Sridakshinamurtistotram (Part IX –f)

November 6, 2006

Sridakshinamurtistotram

(Part IX –f)

AtmalaabhAt paro laabho nAstIti munayo vidhuH |

tallaabhArtham kavis-stauti svAtmAnam parameshvaram ||

(The sages hold that there is no greater gain than the gain of

Atman, the Self. With a view to secure this gain, the sage adores

his own Self, the Supreme Lord.)

(An invocatory prayer in the `MaanasollAsa' of Sri

Sureshwaraachaarya.)

Validity of pramaana-s questioned:

It cannot be maintained that the parlance reality is to be posited

because of its being known by means of the instruments of knowledge,

pramaana-s, for, this knowledge which is sublated, be it by Brahman-

knowledge, would not be valid knowledge and hence the so-called

pramana-s should not be regarded as pramana-s at all. The Srutis

such as `neha nanaa asti kinchana' (Br.Up. 4.4.19) and mAyAm tu

prakritim vidyAt (Shve.U.4.10) [There is in It, no diversity; know

that the material cause of the world is Maayaa] by the declaration

of the unreality of the whole world, declare the untrustworthiness

of perception, inference, etc., which are ordinarily accepted as

making known the world.

Pramaana-s reveal only Sat, Existence:

It cannot be said that perception etc., have to be accepted as

revealing the objects of common parlance, e.g., a pot, that are not

illusory like the rope-snake for, this distinction is without a

difference. Further, if perception etc., have to be accepted as

pramanas revealing objects (whose existence is independent of one's

knowledge of them), then they should be deemed to reveal only

the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is the sattA (Existence) of each

of the objects of parlance like the pot as revealed in the

experience, `the pot is,' for the concealment whose cessation is

brought about by the concerned pramana can pertain only to

the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) which is self-effulgent and not to

the inert objects of the world. That is why it is said:

ato'nubhava eva eko viShayo'jnAtalakShaNaH

akshAdInAm svataH siddho yatra teShAm pramANatA (Sambandha VArtika

1002)

[Therefore it is the self-established one Experience alone, and none

other which can be regarded as unknown, that is the object of

perception etc., whence they (perception, etc.,) become valid.]

The `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is revealed is conditioned by

the form, colour, etc., of the object regarded as perceived and as

such, not the unconditioned `adhishThAna' (Substratum). Further

enquiry shows that the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) is the

attributeless Atman as the Shrutis such as (Kathopanishad 2.5.9)

[His form is not to be seen, no one beholds Him with the eye.]

declare. Thus It cannot be revealed by the so-called pramanas that

are outward as alluded to by the Shruti (Kathopanishad 2.4.1) whose

real meaning lies in showing that the Self is not an object for the

sense organs, nor can they be deemed as revealing the objects of the

world because of the consciousness of the co-presence and co-absence

of the sense organs and the items of knowledge as pointed out

already. The position is, therefore, that they are falsely regarded

as pramanas in the same way as in a dream. So has it been said in

the Vedanta-siddhAnta-muktAvaLi -14.The unsublatable self-

established Atman Itself is to be accepted as the Substratum of all

illusion.

Thus, in the above analysis, we see: (a) In the waking, with regard

to the common objects, the `pramanas' reveal the `adhishThAna'

(Substratum) alone; the `is'ness of the object is what comes to

light. (b) In the dream, the pramanas do not reveal any `real'

objects. They, the pramanas, become sublated along with the objects

upon waking. © Even in the case of an illusion like rope-snake,

the pramana that reveals the substratum, the rope, is deemed to be

revealing the Super Substratum, the Atman alone, as in the case of

the dream-pramanas which actually are revealing the Atman alone

which are wrongly seen in a dream as the various objects.

Pratyabhijnaa (recognition) reveals only Sat, Existence:

If for each cognition there is a separate object as must be the case

on the view which accepts only jnAtasatta, i.e., prAtItika-sattaa,

(pratIti-mAtra-kAlika-sattaa, i.e., the object regarded as having an

existence only when it is cognized), it may be asked as to how the

recognition, pratyabhijnA, of the present object, say a pot or a

house, as identical with the one previously known, is possible. The

reply is: the recognition in this instance, is illusory similar to

the recognition of the identity of the illusory snake perceived

severally be ten men, each declaring to the other `I saw the same

snake as you did.' This is pointed out in the VedAnta-siddhAnta-

muktAvaLi 12):

dvaita-bhede pratijnAnam pratyabhijnA katham vada |

dashAnAm yugapat-sarpa-bhrame tadvat tathaiva sA ||

(meaning already covered in the above para.)

This same idea is spoken of in the Pratyak-tattva-chintAmaNi 4.32

and 33 as well.

In all these cases, similarity is mistaken for identity. The

experience of such a pratyabhijnA that is had in a dream which is

subsequently cancelled with the entire content, serves to clear the

issue.

Similarly, when a man passes from waking consciousness into sleep

from which again he awakes, his present consciousness relates to a

different world. But his recognition of the identity of the present

and the former worlds is simply an error due to similarity just like

the experience of the continuity of the same dream after sleep also

within the dream. [The idea is this: Supposing a person is

dreaming. In the dream he goes to sleep. He wakes up from this

dream-sleep and goes about his `waking' parlance. What is happening

is: one dream alone is interspersed with a sleep. This analogy

serves to convey the idea that we, in the normal way wake up every

day to a waking and continue our parlance that we had left the

previous day. This continuity, as this illustration drives home, is

just an illusion.] The pratyabhijnA `sEyam dIpa-jwAlA', or `so'yam

nadI-pravAhaH' = This is the same flame, or river as the one seen

previously – illustrates this. Such a pratyabhijnA does not reveal

real identity, or prove it. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of

the identity of an object is, by the very nature of the case, an

impossibility as there is no valid means, apart from our subjective

impression, of knowing the objective unity or identity of what is

perceived at different times. There is no recognition of an inner

unity as in the case of the true Self; all objective identity is

fictitious only. The commentary on the MAnasollAsa (II.8) says:

// In the case of all particularities pertaining to objects

presented in cause-effect relationship etc., capable of being

referred to as `this, that' etc., that which is Pure Existence,

constant in all cases without exception is Itself the content of

everything, and that is Brahman alone and none other.//

`Common world', pratikarma-vyavasthA:

The belief that there is a common world independent of what the

individuals themselves create, the experience that nature is

governed by some kind of law, regularity, and uniformity – the cause

of which cannot be changed at will by any individual, may all be

said to militate against the viewpoint that has been put forward in

the above paragraph. But if it is recognized that all these do

pertain to the dream world as well, all such objections would not in

the least be valid. So also in connection with the objection based

on the so-called `Common world', `pratikarma-vyavasthA' of the

srishti-drishti-vAda which is enunciated in: For any individual, at

a time, only one thing can be an objet of knowledge, not all objects

for all people at all times. The `nArAyaNI' gloss on the

SiddhAntabindu on shloka 1 of the Dashashloki gives:

//What is imagined in himself is verily illumined by the jiva in his

aspect as the Witness Self as in a dream and there is no necessity

for prolix postulations such as concealment of the object and the

modification of the mind for destroying the concealment (that

is `revealing' an unknown object through the operation of the sense

organ and the mental vritti). The co-presence and the co-absence of

the sense organs and the knowledge are to be understood as in the

case of a dream.//

(The idea is this: In a dream, I `see' an object with the eye. If

the eye is not there, no seeing takes place. The ear cannot see the

object. It can accomplish sound cognition alone. Thus, in the

dream there is an arrangement, an order. But this order is no

longer true when the dream ends. All the sense organs and their one-

to-one function, the order, etc. are all part of the one whole

unreal dream. So it must be regarded with the case of the waking

order, etc. as well.)

Fate of (a) Vedic injunctions and (b) Permenance of sky etc.:

There might be an objection: the Vedic injunctions in respect of

karma and jnana are rendered invalid, if objects have existence only

when cognized. This objection is not to the point for, the purport

of the injunctive Srutis also is in BrahmajnAna with which even

the `realist' agrees. The SiddhAnta-lesha-sangraha 2 points out:

//The purport of the injunctive Srutis which prescribe jyotiShToma

etc., is in securing Brahman Knowledge through the purification of

the mind.//

The idea is that this Supreme Brahman Knowledge arises only

be `falsifying' all the objective world and as such considering the

Sruti as part of the objective universe that is unreal would not be

wrong.

The other objection is like this: The Srutis like the one, for eg.

the Rg. Veda 8.8.31.2 speak of the permenance of sky, the earth, the

mountains, the universe and this world. How then is the above view

justified? In answer to this, it may be pointed out that the

permenance spoken of here is necessarily to be constrained to mean

at best relative permanence till the next dissolution (pralaya), for

otherwise, there will be no way of understanding the subsequent

sentence: The King is permanent. From the present standpoint, the

Sruti must be regarded as alluding to the relative permanence based

upon the illusory pratyabhijnA as in the case of a flame. The sky

etc., are concocted at the moment of experience as permanent just as

some of the objects are concocted as permanent in a dream.

Some more aspects of this higher standpoint may be considered in the

next part.

With pranams to all,

Subbu

Om Tat Sat