Minutes of the meeting with Hitler and Husseini.

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HinduThought, "Ashok Chowgule" <ashokvc

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Minutes of the meeting with Hitler and Husseini.

Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol

XIII, London, 1964, pp.881 ff.

http://www.tellthechildrenthetruth.com/gallery/#hitler

 

German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini:

Zionism and the Arab Cause (November 28, 1941)

 

 

Haj Amin al-Husseini, the most influential leader of Palestinian

Arabs,

lived in Germany during the Second World War. He met Hitler,

Ribbentrop

and other Nazi leaders on various occasions and attempted to

coordinate

Nazi and Arab policies in the Middle East.

 

Record of the Conversation between the Fuhrer and the Grand Mufti of

Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign

Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin.

 

The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Fuhrer for the great honor he

had

bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity to

convey

to the Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich, admired by the entire Arab

world, his thanks of the sympathy which he had always shown for the

Arab

and especially the Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear

expression in his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly

convinced that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would

then prosper. The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they

had

the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the

Communists. Therefore they were prepared to cooperate with Germany

with

all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only

negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation

of

revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion.

The

Arabs could be more useful to Germany as allies than might be apparent

at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the

suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews.

Furthermore,

they had had close relations with all Moslem nations, of which they

could make use in behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion would be

quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab countries and

the prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in

Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of

Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only

because

the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders

of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory

to an unjust cause.

 

In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence and

unity

of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest confidence in the

Fuhrer and looked to his hand for the balm on their wounds, which had

been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.

 

The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Germany,

which

stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories and understood and

recognized the aspirations to independence and freedom of the Arabs,

just as she supported the elimination of the Jewish national home.

 

A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its

propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would

rouse

the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new courage. It

would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing the Arabs

against the moment when they could strike. At the same time, he could

give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict discipline patiently

wait for the right moment and only strike upon an order form Berlin.

 

With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the Arabs

in

that country certainly had by no means been incited by Germany to

attack

England, but solely had acted in reaction to a direct English assault

upon their honor.

 

The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an Arab

government in the neighboring territories because they would prefer

weaker Arab to strong European governments in the neighboring

countries

and, being themselves a nations of 7 million, they had moreover

nothing

to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan, Iraq,

and Palestine.

 

France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan

because

she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had given

her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under King Faisal as

early as 1933.

 

In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Fuhrer

make

a public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which is

so

powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their

hearts

the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were not

pressing

for immediate realization for their aspirations; they could easily

wait

half a year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a

hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that the

English would be the gainers from it.

 

The Fuhrer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these

questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. Germany

stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included

active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine, which was

nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the exercise

of

destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was also aware that

the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the functions of

economic

pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was done only by the

Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step, to ask one

European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at

the

proper time to direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as

well.

 

Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle

with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism and

Soviet Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both

countries

were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive struggle; on the

political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict between

Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle between

National

Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany would

furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same

struggle, because platonic promises were useless in a war for survival

or destruction in which the Jews were able to mobilize all of

England's

power for their ends.

 

The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little help

sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated plainly

by

the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not permitted the

rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all the

sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome

by

the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews.

 

The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the

struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the Arab

world. The Fuhrer therefore had to think and speak coolly and

deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the

leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help

in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the

Arabs, would have to be done. Anything however, that might contribute

to

weakening the military situation must be put aside, no matter how

unpopular this move might be.

 

Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gateway to

the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly with regard

to maintaining the supply, which was most difficult as a result of the

destruction of railroads and highways as well as the oncoming winter.

If

at such a moment, the Fuhrer were to raise the problem of Syria in a

declaration, those elements in France which were under de Gaulle's

influence would receive new strength. They would interpret the

Fuhrer's

declaration as an intention to break up France's colonial empire and

appeal to their fellow countrymen that they should rather make common

cause with the English to try to save what still could be saved. A

German declaration regarding Syria would in France be understood to

refer to the French colonies in general, and that would at the present

time create new troubles in western Europe, which means that a portion

of the German armed forces would be immobilized in the west and no

longer be available for the campaign in the east.

 

The Fuhrer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoining

him

to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:

 

1. He (the Fuhrer) would carry on the battle to the total destruction

of

the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe.

2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but which

in

any event was not distant, the German armies would in the course of

this

struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.

3. As soon as this had happened, the Fuhrer would on his own give the

Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived.

Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish

element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British

power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative

spokesman

for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab

operations, which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come,

Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a

declaration.

 

Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov;

it would be also the beginning of the end of the British World Empire.

He (the Fuhrer) hoped that the coming year would make it possible for

Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the Middle East. For the

good of their common cause, it would be better if the Arab

proclamation

were put off for a few more months than if Germany were to create

difficulties for herself without being able thereby to help the Arabs.

 

He (the Fuhrer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for a

public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But he

would beg him to consider that he (the Fuhrer) himself was the Chief

of

State of the German Reich for five long years during which he was

unable

to make to his own homeland the announcement of its liberation. He had

to wait with that until the announcement could be made on the basis

of a

situation brought about by the force of arms that the Anschluss had

been

carried out.

 

The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had made

their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal requested by

the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.

 

The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would

come

to pass just as the Fuhrer had indicated. He was fully reassured and

satisfied by the words which he had heard form the Chief of the German

State. He asked, however, whether it would not be possible, secretly

at

least, to enter into an agreement with Germany of the kind he had just

outlined for the Fuhrer.

 

The Fuhrer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti

precisely

that confidential declaration.

 

The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that he

was

taking his leave from the Fuhrer in full confidence and with

reiterated

thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.

SCHMIDT

 

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