Al-Mahdi Army

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Al-Mahdi Army

 

" Hujjat al-Islam Muqtada al-Sadr says that the Mahdi would soon

return, in Iraq. This rumor, touching the core of Shi'i faith and

eschatology, is being spread by Sadr's preachers. In the Shia

tradition, the Mahdi is the 12th Imam, who is in occultation.

Muktada al-Sadr says the Americans were aware of the impending

reappearance, and that the Americans invaded Iraq to seize and kill

the Mahdi. His supporters chant Sadr's name at rallies to imply that

he is the " son of the Mahdi. " Sadr has stated that the army " belongs

to the Mahdi " as an explanation of why he cannot disband it, as has

been required of other private militias. Although the reappearance

of the Mahdi central to Shia thought, it is unusual to raise claims

of the imminence of this event, and other Shiite clerics have

avoided the messianic ecstasy that such claims can induce.

 

One Iraqi Shi'a religious family which opposed working with the US-

led occupation [and trying to get control from the al-Hakim family]

is the al-Sadr family, which calls itself " The Active Religious

Seminary " . Until recently it was headed by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad

Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated along with two of his sons by

presumed agents of Hussein in Al-Najaf in 1999.

 

The loyalty of many of his supporters passed to another son,

Hojatoleslam Muqtada al-Sadr, a mid-level cleric about 30 years of

age. Unlike his father, Muqtada had little formal religious standing

to interpret the Koran, and relied for religious authority on an

Iran-based Iraqi exiled cleric, Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri, who was a

student of Bakir al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr formed the Jama'at al-Sadr

al-Thani (Association of the Second al-Sadr) as the key organization

of the al-Sadr family network.

 

Various observers have suggested that al-Sadr has staked out an anti-

Iranian position by raising the issue of the " foreign origin " of key

Iraqi Shiite clerics, notably including Sistani, who is of Iranian

origin. Other observers contend that al-Sadr is a proxy for Iranian

interests, since he receives theological backing from the Iraqi

Ayatollah Kadhim Hussayni al-Ha'iri, who resides in Tehran. It is

clear that al-Sadr's rival, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim,

leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

[sCIRI], enjoys the support of the Iranian government [before the

downfall of Saddam, SCIRI was based in Tehran]. But Iran may lend

some support to any element working to hasten the departure of the

Americans from Iraq, and would probably seek to develop a working

relationship with all major factions.

 

The militia wing of this movement is known as the " Mahdi Army " and

was estimated as of early 2004 to consist of about 500-1000 trained

combatants along with another 5,000-6,000 active participants.

According to another US DOD estimate, as of 01 April 2004 the Mahdi

Army was estimated to consist of about 3,000 lightly armed devotees

of Sadr before operations against the group started. It was a small

group on the margins, and while it was unknown how large the group

is, it had been degraded.

 

On 04 June 2004 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that the Al-

Mahdi Army consisted of 6,000 to 10,000 combatants.

 

Some younger Shiites have contended for power with the more

traditional Shiite Muslims in the city and region. Sheik Muqtada al-

Sadr and his young followers have sought to replace more traditional

factions as the voice of Iraq's Shiite majority. The al-Sadr family

portrays themselves as the ones doing the most to redress decades of

suppression by Sunni Muslims under the Saddam's rule.

 

The al-Sadr group has drawn charges of involvement in attacks and

intimidation in Al-Najaf that have highlighted political differences

among Shi'a political organizations. The most notable of those

attacks was a mob killing of a pro-US cleric, Abd al-Majid al-Khoi,

shortly after his return from exile in London in early April. Al-

Khoi was himself the son of another extremely powerful former grand

ayatollah, Abolqassem al-Khoi. Al-Khoi was murdered as he emerged

from the city's Imam Ali Mosque in a gesture of reconciliation with

the mosque's custodian, who was popularly considered to have

collaborated with Hussein's regime. The custodian was killed along

with al-Khoi and it is unclear whether al-Khoi was an assassination

target or was struck down because he tried to defend the other man.

 

Immediately after al-Khoi's murder, supporters of al-Sadr surrounded

the house of another grand ayatollah in Al-Najaf, Ali Sistani, in

what was taken to be a gesture of intimidation. Sistani -- who has

said that Shi'a leaders should limit themselves to religious

questions and stay out of politics -- went into hiding and only re-

emerged after tribesmen loyal to him raced to Al-Najaf.

