To Sri Neil

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Neil,

 

On 29/01/07, nlg108108 <nlg_108 (AT) comcast (DOT) net> wrote:

> And second, I just want to say that your description of the negation of

> apparent conceptions of "I" is just marvelous. For several years I

> studied and practiced according to the Madyamika-Prasangika, as

> expounded by Nagarjuna in his Mulamadyamikakarika, and the principle

> commentators of that work. And you seem to hit on the nub of what

> became for me an irreconcileable problem: once all has been negated,

> there is still some "thing" left, which I am now recognizing as the

true

> "I" (Atman) and -- as you point out in your discussion of the universe

> -- its complete identity with the ultimate basis of reality, Brahman.

> This is precisely what led me to Advaita-Vedanta

 

 

I am delighted to know that you have been a longtime practitioner of

the Prasangika-Madhyamika teachings. I have always had many doubts

about where exactly is it that the Madhyamika teachings differ from

those of Advaita. We have had discussions on this in the past and

while those discussions were useful, they were far from being

conclusive.

 

>From what I have understood so far, it appears that the Madhyamika

system in general avoids taking a stance on the substratum of all

apparent phenomena, which according to Advaita-Vedanta is the Self or

Brahman. Some commentators hold the view that the Vedantic Brahman is

the same as the shunyata of the Madhyamika-s. But I have always felt

that shunyata is equivalent to the Vedantic mithya rather than

Brahman. When the Vedantin says that the world/words/concepts/etc are

mithya, what he is really saying is that all of these are conventions,

not real in their own right. In this regard, you might wish to have a

look at the following 2-part article by Swami Dayananda Saraswati, one

of the foremost contemporary teachers of Advaita.

 

http://www.avgsatsang.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_One.pdf

http://www.avgsatsang.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_Two.pdf

 

The explanation of mithya in the first part is one of the clearest I

have ever come across, and seems to be similar to the Buddhist

shunyata from what little I have understood of the latter.

 

However Ken Wilber (who is supposedly a follower of the Madhayamika

system), in one of his books, makes a very clear reference to the

substratum. This has left me confused on whether the Madhyamika-s

accept the substratum at all. Sankara's one -sentence criticism of the

Madhyamika teaching in his sutrabhashya (as I have understood it) is

that negating things **without affirming the Self as the substratum**

is tantamount to nihilism. However, some people opine that this is a

criticism not of Nagarjuna's system but of a later variant propounded

by Dharmakirti.

 

Would greatly appreciate any clarification from you on this matter.

 

SrI gurubhyo namaH

Ramesh

[Guest guest]

Sri Ramesh:

 

 

 

I have been thinking hard about the question you pose, and think it a

fascinating issue to explore. But in attempting to craft a response, I have

already laid out something so lengthy that I'm going to need to break it

into sections, so as not to overwhelm the list with some massive and

ponderous tome. It is, however, worth exploring from my perspective, though

my perspective is that of someone who has come out of that tradition and is

still struggling to articulate why I no longer found it fulfilling. And, to

do so in a manner that in no way can be read or misread as being

disrespectful to a tradition to which I owe a great deal of gratitude and

from which I have derived several principles and practices that I am

confident will remain fully applicable as I continue to evolve and pursue a

complete comprehension of my ultimate nature and strive to fulfill my

ultimate purpose in this human life.

 

 

 

I also want to apologize in advance if any of my posts are longer than they

need be. This is challenging terrain, and I do not want to assume anything

with respect to prior knowledge. You are I'm sure well-versed in what we

are attempting to discuss, but since this is on a list rather than a simple

one-to-one email exchange, I want to make sure I am contributing to the

advancement of the purposes of this list as a whole. I'm a brand new member

of this community, and perhaps am being overly-cautious in not wanting to

"dominate the rap," as the Grateful Dead once sang - sorry for the pop cult

reference, I couldn't help myself. :^)

 

 

 

I am going to begin in my next post with some preliminary thoughts that I

feel are important to be explicit about, and then to continue from there for

so long as others feel it is not detrimental to the purposes of this list.

With sincere humility I must admit that I am no expert on any of this, and

can only present that which I understand to the best of my very limited

abilities. If at any time, my posts on this issue become objectionable, I

will gladly demur, because I do not want my self-interest in this subject to

negatively affect the integrity of the Advaitin list.

 

 

 

OK, to give the ending of this saga away in advance: My own personal

experience is that I was unable to conclude that it would be would be

consistent with the tenets of Buddhism to conceive of or recognize a

substratum, label that as the divinity, and engage in studies and practices

aimed towards greater understanding of and communion/unity with this

Ultimate Existence *as the Divine Principle*. In other words, once I

arrived at this position, I felt a need to embrace a tradition that, while

authentically non-dual, not only embraced this Divinity, but drew all of its

principles and practices from the presupposition of its existence. And I

could not find that in Madhyamika-Mahayana, at least not to the explicit

degree I felt that I personally required. There is, as I may address a bit

in a later post, a further elaboration of the Mahayana, known as Yogachara,

and my understanding is that Yogachara does indeed posit the existence of

some sort of underlying substratum of consciousness in some manner. But it

is so shrouded in mystery, indeed secrecy, that it is virtually

unapproachable for all but the most advanced practitioners of the Highest

Yoga Tantra of the Vajrayana. This, to me, was simply not satisfactory to

my predilections and dispositions.

 

 

 

One person's God is perhaps another person's Shunyata. For me, though,

perhaps I am a very simple person. I love complexity, and yet in the end I

like things to be as straightforward as possible. I prefer to call God,

"God." Or Brahman. Or any of myriad other names. But not empty. That, I

personally cannot do.

 

 

 

Namaste,

 

Neil

 

 

 

_____

 

advaitin [advaitin] On Behalf

Of Ramesh Krishnamurthy

Tuesday, January 30, 2007 10:47 AM

advaitin

To Sri Neil

 

 

 

Namaste Sri Neil,

 

On 29/01/07, nlg108108 <nlg_108 (AT) comcast (DOT) <nlg_108%40comcast.net> net>

wrote:

> And second, I just want to say that your description of the negation of

> apparent conceptions of "I" is just marvelous. For several years I

> studied and practiced according to the Madyamika-Prasangika, as

> expounded by Nagarjuna in his Mulamadyamikakarika, and the principle

> commentators of that work. And you seem to hit on the nub of what

> became for me an irreconcileable problem: once all has been negated,

> there is still some "thing" left, which I am now recognizing as the

true

> "I" (Atman) and -- as you point out in your discussion of the universe

> -- its complete identity with the ultimate basis of reality, Brahman.

> This is precisely what led me to Advaita-Vedanta

 

I am delighted to know that you have been a longtime practitioner of

the Prasangika-Madhyamika teachings. I have always had many doubts

about where exactly is it that the Madhyamika teachings differ from

those of Advaita. We have had discussions on this in the past and

while those discussions were useful, they were far from being

conclusive.

 

>From what I have understood so far, it appears that the Madhyamika

system in general avoids taking a stance on the substratum of all

apparent phenomena, which according to Advaita-Vedanta is the Self or

Brahman. Some commentators hold the view that the Vedantic Brahman is

the same as the shunyata of the Madhyamika-s. But I have always felt

that shunyata is equivalent to the Vedantic mithya rather than

Brahman. When the Vedantin says that the world/words/concepts/etc are

mithya, what he is really saying is that all of these are conventions,

not real in their own right. In this regard, you might wish to have a

look at the following 2-part article by Swami Dayananda Saraswati, one

of the foremost contemporary teachers of Advaita.

 

http://www.avgsatsa <http://www.avgsatsang.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_One.pdf>

ng.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_One.pdf

http://www.avgsatsa <http://www.avgsatsang.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_Two.pdf>

ng.org/hhpsds/pdf/Samadhi_Two.pdf

 

The explanation of mithya in the first part is one of the clearest I

have ever come across, and seems to be similar to the Buddhist

shunyata from what little I have understood of the latter.

 

However Ken Wilber (who is supposedly a follower of the Madhayamika

system), in one of his books, makes a very clear reference to the

substratum. This has left me confused on whether the Madhyamika-s

accept the substratum at all. Sankara's one -sentence criticism of the

Madhyamika teaching in his sutrabhashya (as I have understood it) is

that negating things **without affirming the Self as the substratum**

is tantamount to nihilism. However, some people opine that this is a

criticism not of Nagarjuna's system but of a later variant propounded

by Dharmakirti.

 

Would greatly appreciate any clarification from you on this matter.

 

SrI gurubhyo namaH

Ramesh

[Guest guest]

Sri Ramesh:

 

 

 

Here, I will attempt to give you my take on the distinction I perceive

between Advaita and Madhyamaka on the question of an ultimately existing

substratum of reality, or Brahman. Long as this post is, it is far too

short to properly treat of the subject, but I hope it may provide some

clarification. Writing it certainly helped me, so for that I must thank you

deeply for asking me the question in the first place.

 

 

 

I've read Swami Dayananda Saraswati's explanation of mithya, and I do

believe that this concept is a far more likely candidate for a parallel to

Shunyata than is Brahman, though I am not sure I understand it clearly

enough to state whether I actually think it is parallel. For that, I need

to ponder and perhaps study more deeply.

 

 

 

Preliminarily, and although he is not considered an ultimate arbiter of

Buddhist doctrine for most Buddhists, most agree that His Holiness the Dalai

Lama ("HHDL") is quite knowledgeable about Tibetan Buddhism, especially the

Gelugpa school, in which the Prasangika-Madhyamaka is considered to be the

source of highest wisdom. HHDL has emphatically stated, in ecumenical

discussions with religious leaders, that Buddhism does not posit any

creator. He does not debate the point, for to him there is no need. He

believes deeply that all religions are paths to the truth, and that while

for some a non-theistic tradition such as Buddhism is the right path, for

others a theistic tradition is equally valid. And I do agree with him.

Given the Buddha's agnosticism on the point (I believe he demurred whenever

asked such questions), it is quite proper to leave it at that and hold that

Buddhism does not expound any claims of exclusivity with respect to such

questions.

 

 

 

However, many in the 2500 years since the Buddha's time have taken it

further, and thus it will probably be beneficial here to look at some

relatively authoritative sources directly from the Madhyamika literature. I

say "relatively" because there really are few, if any, absolutely

authoritative sources within the Mahayana. This is not necessarily so for

the Theravada, for whom the Pali canon is considered quite authoritative on

many points. Inasmuch as I do not read Sanskrit, for both Shankarakshita

and Chandrakirti, as well as their commentator, I am using the translation

of the highly regarded Padmakara Translation Committee. For Nagarjuna, I am

using Jay L. Garfield's translation.

 

 

 

Shantarakshita was the eighth century abbot of Nalanda, and his work, the

Madhyamakalankara, is considered by some to be the pinnacle of exposition of

Prasangika-Madhyamaka, in that in this work the author managed to accomplish

a full synthesis of three divergent trends: Nagarjuna's original Madhyamaka,

the "Mind-Only" school of Yogachara originating with Asanga, and the

tradition of Dharmakirti. In stanza 2 of his Madhyamakalankara, he states:

 

 

 

"Producing their effects sequentially,

 

Eternal entities cannot be 'one.'

 

If each of their effects is different from the others,

 

These entities can have no permanence."

 

 

 

Confusing, perhaps. But luckily, we have Jamgon Mipham, a Nyingma and major

figure in the Rime (nonsectarian) movement in Tibet, who around the turn of

the 20th Century, wrote what is considered to be the authoritative

commentary on Shantarakshita's work here, and he states:

 

 

 

"Broadly speaking, if, within the field of phenomena, a single, truly

existent entity could be found, it would be impossible to divide it into

aspects. Such an entity would have to be uniformly one, irrespective of

spatial direction and the passage of time. But if such were the case, the

separate manifestation of all knowledge-objects contained within the whole

of time and space would be impossible. All would necessarily become a

single, undivided thing, like space. This, however, is not the case. For

we do perceive an infinite variety of appearances existing in terms of

spatial extension and temporal duration, and these can only appear because

there is no such thing as a single, truly existent entity."

 

 

 

We have, thus, an answer. Not necessarily *the* answer, because in

Buddhism, there rarely are any such definitive propositions.

 

 

 

Nevertheless, Chandrakirti did address the nature of reality and its (in his

view) lack of inherent existence even on the level of some substratum, and

he did so from numerous angles in his grand work, the Madhyamakavatara:

 

 

 

Chapter 6, Stanza 114:

 

 

 

"And therefore since phenomena are not produced

 

Uncaused, nor are the handiwork of God,

 

Do not arise from self, from other, nor from both of these things,

 

They do indeed arise dependently."

 

 

 

I am curious what Sanskrit word Chandrakirti used, that the Padmakara

Translation Committee chose to translate as "God." Be that as it may,

Jamgon Mipham also provides us with an excellent commentary to this work,

and with respect to this stanza, he states:

 

 

 

"First of all, as it has been explained, since phenomena, outer and inner,

are not produced uncaused, nor are they produced through divine creation nor

by evolution through time from atoms, prakriti, purusha, Vishnu and so

forth, they arise merely as effects deriving from causes and conditions."

 

 

 

This is an extraordinarily brief distillation of an extremely lengthy and

complex mode of reasoning. The Sixth Chapter of Chandrakirti's work alone

takes 226 Stanzas to work out. But I think I have captured, in one example

(and thus only in one dimension of a multidimensional treatise), the gist of

his thought on the subject.

 

 

 

Working backwards in time, Nagarjuna's work is by far the most challenging

of the Madhyamaka literature. One truly has to spend considerable time with

the methodology, and work through many elaborate sets of proofs even to

approach comprehension. However, I'll quote one stanza from the

Mulamadhyamakakarika:

 

 

 

Chapter 15, Stanza 8:

 

 

 

"If existence were through essence,

 

Then there would be no nonexistence.

 

A change in essence

 

Could never be tenable."

 

 

 

I must note, however, that for Nagarjuna it is far more complicated then

just that. He is, at this point in his work, attacking both sides as it

were - refuting those who would say, "it is," on the one hand, and the

nihilists who might say, "it isn't" on the other. For once one truly

understands the Madhyamaka, one perhaps will understand the proposition that

phenomena are neither of the nature of "being" nor "nonbeing" nor both nor

neither. All phenomena.

 

 

 

For most Madhyamakas, it is sufficient to stop there.

 

 

 

For me, though, this is where I paused to ask myself, what can be neither

being nor nonbeing nor both nor neither? And I think I heard an answer:

Brahman.

 

 

 

I've oversimplified considerably, eliding many nuances, twists and turns in

the process, but I am hopeful this sheds some light on the subject. I am

more than happy to continue if it would be productive, to the extent of my

abilities.

 

 

 

 

 

Namaste,

 

Neil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_____

 

advaitin [advaitin] On Behalf

Of Ramesh Krishnamurthy

Tuesday, January 30, 2007 10:47 AM

 

 

 

 

Some commentators hold the view that the Vedantic Brahman is

the same as the shunyata of the Madhyamaka-s. But I have always felt

that shunyata is equivalent to the Vedantic mithya rather than

Brahman.

 

 

 

However Ken Wilber (who is supposedly a follower of the Madhayamika

system), in one of his books, makes a very clear reference to the

substratum. This has left me confused on whether the Madhyamaka-s

accept the substratum at all. Sankara's one -sentence criticism of the

Madhyamaka teaching in his sutrabhashya (as I have understood it) is

that negating things **without affirming the Self as the substratum**

is tantamount to nihilism. However, some people opine that this is a

criticism not of Nagarjuna's system but of a later variant propounded

by Dharmakirti.

 

Would greatly appreciate any clarification from you on this matter.

 

SrI gurubhyo namaH

Ramesh