Introduction to Vedanta-7

[Guest guest]

Brahman and the world

 

In proclaiming that ‘consciousness is Brahman’, as an

aphoristic statement, Vedanta essentially provides a

fundamental definition for Brahman. Brahman being

infinite, it cannot be defined since whatever that can

be defined becomes an object, and thus limited by

other objects. Object is different from the subject

and that which is objectified can only be inert

entity, jadam. But the definition provided by Vedanta

is therefore not meant for objectification, since it

is the very consciousness that cannot be objectified.

Then what is the meaning of this so called aphoristic

statement “consciousness is Brahman’, if one cannot

objectify or even meditate on it.

 

Careful analysis therefore indicates that it is also a

pointer to arrive at the knowledge of Brahman by

negating all that which is inert as not Brahman – all

that which can be objectified as ‘this’ and ‘this’ is

not Brahman. One cannot say ‘this is consciousness’

or ‘this is Brahman’, since the very statement makes

it as inert entity, which is not Brahman. This is the

reason why ‘science’ cannot objectively study

consciousness, as some of scientists are attempting to

do, since the very study makes it an object and thus

different from ‘consciousness’.

 

We have discussed that the inert object or even the

world cannot be established without being aware of by

a conscious entity. That is, inert should be within

the consciousness, for one to be conscious of the

inert. The statement is similar to that an object

should be flooded by light for one to see it. Hence,

the inert has to be pervaded by the consciousness or

within the consciousness, if one is conscious of the

inert. If one is aware of the world which is

infinite, then the consciousness because of which one

is aware of the world should be infinite too.

 

-Sir, I do not understand this concocted logic. You

say world is infinite on one side and on the other

side, you say consciousness is infinite. In addition

consciousness should pervade the inert, if one is

conscious of the inert. How can you have two infinite

entities diagonally opposite to each other and one

pervading the other? In addition, you have also not

explained how Brahman who is of the nature of infinite

consciousness can be cause for an inert universe. All

you have established so far is that inert entity

cannot exist independent of the consciousness. You

have also mentioned that Brahman cannot be the creator

also since creation is an action and infinite cannot

act. At the same time Brahman is supposed to be the

both the material and intelligent cause for the

universe. What exactly is the relation between

consciousness, Brahman, and the Universe which is

inert?

 

OK. You caught me. Please follow me closely. Let us go

step by step and everything should ultimately fit in.

First, we will use a rational analysis and then the

scriptural analysis.

 

Knowledge of an object:

 

We now know that without consciousness, the existence

of the world cannot be established. World has two

components – one is the finite objects and the other

is the subtler one, space, which is infinite. There

is also a third one that is part of the universe which

arises with interaction of Universe with the mind –

the time concept. Understanding of the Universe

therefore involves not only understanding of the

objects, Space as well as time concept.

Thanks to Einstein, he showed that both space and time

are relative or essentially related. Movement in

space creates time and movement in time creates space.

Space and time somehow are interlinked with the mind.

Let us analyze these slowly.

 

Object – Does it really exist?

 

Existence of the object is intimately related to the

knowledge of the object. I cannot talk about the

existence of any object without the knowledge of its

existence, if not physically at least conceptually.

Therefore object is (is-ness is associated with its

existence), means knowledge of the existence in terms

of ‘the object is’. Let us illustrate this with an

example. Let me ask you, ‘Can you bring the ‘gaa gaa

buu bu’ that you have in your room?’ – ‘What the hell

is this ‘gaa gaa buu bu’ that I have in my room? What

is that weird stuff, gaa gaa buu bu, anyway, and what

is it doing in my room?’ – ‘Well, I do not know what

it is or what it does either, but I heard that you

have it in your room. Can you bring it?’- ‘You are

crazy, you are asking me to bring something neither

you nor I know what it is.’ – This crazy conversation

is just to point out that we cannot talk of the

existence of an object, without the knowledge its

existence. Hence world is or the world exists means

I or some conscious entity has the knowledge of its

existence. Thus, knowledge and existence of an object

go together. They, in fact, are essentially the ‘chit’

and ‘sat’ aspects of Brahman.

 

What is knowledge?

