Mystical Experience - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[Guest guest]

, " Violet " <violetubb

wrote:

 

" Over the past several decades, the number of people who are seeking—and

finding—direct access to the mystical dimension has increased dramatically.

Between 1962 and 1994, the percentage of U.S. adults who report having had " a

religious or mystical experience " grew from twenty-two to thirty-three percent,

and more recent polls indicate that this figure may now be as high as forty

percent. While this figure would include the " conversion " experiences that are

part of Baptist and other fundamentalist Christian sects, the number of

Americans who identify themselves with a traditional religion has decreased, and

those who check " none " when asked for a religious affiliation have doubled in

the last decade. These unconventional " nones, " who, after Catholics and

Baptists, are possibly the third-largest group in the country, comprise some

twenty-nine million people. According to a 2001 survey, two-thirds of the

" nones " believe in God, more than one-third consider themselves religious, and

they buy many books on spirituality. Looking at the rise in numbers of people

having spiritual experiences and the decline in traditional religious

affiliation, it seems very likely that many of those who are now having mystical

experiences are doing so on their own, or in unorthodox ways. "

 

http://adishakti.org/_/spiritual_not_religious.htm

 

 

>

> Mysticism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

>

> (First published Thu Nov 11, 2004; substantive revision Mon Jan 10,

2005)

>

> The term `mysticism,' comes from the Greek & #956; & #965; & #969;,

meaning " to conceal. " In the Hellenistic world, `mystical' referred to

" secret " religious rituals. In early Christianity the term came to

refer to " hidden " allegorical interpretations of Scriptures and to

hidden presences, such as that of Jesus at the Eucharist. Only later

did the term begin to denote " mystical theology, " that included direct

experience of the divine (See Bouyer, 1981). Typically, mystics,

theistic or not, see their mystical experience as part of a larger

undertaking aimed at human transformation (See, for example, Teresa of

Avila, Life, Chapter 19) and not as the terminus of their efforts.

Thus, in general, `mysticism' would best be thought of as a

constellation of distinctive practices, discourses, texts,

institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at human

transformation, variously defined in different traditions.

>

> Under the influence of William James' The Varieties of Religious

Experience, heavily centered on people's conversion experiences, most

philosophers' interest in mysticism has been in distinctive, allegedly

knowledge-granting " mystical experiences. " Philosophers have focused

on such topics as the classification of mystical experiences, their

nature in different religions and mystical traditions, to what extent

mystical experiences are conditioned by a mystic's language and

culture, and whether mystical experiences furnish evidence for the

truth of their contents. Some philosophers have begun to question the

emphasis on experience in favor of examining the entire mystical

complex (See Jantzen, 1994 and 1995, and section 9 below). Since this

article pertains to mysticism and philosophy, it will concentrate

chiefly on topics philosophers have discussed concerning mystical

experience.

>

> 1. Mystical Experience

> 2. Categories of Mystical Experiences

> 3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience

> 4. Perennialism

> 5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)

> 6. Constructivism

> 7. On the Possibility of Experiencing Mystical Realities

> 8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument

> from Perception

> 9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender

> Bibliography

> Other Internet Resources

> Related Entries

>

>

>

> 1. Mystical Experience

>

> Because of its variable meanings, even in serious treatments, any

definition of `mystical experience' must be at least partly

stipulative. Two, related, senses of `mystical experience' will be

presented, one in a wide definition reflecting a more general usage,

and the second in a narrow definition suiting more specialized

treatments of mysticism in philosophy.

>

>

> 1.1 The Wide Sense of `Mystical Experience'

>

> In the wide sense, let us say that a `mystical experience,' is:

>

> A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual

experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs

that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense perception,

somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.

>

> We can further define the terms used in the definition, as follows:

>

> 1. The inclusion of `purportedly' is to allow the definition to be

accepted without acknowledging that mystics ever really do experience

realities or states of affairs in the way described.

>

> 2. A `super sense-perceptual experience' includes perception-like

content of a kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory

modalities (including the means for sensing pain and body temperature,

and internally sensing body, limb, organ, and visceral positions and

states), or standard introspection. Some mystics have referred to a

" spiritual " sense, corresponding to the perceptual senses, appropriate

to a non-physical realm. A super sense-perceptual mode of experience

may accompany sense perception (see on " extrovertive " experience,

Section 2.1). For example, a person can have a super sense-perceptual

experience while watching a setting sun. The inclusion of the

supersensory mode is what makes the experience mystical.

>

> 3. A `sub sense-perceptual experience' is either devoid of

phenomenological content altogether, or nearly so (see the notion of

" pure conscious events, " in Sections 5 and 6), or consists of

phenomenological content appropriate to sense perception, but lacking

in the conceptualization typical of attentive sense perception (see

below on " unconstructed experiences " ).

>

> 4. `Acquaintance' of realities means the subject is aware of the

presence of (one or more) realities.

>

> 5. `States of affairs' includes, for example, the impermanence of

all reality and that God is the ground of the self. `Acquaintance' of

states of affairs can come in two forms. In one, a subject is aware of

the presence of (one or more) realities on which (one or more) states

of affairs supervene. An example would be an awareness of God (a

reality) affording an awareness of one's utter dependence on God (a

state of affairs). In its second form, `acquaintance' of states of

affairs involves an insight directly, without supervening on

acquaintance, of any reality. An example would be coming to " see " the

impermanence of all that exists following an experience that

eliminates all phenomenological content.

>

> It is not part of the definition that necessarily at the time of the

experience the subject could tell herself, as it were, what realities

or state of affairs were then being disclosed to her. The realization

may arise following the experience.

>

> Mystical experience is alleged to be " noetic, " involving knowledge

of what a subject apprehends (see James, 1958). To what extent this

knowledge is alleged to come from the experience alone will be

discussed below (Section 8.5).

>

> Para-sensual experiences such as religious visions and auditions

fail to make an experience mystical. The definition also excludes

anomalous experiences such as out of body experiences, telepathy,

precognition, and clairvoyance. All of these are acquaintance with

objects or qualities of a kind accessible to the senses or to ordinary

introspection, such as human thoughts and future physical events. (A

degree of vagueness enters the definition of mystical experience here

because of what is to count as a " kind " of thing accessible to

non-mystical experience.)

>

> Mystical writings do not support William James' claim (James, 1958)

that mystical experience must be a transient event, lasting only a

short time and then disappearing. Rather, the experience might be an

abiding consciousness, accompanying a person throughout the day, or

parts of it. For that reason, it might be better to speak of mystical

consciousness, which can be either fleeting or abiding. Hereafter, the

reader should understand " experience " in this sense.

>

> In the wide sense, mystical experiences occur within the religious

traditions of at least Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Indian religions,

Buddhism, and primal religions. In some of these traditions, the

experiences are allegedly of a supersensory reality, such as God or

Brahman (or, in a few Buddhist traditions, Nirvana, as a reality (See

Takeuchi, 1983, pp. 8-9). Many Buddhist traditions, however, make no

claim for an experience of a supersensory reality. Some cultivate

instead an experience of " unconstructed awareness, " involving an

awareness of the world on an absolutely or relatively non-conceptual

level (see Griffiths, 1993). The unconstructed experience is thought

to grant insight, such as into the impermanent nature of all things.

Buddhists refer to an experience of tathata or the " thisness " of

reality, accessible only by the absence of ordinary sense-perceptual

cognition. These Buddhist experiences are sub sense-perceptual, and

mystical, since thisness is claimed to be inaccessible to ordinary

sense perception and the awareness of it to provide knowledge about

the true nature of reality. Some Buddhist experiences, however,

including some Zen experiences, would not count as mystical by our

definition, involving no alleged acquaintance with either a reality or

a state of affairs (see Suzuki, 1970).

>

>

> 1.2 The Narrow Sense of `Mystical Experience'

>

> In the narrow sense, more common among philosophers, `mystical

experience' refers to a sub-class of mystical experience in the wide

sense. Specifically it refers to:

>

> A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual

unitive experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of

affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception,

somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.

>

> A unitive experience involves a phenomenological de-emphasis,

blurring, or eradication of multiplicity, where the cognitive

significance of the experience is deemed to lie precisely in that

phenomenological feature. Examples are experiences of the oneness of

all of nature, " union " with God, as in Christian mysticism, (see

section 2.2.1), the Hindu experience that Atman is Brahman (that the

self/soul is identical with the eternal, absolute being), the Buddhist

unconstructed experience, and " monistic " experiences, devoid of all

multiplicity. (On " unitive " experiences see Smart 1958 and 1978, and

Wainwright, 1981, Chapter One.) Excluded from the narrow definition,

though present in the wide one, are, for example, a dualistic

experience of God, where subject and God remain strictly distinct, a

Jewish kabbalistic experience of a single supernal sefirah, and

shamanistic experiences of spirits. These are not mystical in the

narrow sense, because not unitive experiences.

>

> Hereafter, `mystical experience' will be used in the narrow sense,

unless otherwise noted. Correspondingly, the term `mysticism' will

refer to practices, discourse, texts, institutions, and traditions

associated with unitive experiences.

>

> Care should be taken not to confuse mystical experience with

" religious experience. " The latter refers to any experience having

content or significance appropriate to a religious context or that has

a " religious " flavor. This would include much of mystical experience,

but also religious visions and auditions, non-mystical Zen

experiences, and various religious feelings, such as religious awe and

sublimity. Also included is what Friedrich Schleiermacher identified

as the fundamental religious experience: the feeling of " absolute

dependence " (Schleiermacher, 1963).

>

> We can call a numinous (from " numen " meaning divine or spirit)

experience, a non-unitive experience (purportedly) granting

acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not

accessible by way of sense perception, somatosensory modalities, or

standard introspection. Your garden-variety sense of God's (mere)

" presence " would count as a numinous experience. Numinous experiences

contrast with religious experiences that involve, for example,

feelings but no alleged acquaintance with non-sensory realities or

states of affairs.

>

> Rudolf Otto reserved the term " numinous experience " for experiences

allegedly of a reality perceived of as " wholly other " than the

subject, producing a reaction of dread and fascination before an

incomprehensible mystery (Otto, 1957). In the sense used here, Otto's

" numinous " experience is but one kind of numinous experience.

>

>

>

> 2. Categories of Mystical Experiences

>

> Mystical and religious experiences can be classified in various

ways, in addition to the built-in difference between mystical super

sense-perceptual and sub sense-perceptual experiences. This section

notes some common classifications.

>

>

> 2.1 Extrovertive and Introvertive

>

> When any experience includes sense-perceptual, somatosensory, or

introspective content, we may say it is an extrovertive experience.

There are, then, mystical extrovertive experiences, as in one's

mystical consciousness of the unity of nature overlaid onto one's

sense perception of the world, as well as non-unitive numinous

extrovertive experiences, as when experiencing God's presence when

gazing at a snowflake. When not extrovertive, we may say an experience

is introvertive. An experience of " nothingness " or " emptiness, " in

some mystical traditions, and an experience of God resulting from a

disengagement from sense experience, would be examples of introvertive

experiences (For more on these terms see section 4).

>

>

> 2.2 Theistic and non-theistic

>

> A favorite distinction of Western philosophers is between theistic

experiences, which are purportedly of God, and non-theistic ones.

Non-theistic experiences can be allegedly of an ultimate reality other

than God or of no reality at all. Numinous theistic experiences are

dualistic, where God and the subject remain clearly distinct, while

theistic mysticism pertains to some sort of union or else identity

with God.

>

>

> 2.2.1 Union with God

>

> " Union " with God signifies a rich family of experiences rather than

a single experience. " Union " involves a falling away of the separation

between a person and God, short of identity. Christian mystics have

variously described union with the Divine. This includes Bernard of

Clairvaux (1090-1153) describing unification as " mutuality of love, "

Henry Suso (1295-1366) likening union with God to a drop of water

falling into wine, taking on the taste and color of the wine (Suso,

1953, p. 185), and Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) describing union as

" iron within the fire and the fire within the iron " (see Pike, 1992,

Chapter 2). Generally, medieval Christian mysticism had at least three

stages, variously described, in the union-consciousness: quiet,

essentially a prelude to the union with God, full union, and rapture,

the latter involving a feeling of being " carried away " beyond oneself

(see Pike, 1992, Chapter 1).

>

>

> 2.2.2 Identity with God

>

> Theistic mystics sometimes speak as though they have a consciousness

of being fully absorbed into or even identical with God. Examples are

the Islamic Sufi mystic al-Husayn al-Hallaj (858-922) proclaiming, " I

am God " (see Schimmel, 1975, Chapter 2), and the Jewish kabbalist,

Isaac of Acre (b. 1291?), who wrote of the soul being absorbed into

God " as a jug of water into a running well. " (see Idel, 1988, p. 67.)

Also, the Hasidic master, R. Shneur Zalman of Liady (1745-1812) wrote

of a person as a drop of water in the ocean of the Infinite with an

illusory sense of individual " dropness. " And, the (heretical)

Christian mystic, Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1327/8) made what looked

very much like identity-declarations (see McGinn, 2001 and Smith,

1997). It is an open question, however, when such declarations are to

be taken as identity assertions, with pantheistic or acosmic

intentions, and when they are perhaps hyperbolic variations on

descriptions of union-type experiences.

>

>

> 2.3 Theurgic vs. Non-Theurgic Mysticism

>

> In theurgic (from the Greek theourgia) mysticism a mystic intends to

activate the divine in the mystical experience. (See Shaw, 1995, p.

4.) Thus, a Christian mystic who intends to activate God's grace, is

involved in theurgy. Nonetheless, while typically theistic mystics

claim experience of God's activity, many do not claim this to result

from their own endeavors, while others refrain from declaring the

activation of the divine as the purpose of their mystical life. So

they are not involved in theurgic activity.

>

> The Jewish kabbalah is the most prominent form of alleged theurgic

mysticism. In it, the mystic aims to bring about a modification in the

inner life of the Godhead (see Idel, 1988). However, it is

questionable whether in its theurgic forms kabbalah is mysticism, even

on the wide definition of mysticism, although it is clearly mysticism

with regard to its teaching of union with the Godhead and the Einsof,

or Infinite.

>

>

> 2.4 Apophatic vs. Kataphatic

>

> Apophatic mysticism (from the Greek, " apophasis, " meaning negation

or " saying away " ) is contrasted with kataphatic mysticism (from the

Greek, " kataphasis, " meaning affirmation or " saying with " ). Apophatic

mysticism claims that nothing can be said of objects or states of

affairs which the mystic experiences. These are absolutely

indescribable, or " ineffable. " Kataphatic mysticism does make claims

about what the mystic experiences.

>

> An example of apophatic mysticism is in the classical Tao text, Tao

Te Ching, attributed to Lao Tsu (6th century B.C.E.), which begins

with the words, " Even the finest teaching is not the Tao itself. Even

the finest name is insufficient to define it. Without words, the Tao

can be experienced, and without a name, it can be known. " (Lao Tsu, 1984).

>

> In contrast, with this understanding of kataphatic and apophatic,

Fr. Thomas Keating has argued that Christian mysticism strongly

endorses God's being unknowable. Instead, the distinction between

kataphatic and apophatic refers solely to differences in the

preparatory regimen employed in the " mystical way, " the former using

" positive " techniques, the latter only " negative " techniques.

Kataphatic preparation, he states, employs reason, imagination,

memory, and visualization for getting into position for mystical

consciousness. Apophatic preparation involves a practice of " emptying "

out of other conscious content in order to " make room " for the

apprehension of God, who is beyond our discursive, sensual natures.

(see Keating, 1996, Chapter 4).

>

>

>

> 3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience

>

>

> 3.1 Ineffability

>

> William James, (James, 1958, 292-93) deemed " ineffability " or

indescribability an essential mark of the mystical. It is not always

clear, however, whether it is the experience or its alleged object, or

both, that are to be ineffable. A logical problem with ineffability

was noted long ago by Augustine, " God should not be said to be

ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a

contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which

cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called

ineffable " (Augustine, 1958, pp. 10-11). To say that X is ineffable is

to say something about X, which contravenes ineffability. This problem

has been raised anew by Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga, 1980, 23-25) and

Keith Yandell (Yandell, 1975).

>

> Several responses to this problem are possible for the mystic. One

is to avoid speech altogether and remain silent about what is revealed

in experience. Mystics, however, have not been very good at this. A

second possibility is to distinguish first-order from second-order

attributions, where " ineffability " both is a second-order term and

refers solely to first-order terms. To say, then, that something is

" ineffable " would be to assert that it could not be described by any

first-order terms, " ineffability " not being one of them. A third

possibility is to say, for example, that " X is ineffable " is really a

statement about the term `X,' saying about it that it fails to refer

to any describable entity. A fourth possibility lies in the ongoing

negation of whatever is said about X, ad infinitum, in what Michael

Sells has called an infinite " unsaying " or taking back of what has

been said (See Sells, 1994, Chapter 1).

>

> An example of unsaying can be found in the endless negations in some

Madyamika and Zen Buddhist meditative consciousness. Since the truth

about reality - as it is - lies outside of our conceptualizations of

it, we cannot say that truth, only experience it. Hence, when we say,

" Reality is not reality, " that is, that reality as it is differs from

what we take it to be conceptually, we must also say that " Reality is

not - not reality. " Otherwise we will have been caught in

conceptualizing about reality (saying about it that it is not what our

conceptualizations say it is). We must then immediately negate the

latter saying by saying that reality is neither not-reality nor not

not-reality. And so on. (See Thich Nhat Hanh, 1994, Chapter 5). A

second, theistic, example of this approach is in the negative theology

of (Pseudo) Dionysius (c.500) for whom God was " a most

incomprehensible absolute mystery, " about which we can only say what

it is not. Such continuing negation points beyond discourse to experience.

>

> A fifth possibility for resolving the paradox of ineffability issues

from William Alston's observation that mystics professing the utter

unknowability of God have had much to say about their experiences and

about God (Alston, 1991). Alston maintains, therefore, that when

mystics talk about `indescribability' they refer to the difficulty of

describing in literal terms, rather than by metaphor, analogy, and

symbols. This is not a peculiar mark of mysticism, demurs Alston,

since quite common in science, philosophy, and religion. Alston's

position, however, may not square well with the explicitly " unsaying "

trends in mysticism.

>

> A sixth solution to the ineffability paradox could come from Richard

Gale (1960) and Ninian Smart (1958, 69) each of whom have argued that

'ineffability' is (merely) an honorific title marking the value and

intensity of an experience for a mystic. Similarly, Wayne Proudfoot

argues that mystics could not know that what they experienced could

not be expressed in any possible language, because they do not know

every possible language. He concludes that the ineffability-claim only

prescribes that no language system shall be applicable to it, and is

not a descriptive claim. The word `ineffable' serves to create and

maintain a sense of mystery (Proudfoot, 1985, 125-27). These positions

beg the question against the possibility of there being mystical

experience so different in kind from what humans otherwise know that

it cannot be expressed by ordinary human language. Against Proudfoot

it may be said that: because mystics could not know that a mystical

object was indescribable in any possible language, it does not follow

they would not, in their enthusiasm, make a claim beyond their

knowledge. In any case, mystics might reasonably believe that since

languages known to them cannot describe what they experienced, in all

likelihood no other human language could describe it either.

>

> Some philosophers think that a stress on ineffability signifies an

attempt to consign mysticism to the " irrational, " thus excluding it

from more sensible human pursuits. Grace Jantzen has advanced a

critique of the emphasis on ineffability as an attempt to remove

mystical experiences from the realm of rational discourse, placing

them instead into the realm of the emotions (Jantzen, 1995, p. 344).

Others have staunchly defended the " rationality " of mysticism against

charges of irrationalism (Staal, 1975). The issue of ineffability is

thus tied into questions of the epistemic value of mystical

experiences, to be discussed below in section 8.

>

>

> 3.2 Paradoxicality

>

> Scholars of mysticism sometimes stress the " paradoxical " nature of

mystical experiences. It is not always clear whether the experience,

the mystical object, or both, are supposed to be paradoxical. We can

discern four relevant senses of `paradoxical': (1) According to its

etymology, `paradoxical' refers to what is surprising or " contrary to

expectation. " (2) Language can be intentionally `paradoxical' in using

a logically improper form of words to convey what is not intended to

be logically absurd. This may be for rhetorical effect or because of

difficulty in conveying a thought without resort to linguistic tricks.

(3) As in philosophy, a `paradox' can involve an unexpected logical

contradiction, as in the " Liar Paradox. " (4) Walter Stace sees

paradoxality as a universal feature of mystical experiences, equating

`paradoxality' with an intended logical contradiction (Stace, 1961,

212. See section 4 below).

>

> Insofar as mystical experience is out of the ordinary, and the

unitive quality strange (for ordinary folk, at least), reports of them

may very well be surprising or contrary to expectation. Hence, they

may be paradoxical in sense (1). Reports of mystical experiences may

be paradoxical also in sense (2), because at times mystical language

does assume logically offensive forms, when actual absurdity may not

be intended. However, paradox in this sense occurs less frequently in

first-hand reports of mystical experiences and more in second-order

mystical systems of thought (Moore, 1973, and Staal, 1975).

>

> There is no good reason, however, why mystical experiences or their

objects should be paradoxical in either senses (3) or (4). In general,

there is no good reason for thinking that reports of mystical

experience must imply logical absurdity. As we have seen above, while

there do occur forms of expression that are contradictory, the

contradiction is often removed by the device of " unsaying " or

canceling out, which propels the discourse into a non-discursive realm.

>

> The attempt to designate mystical experiences as paradoxical in

senses (3) and (4) may result from being too eager to take logically

deviant language at its most literal. For example, Zen Buddhism speaks

of reaching a state of mind beyond both thought and " no-thought. "

However, rather than referring to a middle state, neither thought nor

no-thought, often the intention is to point to a state of mind in

which striving is absent, and labeling of mental activities ceases.

The mind of " no effort " strives neither for thought nor for

no-thought. No logical absurdity infects this description. In a

different direction, Frits Staal has argued that paradoxical mystical

language has been used systematically to make logically respectable

claims (Staal, 1975). While mystics use much literal language in

describing their experiences (see Alston, 1992, 80-102), the

literality need not extend to paradox in senses (3) or (4).

>

>

>

> 4. Perennialism

>

> Various philosophers, sometimes dubbed " perennialists, " have

attempted to identify common mystical experiences across cultures and

traditions (for the term `perennialism,' see Huxley, 1945). Walter

Stace's perennialist position has generated much discussion (Stace,

1960, 1961). Stace proposes two mystical experiences found " in all

cultures, religions, periods, and social conditions. " He identifies a

universal extrovertive experience that " looks outward through the

senses " to apprehend the One or the Oneness of all in or through the

multiplicity of the world, apprehending the " One " as an inner life or

consciousness of the world. The Oneness is experienced as a sacred

objective reality, in a feeling of " bliss " and " joy. " Stace's

universal extrovertive experience (or the experienced reality, it is

not always clear which) is paradoxical, and possibly ineffable (Stace,

1961, 79).

>

> Secondly, Stace identifies a universal, " monistic, " introvertive

experience that " looks inward into the mind, " to achieve " pure

consciousness, " that is, an experience phenomenologically not of

anything (Stace, 1961, 86). Stace calls this a " unitary

consciousness. " Some have called this a " Pure Conscious Event " or

" PCE " (Forman, 1993b and 1999. See section 6 below). A PCE consists of

an " emptying out " by a subject of all experiential content and

phenomenological qualities, including concepts, thoughts, sense

perception, and sensuous images. The subject allegedly remains with

" pure " wakeful consciousness. Like his extrovertive experience,

Stace's universal introvertive experience involves a blissful sense of

sacred objectivity, and is paradoxical and possibly ineffable. Stace

considers the universal introvertive experience to be a ripening of

mystical awareness beyond the halfway house of the universal

extrovertive consciousness.

>

> Stace assimilates theistic mystical experiences to his universal

introvertive experience by distinguishing between experience and

interpretation. The introvertive experience, says Stace, is the same

across cultures. Only interpretations differ. Theistic mystics are

pressured by their surroundings, says Stace, to put a theistic

interpretation on their introvertive experiences. Ninian Smart also

maintained the universality of the monistic experience, arguing that

descriptions of theistic mystical experiences reflect an interpretive

overlay upon an experiential base common to both theistic and

non-theistic experiences (Smart, 1965).

>

> Stace has been strongly criticized for simplifying or distorting

mystical reports (For a summary, see Moore, 1973). For example, Pike

criticizes the Stace-Smart position because in Christian mysticism

union with God is divided into discernable phases, which find no basis

in Christian theology. These phases, therefore, plausibly reflect

experience and not forced interpretation (Pike, 1992, Chapter 5).

>

> In contrast to Stace, R. C. Zaehner identified three types of

mystical consciousness: (1) a " panenhenic " extrovertive experience, an

experience of oneness of nature, one's self included, (2) a " monistic "

experience of an undifferentiated unity transcending space and time,

and (3) theistic experience where there is a duality between subject

and the object of the experience (Zaehner, 1961). Zaehner thought that

theistic experience was an advance over the monistic, since the

latter, he thought, expressed a self-centered interest of the mystic

to be included in the ultimate.

>

> William Wainwright has described four modes of mystical extrovertive

experience: a sense of the unity of nature, of nature as a living

presence, a sense that everything transpiring in nature is in an

eternal present, and the Buddhist unconstructed experience.

Wainwright, like Zaehner, distinguishes two mystical introvertive

experiences, one of pure empty consciousness, and theistic experience

marked by an awareness of an object in " mutual love " (Wainwright,

1981, Chapter 1).

>

>

>

> 5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)

>

>

> 5.1 The Defenders of Pure Conscious Events

>

> Much philosophical disagreement has taken place over questions

concerning PCEs, allegedly an " emptying out " by a subject of all

experiential content and phenomenological qualities, including

concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and sensuous images. Do such

events ever really occur, and if they do, how significant are they in

mysticism? Defenders of PCEs depend on alleged references to pure

consciousness in the mystical literature. One striking example is the

Buddhist philosopher, Paramaartha (499-569), who stated explicitly

that all of our cognitions were " conditioned " by our concepts save for

the non-sensory " unconditioned " Buddhist experience of emptiness (see

Forman, 1989). Another example cited is from the writings of the

Christian mystic Meister Eckhart that describe a " forgetting " that

abandons concepts and sense experience to sink into a mystical

" oblivion " (Forman, 1993a). In addition, Robert Forman has testified

to a PCE he himself endured, describing it as an empty consciousness

from which one " need not awake " (Forman, 1993b).

>

>

> 5.2 Criticism of the Defense of Pure Conscious Events

>

> Here is a sampling of important criticisms of the defense of Pure

Conscious Events (PCEs): (1) Reports of PCEs found in the literature

may not be decisive in establishing the occurrence of PCEs. We should

suspect the phenomenon of " idealization " in these reports.

Idealization occurs when an ideal goal is presented as achieved, when

it wasn't. Whether or not pure consciousness ever occurs, we should

suspect it might be presented as though it did because so strived for

by the mystic. (2) The PCE defenders exaggerate the centrality of

complete emptying out in mysticism. It is questionable if it is

central in the mainstream of Christian mysticism, for example, where

typically the mystic forgets all else only to better contemplate God.

Typical is the Christian mystic Jan Ruysbroeck who wrote that emptying

oneself is but a prelude to the mystical life of contemplating God

through an act of Divine grace (Zaehner, 1961, 170-71). Likewise, the

" shedding of corporeality " in early Hasidism was meant, for example,

to enable the mystic to contemplate the unified supernal structure of

the divine sefirot. And the Zen master, Dogen (1200-1253), wrote about

" wrongly thinking that the nature of things will appear when the whole

world we perceive is obliterated " (Dogen, 1986, 39). (3) Accordingly,

reports of " emptying out " and " forgetting " may refer only to an

emptying of ordinary experiential content, making room for an

extraordinary content. This accords well with the conception of ayin

(nothingness) in Jewish mysticism, which is positively saturated with

divine reality (Matt, 1997). Some have claimed that even for Meister

Eckhart " emptying out " is having one's mind on no object other than

God, rather than an absolute emptiness of content (Matt, 1997). (4)

Perennialists may be exaggerating the wakefulness of some emptying

out. The Islamic Sufi fana experience ( " passing away " ) is sometimes

described as an unconscious state, and the Sufi might become purely

unconscious upon finding God, in wajd (Schimmel, 1975, 178-79).

Therefore, an emptying out might sometimes simply be pure

unconsciousness. (5) Even if a subject honestly reports on a pure

conscious episode, there may have been conceptual events the subject

either repressed or experienced in a nebulous way (see Wainwright,

1981, 117-119). These latter simply do not remain for memory.

>

>

>

> 6. Constructivism

>

> `Constructivism' underscores the conceptual " construction " of

mystical experience. Let us call `soft constructivism' the view that

there is no mystical experience without at least some concepts,

concepts being what " construct " an experience. Let us call `hard

constructivism' the view that a mystic's specific cultural background

massively constructs - determines, shapes, or influences - the nature

of mystical experiences (See Hollenback, 1996, Jones, 1909,

Introduction, and Katz, 1978 and 1983). On the assumption that

mystical traditions are widely divergent, hard constructivism entails

the denial of perennialism. Soft constructivism is strictly consistent

with perennialism, however, since consistent with there being some

trans-cultural mystical experience involving concepts common across

mystical traditions. Both hard and soft constructivist arguments have

been mobilized against the existence of PCEs.

>

>

> 6.1 Soft Constructivist arguments Against PCE Defenders

>

> Here is a sampling of soft constructivist arguments against PCE

defenders: (1) PCEs are impossible because of the " kind of beings "

that we are (Katz, 1978, 59). It is a fact about humans that we can

experience only with the aid of memory, language, expectations, and

conceptualizations. Therefore, we cannot have a " pure " awareness,

empty of all content. (2) PCEs cannot be " experiences " (see Proudfoot,

1985, Chapter 4, and Bagger, 1999, Chapter 4). We must distinguish,

the claim goes, between an " event " and an " experience. " That X has " an

experience " E entails that X conceptualizes E. Hence, even if pure

conscious events happen to occur, they do not count as " experiences "

until the subject conceptualizes them. At that moment, they cease to

be " pure consciousness. " (3) A survey of mystical literature shows

that typical mystical experiences are conceptual in nature and not

empty of concepts. (4) An epistemological objection: Subjects could

not know they had endured a PCE. They could not know this during a

PCE, because it is supposed to be empty of all conceptual content

(Bagger, 1999, 102-3). A subject could not know this by remembering

the PCE, since there is supposed to be nothing to observe while it is

going on, and hence nothing to remember. Neither could a subject

surmise that a PCE had transpired by remembering a " before " and an

" after, " with an unaccounted for middle. This would fail to

distinguish a PCE from plain unconsciousness. Indeed, it seems to

matter little whether a subject who emerges with mystical insights

underwent a PCE or was simply unconscious. (5) A second

epistemological objection: Suppose a PCE has occurred and that a

subject knows that, somehow. Still, there is a problem of the

relationship of a PCE to the subsequent claims to knowledge, such as

when Eckhart purportedly grounds knowledge of the soul and God as one,

in a PCE (see Forman, 1993a). If in a PCE subjects were empty of all

experiential content, they could not claim to have had acquaintance of

anything (Bagger, 1999, 102-3).

>

>

> 6.2 Criticism of Soft Constructivism

>

> Several objections can be raised against the Soft Constructivist

Position:

>

> 1. The argument from the kind of beings we are against the

possibility of a PCE is not convincing. While our cultural sets shape

our ordinary experience, this argument gives no good reason why we

could not enjoy experiences on a pre-conceptual level of awareness,

especially through a regimen of training. Steven Katz, the author of

this argument, notes our " most brutish, infantile, and sensate levels "

of experience when we were infants (Katz, 1988, 755). It is hard to

see why in principle we could not retrieve such an unconceptualized

level of experience. And it is hard to rule out the possibility that

undergoing such events could provide allegedly new vantage points on

the " nature of reality. "

>

> 2. It makes little difference whether a PCE is called an

" experience " or an " event. " A PCE occurs within a wider experience of

the subject, including the subject's coming out of the PCE and

assigning it meaning. Let this wider experience be the " experience "

under discussion, rather than the PCE alone.

>

> 3. Defenders of PCEs maintain that persons who endure PCEs afterward

place interpretations on them. The textual evidence that objectors

cite against PCEs occurring, having do with the assignment of meaning

to the events, often seems quite consistent with the view that PCEs

exist and that different traditions place different interpretations on

them (see Pike, 1992, supplemental study 2).

>

> 4. Neuropsychological studies of mystical experience point to the

possibility of events of pure consciousness. A theory by Eugene

d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg (d'Aquili and Newberg, 1993 and 1999)

claims to account for PCEs by reference to occurrences in the brain

that cut off ordinary brain activity from consciousness. This theory,

if upheld, would provide physiological support for episodes of pure

consciousness (for more on this theory see section 8.7.1.)

>

> 5. There need be no problem about mystics knowing they had PCEs. If

we accept a reliabilist account of knowledge, a belief is knowledge if

produced by a reliable cognitive mechanism (perhaps with some further

conditions). In order to have knowledge, a person does not have to be

aware of and judge evidence, nor be cognizant of the reliability of

the mechanism that produces the knowledge. Hence, " awakening " from

(what is in fact) a PCE, if it produces the belief that one has

" awakened " from a PCE, could be a reliable cognitive mechanism

sufficient for knowing one had had a PCE. If we stick to an

evidentialist conception of knowledge, mystics might be able to have

evidence they had endured a PCE, though not at the precise time of its

occurrence. Here's how: (a) By hypothesis, a PCE is an event of

conscious awareness. (b) A conscious event can have elements one does

not note at the time, but recalls afterward. This is especially

possible when the recall immediately follows the event. © Therefore,

it should be possible for a mystic who endures a PCE to recall

immediately afterward the very awareness that was present in the PCE,

even though that awareness was not an object of consciousness at the

time of the PCE. The mystic, recalling the PCE awareness, could note

that the awareness had been of a " pure " type. Since the recall takes

place just following a PCE, the entire complex becomes enfolded into

one recognizable " experience " of the mystic, for which the mystic has

evidence.

>

> 6. Defenders of PCEs can champion their epistemological

significance, although PCEs are not of anything. Recall that the

noetic quality of a mystical experience can come from an acquaintance

of states of affairs involving an insight directly, without

supervening on acquaintance of any reality (see Section 1.1, clause

(5)). In addition, an experience is mystical as long as it allegedly

grants such an acquaintance. Neither need the insight be exactly

simultaneous with what makes the experience mystical. Hence, a person

could undergo a PCE, which then granted acquaintance of states of

affairs by a direct insight. The PCE plus the insight would constitute

a complex mystical experience that afforded awareness of a state of

affairs not otherwise accessible.

>

>

> 6.3 Hard Constructivism against Perennialism

>

> Hard Constructivism's main argument against any perennialism, not

only against defenders of PCEs, may be presented as follows (Katz, 1978):

>

> Premise (A): The conceptual scheme a mystic possesses massively

determines, shapes, or influences the nature of the mystical experience.

>

> Premise (B): Mystics of different mystical traditions possess

pervasively different conceptual schemes.

>

> Conclusion: Therefore, there cannot be a common experience across

cultural traditions. That is, perennialism is false.

>

> The hard constructivist denies the distinction between experience

and interpretation, since our conceptual apparatus massively shapes

our very experience. If successful, the argument would show that there

were no common numinous experiences across religious traditions either.

>

>

> 6.4 Criticism of Hard Constructivism

>

> This section summarizes objections against hard constructivism that

are not objections to soft constructivism as well.

>

> 1. It seems quite possible for subjects in the first instance to

apply " thin " descriptions to experiences, involving only a small part

of their conceptual schemes. Only on second thought, perhaps, will

they elaborate on their experience in terms of the richness of their

home culture. This would be like a physician with a headache, who

experiences pain in the first instance just like ordinary folk and

only subsequently applies medical terminology to the headache (Compare

King, 1988). If so, there is a possibility of common first-instance

mystical experiences across cultures, contrary to Premise A.

>

> 2. Premise A is thrown into further doubt by expressions of surprise

by mystics-in-training about what they experience (see Gellman, 1997,

145-46 and Barnard, 1997, 127-130), as well as by heretical types of

experience occurring with mystics acculturated in orthodox teachings,

such as Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme (See Stoeber, 1992, 112-113).

These illustrate the possibility of getting out from under one's

mystical background to have new experiences. Likewise, hard

constructivism's inherently conservative take on mysticism will

struggle to explain transformations within mystical traditions, and

cannot easily account for innovative geniuses within mystical traditions.

>

> 3. Two people walk together down the street and see an approaching

dog. One experiences the dog as " Jones's favorite black terrier that

came in second in last year's competition, " while the other

experiences it as " a stray mutt that the dog-catchers should take

away. " Because of the excessive conceptual differences in their

experiencing, the constructivist would have to insist that there was

no worthwhile sense in which both dog-sighters had the same

experience. However, there is an interesting sense in which they are

having the same experience: seeing that black dog at that place, at

that time. Similarly, there might exist an interesting commonality of

experiences across mystical traditions, most plausibly theistic ones,

despite conceptual disparity. The conceptual differences might not be

sufficient to deny this important commonality (See Wainwright, 1981, 25).

>

> 4. Specific cultural conditioning does not influence everyone to the

same degree and in the same way. Individuals have rich and varied

personal histories that influence their experiential lives in widely

differing ways. Some accept cultural restraints gladly; others rebel

against them; still others are blessed with a creative spirit, etc. A

" fat people must drive fat cows " approach to mysticism fails to mirror

the complex human phenomenon of acculturation.

>

> 5. Mystical traditions characteristically involve disciplines aimed

at loosening the hold of one's conceptual scheme on subsequent

experience. Techniques practiced for years promote a pronounced

inhibition of ordinary cognitive processes, sometimes called

" deautomization " (Deikman, 1980). This plausibly restricts the

influence of one's cultural background on one's mystical experiences,

in turn making possible identical experiences across mystical traditions.

>

> 6. The hard constructivist over-emphasizes the influence of

pre-mystical religious teaching on the mystic's experience. Mystical

experiences can circle around and reinvent meaning for the doctrines.

An example is the Jewish Kabbalistic transformation of the notion of

mitzvah ( " commandment " ) to that of " joining " or " connection " with God.

Starting with commandment, the mystic ends up with devekut, " clinging "

to God.

>

> 7. Hard Constructivism fails to account well for widely differing

mystical understandings of the same religious text. For example, the

Hindu text, The Brahma Sutra, is monistic for Shankara (788-820), a

" qualified dualism " for Ramanuja (c. 1055-1137), and yet again a

strict dualism, for Madhva (1199-1278) (see Radhakrishnan,

Introduction, 1968). Likewise, the teaching of emptiness in the

Buddhist text the Prajnaparamita Hrydaya Sutra (The Heart Sutra),

receives quite disparate unpacking in different streams of Buddhism.

It's plausible to conclude that distinct experiences were responsible,

at least in part, for these differences.

>

> On the one hand, talk about mystical experiences " the same " across

all mystical traditions should be taken with a tablespoon of salt, if

scholars claim to have discovered them solely from isolated

descriptions of experiences. It is difficult to assess the nature of

an experience without attending to how it " radiates " out into the

structure of the local mystical theory and life of which it is a part

(See Idel, 1997). Nevertheless, it does seem possible to generalize

about experiences " similar enough " to be philosophically interesting.

>

>

>

> 7. On the Possibility of Experiencing Mystical Realities

>

> In a position related to constructivism, William Forgie has argued

that there could not be an experience " of God, " if we understand

experience " of X " to mean that it is phenomenologically given that the

experience is of X (Forgie, 1984, 1994). Forgie argues that

phenomenological content can consist of general features only, and not

features specifically identifying God as the object of experience. He

compares this to your seeing one of two identical twins. Which one of

the two you perceive cannot be a phenomenological given. Likewise,

that you experience precisely God and not something else cannot be a

phenomenological datum. Forgie's type of argument applies as well to

objects of mystical experiences other than God. Nelson Pike argues,

against Forgie, that the individuation of an object can be a component

of the phenomenological content of an experience, drawing on examples

from sense perception (Pike 1992, Chapter 7).

>

> Forgie assumes that the phenomenological content of a theistic

experience must be confined to data akin to the " sense data " of

sensory experience, somehow analogous to colors, shapes, movement,

sounds, tastes, and the like. Individuation is absent from

phenomenological content of that sort. Pike, for his part, teases out

alleged phenomenological content for individuating God from analogies

to ordinary sense perception. Both philosophers restrict experiences

of God to phenomenal content somehow analogous to sense perception.

This might be a mistake. Consider, for example, that God could appear

to a person mystically, and at the same time transmit, telepathy-like,

the thought that this was God appearing. Imagine further that this

thought had the flavor of being conveyed to one from the outside,

rather than as originating in the subject. The thought that " This is

God appearing " would be part of the phenomenological content of the

subject's present (complex) experience (though not part of the

mystical mode of the experience as defined in section 1.1), and yet

not the product of an interpretation by the subject. Indeed, reports

of experiences of God sometimes describe what seems to come with the

thought included that " this is God. " Whatever the epistemological

merits of such an experience might be, it would be quite natural to

say that its phenomenology includes the datum that it is an experience

" of God, " in particular.

>

>

>

> 8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument

from Perception

>

> In his celebrated, The Varieties of Religious Experience (London

1925, p. 415), Williams James, asked, " Do mystical states establish

the truth of those theological affections in which the saintly life

has its roots? " This question can be divided into two: (Q1) Is a

person warranted in thinking that his or her experiences are veridical

or have evidential value? And (Q2) Are " we, " who do not enjoy mystical

experiences, upon examining the evidence of such experiences,

warranted in thinking them veridical or endowed with evidential value?

While related, these questions can be treated separately.

>

> The major philosophical reply in the affirmative to (Q1) may be

called the " Doxastic Practice Approach. " The major defense of an

affirmative reply to (Q2) may be called the " Argument from Perception. "

>

>

> 8.1 The Doxastic Practice Approach

>

> William Alston has defended beliefs a person forms based on mystical

and numinous (in the terminology of this entry) experience,

specifically of a theistic kind (Alston, 1991). Alston defines a

'doxastic practice' as consisting of socially established ways of

forming and epistemically evaluating beliefs (the " output " ) from a

certain kind of content from various inputs, such as cognitive and

perceptual ones (Alston, 1991, 100). The practice of forming

physical-object beliefs derived from sense perception is an example of

a 'doxastic practice' and the practice of drawing deductive

conclusions in a certain way from premises is another. Now, Alston

argues that the justification of every doxastic practice is

" epistemically circular, " that is, its reliability cannot be

established in any way independent of the practice itself. (See

Alston, 1993) This includes the " sense-perception practice. " However,

we cannot avoid engaging in doxastic practices. Therefore, Alston

contends, it is rational to engage in the doxastic practices we do

engage in providing there is no good reason to think they are

unreliable. Now, there are doxastic practices consisting of forming

beliefs about God, God's purposes for us, and the like, grounded on

religious and mystical experiences such as " God is now appearing to

me. " Such, for example, is the " Christian Doxastic Practice. " It

follows from Alston's argument that it is rational for a person in

such a practice to take its belief outputs as true unless the practice

is shown to be unreliable. Thus we have an affirmative answer to

question (Q1).

>

>

> 8.2 The Argument from Perception

>

> Various philosophers have defended the evidential value, to one

degree or another, of some religious and mystical experiences,

principally with regard to experiences of God (see Baillie, 1939,

Broad, 1953, Davis, 1989, Gellman, 1997 and 2001a, Gutting, 1982,

Swinburne, 1991 and 1996, Wainwright, 1981, and Yandell, 1993). These

philosophers have stressed the " perceptual " nature of experiences of

God, hence the name given here, the " Argument from Perception. " We can

summarize the approach as follows:

>

> 1. Experiences of God have a subject-object structure, with a

phenomenological content allegedly representing the object of the

experience. Also, subjects are moved to make truth claims based on

such experiences. Furthermore, there are mystical procedures for

getting into position for a mystical experience of God (see Underhill,

90-94), and others can take up a suitable mystical path to try to

check on the subject's claims (see Bergson, 1935, 210). In all these

ways, experiences of God are perceptual in nature.

>

> 2. Perception-like experiences count as (at least some) evidence in

favor of their own validity. That a person seems to experience some

object is some reason to think he or she really does have experiential

contact with it. So, experiences of God count as (at least some)

evidence in favor of their own validity.

>

> 3. Agreement between the perceptions of people in different places,

times, and traditions, enhances the evidence in favor of their

validity (see Broad, 1953). Hence, agreement about experiences of God

in diverse circumstances enhances the evidence in their favor.

>

> 4. Further enhancement of the validity of a religious or mystical

experience can come from appropriate consequences in the life of the

person who had the experience, such as increased saintliness (See

Wainwright, 1981, 83-88).

>

> 5. (1)-(4) yield initial evidence in favor of the validity of (some)

experiences of God.

>

> Whether any experiences of God are veridical in the final reckoning

will depend on the strength of the initial evidential case, on other

favorable evidence, and on the power of counter-considerations against

validity. Defenders of the Argument from Perception differ over the

strength of the initial evidential case and have defended the staying

power of the Argument from Perception against counter-evidence to

varying degrees. All agree, however in advancing a positive answer to

question (Q2).

>

>

> 8.3 An Epistemological Critique: Disanalogies to Sense Experience

>

> Several philosophers have argued against either the doxastic

practice approach or the Argument from Perception, or both (see Bagger

1999, Fales, 1996a, 1996b, and 2001, Gale, 1991, 1994, and 1995, C.B.

Martin, 1955, Michael Martin, 1990, Proudfoot, 1985, and Rowe, 1982).

Here the focus will be on objections related specifically to mystical

and numinous experience, rather than to general epistemological

complaints,

>

> Philosophers have disputed the Argument from Perception on the

grounds of alleged disanalogies between experiences of God and sense

perception. Two issues must be examined: (a) whether the disanalogies

exist, and (b) if they do exist, whether they are epistemologically

significant.

>

>

> 8.3.1 Lack of Checkability

>

> The analogy allegedly breaks down over the lack of appropriate

crosschecking procedures for experiences of God. With sense

perception, we can crosscheck by employing inductive methods to

determine causally relevant antecedent conditions; can " triangulate "

an event by correlating it with other effects of the same purported

cause; and can discover causal mechanisms connecting a cause to its

effects. These are not available for checking on experiences of God.

Evan Fales argues that " crosscheckability " is an integral part of any

successful perceptual epistemic practice. Therefore, the perceptual

epistemic practice in which mystical experiences of God are embedded

is severely defective (Fales, 200) In addition, Richard Gale (1991),

argues that in experiences of God there is missing agreement between

perceivers as well as the possibility of checking whether the

perceiver was in the " right " position and psychological and

physiological state for a veridical experience. For similar reasons,

C.B. Martin concludes that claims to have experienced God are " very

close " to subjective claims like " I seem to see a piece of paper "

rather than to objective claims like " I see a piece of paper " (C.B.

Martin, 1955).

>

> William Rowe observes that God may choose to be revealed to one

person and not to another. Therefore, unlike with sense perception,

the failure of others to have an experience of God under conditions

similar to those in which one person did, does not impugn the validity

of the experience. Therefore, we have no way of determining when an

experience of God is delusory. If so, neither can we credit an

experience as authentic (Rowe, 1982).

>

>

> 8.3.2 God's Lack of Space-Time Coordinates

>

> Some philosophers have argued that there could never be evidence for

thinking a person had perceived God (Gale, 1994 and 1995, and Byrne,

2001). For there to be evidence that a person experienced an object O,

and did not have just an " O-ish-impression, " it would have to be

possible for there to be evidence that O was the common object of

different perceptions (not necessarily simultaneous with one another).

This, in turn, would be possible only if it were possible to

distinguish perceptions of O, specifically, from possible perceptions

of other objects that might be perceptually similar to O. This latter

requirement is possible only if O exists in both space and time.

Space-time coordinates make it possible to distinguish O from objects

of similar appearance existing in other space-time coordinates. God,

however, does not exist in both space and time. Therefore, there could

never be evidence that a person had experienced God.

>

>

> 8.4 Evaluation of the Disanalogy arguments

>

> Although Alston defends the perceptual character of mystical

experiences of God for his doxastic practice approach, there is no

restriction to the perceptual on the inputs of a doxastic practice.

Any cognitive input will do. Hence, disanalogies between experiences

of God and sense perception, even if great, would not be directly

harmful to this approach (Alston, 1994).

>

> Regarding the bearing of the alleged disanalogies on the Argument

from Perception, the disanalogists take the evidential credentials of

sense perception as paradigmatic for epistemology. They equate

confirming and disconfirming evidence with evidence strongly analogous

to the kind available for sensory perception. However, the evidential

requirement should be only " confirming empirical evidence, " be what it

may. If God-sightings have confirming evidence, even if different from

the kind available for sense perception, they will then be

evidentially strengthened. If God-sightings do not have much

confirming empirical evidence, be it what it may, they will remain

unjustified for that reason, and not because they lack crosschecks

appropriate to sense perception.

>

> Perhaps the disanalogy proponents believe that justification of

> physical object claims should be our evidential standard, because only

> where crosschecks of the physical object kind are available do we get

> sufficient justification. However, this is not convincing. Our

> ordinary physical object beliefs are far over-supported by confirming

> evidence. We have extremely luxurious constellations of confirming

> networks there. Hence, it does not follow that were mystical claims

> justified to a lesser degree than that, or not by similar procedures,

> that they would be unjustified.

>

> A problem with the argument from God's lack of dimensionality is

that the practice of identifying physical objects proceeds by way of

an interplay between qualitative features and relative positions to

determine both location and identity. The judgments we make reflect a

holistic practice of making identifications of place and identity

together. There is no obvious reason why the identification of God

cannot take place within its own holistic practice, with its own

criteria of identification, not beholden to the holistic practice

involved in identifying physical objects (See Gellman, 2001a, Chapter

3, for a sketch of such a holistic practice). We should be suspicious

of taking the practice of identifying physical objects as paradigmatic

for all epistemology.

>

>

> 8.5 The Argument from Perception as Dependent on the Doxastic

Practice Approach

>

> In the end, the Argument from Perception might have to yield to the

Doxastic Practice Approach. One reason is that it is doubtful if many

experiencers of God make truth claims solely on the basis of their

mystical experiences, rather than within a doxastic practice. For

example, as Rowan Williams has commented concerning Teresa of Avila,

she would never have imagined that her experiences alone were

sufficient evidence for any truth. The criterion of authenticity for

her experiences was how they related to subsequent concrete behavior,

as judged by and within her religious practice. Mystical experience as

such was given no special authority.

>

> A second reason why the Argument from Perception might have to yield

to the Doxastic Practice Approach is that if, as noted in section 8.4,

identification of God takes place in an holistic practice, then quite

plausibly this is a social practice in which one judges one's mystical

experiences to be of God. Turning again to the example of Teresa, her

experiences in themselves did not always give her assurance that she

was not experiencing the Devil rather than God. She adjudicated the

issue from within the teachings of the Church. Finally, it is an open

question to what extent alleged God-experiences are sufficiently

detailed to provide grounds to the subject that they are of God.

Hence, a subject's judgment that a particular encounter is with God

might well be the fruit of assimilating the present event into a

larger social practice.

>

>

> 8.6 An Epistemological Critique: Religious Diversity

>

> A critique of the Argument from Perception for the epistemic value

of theistic experiences comes from the facts of religious diversity.

This critique applies to non-theistic experiences as well. In the

history of religions, we find innumerable gods, with different

characteristics. Shall we say they all exist? Can belief in all of

them be rational? (Hick, 1989, 234-5) In addition, there are

experiences of non-personal ultimate realities, such as the Nirguna

Brahman of Indian religions. Nirguna Brahman cannot be an ultimate

reality if God is (Hick, 1984, 234-5). The Argument from Perception

cannot work for both, so works for neither. Furthermore, different

theistic faiths claim experience of the one and only God, ostensibly

justifying beliefs that are in contradiction with one another (see

Flew, 1966, 126). If the Argument from Perception leads to such

contradictory results, it cannot provide evidence in favor of the

validity of experiences of God.

>

> In reply to this objection, straight away we can discount

experiences of polytheistic gods because of their being embedded in

bizarre, fantastic settings, and because of the relative paucity of

reports of actual experiences of such beings. Regarding clashing

experiences within theistic settings, Richard Swinburne has proposed

an ascent to generality as a harmonizing mechanism. Swinburne believes

that conflicting descriptions of objects of religious experience pose

a challenge only to detailed claims, not to general claims of having

experienced a supernal being (Swinburne, 1991, 266).

>

> John Hick has proposed a " pluralistic hypothesis " to deal with the

problem of religious diversity (Hick, 1984, Chapter 14). According to

the pluralistic hypothesis, the great world faiths embody different

perceptions and conceptions of one reality that Hick christens " the

Real. " The Real itself is never experienced directly, but has " masks "

or " faces " which are experienced, depending on how a particular

culture or religion thinks of the Real. The Real itself is, therefore,

neither personal nor impersonal, these categories being imposed upon

the Real by different cultural contexts. Hence, the typical

experiences of the major faiths are to be taken as validly of the

Real, through mediation by the local face of the Real.

>

> Hick has been criticized for infidelity to the world's religious

traditions. However, we should understand Hick to be providing a

theory about religions rather than an exposition of religions

themselves would endorse (for criticism of Hick see Gavin d'Costa,

1987). Some propose harmonizing some conflicting experiences by

reference to God's " inexhaustible fullness " (Gellman, 1997, Chapter

4). In at least some mystical experiences of God, a subject

experiences what is presented as proceeding from an intimation of

infinite plenitude. Given this feature, a claim to experience a

personal ultimate, for example, can be squared with an experience of

an impersonal ultimate: one " object, " identified as God or Nirguna

Brahman, can be experienced in its personal attributes or in its

impersonal attributes, from out of its inexhaustible plenitude.

>

> Whether any of these solutions succeed, the body of experiential

data is too large for us to simply scrap on the grounds of

contradictory claims. We should endeavor to retain as much of the

conflicting data as possible by seeking some means of conciliation.

>

>

> 8.7 An Epistemological Critique: Naturalistic explanations

>

> Bertrand Russell once quipped that " We can make no distinction

between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks

much and sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and

therefore has abnormal perceptions " (Russell, 1935, 188). C.D. Broad

wrote, to the contrary, " One might need to be slightly `cracked' in

order to have some peep-holes into the super-sensible world " (Broad,

1939, 164). Thus is the issue engaged whether we can explain away

religious and mystical experiences by reference to naturalistic causes.

>

> Wainwright has argued that a naturalistic explanation is compatible

with the validity of an experience since God could bring about an

experience through a naturalistic medium (Wainwright, 1981, Chapter

2). However, we should take into account that there might be

naturalistic explanations that would make it implausible that God

would appear in just those ways (this is elaborated in section 8.7.2).

>

> Various psychological naturalistic explanations of religious and

mystical experience have been offered, including pathological

conditions such as: hypersuggestibility, severe deprivation, severe

sexual frustration, intense fear of death, infantile regression,

pronounced maladjustment, and mental illness, as well as

non-pathological conditions, including the inordinate influence of a

religious psychological " set " (See Davis, 1989, Chapter 8, and Wulff,

2000). In addition, some have advanced a sociological explanation for

some mysticism, in terms of the socio-political power available to an

accomplished mystic (Fales, 1996a, 1996b).

>

> Naturalistic proposals of these kinds exaggerate the scope and

influence of the cited factors, sometimes choosing to highlight the

bizarre and eye-catching at the expense of the more common

occurrences. Secondly, some of the proposals, at least, are perfectly

compatible with the validity of experiences of God. For example, a

person's having a religious psychological set can just as well be a

condition for enjoying and being capable of recognizing an experience

of God, as it can be a cause of delusion.

>

>

> 8.7.1 Neuropsychological Explanations

>

> Neuropsychological research has been conducted to look for unique

brain processes involved in religious and mystical experiences,

resulting in a number of competing theories (see Wulff, 2000). The

" explaining away " enters when one claims that " It's all in the head. "

The most comprehensive current theory, that of d'Aquili and Newberg

(d'Aquili and Newberg 1993 and 1999), proposes the prefrontal area of

the brain as the locus of special brain activity during mystical

episodes. Through " deafferentiation, " or cutting off of neural input

to that area of the brain, they claim, an event of pure consciousness

occurs. The patterns set up in the brain create an overwhelming

experience of " absolute unitary being. " If reinforcement of a certain

hypothalamic discharge then occurs, this will prolong the feeling of

elation, and will be interpreted as an experience of God. Otherwise,

there will arise a deep peacefulness due to the dominance of specified

hypothalamic structures. This gets interpreted as an experience of an

impersonal, absolute ground of being. The theory associates numinous

experiences with variations in deafferentiation in various structures

of the nervous system, and lesser religious experiences with mild to

moderate stimulation of circuits in the lateral hypothalamus. The

latter generate religious awe: a complex of fear and exaltation (see

d'Aquili and Newberg, 1993, 195). The brain functions in related ways

in aesthetic experience as well (d'Aquili and Newberg, 2000).

>

> The authors themselves do not say their theory shows there to be

nothing objective to mystical or religious experience. However, they

do recommend explaining away objective differences between, for

example, theistic and non-theistic experiences. And their theory could

be utilized in a " It's all in the head " strategy.

>

> Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis (1993) maintain (comparing religious

experiences to creative problem solving) that a person who has a

religious experience faces an existential crisis, and attempts to

solve it within fixed cognitive structures, which are embedded in the

brain's left-hemisphere. This yields no solution. The person may then

undergo a transforming religious experience, in which the brain

temporarily switches from left-hemisphere to right-hemisphere

dominance, from verbal/conceptual thinking to non-verbal insight

" beyond " the person's dominant conceptual structure. The switch then

reverberates back to restructure the left-hemisphere conceptual

network, now made apt for dealing with the existential crisis. The

right-hemisphere switch can account for the sense of `ineffability,'

since the right hemisphere is not analytic or verbal (See Fenwick 1996

and Michael Persinger, 1994). Because the shift involves

" transcending " the cognitive, it may explain the conviction of having

contact with a " transcendent realm. " If offered as a naturalistic

" explaining away, " this theory would imply that what a person thinks

is an experience of God, say, is really an experience of temporary

right-hemisphere dominance. The theory has the drawback, however, of

applying only to conversion experiences, and not to other religious

and mystical episodes.

>

> Other theories that have attracted attention include one focusing on

anomalous features of the temporal lobes of the brain, the locus for

epileptic conditions (Persinger, 1987). One study even claims to have

discovered a correlation between temporal lobe epilepsy and sudden

conversion experiences (Dewhurst and Beard, 1970). James Austin, a

neurologist and himself a Zen practitioner, has developed a theory of

brain transformations for prolonged Zen meditative practice (Austin,

1998). The theory is based on gradual, complex changes in the brain,

leading to a blocking of our higher associative processes. Austin

believes that the Zen kensho experience, according to Austin an

experience of reality " as it is in itself, " is an experience with

(relatively) shut down neural activity.

>

>

> 8.7.2 Evaluation of Neuropsychological Explanations

>

> It would seem that a neuropsychological theory could do no more than

relate what happens in the brain when a mystical or religious

experience occurs. It could not tell us that the ultimate cause for a

theory's favored brain-events was altogether internal to the organism.

On the other hand, such a theory could help rule out cases of

suspected deception and block the identification of mystical

experiences with mere emotion. True, there may not be out-of-brain

" God-receptors " in the body, analogous to those for sensory

perception, which might reinforce a suspicion that it's all in the

head. However, out-of-brain receptors are neither to be expected nor

required with non-physical stimuli, as in mystical experiences. God,

for example, does not exist at a physical distance from the brain.

Furthermore, God could act directly upon the brain to bring about the

relevant processes for a subject to perceive God.

>

> On the other hand, a neuropsychological theory would put pressure on

claims to veridical experiences, if it could point to brain processes

implausibly grounding a veridical experience. The implausibility would

flow from a being of God's nature wanting to make itself known by just

that way. Suppose, for (an outlandish) example, researchers convinced

us that all and only alleged experiencers of God had a brain-defect

caused only by a certain type of blow to the shoulder to people with a

genetic propensity to psoriasis, and that the area of the defect was

activated in the experiences. This might not prove that experiences of

God were delusory, but would raise serious doubts. It is too early in

the research, however, to say that implausible brain conditions have

been found for experiences of God.

>

>

> 8.7.3 The Superiority of Naturalistic Explanation

>

> Some philosophers have argued that because the " modern inquirer "

assumes everything ultimately explicable in naturalistic terms, in

principle we should reject any supernatural explanation of mystical

and religious experience (see Bagger, 1999). Invoking God to explain

mystical experiences is like invoking miracles to explain natural

phenomena. We should match our elimination of miracles from our

explanatory vocabulary with an elimination of a supernatural

explanation of mystical experiences of God. Hence, we do not have to

wait until we discover a live alternative explanation to the theistic

explanation of mystical experiences of God. We should resist a

theistic explanation in the name of our epistemic standards. Hence, we

should reject both the doxastic practice approach and the Argument

from Perception.

>

> This argument raises the important question of the relationship

between theistic explanation and a naturalistic program of

explanation. Various theistic philosophers have attempted to square

special divine activity with a modern scientific understanding of the

world (See for example, Swinburne, 1989). Whether they have succeeded

is a question beyond the scope of the present essay, however. Of

course, a person for whom supernatural explanation is not a live

option would have reason to reject the Argument from Perception and

refuse to engage in a doxastic practice of identifying valid

God-experiences. However, most defenders of the Argument from

Perception advance it at best as a defensible line of reasoning,

rather than as a proof of valid experiences of God that should

convince anyone, and the doxastic practice approach is not meant to

convince everybody to participate in a theistic doxastic practice (see

Gellman, 2001b).

>

>

>

> 9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender

>

> Feminist philosophers have criticized the androcentric bias in

mysticism and its philosophical treatment. There are three main

objections: (1) Contemporary male philosophers treat mysticism as most

centrally a matter of the private psychological episodes of a solitary

person. Philosophers believe these private experiences reveal the

meaning and value of mysticism (Jantzen, 1994 and 1995). Instead,

philosophers should be studying the socio-political ramifications of

mysticism, including its patriarchal failings. (2) Scholars of

mysticism have systematically ignored or marginalized much of women's

mysticism. Closer attention to women would reveal the androcentric

bias in male mysticism (Jantzen, 1995). (3) The traditional male

construction of God has determined the way male philosophers think of

theistic experience. Thus, theistic experience is conditioned from the

outset by patriarchal conceptualizations and values, and by sex-role

differentiation in the practice of religion (Raphael, 1994).

Typically, the view states, men understand theistic experience as a

human subject encountering a being wholly distinct, distant, and

overpowering. A paradigm of this approach is Rudolf Otto's " numinous

experience, " of a " wholly other " reality, unfathomable and

overpowering, engendering a sense of dreaded fascination. The mystic

is " submerged and overwhelmed " by his own nothingness (Otto, 1957).

Otto claims that this is the foundational experience of religion. This

approach, it is claimed, is mediated by the androcentrism of Otto's

worldview, entrapped in issues of domination, atomicity, and

submission. Feminist thinkers tend to deny the dichotomy between the

holy and the creaturely that makes Otto's analysis possible (see Daly,

1973 and Goldenberg, 1979). Feminist theologians stress the immanent

nature of the object of theistic experience, and bring to prominence

women's experience of the holy in their fleshly embodiment, denigrated

by androcentric attitudes.

>

> The feminist critique poses a welcome corrective to undoubted

> androcentric biases in mysticism and mystical studies. Regarding (1),

> while studying the socio-political ramifications of mysticism is

> certainly a mandatory undertaking, and should contribute to future

> social justice, it is not necessarily the task of philosophers, and

> certainly not all philosophers. A division of labor should free

> philosophers to examine the important phenomenological and

> epistemological aspects of mysticism, though always in awareness of

> possible androcentric prejudices. That being said, the feminist

> critique should help to neutralize the conception of the private

> nature of mysticism and religious experience, introduced to philosophy

> largely by William James. Objection (2) has begun to bring about a

> welcome change with scholarship dedicated to women's mysticism and its

> significance (see for example, Hurcombe, 1987, Brunn and

> Epiney-Burgard, 1989, Beer, 1993, and Borchert, 1994). Regarding (3),

> we must distinguish between Otto's androcentric claim that his type of

> numinous experience constitutes religious experience at its most

> profound, and the rich variegation of religious and mystical

> experience of men throughout history. This includes men's experiences

> of God's immanent closeness as well as mystical union with God, quite

> opposite, by feminist lights, to Otto's numinous experience. The study

> of gender in religious experience and mysticism has barely begun and

> promises new insights into and revisions of our understanding of these

> human phenomena.

>

>

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Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications, Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press.

>

> * Wulff, David M., 2000, " Mystical Experience, " In Varieties of

Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence, Etzel Cardena

(ed.), Steven Jay Lynn, and Stanley Krippner, 397-440, Washington,

D.C.: American Psychological Association.

>

> * Yandell, Keith, 1975, " Some Varieties of Ineffability, "

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6: 167-179.

>

> * Yandell, Keith, 1993, The Epistemology of Religious Experience,

New York: Cambridge University Press.

>

> * Zaehner, R. C., 1961, Mysticism, Sacred and Profane, New York:

Oxford University Press.

>

>

> Other Internet Resources

>

> * Varieties of Religious Experience, by William James (Electronice

Text Center, University of Virginia).

>

> * Tao Te Ching, Taoism Information Page (University of Florida), web

page listing various translations.

>

> * Mysticism Resources Page, maintained by Gene Thursby (University

of Florida).

>

> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/#1

>