 

Al-Sadr's group denied it had anything to do with the April 2003

attempt on the elder al-Hakim, and said Hussein loyalists were to

blame. But in 2004, an Iraqi judge issued an arrest warrant for al-

Sadr in connection with the killing of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-

Khoi in 2003.

 

Mustafa Al-Yaqubi was detained on April 3, 2004 in connection with

the April 2003 murder of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majeed al-Khoei. An

Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Mr. Yaqubi's arrest as a result of

an Iraqi criminal investigation and indictment. He was taken into

custody at his home in An Najaf.

 

In early April 2004, the militia of Muqtada Al Sadr's army -- Jaysh

Mahdi or Mahdi Army -- attempted to interfere with security in

Baghdad, intimidate Iraqi citizens and place them in danger. The

militia attempted to occupy and gain control of police stations and

government buildings. During this attack, this illegal militia

engaged coalition forces and ISF with small arms fire and RPGs.

Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces prevented this effort and

reestablished security in Baghdad. Coalition troops fought gun

battles with members of Muqtada al-Sadr's Imam Al-Mahdi Army militia

in the southern cities of Al-Nassiriyah, Amara, and Kut. Clashes

etween al-Sadr's Al-Mahdi Army and coalition troops south of Baghdad

tested the resolve of the United States' partners in Iraq.

 

By 07 April 2004, US-led coalition forces were involved in the most

widespread fighting in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein a year

ago. Troops battled Shiite militias in half a dozen Iraqi towns and

cities from near Kirkuk in the north to Basra in the south.

 

As of 08 April 2004, the Al-Mahdi Army had taken full control of the

city of Al-Kut and partial control of Al-Najaf. Residents of Al-

Kufah said militiamen had some control of that city as well. In

Karbala, Polish and Bulgarian troops fought Al-Mahdi Army militants

as hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites were gathering ahead of a

religious festival. The Polish Army said commanders were meeting

with moderate Shi'ite clerics after radicals demanded the withdrawal

of coalition forces.

 

Hundreds of loyalists to radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr

attacked British troops Saturday 08 May 2004 in the center of Basra,

south of Baghdad. They also assaulted the governor's offices there,

and fired rocket-propelled grenades at the coalition headquarters.

The British sent in reinforcements, tanks and armored vehicles to

secure the area. Several Iraqi insurgents were killed in the gun

battles. The violence erupted a day after a cleric in Basra told

worshippers he would offer cash rewards for the killing or capture

of British and American troops. He also said anyone who captured

female soldiers could keep them as slaves. The cleric, Sheikh Abdul-

Sattar al-Bahadli, said his offer was in response to the abuse of

Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers. Al-Bahadli is the Basra

representative of hard- line Shiite leader Muqtada al- Sadr.

 

In early June 2004, Iraq's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said

that most of the country's powerful militias had agreed to disarm.

Their members would either join state-controlled security services,

or return to civilian life.

 

The first week of August 2004 witnessed a cycle of growing violence

which culminated with fierce clashes across central and southern

Iraq between the Al-Mahdi Army and US, British, and Italian forces.

It was the heaviest fighting since al-Sadr's forces agreed to a

truce in June. In the southern city of Al-Nasiriyah, Iraqi fighters

attacked Italian patrols with rocket-propelled grenades and gunfire.

At least 20 Iraqis and one US soldier were reported killed on 5

August in Baghdad, Al-Najaf, and Al-Basrah. Militants brought down a

US helicopter in Al-Najaf, though the US military recovered the crew

unharmed. Al-Sadr offered to join a new reciprocal ceasefire, but it

was unclear whether the fighting was a brief flare-up or the

collapse of the truce.

 

On 07 August 2004, the interim Iraqi prime minister signed a limited

amnesty law that will pardon insurgents who have committed minor

crimes, but have not killed anyone. Interim Prime Minister Iyad

Allawi said insurgents have 30 days to turn themselves in to Iraqi

security forces to qualify for the amnesty. The prime minister

offered an olive branch to Moqtada al-Sadr. Allawi gave the cleric a

chance to distance himself from the actions of his followers and

begin taking part in the political process. Allawi said " I have been

having positive messages from Moqtada al-Sadr. That is why we don't

think that the people who are committing the crimes in Najaf and

elsewhere are his people. We think they are people using his name.

We invite, and I invite from this platform, Moqtada al-Sadr to

participate in the elections next year. " Previously, Moqtada al-Sadr

has rejected invitations to participate in a national conference and

national council, and has not indicated any willingness to take part

in the elections scheduled for January.