 

Interestingly, ‘knowledge’ cannot be defined. All I

can talk about is ‘knowledge of’- of this or that

which is nothing but knowledge of objects. For

example, knowledge of Chemistry, knowledge of Physics,

knowledge of Vedanta, and knowledge of the World. All

that is informative knowledge. He is very

knowledgeable means he has lot of information stored

in his memory. Can I define knowledge devoid of any

objects? Knowledge devoid of objects cannot be

defined! Knowledge devoid of objects is nothing but

the knowledge of the ‘subject’, I, which cannot be

defined. Why ‘I’ cannot be defined? Because, any

definition is objectification, and ‘I am’ is the

subject that cannot be objectified. At the most one

can define ‘I’ only by means of a negative statement;

‘I’ is that, which is not subject to objectification’.

– Oh! This is all intellectual. I am interested only

in Self-realization, not in this mind-boggling logic.

– Existence of I and therefore knowledge of I is

neither intellectual nor non-intellectual – it is

factual knowledge. That I am a man is not intellectual

understanding – it is a factual understanding.

And it is not by accident that it is the same

definition that we can give to Brahman. Therefore

pure knowledge devoid of any object is the

‘consciousness’ that I am. I am conscious of all the

objects that I know. I am also self-conscious, as we

discussed before, which is not a knowledge of … but

pure knowledge. In other words that is my very nature

or swaruupa laxaNa of myself – which Vedanta calls as

‘chit’ swaruupam. I am the nature of consciousness.

This statement should not be a statement of thought at

the intellect level but clear understanding that I am

conscious entity because of which I am even conscious

of this statement of thought.

 

We have already defined that consciousness is infinite

and it is Brahman. I am also of the nature of

consciousness. Another identity relation ‘I am

Brahman’ should follow. But the problem is, I am not

infinite like Brahman, at least I do not feel like I

am infinite. I will be deluded if I think I am

infinite, while being finite. I am limited by this

universe of objects, all the time. In fact, I am

limited by space, time and by other objects in the

universe. In fact, that is my fundamental problem -

the limitations that I experience all the time. And

you say I am Brahman – how can that be? I am not the

object – neti, neti – etc that you mentioned before –

I am not this and not this – and that is how I am

supposed to arrive at myself. This means I am

different from this and this. Being different from all

this, this, and this, I am limited by all the objects,

nay the whole world, since they are all different from

me. At the same time you say I am Brahman, the all

pervading infinite consciousness. There seems to be

some internal contradiction here. Please explain.

We stated that the existence of an object ‘out there’

depends on the knowledge of its existence. Knowledge

of the object, however, involves a knower, the

conscious entity that I am, and the object that is

being known and the process of knowing which involves

a pramaaNa, the means of knowledge. Knowledge can only

takes places in the intellect. Let us examine closely

the mechanics of how the knowledge takes place.

Objects have attributes that can be measured by our

five senses. Eyes can only see form and colors, nose

the smell, tongue the taste, ears the sound and skin

the texture (soft or hard etc). These are attributes

only and not substantive, which is the locus for these

attributes. None of the senses can grasp the

substantive of the objects (substantive is the matter

that the object is made up of). Perception therefore

involves sense input to the mind. Mind gathers the

input from the sense, integrates all the input and

projects an image in the mind with all the attributes

it has gathered (form, color, smell, texture, etc).

This is the cognitive process that occurs in the mind.

The cognized image is then compared with the previous

images stored in the memory by the intellect. If there

is match, then the object is recognized (re-cognized).

 

 

During the learning process, mother shows a child a

cow and says that is a cow. The child stores not only

the image but also the name for that form or image.

Next time when mother shows another cow which has a

different color, child starts understanding the common

features of the two cows (called jaati) as well as

individual (vyakti) differences between the cows (one

is black and the other white, etc). That is how the

knowledge of objects are gathered and stored in the

memory bank. What are perceived are the attributes

through the five sense input. An image is formed in

the mind using the sense input. The image is stored in

the memory along with a name associated with that

image. Thus we have a name and form (naama and ruupa)

associated with stored image of an object. Next time

when the child sees a cow, he immediately recognizes

it as a cow, based on his memory. Mental images are

nothing but thoughts in the mind. If someone says a

word ‘cow’, immediately an image of a cow is brought

in from the memory, even when there is no cow outside.

The name cow and the image cow are now intimately

associated with each other, as both are stored in

memory. All are thoughts. What I think about myself

is also images of myself as I am this or I am that,

etc which are again nothing but thoughts. This is

also the form of my ego. What I project about myself

in all my transactions is also image of myself as I

see myself, or sometime what I want others to see

myself. All our transactions are at these image

levels. This is all part of vyavahaara or

transactional self which is different from my true

self. My true self is the consciousness that I am

because of which I am aware of all these transactions

at the image level. Descartes statement ‘I think,

therefore I am’ – is essentially egotistical self that

I am which is related to the images of myself in the

mind. The recollection of the image of a cow from the

memory based on the word ‘cow’ is called pratyabhijna.

