The Swami and the Rose

[Guest guest]

Hi Dennis,

I have been pondering your advaita story. I here

append a few stray remarks on the reservations that I have about it.

 

The argument from material identity ought to be kept separate from the

nominal identity argument. In the case of the airplane and the ball the

paper is the material cause of both forms. The rose analogy is different

and it reminds me of the famous chariot of Milinda which has the same

logical fault at its core. There is supposed to be the same counter

intuitive ah factor as we are invited to consider that there is no real

thing corresponding to the flower, that, in the words of the Buddhist

original, it is 'empty'.

 

Let me come at this via a mathematical analogy. In the square root of 9

you have function (square root) and argument (9). To ask what a square

root is as though it were a separate thing floating around on its own is

meaningless. Similarily when reducing a concrete thing to its parts we

use the name of those parts as though it were the term 'square root'. It

is a matter of verbal convenience. What we should be saying if we wished

to be impossibly punctilious is 'petal (of) rose' and 'stem (of) rose' and

so forth. All these part get their intelligibility and their meaning from

the fact that there exists a rose as a real thing. Likewise for the

botanist who can go into detail there is 'x (of) petal', 'y (of) petal'

and so on.

 

There is another consideration in the defence of the reality of what

general terms refer to. Shankara deals with it in B.S.B. I.iii.28. In a

discussion which is reminiscent of Plato's Doctrine of Forms, Shankara

urges the idea of the creative power of Vedic words. This can be

understood as the intelligibility of the Vedic word. As with the Platonic

forms if there is an instance of something there must be that which it is

an instance of. You recognise the individual in the universal. (pg.209

Gambhirananda trans)

 

"...since the relationship between such generic words and their meanings,

as for instance cowhood and cows, is seen to be eternal (i.e.

beginningless). Not that the distinguishing characteristics (i.e. genus)

of the cows etc. are created afresh each time these cows etc. are born;

for the individual forms of substances, qualities, and actions alone can

have origin, but not so their distinguishing (general) characteristics

(i.e. genus)."

 

That whole section needs to be read but the fundamental question that it

answers is: why is it that the world is carved up in such and such ways.

The answer that he gives (209 bottom)

"When there is first a word without a beginning and bearing a meaning with

which it has an eternal connection, then only is there a possibility of an

individual cropping up which can be fit to be referred to by that word.

In that sense it is said to originate from a word." Shankara gives

chapter and verse from the Smrti on this point. There is no suggestion of

the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness in any of this.

 

On final consideration the Vedic words are different from the Platonic

realm of forms in which things have their changeless originals. That is

part of the Vedic word but they also have creative power. This

incidentally ensures sameness in successive cycles of creation.

 

Aphorism I.iii.29 BSB. "And there is no contradiction, since similar

names and forms are repeated even in the revolution of the world cycles,

as is known from the Vedas and Smrti."

 

Note on Material Reality:

The chair's material reality is being is being a chair made of wood. To

speak of the chair really being wood is to misapply the term 'reality' in

a standard situation. One could speaking ontologically say that the being

of the chair is Brahman or pure consciousness. If speaking in causal

terms it could be that the material cause of the chair is wood, the formal

cause of the chair is the design in the mind of the maker, the efficient

cause is the maker himself and the final cause is the providing of

comfortable seating. To say that chair is just a name for an arrangement

of wood is to fall into the same logical error as delineated re the

'rose'. When the material identity analogy for the view of Brahman as

substratum is used e.g. clay as the material substratum of various

vessels, that analogy is being used in a very narrow focussed way, it is

not meant to be taken as an indication that the cup, pot etc. are merely

names that are empty of reality. As Shankara says they are instantiations

of Vedic names. Please read B.S.B. I.iii.28 as an antidote to facile

overextension of the analogy.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Hi Michael,

 

Fascinating philosophical analysis and I wouldn't want to argue the detail

of your argument (I wouldn't dare!) but I can't help feeling that you are

missing the point.

 

It is not possible to talk directly about the non-dual reality - obviously,

because we would be using dualistic language and trying to objectify the

unobjectifiable. Accordingly, Advaita makes use of various strategies such

as adhyAropa apavAda and taTastha lakShaNa etc. If a teaching has the effect

of pointing the listener towards the non-dual reality, then it has been

successful, regardless of whether it stands up to logical scrutiny in the

world of duality. It is disarded in the end anyway.

 

I am happy that the story, as it stands, serves this function for the person

who has never heard of Advaita and who does not have a degree in philosophy!

Accordingly, from this point of view, your arguments have no relevance and,

indeed, you do the beginner a disservice by drawing him back into futile,

intellectual ratiocination.

 

However, as I said, I find the discussion interesting and would take up a

couple of points. Firstly, I'm not sure that your mathematical analogy is

relevant. After all, you admit at the start that 'square root' is a

function, i.e. a process. It does not purport to be a 'thing'. Thus it does

not seem analogical to the flower, which clearly does purport to be a thing..

'Petal' and 'stem' equally make the claim (by virtue of being nouns) of

being things. And they are not things. They are only names given to forms of

some supposedly more basic substantive. Analysis shows that one must

logically keep drilling down until the only real substantive is reached -

brahman.

 

Similarly, the chair example I used was to point out that it was not a

separately existing thing but only a particular arrangement (form) of

something else (wood), itself also initially (but erroneously) supposed to

be a separately existing thing. I wasn't considering the wood as a 'cause' -

a far better example of the material/efficient cause and effect argument is

the spider and its web.

 

Obviously I don't question Shankara's analysis but I wonder at its

applicability to the purpose here. From my point of view, what I am aiming

to do is point towards the lack of separation of objects, the practical but

ultimately misleading applicability of names and the eventual dismissal of

time, space and causality in the non-duality of turIya.

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin] On Behalf

Of ombhurbhuva

25 February 2007 18:10

advaitin

The Swami and the Rose

 

 

Hi Dennis,

I have been pondering your advaita story. I here

append a few stray remarks on the reservations that I have about it.