 

By 07 August 2004, fighting between al-Sadr's supporters and US

forces continued in Baghdad and Najaf, though initial reports

suggested the battles had lessened in intensity. By that time as

many as 400 militants had been killed in Najaf alone, the highest

single-day death toll among anti-coalition forces since the end of

Major Combat Operations in 2003. Two US Marines were also killed in

the fighting in Najaf.

 

The Mahdi

 

The great religious traditions -- Hinduism, Buddhism,

Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam -- share references

to a savior of humanity at the end of time. These religions share

glad tidings of his coming, though there are differences in detail

and deep controversies in interpretation.

 

The idea of the coming of a Mahdi (the guided) has roots in Islamic

traditions, both Shiia and Sunni, even though the Mahdi is not

mentioned in the Qur'an. The Mahdi prepares the way for the second

coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus) and the impending end of the

world. Eventually the awaited Imam will appear, and the Divine Aim

will reach its fulfillment. The Qur'an explicitly declares the

return of Jesus to earth. Surah Al `Imran 55 is one of the verses

indicating that Jesus will come back. But in many verses of the

Qur'an Allah states that those having faith in the trinity certainly

are disbelievers: Those who say that the Messiah, son of Maryam, is

the third of three are disbelievers. There is no god but One God.

(Surat al-Ma'idah: 73).

 

In anticipation of Judgment Day, it was essential that the people

return to a simple and rigorous, even puritanical Islam. The Islamic

belief in the second coming of Christ is the creed of Sunni and

Shi`i Islam in its generality. For Muslims, there is no question

about the forthcoming Armageddon, following which war technology

shall become unusable. The Mahdi will defeat the remaining third of

the Jews (the other two thirds having already perished at

Armageddon); This will be followed by a Christian vs. Muslim war,

called al-Malhama al-Kubra ( " Great Slaughter of the Intercessor " ie,

the Prophet) in Muslim texts.

 

When the Mahdi's Army receives word of the Antichrist, they will go

to fight the Antichrist, but he will besiege them in Jerusalem.

Jesus will descend, and perform the dawn prayer behind the Mahdi,

then Jesus will go out and kill the Antichrist. After that, he will

take over the Caliphate. Upon the return of Jesus, he will not

accept that Christians and Jews live with any other religion than

Islam, and so will unite all the believers as Muslims.

 

Through the history of Islam, a few individuals claimed to be the

Mahdi and found a following among those who were looking for

salvation. For some of these figures, like Bab in Iran or Mirza

Ghulam in India, the claim of being Mahdi was a stepping stone to

the development of sects which broke away from Islam.

 

Muhammad b. Hanafiyya was regarded as the Mahdi by some Muslims. The

Jarudis among the Zaydis believed that Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b.

Hasan was the Mahdi. The Nawusi's believed that Imam Ja'far Sadiq

was the Mahdi. The Waqifis believed that Imam Musa b. Ja'far had not

died and was in occultation.

 

The Shiia Mahdi

 

The Awaited Mahdi is absolutely central to the belief system of the

twelve Imami'ah Shias, and constitutes one of the core principles of

their religion. Shiia look for the Signs of the Reappearance (Qiyam)

of the (Imam) who undertakes the Office (al-Qa'im).

 

Muhammad al Mahdi (the guided) is the 12th and last Imam of the

Twelver Shi'i, and is also known as Muhammad al Muntazar (the

awaited). Little can be said of him with certainty, and the non-

Twelver Muslims question whether there was an historical person

associated with the name. Jafar, the brother of the Eleventh Imam,

denied the existence of any child and claimed the Imamate for

himself. Twelver Shi'i believe he was born to a Byzantine slave, and

that his birth was kept quiet by his father, the Eleventh Imam,

Hassan al Askari, because of the persecution of the Shi'is at that

time. The 10th and 11th Imams were both under house arrest and

communicated with their followers through a network of wikala

(agents), a time that subsequently came to be known as the Lesser

Occultation.

 

For the seventy years after the martyrdom of his father when he was

aged six, he communicated with his adherents through a succession of

four assistants, each known as the Bab (Gate). As he lay dying in AD

941, the fourth Bab disclosed a letter from the Hidden Imam stating

that there should fifth Bab, and that thenceforth the Mahdi would be

unseen [ghaybah]. Thus began the Greater Occultation, which would

end with the reappearnce of the Mahdi as champion of the faithful in

the events leading to the Judgement Day. Titles of the 12th Imam

include: Hujjat, Khalaf Salih (the righteous offspring), Sahib az

Zaman (Master of the Age), Sahib al Amr (Master of Command), al

Qa'im (the one to arise), Bagiyyat Allah (remnant of Allah) and Imam

al Muntazar (the awaited Imam).

 

The Sunni Mahdi

 

The Mahdi also figures in Sunni belief, as events in the Sudan in

the late 19th Century reveal. The story of the Mahdi and his

fundamentalist revolt in the Sudan in the late 1880s is the stuff

that movies are made of (ie., " Khartoum " , " The Four Feathers " ).

Charles George " Chinese " Gordon, a British officer, resigned as

governor general of Sudan in 1880. His successors lacked direction

from Cairo and feared the political turmoil that had engulfed Egypt.

As a result, they failed to continue the policies Gordon had put in

place. The illegal slave trade revived, although not enough to

satisfy the merchants whom Gordon had put out of business. The

Sudanese army suffered from a lack of resources, and unemployed

soldiers from disbanded units troubled garrison towns. Tax

collectors arbitrarily increased taxation.

 

In this troubled atmosphere, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah,

a faqir or holy man who combined personal magnetism with religious

zealotry, emerged, determined to expel the Turks and restore Islam

to its primitive purity. The son of a Dunqulah boatbuilder, Muhammad

Ahmad had become the disciple of Muhammad ash Sharif, the head of

the Sammaniyah order. Later, as a shaykh of the order, Muhammad

Ahmad spent several years in seclusion and gained a reputation as a

mystic and teacher. In 1880 he became a Sammaniyah leader.

 

Muhammad Ahmad's sermons attracted an increasing number of

followers. Among those who joined him was Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, a

Baqqara from southern Darfur. His planning capabilities proved

invaluable to Muhammad Ahmad, who revealed himself as Al Mahdi al

Muntazar ( " the awaited guide in the right path, " usually seen as the

Mahdi), sent from God to redeem the faithful and prepare the way for

the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus). The Mahdist movement

demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam, abstention from

alcohol and tobacco, and the strict seclusion of women.

 

To avoid arrest, the Mahdi and a party of his followers, the Ansar,

made a long march to Kurdufan, where he gained a large number of

recruits, especially from the Baqqara. From a refuge in the area, he

wrote appeals to the shaykhs of the religious orders and won active

support or assurances of neutrality from all except the pro-Egyptian

Khatmiyyah. Merchants and Arab tribes that had depended on the slave

trade responded as well, along with the Hadendowa Beja, who were

rallied to the Mahdi by an Ansar captain, Usman Digna.

 

Early in 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed

a 7,000-man Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and seized their

rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying

siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submission after four

months. The Ansar, 30,000 men strong, then defeated an 8,000-man

Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next the Mahdi captured Darfur and

imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khedive's service, who

later became the first Egyptian-appointed governor of Darfur

Province.

 

The advance of the Ansar and the Beja rising in the east imperiled

communications with Egypt and threatened to cut off garrisons at

Khartoum, Kassala, Sannar, and Sawakin and in the south. To avoid

being drawn into a costly military intervention, the British

government ordered an Egyptian withdrawal from Sudan. Gordon, who

had received a reappointment as governor general, arranged to

supervise the evacuation of Egyptian troops and officials and all

foreigners from Sudan.

 

After reaching Khartoum in February 1884, Gordon realized that he

could not extricate the garrisons. As a result, he called for

reinforcements from Egypt to relieve Khartoum. Gordon also

recommended that Zubayr, an old enemy whom he recognized as an

excellent military commander, be named to succeed him to give

disaffected Sudanese a leader other than the Mahdi to rally behind.

London rejected this plan. As the situation deteriorated, Gordon

argued that Sudan was essential to Egypt's security and that to

allow the Ansar a victory there would invite the movement to spread

elsewhere.

 

Increasing British popular support for Gordon eventually forced

Prime Minister William Gladstone to mobilize a relief force under

the command of Lord Garnet Joseph Wolseley. A " flying column " sent

overland from Wadi Halfa across the Bayyudah Desert bogged down at

Abu Tulayh (commonly called Abu Klea), where the Hadendowa Beja --

the so-called Fuzzy Wuzzies -- broke the British line. An advance

unit that had gone ahead by river when the column reached Al

Matammah arrived at Khartoum on January 28, 1885, to find the town

had fallen two days earlier. The Ansar had waited for the Nile flood

to recede before attacking the poorly defended river approach to

Khartoum in boats.

 

The Ansar slaughtered the garrison, killing Gordon, and delivering

his head to the Mahdi's tent. Kassala and Sannar fell soon after,

and by the end of 1885, the Ansar had begun to move into the

southern region. In all Sudan, only Sawakin, reinforced by Indian

army troops, and Wadi Halfa on the northern frontier remained in

Anglo-Egyptian hands.

 

The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic laws.

Sudan's new ruler also authorized the burning of lists of pedigrees

and books of law and theology because of their association with the

old order and because he believed that the former accentuated

tribalism at the expense of religious unity.

 

The Mahdi maintained that his movement was not a religious order

that could be accepted or rejected at will, but that it was a

universal regime, which challenged man to join or to be destroyed.

The Mahdi modified Islam's five pillars to support the dogma that

loyalty to him was essential to true belief. The Mahdi also added

the declaration " and Muhammad Ahmad is the Mahdi of God and the

representative of His Prophet " to the recitation of the creed, the

shahada. Moreover, service in the jihad replaced the hajj, or

pilgrimage to Mecca, as a duty incumbent on the faithful. Zakat

(almsgiving) became the tax paid to the state. The Mahdi justified

these and other innovations and reforms as responses to instructions

conveyed to him by God in visions.

 

On the advice of the British, who occupied Egypt since 1882, the

Turko-Egyptian government was withdrawn. Although the Mahdi died in

the same year, the Sudan under his successor, the Khalifa Abd Allah

remained independent until 1898.

 

In 1892, Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener) became sirdar, or

commander, of the Egyptian army and started preparations for the

reconquest of Sudan. The British decision to occupy Sudan resulted

in part from international developments that required the country be

brought under British supervision. By the early 1890s, British,

French, and Belgian claims had converged at the Nile headwaters.

Britain feared that the other colonial powers would take advantage

of Sudan's instability to acquire territory previously annexed to

Egypt. Apart from these political considerations, Britain wanted to

establish control over the Nile to safeguard a planned irrigation

dam at Aswan.

 

In 1895, the British government authorized Kitchener to launch a

campaign to reconquer Sudan. Britain provided men and materiel while

Egypt financed the expedition. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary

Force included 25,800 men, 8,600 of whom were British. The remainder

were troops belonging to Egyptian units that included six battalions

recruited in southern Sudan. An armed river flotilla escorted the

force, which also had artillery support. In preparation for the

attack, the British established army headquarters at Wadi Halfa and

extended and reinforced the perimeter defenses around Sawakin. In

March 1896, the campaign started; in September, Kitchener captured

Dunqulah. The British then constructed a rail line from Wadi Halfa

to Abu Hamad and an extension parallel to the Nile to transport

troops and supplies to Barbar. Anglo-Egyptian units fought a sharp

action at Abu Hamad, but there was little other significant

resistance until Kitchener reached Atbarah and defeated the Ansar.

After this engagement, Kitchener's soldiers marched and sailed

toward Omdurman, where the Khalifa made his last stand.

 

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa committed his 52,000-man army to a

frontal assault against the Anglo-Egyptian force, which was massed

on the plain outside Omdurman. The outcome never was in doubt,

largely because of superior British firepower. During the five-hour

battle, about 11,000 Mahdists died whereas Anglo-Egyptian losses

amounted to 48 dead and fewer than 400 wounded. Mopping-up

operations required several years, but organized resistance ended

when the Khalifa, who had escaped to Kurdufan, died in fighting at

Umm Diwaykarat in November 1899.

 

In the century since the Mahdist uprising, the neo-Mahdist movement

and the Ansar, supporters of Mahdism from the west, have persisted

as a political force in Sudan. Many groups, from the Baqqara cattle

nomads to the largely sedentary tribes on the White Nile, supported

this movement. The Ansar were hierarchically organized under the

control of Muhammad Ahmad's successors, who have all been members of

the Mahdi family (known as the ashraf). The ambitions and varying

political perspectives of different members of the family have led

to internal conflicts, and it appeared that Sadiq al Mahdi, putative

leader of the Ansar since the early 1970s, did not enjoy the

unanimous support of all Mahdists. Mahdist family political goals

and ambitions seemed to have taken precedence over the movement's

original religious mission. The modern-day Ansar were thus loyal

more to the political descendants of the Mahdi than to the religious

message of Mahdism.

 

In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition government.

Unfortunately, however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and

incapable of governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption,

personal rivalries, scandals, and political instability

characterized the Sadiq regime.

 

Al-Mahdi Army

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-sadr.htm