I can only recollect what I have stored in my memory.

What I store in my memory is based on the knowledge of

the objects gathered through various means of

knowledge (pramaaNa). Thus our life runs at this

thought level all the time.

 

When I say the object is ‘out there’, it follows from

the above description of the cognitive processes that

there is an image of the object in the mind and that

it is the image as ‘a thought’ that I am conscious

of. When I perceive the object, it is important to

note that I do not perceive the substantive of the

object. Vishishtaadvaitins as well as dvaitins wrongly

assume that one perceives the substantive too when the

senses gather the attributes, since substantive is

inseparable from their locus. Mind makes an

inferential statement which is established by

experience that attributes cannot exist with out a

substantive. Therefore it is inferred image of the

object as perceived through the senses that ‘there is

an object out there with these attributes’. The

reason we cannot also perceive the substantive is in

tune with the Vedic assertion that substantive is

nothing but Brahman, since Brahman is the material

cause for the universe and Brahman cannot be

perceived. This is categorically stated again and

again by Vedanta, that there is nothing (no thing)

other than Brahman (neha naanaasti kinchana), and in

deed every thing is nothing but Brahman (sarvam

khalvidam brahma).

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri SadAnanda,

 

Please accept my pranAms and hope you will allow me to make some

comments with regard to recent posting.

 

 

> When I say the object is `out there', it follows from

> the above description of the cognitive processes that

> there is an image of the object in the mind and that

> it is the image as `a thought' that I am conscious

> of. When I perceive the object, it is important to

> note that I do not perceive the substantive of the

> object. Vishishtaadvaitins as well as dvaitins wrongly

> assume that one perceives the substantive too when the

> senses gather the attributes, since substantive is

> inseparable from their locus.

 

 

In my opinion V.Advaita is not like Dvaita.

 

It is closer to Advaita as it accepts the upAdAna kAraNa of Brahman.

The difference is shown as a prakAra or amsha or shareera of Brahman!

 

Prakriti is the Shakti of Brahman and jIva is an amsha or shareera of

Brahman.

 

Thus primary meanings have been taken from the bhEda and abhEda vakyAs

Of vEda.

 

 

>Mind makes an

> inferential statement which is established by

> experience that attributes cannot exist with out a

> substantive. Therefore it is inferred image of the

> object as perceived through the senses that `there is

> an object out there with these attributes'. The

> reason we cannot also perceive the substantive is in

> tune with the Vedic assertion that substantive is

> nothing but Brahman, since Brahman is the material

> cause for the universe and Brahman cannot be

> perceived. This is categorically stated again and

> again by Vedanta, that there is nothing (no thing)

> other than Brahman (neha naanaasti kinchana), and in

> deed every thing is nothing but Brahman (sarvam

> khalvidam brahma).

>

 

The substance of jagat is food. Brahman creates this jagat as food.

Therefore it exists for the enjoyment of Brahman.

 

In V.advaita, the substance of jIva belongs to and is owned by

Brahman just like Shareera belongs to and owned by the Atma.

 

nEha nanAsti actually means jagat as a sense object is not

the "other". Jagat as food arises from the fire of VaishvAnara! It

should therefore be returned back to Him in the form of yagnya.

 

All senses/sense objects therefore have to be offered as havis in the

fire of the universal spirit of Brahman!

 

The jiva or purusha and the material jagat or prakriti are definitely

different. But they are not disconnected. Every perception

establishes that relation or yOga between purusha and prakriti.

 

Therefore there must be a third entity that is different from both to

establish the relation. That third entity is Brahman who is the

antaryAmi or soul of both!

 

Thus in V.Advaita the reality of prakriti, jiva and Brahman are

accepted and the difference and relation are both established as

shareera-shareeri.

 

Namaste

Suresh

[Guest guest]

Shree Suresh

PraNAms.

 

Thanks for your comments on the V. Advaita. I do agree

that V.Advaita accepts Brahman as the material cause

for the universe, unlike dwaita philosophy.

