The Theory of Evolution and the Vedic perspective of Creation

[Guest guest]

Namaste Ananadaji,

You ask what I might mean by the term

'metaphysics'. My use is the standard one of philosophy. It has a long

history from the Aristotlelian study of being as being i.e. ontology,

epistemology, rational theology or theodicy and cosmology and rational

psychology. In general it would encompass theories of fundamental

structure which unperpins our world. Topics would be the Self, the soul,

individuality, immortality, concept formation, valid knowledge.

 

The topics of DSV and SDV would come into the general ambit of

metaphysics. Am I right in thinking that Shankara did not consider

reality under these headings? I have this notion that the doctrine of

Satkaryavada (more metaphysics) or the non-difference of cause and effect

would prevent him from accepting that dichotomy. In that perspective all

nature and the 3 modes of time is a single seamless unit and its reality

nondual with pure undifferentiated being. The DSV mode is from a single

viewpoint and is thus relative to the one viewpoint which brings out its

solipsistic hue. It makes the single viewpoint the basis of the

underlying structure of the world. For instance Shankara speaks of the

organs as being of the same category as the objects. (Brh.Up. II.iv.11).

"The organs are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive

them" Organs and objects are generalised over the human species with no

reservation to one human being. The object is pure consciousness with the

object as limiting adjunct so that object can be a common object in a

common world. When we know that 'which when it is known everything is

known' all upadhis are dissolved but my understanding is that we move from

a common world to that undifferentiated state.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael

[Guest guest]

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

>

> Namaste All Followers of this Thread,

 

> First of all my questioning of Subbuji's position assumed that he

was

> taking a literal approach. His latest post indicates that this was

the

> case. For him the Vedic doctrine conflicts with science in the way

that

> two theories in science might contest the same problem field. He is

> thus on a par with those Christians who discuss where on earth

exactly

> the Garden of Eden was situated.

>

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

>

 

 

Namaste Michael ji,

 

This is just a clarification. While i do not at all mind being called

a 'literalist', i would like you to consider the proposal that being

a 'literalist' can in no way prevent one being an Advaitin. In fact,

in the sense that i see this epithet, i long to be one and clearly see

that my not being one in the true sense of the term (of my meaning),

proves to be a great impediment in my spiritual progress. Let me

elaborate.

 

Talking of the Garden of Eden i am reminded of the Holy Brindavan and

Mathura of India where Lord Krishna is believed to have spent many

days, playing the several leela-s. The place is held in so much

reverence that great Jnanis, Saints, Remarkable devotees have gone

there in holy pilgrimage and experienced rapturous events related to

Lord Krishna. There are thousands of such spots, temples, river

banks, hills, etc. all over India that even today great Advaita Jnanis

take to these places in the firm belief that the Lord is literally

enshrined there.

 

Here are some messages (No. 29440, 29491 and 29590) depicting some

incidents from the lives of Jnanis where the phenomenon

of 'literalism' is highlighted. The first of these i am reproducing

here. The rest may be accessed.

 

 

Some years ago, I heard an incident relating to the Kanchi Maha

Periyaval narrated on the TV by Sri Muralidhara Swamigal. I am

relating it here with the caveat that some minor details like names of

places, time, etc. may be inaccurate; this is because of time lapse:

 

Maha Periyaval was camping a little away from Kanchipuram, (Kalavai?).

A particular utsavam was on at the Kamakshi Amman Temple. That

morning, as early as about 3 am, the Acharya said to his assistants

that He would like to go to the utsavam and have darshan of the

Mother. The assistants were a bit worried because however fast they

could move, by the time they would reach Kanchipuram, the utsavam

would have ended and the Utsavamurti would have entered the Temple;

already signs of firing of crackers were noticed. But the Acharya was

firm and would not listen to any dissuasion. So, reluctantly the

others set out with the Acharya. Just before leaving the camp

premises, the Acharya prostrated before the Ganapathy idol there. He

stood for some moments before the idol, making some gestures which

puzzled the others.

( Note: Lord Ganapathy is the 'elephant faced God worshipped chiefly

for removal of obstacles.)

 

In time, they reached Kanchipuram. And those accompanying the Acharya

were in for a surprise. The utsavam retinue was very much there, only

a little way to reach the entrance to the Temple. The Acharya had a

fulfilling darshan of the Mother. Only after this did the retinue move

ahead. Those managing the utsavam had this story to tell:

 

The utsavam had proceeded as usual with no untoward happening thus

far. When it reached this spot, suddenly the elephant going in

front refused to move and stay put there. All efforts to cajole it to

march ahead failed and this caused worry to the others as all further

programmes would be affected. Their anxiety came to an end only when

the Acharya arrived and had the Mother's darshan. The party that

accompanied the Acharya suddenly recalled the gestures made by the

Acharya to that Ganapathy before leaving the camp.

*****

 

 

Sir Chandrasekhara Bharati Swamigal of Sringeri was a great

Jivanmukta. Here is an incident bringing out his deep faith in the

words of the scriptures even when he was a small boy:

 

Hanuman comes to the spot where Ramayana Parayana is performed. We

have read this verse about Hanuman and know its meaning. Still we

hardly believe that Hanuman will come and go. My Guru's stance was

novel. He reflected: "What is the procedure for seating Hanuman when

He comes? Is it appropriate that He should sit on the ground and

listen while we sit on a wooden plank and recite?

 

Further, is it appropriate that He should just have to get up and go

when we close our books? Is He not to be offered respect and a place

to sit?"

 

Having thought over the matter My Guru decided, "As I myself sit on a

wooden plank, a seat must be placed for Him". Placing a wooden plank

for Hanuman to use, he did Ramayana Parayanam with the feeling that

Hanuman was seated. Once someone came there and asked, "Boy, why have

you placed a wooden plank here?"

 

The following conversation ensued:

"It is for Anjaneya".

"He is not there".

"He may not be seen by you but:

Yatra Yatra Raghunaatha-keerthanam tatra tatra krtamastakaanjalim….

 

He is seated there with His hands over His head".

 

"What is all this nonsense that you are saying?"

 

"Can the words of the great be false? Do we not recite this verse about

Hanuman's presence everyday?"

 

The extent of My Guru's faith in the verse being factual now becomes

clear to us. What faith he had!

 

(Excerpted from the book 'Diovine Discourses of Sri Abhinava

Vidyaatheertha Swamigal)

 

*****

 

Bhagavan Ramana Maharshi used to experience an extraordinary thrill

on just hearing the name 'Tiruvannamalai', even as small boy. He

longed to visit the shrine of Lord Arunachala there. The time came

only after he had become self-realized and left hearth and home

(Madurai) and went to Tiruvannamalai. On reaching the temple he ran

to the shrine and devoutly submitted himself to the Lord : 'Father, I

have come'. Such was Ramana's devotion to the Lord that despite being

a Vedantin, a great Jnani, he composed several hymns on the Lord

Arunachala.

 

Whenever someone brought him the holy 'prasada' from Madurai Meenakshi

Amman Temple, He would receive it with devotion, tears welling up,

voice choked, saying: 'The Mother has sent this' and apply the kumkum

on his forehead. A Jnani for whom the world is mithya, Ishwara is

mithya and Brahman is everywhere, holds saguna Brahman in such great

reverence considering those holy places as literally the abodes of

Ishwara. (pl. read the other incident from the message no. above)

 

I pointed out the above to show that these paragons of Advaitic

Realization exhibited with no hesitation, what was natural to them, no

make-belief stuff, what you have called 'literalism'. It can

perfectly co-exist with the Maya-vAda of Advaita. In fact the

Acharyas teach us to cultivate such bhakti in order that one might

reach the towering heights of Advaita Jnana without hassles.

 

With best wishes and warm regards,

subbu

Om Tat Sat

[Guest guest]

Namaste!

 

This thread has been troubling me somewhat. It started with Michael-

ji's post about the arrival of consciousness. He wrote:

 

"The implication of what you write here is that there was no world

prior to their being consciousness of it, that there was no world

prior to the arrival of the organic. In other words that what the

best scientific minds have shown, namely that the arrival of human

consciousness is the end product of a long chain of evolution, is

just not true. You can't be serious."

 

I understand the science and the principles of evolution. I am not

arguing about that. Maybe, I am viewing this in a different context,

but this set me thinking about consciousness in general and in the

Advaitic context in particular.

 

When Brahman is consciousness and everything is brahman, what does

it mean to say that consciousness arrived at a particular time?

Further, how can we talk of this arrival at a particular point in

time, when Brahman is beyond time?

 

In Atma Bodha (verse 17), AchArya says:

 

sadA sarva gatOpyAtmA na sarvatrAvabhAsate|

buddhAvEvAvabhaAseta svacchEShu pratibimbavat||

 

Translation: Although Atman is all-pervading, He does not shine in

everything. He is manifest only in the intellect (buddhi) just as

the reflection in a clean mirror.

 

Here's a verse from AnandasAgarastva (verse 101) in this context:

 

nirmAsi samharasi nirvahasi trilOkIm

vrttAntamEtamapi vEtthi na vA mahEzah |

tasyeEzvarasya girijE tava sAhacaryAt

jAta: zrutiShvapi jagajjanakatva vAdah ||

 

Translation: You create, sustain and dissolve the three worlds;

Mahesha may or may not even know this fact. O GirijA, only because

of His being your consort is He spoken of in the shruti as the

creator of the worlds.

 

As this verse points out, Brahman is actionless but it is only

through the 'tatasthalakshnas' that Brahman is recognized, that is,

through the acts of creation, etc. (which pertain to 'shakti', and

not Maheshvara - hence the statement He may not be aware of it!).

 

I would like to say that consciousness is seen where we see life.

But that need not mean that it is not present everywhere all the

time. It is, but just not in a way that our senses can recognize it.

 

Harih Om!

Neelakantan

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

Shrimati Dhyanasarswati wrote (message #34078 of Nov 25):

 

"I am a little puzzled by the term 'human consciousness'?! Do you

for a moment think 'animals' or for that matter even the green

'grass' have no consciousness or 'feelings'?"

 

>From an advaita standpoint, true knowing is impersonal --

unqualified by any human or animal or vegetable or mineral

personality that may be superimposed through a restricted

identification with any organic creature or inorganic object.

 

Such an impersonal knowing is pure consciousness, found by a

complete detachment from all changing acts of inorganic objects and

organic faculties. That consciousness is present always,

illuminating every moment of experience, no matter what appears or

disappears in personality and world.

 

No human persons, nor any animals nor growing plants can possess

that impersonal consciousness. It's that which illuminates them all,

along with all inorganic objects.

 

But where can that consciousness be found expressed? In the end,

where it is found does not depend on *what* is observed -- whether

it be a human person, or an instinctive animal, or a growing plant,

or an inanimate object. Instead, where consciousness is found

expressed depends on *how* the observer looks at whatever may be

seen.

 

If one looks externally, from the outside, then consciousness is not

there seen in whatever is observed. If I look at another person

merely as a outside body, then this external looking does not show

any consciousness expressed. Similarly, if I see a painting or a

sculpture merely as an outside sight, I don't thereby see

consciousness expressed in the painted or the sculpted image. And if

I hear a spoken word merely as an outside sound, I don't thereby

hear consciousness expressed in living speech.

 

But if one looks reflectively, with outward looking turned back in,

then consciousness is always seen in whatever is observed. Thus, if

I see an angry face, reflecting my attention back to anger felt

within my mind; then this reflective seeing is what shows that

consciousness is there expressed, in a face that's found to be

alive. And it's the same when I hear a growling animal, or listen

fearfully to nature's fury that I hear expressed in the howling

winds and creaking plants and crashing rocks of a destructive storm.

 

Then I am listening reflectively, to a living meaning that I thus

interpret in what nature has to say. Then nature comes alive and

speaks to me -- expressing consciousness through every person, every

animal, each growing plant and all objects and happenings of world

or personality.

 

That life of nature is essentially impersonal, beneath the variety

of partial appearances that show up through our observing

personalities. That life is found by reflecting back so deeply that

no personal compromise remains.

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

Pranams to all the participants in this thread.

 

Please excuse my delayed rejoining this - Ishwara

blessed me with a severe viral flu I am just about

recuperating from.

I will try to pick up on some points from the

excellent discussions that have since taken place.

 

> If the > evolution theory is > accepted, it would

put a date on the Vedas. But > this is quite >

contradictory to the anAditva (beginninglessness) >

and nityatva > (Eternality)of the Veda.

 

____________ Let me humbly offer a different

perspective. The Vedas are eternal. They are also in

the form of transmitted sound. Only with the arrival

of a species in this Universe that has the external

and internal faculty to make sense of these sound

combinations and understand them as words, would they

have the exalted status of being Shruti. So we need

not consider that simply because humans were not

created simultaneous with the big bang that we need to

assign a date to the vedas. The beauty of our vedic

teaching is as Rameshji i think also pointed out, it

has the flexibility to not be opposed to anything that

Science comes up with...Neither Galileo nor Newton

postulated anything that contradicted something in the

Vedas in terms of a concept.. and of course with

metaphysics, string theory, quantum mecahnics,

einstenian relativity, Science is starting to sound

more and more like Vedanta.. ___________________

> If Ishwara gave out the Vedas only when man

arrived, > Ishwara will be subjected to the charge of

partiality.

_____________________

This is a question we could ask even today,

irrespective of how we view creation and evolution.

Why is the human birth the only one which can confer

moksha? Is ishwara partial to humans? The simple

answer of course is that it is not Ishwara who is

parital, but the ignorant jiva who is to blame...his

prior papas have given him an appropriate vehicle to

enable him to reap the results of his own prior

actions - Ishwara is ever ready to bless us with

whatever it is we ask him...unfortunately less than

one in a million people are interested in moksha, not

being equipped with viveka which in turn is always a

result of previously acquired punya. So based on

accumulated punya from millions of prior cycles of

manifest creation, a particular jiva is allowed to

take human birth only to be given a chance of

achieving jnana. All other jivas have this very same

oppurtunity - except not in their current form -of

plant,animal, or even devas. One more thing - these

jivas in the form of a beast or a vulture for example

do not have the "problem of samsara" They do not have

any selfimage (- and i will try to expand on this in a

reply to dhyanasaraswati-jis excellent post on this

topic.) So there is no sense in there being any kind

of mechanism in place for release for a nonhuman, who

while leading a preprogrammed instinctdriven life is

neither participating in any punya or papa nor has any

conflicts in his or her mind....

___________________________

> Again, as per the evolution theory, the human form

> has evolved from > the immediate, closest cousin,

the primate. If this > is true, we see > quite

different things in the rebirth/karma scheme.

___________________

This I agree with completely. Where Darwin is totally

off the mark is in assuming that the only basic

instinct that drives life on this planet is survival

of the physical body. And "nature" fashions tools to

help a lifeform survive and propagate...He has

completely missed out on the fact that in actuality,

what drives life is not the physical organism in flesh

and blood but the underlying spirit - the jiva - and

its constant search to end its suffering and thereby

taking on life forms like new clothes and discarding

old ones..And hence in the Darwinian schema of things

there would be no reason for a human to "devolve" into

a crocodile, while in the vedic schema of karma and

rebirth, there are hundreds of these stories in our

puranas and this concept is intrinsic to any talk on

spirituality.

 

Darwin could never accept the concept of an

intelligent "Creator" and this is what of course drew

the ire of the Church.

 

The point is:

Vedic concepts of karma/rebirth are logical and

indispensible towards understanding life.

They can accomodate any theory or sets of theories

that the best and sane scientific minds can come up

with at any point in time.

If tomorrow someone is able to disprove Darwin, well,

more power to him - nothing he or she offers as an

alternative will conflict with the vedic vision -

because the Vedas represent what has been eternally

true - there is no scope of error - and science can

never venture into its domain - which is centered on

spirituality.

 

 

Pranams to all

 

hari OM

Shyam

 

--- subrahmanian_v <subrahmanian_v > wrote:

 

> ShrIgurubhyo namaH

>

> Namaste Rameshji, Shyamji and others,

>

> Just in order to have a focussed discussion, i have

> given the above

> title to the topic we have on hand.

 

 

 

 

 

Everyone is raving about the all-new Mail beta.

http://new.mail.

[Guest guest]

Pranams to all,

 

Some thoughts on what is human selfconsciousness...

Like I had alluded to previously and provided a

scientific paper sometime back, the best scientific

minds have not one tiny iota of what constitutes

consciousness.

Even a casual look at the scientific literature will

help underscore not only how divided but how utterly

confused the entire neuroscientific community is on

this score..

Terms like access consciousness, phenomenal

consciousness, reflexive consciousness, introspective

consciousness, selfawareness, awareness of

selfawareness, 'what is it like'ness, an

inner-sense-ness, and HOTS(Higher order thougts) are

readily and routinely chucked around, with no

consensus anywhere in sight..

 

What then is special about human consciousness?

It is certainly not "selfconsciousness". There are

again multiple layers of selfconsciousness - being

aware of oneself as a distinct entity, seeking out

what is of benefit and turning away from where there

is harm are basic layers of selfawareness and this

goes way down the phylogenetic tree. Even more complex

 

 

In a very simple term, humans are endowed with a

self-image. We view the world and most importantly our

own selves via the prisms of our fully and highly

evolved and developed ego. Hence it is that "i am

ugly, poor, short, fat, sinful, loathsome,etc etc etc"

all come into play. All this of course stems from one

central misunderstanding - we erroneously view

ourselves as incomplete,accompanied by a constant

unease, the truth being quite the contrary, and hence

alone when that error is removed by means of a

appropriate pramana do we have the potential of

"self-realization". No one species other than humans

has this fully developed,matured ego which has such a

complex capacity to self-judge and self-introspect and

self-realize. No cow has thoughts of getting too fat,

no lion has guilttrips about his nonvegetarian diet,

and so on. The fact that we have this ego is thus a

blessing - if used intelligently.

 

In the absence of such an ego - feelings of

"do-ership" and "enjoyer-ship" cannot exist. Show a

cow a stick - he will run away, show him grass - he

will come towards you...the cow though acting, cannot

introspectively view this and have notions of

ownership about its action - in that sense it is

actionless - it is impelled by nature, in just the way

birds are impelled to fly thousands of miles away to

an unknown land when they sense the advent of

winter....

 

for ahankara to be destroyed, the first requirement

paradoxically is that a welldeveloped/wellnourished

ahankara should be present to begin with....and this

is Maya's wondrous paradox..

 

Hari OM

Shri Gurubhyo namah

 

Shyam

 

 

___

 

I have posted below some very basic concepts of how

science views of consciousness, which in turn is just

a nontechnical portion of a very detailed review by

celebrated scientist Adam Zeman. (The original is in

the journal BRAIN 2001 for those interested.)

The etymology of `consciousness' and `conscience'

The word `consciousness' has its Latin root in

conscio, formed by the coalescence of cum, meaning

`with', and scio, meaning `know'. In its original

Latin sense, to be conscious of something was to share

knowledge of it, with someone else, or with oneself.

The knowledge in question was often of something

secret or shameful, the source of a bad conscientia, a

bad conscience. A `weakened' sense of conscientia

coexisted in Latin with the stronger sense which

implies shared knowledge: in this weak sense

conscientia was, simply, knowledge. All three senses

(knowledge shared with another, knowledge shared with

oneself and, simply, knowledge) entered the English

language with `conscience', the first equivalent of

conscientia. The words `conscious' and `consciousness'

first appear early in the 17th century, rapidly

followed by `self-conscious' and `self-consciousness'

(Lewis, 1960Go).

 

(b) The meanings of `consciousness'

The Oxford English Dictionary distinguishes 12 senses

of `conscious' and eight of `consciousness'. For our

purposes it is helpful to distinguish three principal

meanings (Zeman et al., 1997Go).

 

(i) Consciousness as the waking state

In everyday neurological practice consciousness is

generally equated with the waking state, and the

abilities to perceive, interact and communicate with

the environment and with others in the integrated

manner which wakefulness normally implies.

Consciousness in this sense is a matter of degree: a

range of conscious states extends from waking through

sleep into coma. These states can be defined

objectively.

 

(ii) Consciousness as experience

Consciousness in its first sense is the behavioural

expression of our normal waking state. But when we are

conscious in this first sense we are always conscious

of something. In its second sense consciousness is the

content of experience from moment to moment: what it

feels like to be a certain person, now, in a sense in

which we suppose there is nothing it feels like to be

a stone or lost in dreamless sleep. This second sense

of consciousness is more inward than the first. It

highlights the qualitative, subjective dimension of

experience. Philosophers sometimes use the technical

(and controversial) term `qualia' to refer to the

subjective texture of experience which is the essence

of this second sense of consciousness.

There is a broad consensus that, in addition to its

qualitative character, the following features are

central: consciousness is personal, involving a

conscious subject with a necessarily limited point of

view; its contents are stable for short periods,

lasting from hundreds of milliseconds to a few

seconds, but characteristically vary over longer

intervals; its contents are unified at any one time;

they are continuous over time, in the sense that

memory normally allows us to connect consciousness of

the present with consciousness of the past;

consciousness is selective, with a foreground and

background, and a limited capacity at a given moment;

over time, however, it ranges over innumerable

contents, with potential contributions from each of

the senses, and from all the major psychological

processes, including thought, emotion, memory,

imagination, language and action planning. Most states

of consciousness are `intentional', in the

philosophical sense that they are directed at the

world, consciousness of this or that, and these

states, in turn, are `aspectual': conditioned by the

perspective which our conscious viewpoint affords.

Finally, most commentators emphasize the centrality of

consciousness to human values: the prolongation of

human life, where one can be certain that

consciousness has been lost forever, is generally

regarded as a wasted effort.

 

Although we all tend to consider ourselves expert

witnesses on the nature of our experiences, the

thought that we may be misled by introspection, and

that our experience is not as we usually take it to

be, underlies several lines of recent work. For

example, research on our sensitivity to change in our

visual surroundings suggests that the focus of our

visual attention is much narrower than we normally

suppose; work requiring subjects to give instantaneous

reports of their current experience, at the moment a

random buzzer sounds, reveals a surprising

preponderance of reports of `inner thought';

approaches inspired both by the phenomeno-logical

tradition in continental philosophy, and by the

practice of meditation, emphasize the potential value

of disciplined observation of awareness in supplying

first-person data for the scientific study of

consciousness. These lines of research take the

qualitative character of consciousness seriously while

recognizing that our ordinary assumptions about it may

be mistaken. This attentive but critical scrutiny of

the `view from within' is a promising development.

 

(iii) Consciousness as mind

Echoing the weakened Latin sense of conscientia, any

mental state with a propositional content can be said

to be conscious—anything that we believe, hope, fear,

intend, expect, desire, etc. Thus we might accurately

say that `the prime minister is conscious of the

funding crisis in the health service' at a time when

his thoughts are quite otherwise occupied. Most of the

recent interest in consciousness has centred on its

first and second senses, rather than this third sense

in which consciousness is synonymous with mind.

 

It may be helpful to give one example of the use of

`conscious' in each of these three main senses: (i)

after a lucid interval, the injured soldier lapsed

into unconsciousness; (ii) I became conscious of a

feeling of dread, and an overpowering smell of burning

rubber; (iii) I am conscious that I may be straining

your patience.

 

© The meanings of `self-consciousness'

`Self-consciousness' is also a multi-faceted concept.

 

(i) Self-consciousness as proneness to embarrassment

The idiomatic sense of self-consciousness implies

awkwardness in the company of others. Interestingly,

we are self-conscious in this sense when we are

excessively aware of others' awareness of ourselves.

This humdrum usage thus turns out to be rather

sophisticated, hinting at a link between consciousness

of self and consciousness of others which is a focus

of current research in developmental psychology

(ii) Self-consciousness as self-detection

We might speak of an organism as self-conscious if it

can respond to stimuli which impinge upon it directly,

or modify its behaviour in ways which imply an

awareness of its own actions. Thus your awareness of

an insect walking across your hand involves

self-consciousness in this rather minimal sense. Rats,

who can be trained to respond to a signal in a way

that depends on what they were doing last, may be

conscious of their own actions in a similar sense. But

this variety of self-consciousness amounts to little

more than perceptual awareness, directed towards

events brought about by, or ones which impinge

directly upon, the creature in question.

 

(iii) Self-consciousness as self-recognition

Chimpanzees and orang-utans, but not monkeys, in

common with children over ~18 months of age can

recognize themselves in mirrors. This ability implies

the possession of a rudimentary concept of self. The

flowering of the `idea of me' in the human child over

subsequent months is attested by the mastery of the

first person pronoun and a growing interest in

self-adornment. But physical and verbal

self-recognition falls short of the most distinctively

human species of self-consciousness, which allows us

to reflect upon the mental lives of others and

ourselves.

 

(iv) Self-consciousness as awareness of awareness

We constantly attribute mental states in the everyday

explanation and prediction of behaviour: talk of

states of perception, desire and belief, for example,

peppers our conversation. These have recently been

described as evidence for an implicit `theory of

mind'. Thus by the age of 5 most children have

discovered that they and others are fallible subjects

of experience, who glimpse the world from eccentric

points of view and are prey to deception and

misapprehension. An influential account of autism

suggests that the core impairment in this condition

stems from the failure to acquire such a `theory of

mind'. This sense of self-consciousness echoes the

idiomatic use of the term, and although we tend to

regard self-consciousness in its colloquial sense as a

social disadvantage, we would not really want to be

without it: only a nuance separates the valuable

ability to inform ourselves about the impression we

are making on others from the awkward encumbrance of

`self-consciousness'.

 

(v) Self-consciousness as self-knowledge

Like consciousness, self-consciousness has an extended

final sense. It can refer to our knowledge of the

broad social and cultural background which shapes us:

thus my `idea of me' takes in not just a body and a

mind but membership of a cultural and linguistic

community, a profession, a family group. In this

extended sense our self-consciousness evolves

throughout our lives, as it has done through the

course of history. It finds its richest expression in

self-portraiture and autobiography, activities of

which most human children, but no other animals, are

enthusiastic practitioners from an early age!

___

 

> > Namaste,

> >

> > Shrimati Dhyanasarswati wrote (message #34078 of

> Nov 25):

> >

> > "I am a little puzzled by the term 'human

> consciousness'?! Do you

> > for a moment think 'animals' or for that matter

> even the green

> > 'grass' have no consciousness or 'feelings'?"

> >

> > From an advaita standpoint, true knowing is

> impersonal --

> > unqualified by any human or animal or vegetable or

> mineral

> > personality that may be superimposed through a

> restricted

> > identification with any organic creature or

> inorganic object.

> >

> >

>

>

 

 

 

 

 

Want to start your own business?

Learn how on Small Business.

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[Guest guest]

Namaste Shyamji,

Excellent catalogue of a number of the

rational/scientific approaches to the problem of consciousness. It

demonstrates that a lot of good minds are thinking very seriously about

the field and if they are not coming to a definite conclusion have at

least eliminated the most blatent examples of ill-logic and incoherence.

The question then arises whether anyone can have any knowledge of the

nature of consciousness in an objective sense. The Vedic answer would be

that the Knower cannot be known, that it is one without a second and so

forth. Now there are two ways you can take that (a) believe it and short

circuit all the questioning and (b) go through all the questions until you

are satisfied that it is the only rational answer. As you know there are

people for both and Teachers for them.

 

The supposed resonance of Vedanta and string theory etc. Does that imply

that when string theory has been surpassed in 1000 years time that Vedanta

will be left behind with it as an historical curiousity. I don't think so

and neither do you I suppose.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael

[Guest guest]

Dear Michaelji,

 

I think when considering the Vedantic position on evolution, something

like sunrise is a useful analogy. Whether someone tells you that the

sun rises in the east or the west, you know this person is wrong

because the sun actually doesn't rise - it is the earth that goes

around the sun. However, clearly there is a difference between saying

the sun rises in the east and saying the sun rises in the west. The

former is correct if one assumes the sun goes around the earth and the

latter is incorrect even with that assumption. The former has

practical use, the latter doesn't. The final Vedantic position does

not disagree with evolution given the same assumptions, but disagrees

because it subverts the assumptions. I believe this is what Anandaji

says as well.

 

What is interesting here is that I think for you something like DSV is

more suspicious than ajati-vada (b/c the former inclines towards

idealism and solipsism) or a SDV version of Advaita. I think its

important to look at how DSV fits in the general Advaita scheme of

things very elegantly. I would like to argue that an Advaitic SDV

implies DSV.

 

Our natural perspective is SDV and one can start the analysis on this

basis - let us start with a desk for instance. If I run into the desk

and do not see it, I will still bang into the desk. Thus, the desk

exists independently of whether I see it or not - even when I don't

see it, I still bang into it. If I look away from it and then look

back the desk is still there. When I am not looking on the desk, other

people can still interact with the desk. So the desk exists

independently of my mind.

 

The question to ask is: in what form does it exist independent of my

mind? When it is cognized, I know what the desk is like because it is

experienced. However, it would be interesting to try to see how it

would be like when it is not cognized. We might try by the scientific

method, but we ecnounter some problems. The scientific method only

gives us information about the desk, when the desk is being observed

by the scientist. It might be observed directly through the senses or

we might be observing the output on an instrument which reacts to the

properties of the object in some consistent way (eg: an IR sensor or

thermometer perhaps). A direct perception would only still tell us how

it is like in perception. Percieving the output on an instrument which

reacts to properties of the object also does not work to give us the

object as it stands independent of perception. All it gives us is the

way the instrument reacts to the object. The linkage between the

instrument and the object (which permits us to say that when the

instrument reacts in such a way, the object is in such and such state)

is one created through our previous experiences so it just sets back

the problem. The gist of this is that we can only tell how the object

appears to us but not how it is in reality by empirical means.

 

To proceed further, an Advaitin can use the the analysis from the 6th

chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad. The table is just wood - apart

from the wood there is no table. If you make the wood vanish, nothing

whatsoever remains of the table. There is no specific reason that the

wood we call a table should be considered a single object, "table". We

could perhaps see two objects - one consisting of two legs of the

table and the other consisting of two legs and the top part of the

table. We could call this an X and a Y respectively. There is no

reason why that wood should be divided into a table instead of into an

X and a Y. The table serves a function but the X and the Y does not

and it seems natural in our cognitive nature to see a seemingly

continuous lump of wood as a single object. It is clear, however, that

the wood is divided into a table by our minds and the wood is not

inherently table-like or x&y-like.

 

Keep in mind that there is no idealism involved here in that there is

no argument that the object is mental. The table is a physical object

in that it is wood, but the form of the table is something we see in

the wood according to our subjective cognitive habits. The wood could

be broken down in different ways into different objects - a subjective

element is needed to see the wood as a table as opposed to some other

possibility. The wood is objectively there but the table depends on

some subjective element.

 

What this means is that whatever be the nature of the table when it is

not cognized, we can definitely say that it is not existing as a

table. It is not existing as a table because the subjective element

needed to see the wood as having the form of a table is not present

when the mind is not cognizing the table. But upon further analysis,

it is also not existing as wood because the wood itself has material

causes and can be subjected to the same analysis.

 

Unless something objective existed, nothing would appear. In a

relative sense, if there was no wood, the table wouldn't appear. We

might analyse the wood down to something further and so on, but

eventually we would need something that exists otherwise nothing would

appear. The objective principle at the very least would have to be

partless and not have any material causes of its own. Otherwise it too

would be an object carved out of its material cause by the mind. Here

to posit a single partless material cause for all effects is elegant

and a lot of alternative positions could probably be effectively

refuted (eg: atomism-type positions). In any case, I am trying to show

that Advaitic style SDV implies DSV so taking it for granted that

everything will reduce to a single material cause.

 

Since there is a single material cause for all effects and this

material cause is partless, the answer to the question of what the

table is like when the mind is not there is quite clear. The table

remains as this material cause. When the mind is absent, the table

exists not as a table (since the table is carved out of its causes by

the mind), but it exists as its (ie: the table's) material cause. The

table, as an effect does not exist when the mind is not present

because when the mind is not present, the table is just its material

cause. There is also no table "in" the material cause because the

material cause is partless.

 

Thus we see that when we do not cognize the table there is no object

exhibiting the properties of the table - what exists is the partless

material cause of the table. When we cognize the table, then alone an

object exhibiting the properties of a table (ie: table as effect)

exists. Thus, we have DSV.

 

I would be honoured if the members in the group could analyse this

line of argumentation. I am very curious to see your opinions on this

and it would help me improve my understanding a lot,

 

Regards,

 

R.

[Guest guest]

Dear Rishi-ji,

 

Very elegantly and comprehensively described in my view. (In fact, I would

like to add the essay to my website if you are agreeable!)

 

Coincidentally, I was asked several questions on this topic only last week

(in the Q & A section of the website) and this is how I responded:

 

*****

 

Q: Does the reality of the world depend on a perceiver?

 

A: The world is not 'real'; it is mithyA. It has not been 'created'; it has

'dependent' reality, being simply name and form of the non-dual reality.

What it depends upon is brahman, not the perceiver which is itself part of

that mithyA world.

 

Q: Does the world or universe exist independently?

 

A: I could say that, having answered the first question, all the rest are

irrelevant and effectively meaningless. There is only brahman. Seeing

something other than brahman is the mistake of adhyAsa - mixing up real and

unreal. The mind sees forms and assigns names based on its particular

nature, saMskAra etc. Accordingly, what it thinks it sees and what it calls

what it thinks it sees will be dependent upon that nature. Thus, in a sense,

the mind does create its own world (heaven or hell).

 

Q: Are there as many worlds as there are perceivers?

 

A: As above. Most questions of this sort depend upon the level at which you

are speaking (paramArtha or vyavahAra) and confusion arises when the

question is at one level and the answer is at the other. In reality, there

is no world and no perceiver - obviously, if you are talking Advaita, since

there are 'not two things'. At the level of appearance, you can apply

whatever theory you like. Ultimately, it will have to be discarded. The

approach to use is called svataHprAmANyavAda, which means accepting a given

explanation, if reasonable, until something better comes along.

 

The theory that you are referencing is dRRiShTisRRiShTivAda, where the

perceiver combines what he (thinks he) sees with memory etc. and

superimposes this upon reality, thus bringing a 'world' into existence. This

theory supersedes the more common-sense sRRiShTidRRiShTivAda, which says

that the world has been created and then we see it. The theory that sublates

both of these is ajAtivAda - there has never been any creation.

 

Q: When I look at an object with another person for instance, say the Statue

of Liberty, is there just one that we both perceive or are there as many

Statues of Liberty as there are sentient beings perceiving it?

 

A: As above - use whichever theory you like, really! I hope you can see that

this is not being flippant. Wherever you think you are, use that theory

which satisfies the mind for the time being. But the mind likes to play -

and this is not always very helpful! Ultimately, there is no statue of

liberty and no perceiver. There is only brahman.

 

Q: Independent of a perceiver, what actually exists besides undifferentiated

infinite eternal Consciousness?

 

A: Nothing - and what is this 'perceiver' that it is independent of? The

differentiation only comes about in the manifestation as a result of a mind

imposing name and form.

 

*****

 

Apologies for my long absence from the site, due to working on two new

books. Now these are out of the way (due to be published in February next

year), I have been able to catch up with reading the digests. (I was over a

month behind at one point.) Hopefully, I will be able to contribute

occasionally again now... although I have already started the next book!

 

Incidentally, I would like to offer my profound thanks to the group for its

inspiration and help over the years. The extent of this can be gauged by the

number of Advaitin contributors to my main book 'Back to the Truth: 5000

years of Advaita'. Very briefly, this book describes Advaita with a chapter

breakdown fairly similar to 'Book of One'. The differences are, firstly,

that I use the best extracts I have found from scriptures, Shankara, sages,

modern teachers and writers, email discussions and websites to illustrate

the text and, secondly, that I introduce much more advanced topics than were

dealt with in the earlier book. There are 640 pages, 375 separate references

and over 550 extracts, including more than 100 modern teachers and writers.

The glossary contains definitions of over 500 Sanskrit terms and includes

the Devanagari script.

 

Advaitin contributors include: Atagrasin, Bhaskar, Ram Chandran, Greg Goode,

Harsha, Alan Jacobs, ProfVK, Stig Lundgren, Gummuluru Murthy, Chittaranjan

Naik, Madathil Nair, Michael Reidy, Kuntimaddi Sadananda, Ranjeet Sankar

and Ananda Wood.

 

Incidentally, there are full details, endorsements, pictures of the cover,

contents list and six extracts from the book at the website:

 

http://www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/backto_truth/backto_truth.htm

 

 

 

Best wishes to all,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

My sincere apologies to Subbu-ji and Sastri-ji - they are also contributors

to 'Back to the Truth'. I forgot to mention them because they were late

contributors and I took the names from an early version of the

'Acknowledgements' list - but they are acknowledged in the final proof - I

have just checked!

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis-ji,

 

Congratulations on finishing the book. Having looked at the extracts I

couldn't resist the temptation to pre-order from Amazon through you web

site. The discount on Amazon.co.uk (for pre-order) is even greater than you

mentioned on your web page, so you may wish to correct this. I enjoyed your

earlier book, "The Book of One." Those people I recommended it to also

found it valuable and easily comprehensible. So I am looking forward to

"Back to Truth."

 

Best wishes,

 

Peter

 

_

 

Incidentally, there are full details, endorsements, pictures of the cover,

contents list and six extracts from the book at the website:

 

http://www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/backto_truth/backto_truth.htm

<http://www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/backto_truth/backto_truth.htm>

 

Best wishes to all,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "risrajlam" <rishi.lamichhane

wrote:

 

> Since there is a single material cause for all effects and this

> material cause is partless, the answer to the question of what the

> table is like when the mind is not there is quite clear. The table

> remains as this material cause. When the mind is absent, the table

> exists not as a table (since the table is carved out of its causes

by

> the mind), but it exists as its (ie: the table's) material cause.

The

> table, as an effect does not exist when the mind is not present

> because when the mind is not present, the table is just its

material

> cause. There is also no table "in" the material cause because the

> material cause is partless.

>

> Thus we see that when we do not cognize the table there is no

object

> exhibiting the properties of the table - what exists is the

partless

> material cause of the table. When we cognize the table, then alone

an

> object exhibiting the properties of a table (ie: table as effect)

> exists. Thus, we have DSV.

>

> I would be honoured if the members in the group could analyse this

> line of argumentation. I am very curious to see your opinions on

this

> and it would help me improve my understanding a lot,

>

> Regards,

>

> R.

 

Dear Rishi,

 

A wonderful analysis of the Truth in a lucid manner. The above

post of yours is worth deep contemplation in order to arrive at a

true understanding of the Advaitic Truth that Shankara has taught in

that Chandogya Upanishad Bhashyam that you have alluded to. I

sincerely appreciate this post of yours.

 

In the context of this topic that you have dwelt upon so

brilliantly, the following quote from the book 'Yoga, Enlightenment

and Perfection' could be seen as pertinent:

 

//An earthen pot has a rotund form, has the name, `pot', and is made

of mud. It is apprehended as something that exists, as "is"; it is

the object of the notion of existence (sadbuddhih). What is

responsible for the pot's being or existence? Decidedly, its name

and form do not lend any being to it. Other than as clay, its

material cause, the pot has no existence; it has existence only as

clay.

 

(A modification (of clay, such as a pot or jar,) has speech as its

origin and exists only in name; as clay alone, it is real.)Chandogya

Upanishad VI.1.4.

 

Can clay, per se, account for the being of the pot? No, for clay has

no existence apart from the particles of which it is made; the name

and form of clay do not make it existent. Nothing that is an effect

has existence apart from its material cause; only as the cause, does

an effect exist. Thus, no intermediary member of the causal chain

headed by the pot, clay and particles can account for the pot's

being. Only the ultimate cause, if it be intrinsically existent, can

adequately do so. The scripture teaches that Brahman is the ultimate

cause, the substratum of all, and that It is of the very nature of

absolute existence.

 

Thus, in the final analysis, a pot has existence only as Brahman;

apart from Brahman, it is simply non-existent. The name and form of

the pot are but its false or illusory aspects. Similarly, every

object has existence only as Brahman; the name and form of the

object are its illusory aspects. Were such not to be the case, the

scripture would not have emphatically taught that on knowing

Brahman, everything becomes known, just as on knowing clay, all

products of clay become known.

 

In the past, whenever I have wanted to, I have been able to readily

ignore the name and form of an object, such as an earthen pot or a

golden vessel, and to apprehend the object as being just the

substance of which it is made, such as clay or gold. Now, I should

go much further. I should thoroughly discriminate the name and form

of any selected object from its being, disregard them, and

understand that the object is actually just its ultimate basis,

absolute existence.

 

Having reflected in this manner, I started My meditation, taking the

sun as the object of relevance. I gazed at the sun, which was to set

in about half an hour and was pleasant to behold. With effort, I

increasingly ignored everything about the sun, such as its shape,

size and brightness, and focused on just its being. Soon, nothing

mattered except the bare existence of the sun; indifference to the

illusory aspects became well established and effortless. I cannot

say whether thereafter My eyes were fully open, partially closed or

fully closed. Abruptly, I almost totally forgot Myself. Just

unqualified being, unrelated to space, time and objects, remained

and that too not as an inert entity but as objectless consciousness.

 

When My mind descended from this savikalpa-samàdhi, I found that the

sun had already set and that the place was illumined by the moon. I

estimated that My samàdhi would have lasted for nearly an hour. I

then left for Narasimhavana.

 

The next morning, the external object I considered to facilitate My

meditation on the Supreme was the wall in front of Me. With hardly

any effort, I was able to disregard all illusory aspects and focus

on just the being of the selected object. I attained savikalpa-

samàdhi in moments; the experience was the same as what I had had on

the previous occasion.

 

{Here, Acharyal instructed me (the Author) , who was seated in front

of Him, to move to His side and face the same direction as Him. He

then said, "In the evening, use the sun as an object and focus on

the Truth, the way I did. Right now, let us both enter savikalpa-

samàdhi for some time with the wall in front serving as the object

to initiate the meditation." Such was the power of Acharyal's

presence and grace that, even without any effort, I went into,

experienced and emerged from savikalpa-samàdhi in the same manner as

and together with Acharyal. Acharyal Himself confirmed that what I

had experienced was similar to what He Himself had experienced.

Acharyal then said that He would continue His account the next

day.}//

 

Warm regards,

subbu

Om Tat Sat