The letter kills but the Spirit gives life...

[Guest guest]

Dear All,

 

The scriptural passage (just below) basically sums up the theme of this post:

 

" And such confidence we have through Christ, cared for by us, written not with

ink, but with the Spirit of the living God... not on tablets of stone, but on

tablets of human hearts. And such confidence we have though Christ toward God.

Not that we are adequate in ourselves to consider anything as coming from

ourselves, but our adequacy is from God, who also made us adequate as servants

of a new covenant, not of the letter, but of the Spirit; for the letter kills,

but the Spirit gives life. " (2 Corinthians 3:4-6)

 

i have appended a most interesting research paper on " Ritual and the Social

Meaning and Meaningless of Religion " ... by Daniel B. Lee. In this paper Mr. Lee

explores the religion of the Old Order Mennonites and shows that spiritual

understanding varies according to the person and is different from ritual or

doctrine that is imposed externally by religion.

 

i just want to say also, that although i was not born into the Old Order

Mennonite community... i was born into the Mennonite Brethren

community/religion, which mainly consisted of German speaking people. They were

very isolationist and kept to themselves. While i was growing up, i was not

allowed to mix with non-Mennonites socially as they were considered

" non-Mennonite-Christians " ... therefore not " real Christians " . So... being the

person i am, and also being born into such a religion, i had my work 'cut out'

for me, because in the Mennonite religion (like many religions) the delineation

between ritual, culture, doctrine, and real spirituality all got mixed up into

one package... so it was difficult to 'see the Light' from the 'not-so-Light'.

It compelled me to question everything i had been taught from birth and had had

to accept as i had been born into it. It took me a lifetime of spiritual seeking

for answers... to finally come to a complete spiritual meaning in my life, when

i finally had my self-realisation... which changed everything for me.

 

Things have changed today in the Mennonite Brethren... as compared with the

years of my early teens... and the Mennonite Brethren are very much like the

Baptists in their fellowship now... from what i have heard. They also have a

variety of ethnicity now too. i also want to say that the description of Old

Mennonite Ritual, Doctrine, etc. was different to what i was brought up with...

but it is very reminiscent of what i was brought up with.

 

i owe my understanding of the difference between ritual, doctrine, (religion)

and real individual spirituality due to my early life experience. That is also

why... when i came to Sahaja Yoga and noticed the religious-forming-elements, i

nevertheless determined not to get caught up in them, by always recognising the

difference.

 

Religious hype, doctrines, rituals and religious hearsay is not the same as Shri

Mataji's teachings. Shri Mataji wanted Sahaja Yoga to be a Movement of Love and

She did not want a religion made out of Her teachings. It is important

therefore, for SYs and others to understand that rituals are not salvaton,

spiritual liberation and moksha... in and of themselves.

 

i do believe that Shri Mataji has changed the Old Religious Order of things to a

new Spiritual Dispensation. It is also my belief that

the power and dominion of religious regimes is largely finished with on Earth.

They are fast becoming " evening empires " . i believe many are changing, and those

that don't... will die out. Theologians are very aware that this is happening

too.

 

Only the Absolute Truth will remain standing, because all that is untruth is now

being exposed at this very time. However... the true spiritual aspect, the

" Absolute Truth " will stand unaffected... as Truth does. This is because we are

now living in apocalyptic times, which means that we are living in the Time of

Revealing.

 

So... what will take its place?

 

Collective consciousness will take its place.

 

Collective Consciousness, when awakened in the person... goes with the person

wherever they go! This is our new Spirit, our new Stability, our new Spiritual

Integration and Cohesion. Collective Consciousness is not the same as Local

Collective Consciousness. Local Collective Consciousness is limited to immediate

physical proximity, whereas Collective Consciousness is within the person, and

goes with them wherever the person goes. It is not left behind when the person

says goodnight to the Local Collective after a meditation meeting. The Local

Collective itself cannot contain collective consciousness. Only each individual

that has the collective consciousness awakened within them... can contain

collective consciousness. A person can attend the Local Collective, and yet not

be in Collective Consciousness.

 

So... we are to grow up spiritually and to " finally " have our spiritual

liberation. That is why i have to warn SYs to not allow their spiritual liberty

to be taken away from them through lack of understanding of the difference

between Ritual, Doctrine and the Real Spirituality that can only be " within " .

 

We must not confuse these opposites. Rituals, doctrine and dogmas are externals

that help physical cohesion. Real spirituality is internal and reveals itself in

spiritual cohesion. Anyone can perform the external rituals and be seen to stick

to man-made doctrines and dogmas. Anyone at all can be religious. However, as

Shri Jesus has taught... only the pure in heart who shall see God: " Blessed are

the pure in heart, for they shall see God. " (Matthew 5:8)

 

Here then is Mr. Daniel B. Lee's " Ritual and the Social Meaning and Meaningless

of Religion " (as given by Wikipedia) which really clarifies a lot about the

finer... or 'not so fine' points of religion.

 

violet

 

 

Ritual and the Social Meaning and Meaninglessness of Religion...

By... Daniel B. Lee

 

The members of an Old Order Mennonite community successfully enact the rituals

of foot washing, baptism, expulsion, and reconciliation without a common

understanding of what the rituals are supposed to signify or why they are

meaningful. The symbols and rituals of Weaverland Mennonites seem to sustain

unity in the group because they completely transcend the individual beliefs of

members. Religion is socially meaningful as a source of social solidarity

because it transcends the personal beliefs of individuals. To be socially

meaningful, religious interaction does not have to personally mean anything to

the actors. The " form " of a ritual is the only thing that is socially

significant because it alone is fixed, objectified, and self-evident. It is

significant even though each participant in the ritual may attach a different

" content " to the form.

 

Sociologists, along with most other people, typically describe religion as if it

was comprised of two corresponding components: beliefs and rituals. According to

this line of reasoning, the members of a religious community share beliefs about

the sacred and enact those common beliefs in their rituals. From this

traditional and rationalist perspective, it makes sense to assume that action is

always motivated by thoughts or beliefs. Thus, if one observes the performance

of a ritual, one may take for granted the preexistence of motivating beliefs. In

this paper I argue that the successful enactment of ritual is highly improbable

and gains no support from beliefs. I also suggest that it is impossible for

participants in ritual to share common beliefs. Individuals may collectively

perform a ritual without attaching the same belief, or any belief, to it.

Sociologists cannot assume that religious beliefs and rituals necessarily have

any correspondence. I conclude by suggesting a theory of ritual that accentuates

the difference between conscious and social systems of meaning.

 

Following Emile Durkheim, contemporary sociologists of religion generally

suggest that beliefs and rituals are the two most important components of

religion (Yinger 1965, p. 9; Schneider 1970, p. 6; Roberts 1990, p. 21;

Chalfant/Beckley/Palmer 1994, p. 29; Berger 1990). Durkheim maintained that

" every religion is made up of intellectual conceptions and ritual practices, " of

beliefs and rites (1954, p. 121). " Religion pervades the whole social life, " he

believed, " because social life is made up almost exclusively of common beliefs

and of common practices which derive from unanimous adhesion a very particular

intensity " (ibid., p. 178). Durkheim explained that during the religious ritual,

members of a community come to recognize the power of their union, creating a

special mood of " collective effervescence. "

 

Durkheim suggested that rituals are the enactments of collectively held beliefs,

but that rituals create the shared ecstasy required for the formulation and

" unanimous " affirmation of those beliefs. Because the power of collective

effervescence is so essential in the production of social solidarity, Durkheim

argued that: " There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding

and reaffirming at regular internals the collective sentiments and the

collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral

remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and

meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in

common their common sentiments (…). " (1954, pp. 474-475)

 

While he did not primarily focus on ritual, Max Weber and his students tend to

emphasize the notion that members of religious groups share a human need for

metaphysical beliefs: that is, for meaningful interpretations of reality.

Prophets, philosophers, and intellectuals create interpretations that may be

adopted by followers. Priests systematize and consolidate popularly embraced

religious insights into creeds and organize congregations of believers who

" carry " culture. Believers use symbols during religious rituals to " stabilize "

shared meaning (Gemeinter Sinn).

 

Weber noted that rituals are controlled, rule-oriented procedures that gain in

holiness by stereotyping themselves without change. Religious beliefs achieve

practical results, in Weber's assessment, helping adherents succeed at life. It

satisfies believers by helping them cope with uncertainty, temptation,

misfortune, inequality, sickness, guilt, and death (Weber 1958; 1963; 1980). In

this paper, I cannot devote adequate attention to describing Durkheim or Weber's

sociology of religion. However, I want to make the point that both pioneering

sociologists of religion assumed the possibility of intersubjectivity (or in

Durkheim's formulation: collective representations, collective conscious):

religion attains social meaning due to shared beliefs. Weber's concept of

" intersubjective " meaning has been elaborated by Alfred Schütz (1967), Peter

Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), and Jürgen Habermas (1984).

 

As they are generally opposed to psychological approaches, it seems remarkable

that so many sociologists who study religion should put so much importance on

the personal beliefs of individuals - as if the social meaning of a ritual

depended on what people understood it to mean. Ritual is socially meaningful as

a demonstration of social solidarity because it transcends the personal beliefs

of individuals. To be socially meaningful, religion does not have to mean

anything to anybody. If the members of a group see themselves enacting a ritual,

they may assume that they share religious belief, an assumption that can

certainly enhance the impression of being socially integrated (Thomas Theorem).

They do not, however, need to share any common beliefs in order to enact the

ritual successfully.

 

Enacting ritual requires participants who know the right moves, possess the

props, and can make the expected noises at the right moments: regardless of what

they may believe. As an operation, ritual becomes socially significant when it

reproduces itself in a perceptible, immanent, and redundant form. The form of

the ritual precludes spontaneity and freedom. Whatever meaning participants

consciously attach to their real-time behavior, the ritual either simulates its

expected form, or else it does not. The cultivation of a repeatable and

recognizable ritual - the bundling of successive selections from among a vast

horizon of behavioral possibilities and routines - should not be expected to

happen. There are so many different things participants can do: why should they

bind themselves to the rules of the ritual? Ritual can happen only when

participants restrict their behavioral possibilities in a socially ordered

manner that is neither necessary nor impossible. To beat the odds against its

happening, ritual must be coordinated by communication, not by thoughts.

 

My rejection of the established viewpoint, that the actors of a ritual

necessarily share religious beliefs, is supported by my observations of rituals

enacted by members of the Weaverland Conference Old Order Mennonites (Lee 2000).

Individual Mennonites may indeed hold personal beliefs, but any alleged beliefs

remain locked up in each member's mind: operationally closed to Mennonite

Society and any other observers.

 

Ministers, bishops, brothers, sisters, and sociologists cannot perceive the

religious beliefs of others. Thoughts (beliefs) can only make meaningful

differences to conscious systems; they cannot meaningfully inform social systems

(Luhmann 1995; 2002; Fuchs 2004).

 

In this paper, I describe how members of this community successfully enact the

rituals of foot washing, baptism, expulsion, and reconciliation without a common

understanding of what the rituals are supposed to signify or why they are

meaningful.

 

Old Order Mennonites assemble and ritualistically " uphold and reaffirm common

sentiments " that individual members do not believe or even understand.

 

 

Rituals of the Old Order Mennonites...

 

The social life of Weaverland Conference Old Order Mennonites is strictly

regulated by a normative code known as the " Discipline, " which symbolically

marks the community's boundary. The Discipline, sometimes called the " Conference

Rules " or " the Ordnung, " explicitly lays out standardized behaviors,

prescriptive and proscriptive norms, with which members must conform or be

expelled from the group. The Discipline, for example, prescribes what kind of

automobile members may drive. All vehicles must be " in black color, (have) no

stripes, nor (have) flashy trimmings " (Hoover 1982, p. 698).

 

Because of their black vehicles, members of this church have been called " Black

Bumper Mennonites. " Members claim that adherence to the behavioral regulations

of the church keeps them from becoming integrated with " the world. " Mennonite

practices are anchored in tradition and are followed because " that is just the

way we do it. " Working on Sundays, using a radio, watching television, joining

political parties, wearing cosmetics, purchasing insurance policies, and driving

sports cars are other things prohibited by the Discipline. It is the Discipline

that also mandates that men wear black hats, black suits, and white shirts to

church. Women wear white head coverings and dresses of the same length and

style, with long sleeves and attached aprons.

 

Footwashing...

 

One of the most important rituals practiced by Mennonites is exchanging the

" kiss of peace " after observing communion and footwashing. The Confession of

Faith of the Mennonite (COF), a little black book given to all members at the

time of baptism, precisely describes how the kiss ought to be performed: Then

both shake hands with each other and give each other the kiss of peace,

whereupon the one says: " The Lord will preserve and strengthen us in love " ; the

other says " Amen. " (COF 1996, p. 56)

 

After watching Mennonites perform this ritual for the first time, I was curious

to know what they whispered in each other after exchanging the kiss. After

church I asked an older man what was said. He explained, " We always say the same

thing: one of us gives a greeting and the other says `amen.' The words of the

greeting are important, they are: `May the Lord guard, guide, and direct you.' "

I inquired how the two decide who will give the greeting and who will say

" Amen. " " That's easy, " the man replied, " the one who had his feet washed first

says the Amen. "

 

I walked over to another member and inquired about the words exchanged. Once

again, it was claimed that " everyone says the same thing, a greeting and an

amen. " However, this time the words of the greeting were different: " May the

Lord love and protect you. " " Amen. "

 

After I interviewed a third member of the church about the words used in the

greeting, the reason for the different responses became clearer:

 

Author: After members exchanged the " kiss of peace, " I saw them lean

over and whisper into each other's ears. Can you tell me what was

said?

 

Member: Well, one says the greeting and the other says " amen. "

 

A: What kind of greeting is it? Does everybody say the same thing?

 

M: Everyone says the same thing.

 

A: Can you tell me what words are used?

 

M: Yes... We say, " May the Lord... (mumbles something). " Like that,

then the other says " Amen. "

 

A: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the words of the greeting. What are they

again?

 

M: You just have to say " May the Lord... (mumbles), " you know. Then

the other says " Amen. "

 

A: But, David, what are the exact words used in the greeting?

 

M: I'll tell you the truth (smiling). We are supposed to say the same thing, but

I don't really know the exact words. I just say " May the Lord... " and mumble

something. I know most of the guys don't really know what to say. They never

told us exactly what to say. The important thing is to make it look right. Since

members are supposed to study their personal copy of the Confession of Faith of

the Mennonite, they should all know the exact wording of the " correct " greeting.

Yet they do not know. The important thing, it seems, is to " make it look right. "

When asked about the religious significance of the " kiss of peace, " members of

the church were almost always prepared to give an explanation, but an

explanation tainted with idiosyncrasy:

 

-Our ancestors brought the kiss with them from Germany and Switzerland. We want

to hold on to those traditions.

-The kiss was established by the early leaders of the church.

Mennonites just believe in doing it.

-It's from the Bible. The disciples did it.

-It's something we have always done.

-I don't know why we do it.

 

Mennonites and Amish will actually give one another the Holy Kiss even if they

have strong personal feelings against the practice. The following letter to the

editor of an Old Order periodical is illuminating. This letter was published in

Family Life, a journal widely read among the Mennonites I observed. The author

of the letter complains about having to give the kiss to his brethren and

confesses that he attaches no spiritual significance to the kiss:

 

Holy kissing makes many miserable (...). It's so repulsive! That spit spot on

the lips and that irresistible urge to wipe off one's mouth with the back of

your hand first chance he's not looking, is anything but a feeling of holiness.

It's so germy and unsanitary. Glasses often clack together. Often on cold days

it's not just spit on the lips but catarrh or nose drip on the cheek. I'm not

trying to be sarcastic! (Family Life Feb. 1984, p. 3)

 

The author concludes his letter by arguing that the church should do away with

the holy kiss as traditionally practiced. Until this happens, however, we may be

certain that members will continue to exchange the kiss of peace whether or not

they " believe " in the custom.

 

Baptism...

 

When they are about fifteen years of age, girls and boys in the Mennonite

community usually request to be baptized. Even if one was born into the

community, membership in the church begins with the ritual of baptism. The girls

and boys tend to go through the baptismal process as a group or " class. " It

would be irregular for a person to not be baptized along with his or her age

cohort. Baptisms generally occur during the " Fall Preparatory Service, " after

the young people have attended " Instruction Meetings. "

 

During these meetings, which " begin the last Sunday afternoon in July at two

o'clock, " the young people " study " the First Part of the Confession of Faith

booklet. The First Part of the little black paperback contains the " Eighteen

Articles of the Dortrecht Confession of Faith, " adopted by Anabaptist ministers

in 1632. At each meeting for instruction, three of the Articles are read aloud

to the " applicants. " The Confession of Faith booklet clearly indicates how the

instructional meetings are to proceed: Applicants will sit near the preachers'

table, with the boys on the men's side and the girls on the women's side. The

ministry come in the same door as the others. Services begin by singing two

hymns, followed by a short, opening message by a minister, and then a kneeling,

silent prayer.

 

Three ministers will each teach one of the eighteen articles, followed by

testimonies. The minister who taught last will lead in a kneeling, audible

prayer, closing with two hymns and a benediction. (COF 1996, p. 45) After the

Ninth Article has been explained, and once again at the last instruction

meeting, the bishop asks the class " if they are satisfied with the teaching they

have received. " The last three Articles of the Dortrecht Confession are read " on

a Friday afternoon at two o'clock, " with only the applicants and the ministry in

attendance. At this last meeting, the boys wear dark suits and the girls wear

dark dresses, preferably navy blue. In order to be baptized during the

Preparatory Service, each individual applicant must have attended all of the

Instruction Meetings and been approved by the congregation at the Counsel

Meeting.

 

Baptism is an outward testimony of an inner New Birth experience, and Baptism

shall be administered upon a confession of one's faith and repentance toward

God. (COF 1996, p. 47) Wearing dark clothing, the applicants bow on their knees

in front of the membership to make their three " baptismal vows. " The complete

vows, as pronounced by the bishop, are as follows: The first question of the

baptismal vows is; " Do you believe in one almighty God who hath created heaven

and earth - all things visible and invisible and preserves the same by His

power; and do you believe in Christ Jesus, His only begotten Son, who was

conceived of the Holy Spirit and born by the pure virgin Mary, suffered under

Pontius Pilate, died on the cross, was buried in a sepulcher, arose victorious

the third day, and after forty days ascended into heaven to the right hand of

God, from whence he will come again to judge the living and the dead; and do you

believe in the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son, to chasten

the world because of sin, and that you have become willing to be baptized by the

guidance of the same. Can you answer this with `Yes'?

 

Secondly, you are asked, are you sorry for your past sins and are you willing to

renounce Satan and the dark kingdom of this world, your own will and all the

satanical works of this world. Are you willing to be subject to the Gospel of

Christ Jesus, to have the same rule in and over you as much as God grants you

grace. Can you answer this with `Yes'?

 

Thirdly, are you willing to submit to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, especially

Matthew the 18th Chapter, where it says, `If thy brother shall trespass against

thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear

thee thou hast gained thy brother, but if he will not hear thee, then take with

thee one or two more that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may

be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church,

let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.' Are you willing to have

this used against you and help use it against others as necessity may demand.

Can you answer `Yes'. (COF 1996, pp. 49-50)

 

After the applicants have affirmed these vows, the bishop kneels with them in

prayer, closing with a solo recital of the Lord's Prayer. The bishop then rises

and steps before each kneeling convert, one at a time, with his hands laid upon

their uncovered heads he says:

 

Upon thy confession of faith, which thou hast confessed before God and many

witnesses, thou art baptized with water, in the name of the Father, and of the

Son and of the Holy Ghost. (COF 1996, p. 51)

 

When the bishop says the words, " baptized with water, " to each convert, the

deacon pours a small amount of water on top of the new member's head. When all

are baptized, the bishop then approaches the first baptized person and extends

him the right hand of fellowship and says, " In the name of the Lord, in the name

of the church, I offer thee my hand; arise, to a new beginning, to a new life.

The Lord strengthen you that you may be able to finish your newly started work,

and be his disciple; acknowledge the truth and the truth shall make you free. "

(COF 1996, p. 51)

 

As a conclusive sign of acceptance, the bishop exchanges the " kiss of peace "

with each of his new brethren. The bishop's wife greets each of the new sisters

with the same sign. The new members are then asked to be seated and the service

continues to the end. Immediately before joining their church through baptism,

as I have already related, the applicants for baptism participate in a mandatory

program of " instruction. "

 

For nine weeks, they meet after Sunday services with members of the ministry.

During each session, two articles of faith from the Confession of Faith of the

Mennonite (1996) are read aloud. There is very little discussion about the

meaning of each article of faith and no formal attempt is made by the ministry

to test whether or not students have understood or memorized the articles of

belief. It is assumed, however, that the young adults who join the church have

adopted the confession that Mennonites are expected to share. Calvin Redekop

conducted an investigation of Old Colony Mennonites in Mexico and observed how

young people were " taught " what members of the church ought to believe. Redekop

also intimates that young people who desire to join an Old Colony congregation

must study their group's beliefs well enough to pass a ceremonial review:

 

When the applicants have successfully " understood " the catechism, they are

presented to the congregation on a Sunday morning. The minister asks them to

rise and answer in order the questions studied in class. The object of the

ceremony is to recite his answers flawlessly. For the congregation, the object

is to see how well the applicants have learned their catechism. " The saying of

the catechism is the very important event. It is the thing the young people

dread most. Most young people memorize it by rote, not knowing what is going on

as far as meaning is concerned. " (Redekop 1969, p. 58) Among both the Weaverland

and Old Colony Mennonites, each baptismal applicant is expected to openly

confirm his or her willingness to accept their group's religious doctrine.

Through the ritual of baptism, each individual communicates his or her

willingness to accept the collective " Confession of Faith. " Even if members do

not understand the meaning of the articles that comprise the official

confession, they can publicly affirm that they accept the collective beliefs of

their congregation.

 

Expulsion and Reconciliation

 

Members who transgress against the rules established in the " gospel and the

regulations of the church " and who do no not repent of their sins are " expelled "

from the Weaverland Church until they do so. Members believe that the Bible

teaches them to separate themselves from " disorderly " people:

 

If a member falls into gross sin or is not willing to be admonished in errors in

his way of life, he shall be excomunicated from the church. When he shows

repentance and amendment of life, and wishes to be reinstated again in the

church, he will make his desire known by coming into the minister's room on a

Sunday morning and presenting his application to the ministry, who then presents

it to the congregation. The bishop will take counsel with the church concerning

reinstating him. (COF 1996, p. 60)

 

The Weaverland manner of excommunication is not as complete as the " shunning "

performed by the Old Order Amish. Regarding the Amish practice, Kephart and

Zellner reported the following:

 

The ultimate sanction is the imposition of the Meidung, also known as the

" shunning " or " ban, " but because of its severity, it is only used as a last

resort. The followers of Jacob Amman have a strong religious orientation and a

finely honed conscience - and the Amish community relies on this fact (...) The

ban is total. No one is permitted to associate with the errant party, including

members of his or her own family (...)

 

Should any member of the community ignore the Meidung, that person would also be

placed under the ban. (1994, p. 27) In contrast, " expelled " Weaverland

Mennonites are permitted to attend worship services with their families and may

even participate in social activities. It is, nonetheless, strictly forbidden to

allow expelled members to participate in the religious " ordinances " (foot

washing, holy kissing, communion, council). It is not uncommon for officially

excommunicated members to continue to attend church services.

 

If a member must be expelled, which is seldom the case, the Bishop announces his

or her name and the practice that is considered intolerable in front of the

assembled congregation. From that moment the ban is instituted, it is hoped that

the experience of expulsion will encourage the detached person to find his or

her own way back into the realm of authentic membership. If the expelled person

decides to mend their ways and rejoin the church, he or she must ask the bishop

for the opportunity to ask forgiveness in front of the assembled congregation.

 

At the end of a normal Sunday worship service, I observed this ritual of

reconciliation to proceed as follows. After leading the congregation in prayer,

the bishop announced that an expelled person, mentioned by name, desired to

confess his sins and request membership in the church. He then exchanged glances

with a man standing in the back of the men's section. This man came forward and

met the bishop in the center of the building, in front of the entire

congregation. The expelled man stood directly in front of the bishop with his

hands clasped tightly at the waist and eyes cast to the floor. The bishop

inquired in a loud voice, " Do you answer with yes that you have repented of your

sin? " With a very brief look upward, the man whispered " yes. " " Do you answer

with yes that you have asked God to forgive you and that He has done so? " " Yes. "

The bishop seemed to refrain from looking directly at the man, preferring

instead to observe the congregation.

 

Most of the members had their heads bowed. The bishop continued, " Because you

have repented and been forgiven you are once again a member of the church. The

ordinances of communion, foot washing, and council are restored to you. " The

bishop then clasped the other man's hand and gave him the kiss of peace on the

lips. After this ceremony, the two men sat down and the songleaders led the

church in singing two hymns about forgiveness and mercy.

 

The procedural rules dictating how the congregation must receive an expelled

member who repents of breaking the Discipline are codified in the Confession of

Faith (1996). It is essentially the same procedure that bishop Jonas Martin, the

first leader of the Weaverland Conference, followed nearly one hundred years ago

(Hoover 1982, pp. 701-709). After observing the church perform this ritual of

reconciliation for the first time, I asked members after the service to describe

what the expelled man had done. I was startled by the variety of answers

received. One member replied, " Oh, he was a drinker. " Another reported, " Henry

cheated on his wife. " A third informant answered with, " That man went with women

for money. " Still another member simply replied that she did not remember what

the man had done, " After all, he was expelled almost a year ago. "

 

Each time a member is expelled, the bishop is required to make the reason for

expulsion completely clear, revealing the nature of the sin in front of everyone

present. Even though he must do this, it seems evident that members do not feel

it is important to specifically know or remember what a " disorderly person " did.

In fact, during the ritual of reconciliation, nobody seems to demonstrate much

interest in the interaction between the bishop and the one seeking

reconciliation.

 

Apparently, the important thing is that all members remain aware of the

Regulations of the Church and conform to them. The Social Meaning of Rituals and

Beliefs while rituals such as baptism, expulsion, and reconciliation emerge as

actual events that can be observed, both by members and visiting sociologists;

the beliefs that participating actors consciously attach to such practices

remain extrasensory. Outside of consciousness, there is no medium in which the

presence, absence, or quality of a belief could make a measurable or informative

difference. As Peter Fuchs suggests, " Communication may select the occurrence of

consciousness as a theme, but it can have no access to any single empirical

consciousness " (2004, p. 84).

 

Subjectivity is operationally closed to society. Though there can be no

sociology of the inner religious experience, several significant questions may

still be entertained. First, in the absence of intersubjectivity and other forms

of mental telepathy, how are social rituals coordinated? Second, how and under

what conditions does society develop religious beliefs as a theme? Finally, how

can sociology make sense of the difference between rituals and the beliefs of

participants?

 

The religious conduct of Mennonites is governed - directed, guided, and

regulated - by the rules described in the Confession of Faith booklet and the

behavioral codex known as the " Discipline. " According to Anthony P. Cohen (1985,

p. 16), " When we speak of people acquiring culture, or learning to be social, we

mean that they acquire the symbols which will equip them to be social. " Symbols,

Cohen maintains, " do not tell us what to mean, but give us the capacity to make

meaning. " For the construction of a plausible community, members depend on

rituals and symbols for the simple reason that their own personal beliefs,

because they are closed to society, cannot " equip them to be social. " Rituals,

like dances, parades, dramas, and boxing matches, are symbiotic relations in

which humans coordinate a series of selections about how to display their body.

 

Accommodating their own choices to the rules of ritual, participants can make

meaningful impressions on one another and simulate the reality of the group. As

long as members accommodate themselves and contribute to a " good show, " the

ritual will successfully contribute its own meaning. Thoughts cannot broach the

limits of consciousness, but bodies can be mutually and improbably controlled so

that members can meaningfully participate in ritual. Thus, communication about

rules reproduces ritual, as when Mennonites write and read and understand the

Confession of Faith book. More than any other structural resource, this small

book helps coordinate each of the Mennonite rituals by plainly stating what each

participant must do during the performance. When reconstructing a specific

ritual 'in actu', participants accommodate themselves to behavioral schemes

consciously understood during the course of previous communication about

rituals.

 

Participants learn what others expect to see them do and say by reading the COF,

imitating the performance of older members, and from personal trial and error.

Participants who make " mistakes " or intentionally slip from the frame during

live performances encourage additional socialization (for themselves) by

irritating the expectations of others and triggering " contingency communication "

(Fuchs 2004, p. 22). Only communication may determine the contingent operating

procedure required to simulate a certain ritual. Were intersubjectivity a

possibility, believers could still not perform a ritual without first learning

the rules and accommodating their behavior.

 

Despite the certainty of its own operational closure, under what conditions does

society take up religious beliefs as a theme? With respect to beliefs, if

society cannot make a difference on consciousness, how can it make a difference

on itself? Before attempting to unravel this theoretical issue, let us briefly

reconsider the case of Old Order Mennonites:

 

We have already concluded that, for Mennonites, maintaining correct and uniform

ritual order and outward discipline (orthopraxis) appears to be more important

than cultivating communication about correct beliefs and doctrine (orthodoxis).

Mennonites learn how to follow the church Discipline and what happens to those

who do not; but members are seldom taught why they ought to conform to the rules

or how to account for the significance of each ritual (Lyman/Scott 1968). The

unspecialized, volunteer, parttime organizational leaders of the church make no

concerted effort to instruct members as to why they should adhere to the

Church's rules. They do not attempt to monitor whether or not members of the

church hold " correct and proper " Mennonite beliefs, not even as a preliminary

test before baptism.

 

The church prohibits Sunday school, seminary, and general education after the

eighth grade. There are no organizational opportunities in which Mennonites

expect one another to freely participate in communication about religious ideas,

testing the variance and degrees of freedom; confronting and conditioning double

contingency (Luhmann 1995, pp. 133-134).

 

Weaverland Mennonites in New York State do not make a habit of reading and

discussing their Confession of Faith book, they do not evangelize or formally

teach doctrine, and they do not openly discuss one another's beliefs. Mennonite

communication does not choose to condition the beliefs of Mennonites. Therefore,

the accommodation of members to a particular program of orthodoxy is minimal.

The viability of a Mennonite as a member in good faith is tested on the basis of

practice. Mennonite society depends on rules and rituals to seal its boundary

and reify (to convert into a material thing) programs of community, humility,

simplicity, and discipline. As John Hostetler observes with regard to the Old

Order Amish, it is more important to live the faith than to be able to explain

it (1993).

 

Orthodoxy ('set doctrine') does not exist until it is created, and the process

of cultivating the theme and description of a complex and contingent theological

program is tedious. A " correct " belief would have to be invented, articulated,

adopted, disseminated, and constantly protected against alternative beliefs

(Zito 1983). Despite the effort involved, a religious organization might decide

to cultivate orthodoxy ('set doctrines') when its members begin to express an

adequate amount of " noise " (von Foerster 1960).

 

In other words, if members began to speak about beliefs and make an effort to

sound each other out, it is likely that disagreement, confusion, and irritation

would result from the exposure of double contingency. Members who gloss over

their beliefs and do not test each other's assumptions have an easier time

taking consensus for granted. The noise created as members attempt to straighten

out the variety exposed by communication threatens the imaginary unity of the

organization. How can members believe in their unity if communication

continually reproduces uncertainty about the difference between correct and

false beliefs?

 

Those most irritated by the noise may attempt to silence it by structuring

communication, adding complexity in the form of orthodoxy ('set doctrine') and

hierarchy, and destroying variety with variety (Ashby 1957). Role players

(ministers, deacons, bishops) may be differentiated and placed " in charge " of

deciding who can speak with authority about the church's beliefs. Role players

may assemble propositions into a creed and then organize ritualistic displays of

instruction, inquisition, and confirmation. Organizational authorities tend to

select and " certify " religious propositions in order to end communication about

alternatives.

 

Conflict about beliefs has an immunizing function: it stimulates an increase in

the complexity of communication about what does not fit the established program,

about what is foreign and what must be destroyed (Luhmann 1995, pp. 369-373).

Though it involves a political question of binding power... unbelievers,

heretics, apostates, free thinkers, and other noise makers can be denied an

address in the community of the saints. No address: no communication.

 

Well known historical incidences of excommunication during the Reformation and

Enlightenment demonstrate, however, that communication is capable of drawing its

own boundaries. Members of a church may assume that they believe the same

things, and they may even endeavor to establish an orthodox creed and require

affirmation to it. A heretic, however, may also be compelled to affirm the

official creed. Spies and traitors can pledge allegiance to the flag. People may

stand together and recite a creed or pray in a language that they do not

understand.

 

We repeat: a symbol or ritual may be personally meaningless and still have

meaning for society. Certain social conditions appear to increase the likelihood

of noise and subsequent attempts to systematize creeds and their acceptance

rituals. Insiders may be asked to account for their beliefs by outsiders. For

instance, Mennonites who migrated from Pennsylvania to settle in New York State

are more likely to have neighbors who are unfamiliar with Old Order customs and

habits. More frequent communication with curious neighbors can produce an

increased appetite for religious semantics:

 

How do I explain to my neighbor that Christians should only own black cars?

Apart from interaction with " the world, " the evolution of communication forms

may also increase noise and attempts to regulate it. When Mennonites decide to

hold services in English because too few members understand German, the

increased level of comprehension among insiders can result in noise. When an

organization distributes printed texts to members, noise may be a consequence.

Any effort to increase the educational level and literacy of members would be

likely to increase the number of random perturbations. The appearance of

prophets and those who are spiritually entranced (connected to God) may also

contribute noise, at least as long as communication can make some initial sense

of revelation.

 

From a sociological perspective, Mennonite communication and the consciousness

of each Mennonite are co-productions that condition each other. The difference

between ritual and belief cannot be denied, as it creates the possibility for a

Mennonite social system to come into view. Communication cannot create its own

meaning, and neither can consciousness. As Peter Fuchs explains: An observer who

concentrates on observing consciousness will not find any idiosyncratic meaning

because he could not understand it.

 

This does not deny the possibility that 'a consciousness' may process

idiosyncratic meaning; but only asserts that at the moment it attempts to

securely grasp it (yet to convey it), it can only make use of ready made,

previously available social meaning (2004, p. 42-43).

 

Communication necessarily entails the availability of conscious systems who

remain operationally closed to one another, but who can observe meaningful

differences made with the selective use of signs. To have social meaning, a

ritual may not be owned by any single interpreter. As the structural couplings

that enable communication... signs (and rituals) only inform those who refuse

their possession.

 

Rituals are socially meaningful because they demonstrate in a perceptible manner

the interpenetration of consciousness and social system. If the self-referential

rules of ritual are followed, properly... self-conditioned participant/observers

may successfully connect each successive operation to others, consciously

synchronizing operations to form a recognizable unity. As a social system,

Mennonite communication reproduces itself by making itself available to the

perceptions of conscious participants.

 

In the end, the self-referential form of a ritual remains open to conditioning

by participants who engage in communication about how they believe rituals

should be conducted. But 'such beliefs' cannot emerge as beliefs; they can only

take form within the flow of communication.

 

Conclusion: Toward a Theory of Ritual

 

A ritual is an imaginary performance pattern for coordinating and synchronizing

the display of human bodies and other selected objects during scheduled

real-time interactions. Society constructs the performance pattern of a ritual

as a solution to the problem of how participants can coordinate spontaneous

displays without sharing consciousness. Ritual destroys the variety of possible

human behavior by restricting spontaneity; it is the conscious attempt to

organize a series of spontaneous selections. The complexity of ritual increases

as the possibilities for meaningfully displaying bodies is reduced by society in

a selected manner that is possible but not necessary.

 

As first order observers... participants in ritual have learned to expect one

another to limit themselves to simulating a performance pattern established in

communication. The distinction between a viable performance and a failure is

marked by a second order observer, who may also be a performer. The expectations

of second order observers are conditioned by their participation in

communication about ritual.

 

In ritual... meaningful displays are redundant and conform to the performance

pattern suggested by communication. One circumambulates, one genuflects, one

chants, one eats, one gives a kiss, one spits at Satan: one performs each

display as a distinct operation.

 

Communication suggests meaningful connections between discrete ritual

operations, preparing observers to expect to perceive a contingent series of

recursive displays.

 

Second order observers (including participants) perceive the display of bodies

and objects and consciously process their fleeting impressions with respect to

an imaginary selfreferential and self-constructed form of ritual. The form of

ritual may be described as a distinction with two sides: expected

display/unexpected display (see Spencer-Brown 1969). A viable ritual is

recognized by cultured observers as a familiar unity in difference, a perfectly

continuous reproduction on the side of " expected displays. " This

self-referential unity represents the social system in operation.

 

Due to the operational closure of both consciousness and communication,

participants in ritual cannot attach their thoughts to ritual in a socially

meaningful manner. Conversely, society cannot restrict or govern the thoughts of

participants. However, both consciousness and communication may select ritual as

an intended theme.

 

Conditioned observers of ritual may miss an expected scent, anticipated sound,

or predicted touch. They may see someone drop a prop, skip a step, appear in the

wrong costume, or forget their lines.

 

Cultured observers who perceive such unexpected displays or omissions may become

irritated enough to participate in additional communication about ritual, which

may further condition the expectations of observers. Ritual cannot perceive its

own expected displays, and consciousness cannot prepare itself to make sense of

what the senses perceive.

 

In the mind and heart of an individual person, religious rituals may " mean " a

great deal. It is easy to accept that a person may feel strongly about the

significance or meaning of a particular ritual. Nonetheless, religious beliefs

are socially meaningless because a human community (as opposed to an individual

person)... having no spirit or mind... cannot possibly hold them.

 

Despite its longstanding appeal among sociologists of religion,

intersubjectivity is not a scientifically valid hypothesis because its existence

cannot be verified or falsified. Sociologists cannot read minds any better than

the faithful. Even without the existence of a collective consciousness, however,

rituals remain socially meaningful because they have the symbolic power to

associate and coordinate individuals in a visible, external, and predictable

manner. This power is the result of successful communication.

 

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shunning