 

What I was referring to is relationless-relation

between substance and the attributes, apRithak Siddhi,

which is emphasized by V.advaita. This is in contrast

to the advaita where Brahman, the consciousness, alone

is the material cause for the universe. This is where

the mithyaatma vaada is rooted in terms of the

invalidity of the reality of the objects or the world.

The world is of course more than at the thought

level of the jiiva as emphasized in Mandukya - I am

going to address some of these issues in coming posts

when I discuss about the microcosm and macrocosm

aspects along the laya and pralaya at individual and

collective levels. Ultimately everything should fit in

scripturally as well as logically.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

 

 

--- sureshsmr <sureshsmr (AT) hotmail (DOT) com> wrote:

 

> Dear Sri SadAnanda,

>

> Please accept my pranAms and hope you will allow me

> to make some

> comments with regard to recent posting.

[Guest guest]

Pranam Sri.Sadananda gAru,

 

Please allow me to submit some comments on your observation.

 

 

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

 

>

> Object – Does it really exist?

>

> Existence of the object is intimately related to the

> knowledge of the object. I cannot talk about the

> existence of any object without the knowledge of its

> existence, if not physically at least conceptually.

 

On the other hand, knowledge of any objects can not be gained unless

they do exist in reality.

 

`Knowledge of Objects' is different from `Knowledge of its

Existence' and which in turn different from `Existence of Objects'

 

While former two are items of our knowledge, the later is the item

of reality.

 

One needs to clearly distinguish the subtle difference between them.

 

>Let us examine closely

> the mechanics of how the knowledge takes place.

> Objects have attributes that can be measured by our

> five senses.

 

How did you know there is such thing as `object' and they have such

thing as `attributes'? Is it an assumption of a fact?

 

Your below argument is entirely based on above premise.

 

>Eyes can only see form and colors, nose

> the smell, tongue the taste, ears the sound and skin

> the texture (soft or hard etc). These are attributes

> only and not substantive, which is the locus for these

> attributes. None of the senses can grasp the

> substantive of the objects (substantive is the matter

> that the object is made up of).

 

If so, your initial basis (that `Objects have attributes that can be

measured by our five senses') is not valid and just an assumption,

just like Vishishtaadvaitins & Dvaitins as you accuse.

 

 

> During the learning process, mother shows a child a

> cow and says that is a cow. The child stores not only

> the image but also the name for that form or image.

>

 

But, how did child know so & so is its `mother' in the first place?

As such `mother' could as well be another input image sensing by

child's sensory organs, and thus has no `substantive` reality ?!

 

 

> When I say the object is `out there', it follows from

> the above description of the cognitive processes that

> there is an image of the object in the mind and that

> it is the image as `a thought' that I am conscious

> of. When I perceive the object, it is important to

> note that I do not perceive the substantive of the

> object. Vishishtaadvaitins as well as dvaitins wrongly

> assume that one perceives the substantive too when the

> senses gather the attributes, since substantive is

> inseparable from their locus. Mind makes an

> inferential statement which is established by

> experience that attributes cannot exist with out a

> substantive. Therefore it is inferred image of the

> object as perceived through the senses that `there is

> an object out there with these attributes'. The

> reason we cannot also perceive the substantive is in

> tune with the Vedic assertion that substantive is

> nothing but Brahman, since Brahman is the material

> cause for the universe and Brahman cannot be

> perceived. This is categorically stated again and

> again by Vedanta, that there is nothing (no thing)

> other than Brahman (neha naanaasti kinchana), and in

> deed every thing is nothing but Brahman (sarvam

> khalvidam brahma).

>

 

Well, the very premise of your position (that Brahman is material

cause and thus not perceptable) is disputed by Dvaitins, and

therefore your characterization of their theory of perception as

wrong is in itself on wrong footings.

 

Regards,

Srinivas

[Guest guest]

Pranam Sri.Sadananda gAru,

 

Please allow me to submit some comments on your observation.

 

 

praNAms

Hare Krishna

 

Since this series of *Introduction to vEdAnta* started by Sri Sadananda

prabhuji for the benefit of novices in vEdAnta...I request those who are

already mastered their vEdAnta from their respective school not to come in

the way & donot give any room for debate...As we all know, this list is

exclusively dedicated to Advaita philosophy as taught by shankara, so these

introductory mails on vEdAnta are obviously from that non-dual

perspective....We do know, other dualistic schools treat these concepts

from their own perspective...but let us not discuss those at this point of

time & digress from the main goal. I hope members from other schools would

appreciate this cause.

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

--- Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p > wrote:

 

>

> Pranam Sri.Sadananda gAru,

>

> Please allow me to submit some comments on your

> observation.

Shree Srinivas - PraNAms.

 

Some of your comments are valid and will be taken up

as we discuss the creation at micro and macro levels,

which are also the essence of Madukya Upanishad. These

will be clarified to the best I can. you may bring

these issues again if you think it helps in the

presentation.

 

Shree Baskerji also expressed his valid concerns. The

topics will be addressed, as stated clearly in the

introductory post, based on my understanding of

Advaita Vedanta. As you know me, I will be least

interested in any dialectic arguments. I will

definitely address the logical issues that you have

raised as part of my posts.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

>

>

>

Sri Srinivas wrote:

 

"How did you know there is such thing as `object' and they have such

thing as `attributes'? Is it an assumption of a fact?"

 

Frankly, Sada-ji I was also stumped by your wordings. Isn't it more accurate

to say that all we know through pratyaksha is attributes only?

 

Dvaitins would make us believe that an object is identical with its

attributes. Therefore, for a human, an apple is identical with its red

color. For a dog, the same apple is identical to its gray color. For some

lower species with fewer senses, the same apple is identical to something

entirely different.

 

However, based on advaita epiestemology can we ever make any claim about the

existence of any 'object' other than the attributes we directly perceive?

 

praNAm

[Guest guest]

Namaste, Sri. Sadaananda gAru,

 

 

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

>

>

> Shree Srinivas - PraNAms.

>

> Some of your comments are valid and will be taken up

> as we discuss the creation at micro and macro levels,

> which are also the essence of Madukya Upanishad. These

> will be clarified to the best I can. you may bring

> these issues again if you think it helps in the

> presentation.

>

 

Thanks for your reply. I'll look forward for your future discussion

which address the those issues I have raised.

 

> Shree Baskerji also expressed his valid concerns. The

> topics will be addressed, as stated clearly in the

> introductory post, based on my understanding of

> Advaita Vedanta. As you know me, I will be least

> interested in any dialectic arguments. I will

> definitely address the logical issues that you have

> raised as part of my posts.

>

 

Yes Sir, I am quite aware that this forum is to discuss non-dual

philosophy only. Accordingly I am also not interested in dialectic

and digress from the topic. However, you brought up a important

issue of guNa-guNi and characterized Dvaitin's position as `they

wrongly assume' etc..; which prompted me to reply highlighting those

logical difficulties in your own exposition.

 

I know very well that your good self is least interested in any

dialectic arguments as such. However, I sincerely feel that if one

were to assert pUrva-paxin's position as simply `wrong', it is not

out of place to expect an explanation why it is wrong and also

expect such person to not shy away from further discussion/debate

till it is resolved.

 

Looking forward for your future articles.

 

With warm regards,

Srinivas.

 

> Hari Om!

> Sadananda

>

[Guest guest]

Namaste, Sri. Sanjay Srivastava.

 

advaitin, "Sanjay Srivastava"

<sksrivastava68 wrote:

>

> >

> >

> >

> Sri Srinivas wrote:

>

> "How did you know there is such thing as `object' and they have

such

> thing as `attributes'? Is it an assumption of a fact?"

>

> Frankly, Sada-ji I was also stumped by your wordings. Isn't it

more accurate

> to say that all we know through pratyaksha is attributes only?

>

 

With all due respect, it is also not accurate.

 

In order for us to say "all we know through pratyaksha is

attributes only", we need to know apriori that there is such thing

as `attribute' which is different from another thing

called `substance'. Given absence of perception of such two

distinct things, we are not even in the position of saying we

perceive `attributes only'. The keyword `only' applies only when we

know there two things in question.

 

Instead, our experience is, when we perceive an apple, we do not

just perceive just `redness' or `sweetness' etc..; rather we

perceive single unitary thing called `apple' at that locus, which is

having multifaceted features such

as `redness', `roundness', `sweetness', `hardness' etc etc..which we

label them as `attributes' for our convention.

 

Another interesting thing is, we also perceive some features of such

single unitary thing changes along the time (such as green apple

turn into red, or sour apple turn into sweet etc). We can not

explain these changes in `attributes' without positing a constant

entity called `substance'. However, we also perceive (and knows)

that some attributes last as long as the substance itself.

 

 

 

> Dvaitins would make us believe that an object is identical with its

> attributes. Therefore, for a human, an apple is identical with its

red

> color. For a dog, the same apple is identical to its gray color.

For some

> lower species with fewer senses, the same apple is identical to

something

> entirely different.

>

 

`Dvaitins' does not ask anyone to `believe'. The explanation was

always based on the day-to-day experience.

 

As for as dogs and lower species concerned, how do we know they

perceive something entirely different? At best we can say we do not

know what they perceive. In the same line, one could always argue

that since they do not know/perceive Brahman, Brahman does not exist

in reality? All epistemological exposition is for us human only, for

it is we are the one after the chatur-vida purushArtha in life.

 

> However, based on advaita epiestemology can we ever make any claim

about the

> existence of any 'object' other than the attributes we directly

perceive?

>

 

Yes, advaita epistemology can make claims about existence

of `objects' or `substance' which are not currently perceptible.

Such `substance' are called `atIndriya vastu' in general. In

Advaitic context, it is substantive `Brahman' who is adhisTAna for

this jagat. That part of epistemology (pramANa vichAra) which deals

with Brahman as `atIndriya adhisTAna' is shabda-pramAna, which is

shruti-pramAna. However, the very validity of the conclusion

that `Brahman is adhisTAna' presupposes validity of premise shruti,

which in turn can not be valid unless it is also an substance on its

own turn without it being conceived as `attribute only'. This is

because, shruti as shabda-pramANa gets its validity only because of

it being apourushEya. ApoursuhEya implies it is uncreated and in

turn that implies it is ever existent (anAdi) `substance' in its own

turn.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Srinivas ji. Your explanation is pretty much in line with

standard dvaita interpretation. I understand that dvaita epiestemology

is quite self consistent within itself and I do not have any issues

with that. But you write:

 

> As for as dogs and lower species concerned, how do we know they

> perceive something entirely different? At best we can say we do not

> know what they perceive.

 

I think neither dvaitins nor advaitins are in a position to make any

authoritative claim about this. The best person to ask about this is a

biologist and at the current level of knowledge they do not seem to

agree with you. Therefore, let us for the time being grant them a

benefit of doubt. Let us assume that biologists know what they are

saying when they claim that a dog perceives an apple as gray. If

tomorrow they change their understanding, I will be happy to take back

my argument.

 

Moreover, it seems to me quite reasonable to conclude that a lower

species with say only three sense of organs will 'perceive' attributes

only along those three dimensions. It is quite a leap of faith to

believe that a species that lacks a sense of smell still somehow

perceives the attribute of an apple's smell. Though I cannot prove you

wrong if you hold it otherwise.

 

praNAm

[Guest guest]

Shree Sanjay Srivatsava,

 

For some reason I missed your mail.

 

I am taking from Shree Srinivas comments on yours.

 

--- Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p > wrote:

 

> Namaste, Sri. Sanjay Srivastava.

 

> > Frankly, Sada-ji I was also stumped by your

> wordings. Isn't it

> more accurate

> > to say that all we know through pratyaksha is

> attributes only?

 

> With all due respect, it is also not accurate.

 

With the same respects I must say Sanjay your are

absolutely correct. we know through pratyaksha the

attributes only. That is the precisely the point I was

making in that jumbled up words, hoping our chief

moderator/editor would correct the language before it

is stored in files. Of course attributes cannot be

there without a locus. I argued that a mind makes an

inference also that there must be an object out there

since attributes cannot exist without an object out

there. Shreenivas raised two points worth

consideration - for the mind to make an inference, it

should be based on vyaapti which itself is again based

on pratyaksha. The second point of course is related

to how the knowledge of objects occurs in the life

forms where the mind is not evovled - this includes

even in children. This is where the global mind or

Iswara does come into picture and that involves

macrocosom aspects or what scientifically termed as

instinctive knowledge-base.

To analyze this exactly only the dream-state is used

by the Upanishads to establish the apparent reality to

the universe of experiences.

 

I do not want to get into these off-hand discussions

on the topics. I will take up some of the objections

as part my own presentation and will address the

issues to the best I can.

 

Shree Srinivas - with due respects to you - . My

statement was factual and dwaitin's may have their

justification and you could discuss that in other

lists. This forum as Bhaskarji rightly pointed out is

intended for advaitic view point and my arguments are

within that scope.

 

You are welcome of course to bring in logical

contradictions that should be resolved.

 

With this, I am going to continue my write-up with due

consideration of the points that were raised.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda