own

statement.

 

The external objects according to the vijnAnavAdhin appear as real being

illuminated by the light of knowledge because, he says, the knowledge

always shines in the form of object only. That is, the knowledge is

objective. But we are always conscious of the object along with the

cognition of it.In other words the idea of an object and the object are

one and the same and hence the idea alone is real which appears as

though it is external. This is what Ramanuja criticises by saying that

by this the buddhist disproves his own statement since two things being

together only means that they are real and different.So it is

meaningless to say that the cognition of a thing is not different from

that thing itself.

 

 

 

The contention that the cognition of external objects arises from a

ceaseless flow of mental impressions is not acceptable because the

continuity of mental impresssions cannot be established. The theory of

momentariness means that the knowledge is also momentary and hence

undergoes continous destruction.Therefore the knowledge existing at the

previous moment cannot produce that of the subsequent moment. This shows

that the variety in knowledge can only be due to the variety of

externally existent objects.

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-28-vaiDHrmyAccha na svapnAdhivath-2-2-28

 

 

 

Because of difference in nature , not like dream.

 

 

 

Buddhist says that the reality of objects is not proved by perception.

As the object in dream appear to be real to the dreamer so also the

objects in the waking state appear as real but they are not.This view is

refuted by the suthra.

 

 

 

Commenting on this suthra Ramanuja says that the knowledge of the things

in the waking state is different from that in the dream because the

latter is sublated in the waking state. The knowledge is inferred by the

buddhist to be devoid of objects because it is knowledge, but Ramanuja

points out that even this inference is a knowledge and it has an object.

So it cannot be concluded that the knowledge has no object in general.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-29-na bhAva anupalabDHEh-2-2-29

 

 

 

The existence is not on account of non-perception.

 

 

 

The existence of mere cognition devoid of objects is never perceived.

Moreover such a knowledge will never be cognised as even in the dream

the knowledge exists only with a subject and an object.Thus the view of

the yOgachAra or vijnAnavAdhin is refuted.

 

This is the end of upalabDhyadhikaraNam.

 

 

 

 

 

sarvaTHA anupapatthyaDHikaraNam2-2-5

 

 

 

 

 

suthra-30-sarvaTHA anupapatthEscha-2-2-30

 

 

 

Because it is not proved in any way.

 

 

 

The nihilist, mADHyamika comes forward to present his view that

everything is a void.He professes that this is the true meaning of

Buddha's teachings and the theory of momentariness which implies the

reality of external things were admitted in order to suit the limited

intellect of his disciples..Since Buddha said that the world has no

beginning and no end, the mADHyamika argues that it has no middle

either.In other words this world is non existent. Causality is only an

illusion because creaqtion is not possible either from existence or from

non-existence.

 

 

 

The mADHyamaika's theory of causation is that nothing is created

because a thing cannot be created anywhere out of itself or out of

another thing or from itself as well as another nor can it be causeless.

This is explained as follows:

 

A pot cannot be produced from mud unless it is destroyed and also

production is not possible from a non- existent cause.

 

A thing cannot be produced from itself since it already exists in the

cause and needs no further action to produce it.

 

If a thing cannot be produced from an entirely different cause as in

that case anything may be produced from anything else. So everything is

sunya.

 

 

 

Ramanuja proceeds to examine the arguments of the mADHyamika inorder to

refute them in accordance with the above suthra 'sarvaTHA

anupapatthEscha.' That is, the view is unproved in all ways.

 

 

 

Ramanuja does not agree with the view that sunya is the only

reality.Saying everything is sunya, 'sarvam sunyam'they disprove their

own theory because the word sarvam, all , denotes the existence of

things only. In worldly experience,the expressions like existence,

non-existence and the respective knowledge regarding them are all reated

to the different conditions of existent things only.

 

 

 

Sudarsanasuri elucidates this point further in his commentary to

sribhashaya by sayind that potness is existent with respect to pot but

non-existent with respect to potsherds and vice versa.

 

 

 

Ramanuja concludes by saying that the sunyavada cannot be proved by any

pramAna as this would mean accepting the existence of the pramAna which

goes against the theory that everything is nonexistent, sunya. So, he

says, the view of the mADHyamika is summarily rejected.

 

Thus ends the sarvaTHAanupapatthyaDHikaraNam and with it the refutation

of buddhist theories of causation.