Sridakshinamurtistotram (Part IX -e)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Michael-ji ,

I enjoyed your questions. Descartes progress

through his "Meditations" took

some interesting twists and turns. He started by

assuming a position

whereby he doubted everything, including the

verifiability of the waking

state, to arrive at his famous 'I think therefore I am.'

This being the one

thing he could not doubt.

If I understood him correctly, he then went on to say

that if one could have

a clear and distinct idea that was free of vagueness

and confusion then such

an idea was not a deceptive idea (eg "I think

therefore I am."). Thus what

it refers to must be true, this being the case with

*any* clear and distinct

idea. This led him to assert that because he could

have a clear and distinct

idea of God, this must also be a true idea and thus

God must exist.

Further, he maintained, we can rely on the fact that

clear and distinct

ideas are true, because they don't really come from

us, but from God - who

is no deceiver.

As for the external world - once our perceptions,

including and some of the

contradictions given in those perceptions, have been

corrected and clarified

by clear and distinct ideas, then we can trust our

perceptions of the world

to be real.

So from doubting everything he went on to assert

that both God and the world

really existed.

Please correct any mistakes of mine re the above.

The two questions of yours that stood out for me

were:

 

"Is it possible to rationally distinguish the fundamental

difference in orientation to the problem of

consciousness

that issues in such clear divergence?"

 

And...

"There in a nutshell, by which they are bounded,

is one version of Advaita. Very well, but is it

Advaitic?

If not, why not?"

I am hoping very much that you are going to share

your own thoughts on

these.

 

Best wishes,

 

Peter

 

________________________________

 

advaitin

 

[advaitin] On Behalf

Of ombhurbhuva

25 October 2006 11:13

advaitin

Sridakshinamurtistotram (Part IX

 

-e)

 

 

 

 

Subbuji wrote:

 

The tripuTI, triad - the dRRik (seer), chitta (the

mind) and dRRishya (the

seen object) - is experienced in dream as much as it

is experienced in the waking. The distinction between

the mind and the

ideas therein, and the outside objects are there in the

dream as

in the waking. The instrumentality of the dream

senses is also in

evidence. The distinction between fancies of the

mind, as for example, in

day-dreaming and the so-called real objects outside,

is

maintained in the dream as also that between the real

and the illusory,

the latter being exemplified by the rope-snake.

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Namaste Subbuji and all Advaitins,

It's clear that Subbu is very committed to a particular

view and is able to justify it following certain well

known scriptures and commentaries. Others with

equal access to the scriptures in the original; a point

which he often stresses; take a different view. Is it

possible to rationally distinguish the fundamental

difference in orientation to the problem of

 

consciousness that issues in

such clear divergence? I believe so.

 

By the way this view which is sometimes referred to

by the slightly pejorative title of 'illusionism' was

held by one of the greatest figures in European

philosophy who founded a branch of mathematics,

did major work in hydraulics, optics and vacuum

theory, was a noted stylist in Latin and the vernacular

as well as an advisor to the Queen of Sweden.

 

He writes: "How often has it happened to me that in

the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular

place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire,

whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this

moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes

awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head

which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and

of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it,

what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor

so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I

remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep

been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling

carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that

there are no certain indications by which we may

clearly distinguish wakefullness from sleep that I am

lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such

that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now

dream."(Descartes: First Meditation)

 

I would say that this position is very easy to

understand and that its genesis is easily traced. It is

predicated on a certain type of personality which is

dominated by inwardness, introspection and a

powerful imagination for whom the world behind the

knitted brow is as real as that which is palpable. I

believe that I would not be going out on a limb if I

suggested that this is a type not unheard of in the

annals of yoga.

 

As well as a natural propensity for introversion they

would add that there is a rational basis for the

assimilation of all states to one another. What is it,

they would ask, we are immediately acquainted with?

Our perceptions? And what are perceptions but the

mental analogue of the busy neuronal traffic which is

by definition intracerebral. From that base we make

our inferences to the existence of an external world.

The proof that such is the case is arises from our

 

often

being deluded about what is really out there.

That in short is the basis for the melding together of

all sorts of consciousness into the one

undifferentiated consciousness which is the mayvic.

This single consciousness is pure consciousness with

the limiting adjunct of the mind. There in a nutshell,

by which they are bounded, is one version of

Advaita. Very well, but is it Advaitic? If not, why

not?

 

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Namaste Peterji,

Sorry for the delay, I've been away.

 

To the question which interested you: "Is it

possible to rationally distinguish the fundamental

difference in orientation to the problem of

 

consciousness that issues in

such clear divergence?" I see it like this; both parties have a notion of

what is given or what is the basic situation that we are immersed in. For

the Cartesian and Idealists in general it is one's own consciousness which

provides the datum. From that we make inferences to the 'outside' world.

For the advaitin the given is the plenum or already whole articulated,

outside and inside world. You do not have to establish this by using the

building blocks of clear and distinct ideas; life is not mathematics.

 

This divergence is implicit in Advaitic Vedanta. If you take perception

as a valid means of knowledge it means that you are treating it as

virtually axiomatic. If you first had to establish it as valid then that

position from which you established it would now be your starting point.

No, perception is a given. From there you then commence the inquiry as to

how perception is possible. This approach is patent in the preamble to

B.S.B. and Vedanta Paribhasa.

 

I could say more but too much detail would obscure the main divergence

between what is advaitic and what is not.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael

[Guest guest]

namaste Michael-ji,

 

Thanks for explaining. Yes, I understand and agree with what you are

saying. I think perhaps I misunderstood the original point you were making

and believed that you had a different interpretation in mind, to that of

Subbu-ji's when you wrote:

 

>>> It's clear that Subbu is very committed to a particular view and is able

to justify it following certain well known scriptures and commentaries.

Others with equal access to the scriptures in the original; a point which he

often stresses; take a different view. Is it possible to rationally

distinguish the fundamental difference in orientation to the problem of

consciousness that issues in such clear divergence.<<<<

 

In other words, I was looking forward to hearing your "different view" based

on "equal access to the scriptures in the original". Sorry I misunderstood.

 

Best wishes,

 

Peter

 

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ORIGINAL MESSAGE

<snip>

Namaste Peterji,

Sorry for the delay, I've been away.

 

To the question which interested you: "Is it possible to rationally

distinguish the fundamental difference in orientation to the problem of

 

consciousness that issues in

such clear divergence?" I see it like this; both parties have a notion of

what is given or what is the basic situation that we are immersed in. For

the Cartesian and Idealists in general it is one's own consciousness which

provides the datum. From that we make inferences to the 'outside' world.

For the advaitin the given is the plenum or already whole articulated,

outside and inside world. You do not have to establish this by using the

building blocks of clear and distinct ideas; life is not mathematics.

 

This divergence is implicit in Advaitic Vedanta. If you take perception as

a valid means of knowledge it means that you are treating it as virtually

axiomatic. If you first had to establish it as valid then that

position from which you established it would now be your starting point.

No, perception is a given. From there you then commence the inquiry as to

how perception is possible. This approach is patent in the preamble to

B.S.B. and Vedanta Paribhasa.

 

I could say more but too much detail would obscure the main divergence

between what is advaitic and what is not.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael