Mystical Experience - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Mysticism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

(First published Thu Nov 11, 2004; substantive revision Mon Jan 10, 2005)

 

The term `mysticism,' comes from the Greek & #956; & #965; & #969;, meaning " to

conceal. " In the Hellenistic world, `mystical' referred to " secret " religious

rituals. In early Christianity the term came to refer to " hidden " allegorical

interpretations of Scriptures and to hidden presences, such as that of Jesus at

the Eucharist. Only later did the term begin to denote " mystical theology, " that

included direct experience of the divine (See Bouyer, 1981). Typically, mystics,

theistic or not, see their mystical experience as part of a larger undertaking

aimed at human transformation (See, for example, Teresa of Avila, Life, Chapter

19) and not as the terminus of their efforts. Thus, in general, `mysticism'

would best be thought of as a constellation of distinctive practices,

discourses, texts, institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at human

transformation, variously defined in different traditions.

 

Under the influence of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience,

heavily centered on people's conversion experiences, most philosophers' interest

in mysticism has been in distinctive, allegedly knowledge-granting " mystical

experiences. " Philosophers have focused on such topics as the classification of

mystical experiences, their nature in different religions and mystical

traditions, to what extent mystical experiences are conditioned by a mystic's

language and culture, and whether mystical experiences furnish evidence for the

truth of their contents. Some philosophers have begun to question the emphasis

on experience in favor of examining the entire mystical complex (See Jantzen,

1994 and 1995, and section 9 below). Since this article pertains to mysticism

and philosophy, it will concentrate chiefly on topics philosophers have

discussed concerning mystical experience.

 

1. Mystical Experience

2. Categories of Mystical Experiences

3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience

4. Perennialism

5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)

6. Constructivism

7. On the Possibility of Experiencing Mystical Realities

8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument from

Perception

9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender

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1. Mystical Experience

 

Because of its variable meanings, even in serious treatments, any definition of

`mystical experience' must be at least partly stipulative. Two, related, senses

of `mystical experience' will be presented, one in a wide definition reflecting

a more general usage, and the second in a narrow definition suiting more

specialized treatments of mysticism in philosophy.

 

 

1.1 The Wide Sense of `Mystical Experience'

 

In the wide sense, let us say that a `mystical experience,' is:

 

A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual experience

granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not

accessible by way of sense perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard

introspection.

 

We can further define the terms used in the definition, as follows:

 

1. The inclusion of `purportedly' is to allow the definition to be accepted

without acknowledging that mystics ever really do experience realities or states

of affairs in the way described.

 

2. A `super sense-perceptual experience' includes perception-like content of a

kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities (including

the means for sensing pain and body temperature, and internally sensing body,

limb, organ, and visceral positions and states), or standard introspection. Some

mystics have referred to a " spiritual " sense, corresponding to the perceptual

senses, appropriate to a non-physical realm. A super sense-perceptual mode of

experience may accompany sense perception (see on " extrovertive " experience,

Section 2.1). For example, a person can have a super sense-perceptual experience

while watching a setting sun. The inclusion of the supersensory mode is what

makes the experience mystical.

 

3. A `sub sense-perceptual experience' is either devoid of phenomenological

content altogether, or nearly so (see the notion of " pure conscious events, " in

Sections 5 and 6), or consists of phenomenological content appropriate to sense

perception, but lacking in the conceptualization typical of attentive sense

perception (see below on " unconstructed experiences " ).

 

4. `Acquaintance' of realities means the subject is aware of the presence of

(one or more) realities.

 

5. `States of affairs' includes, for example, the impermanence of all reality

and that God is the ground of the self. `Acquaintance' of states of affairs can

come in two forms. In one, a subject is aware of the presence of (one or more)

realities on which (one or more) states of affairs supervene. An example would

be an awareness of God (a reality) affording an awareness of one's utter

dependence on God (a state of affairs). In its second form, `acquaintance' of

states of affairs involves an insight directly, without supervening on

acquaintance, of any reality. An example would be coming to " see " the

impermanence of all that exists following an experience that eliminates all

phenomenological content.

 

It is not part of the definition that necessarily at the time of the experience

the subject could tell herself, as it were, what realities or state of affairs

were then being disclosed to her. The realization may arise following the

experience.

 

Mystical experience is alleged to be " noetic, " involving knowledge of what a

subject apprehends (see James, 1958). To what extent this knowledge is alleged

to come from the experience alone will be discussed below (Section 8.5).

 

Para-sensual experiences such as religious visions and auditions fail to make an

experience mystical. The definition also excludes anomalous experiences such as

out of body experiences, telepathy, precognition, and clairvoyance. All of these

are acquaintance with objects or qualities of a kind accessible to the senses or

to ordinary introspection, such as human thoughts and future physical events. (A

degree of vagueness enters the definition of mystical experience here because of

what is to count as a " kind " of thing accessible to non-mystical experience.)

 

Mystical writings do not support William James' claim (James, 1958) that

mystical experience must be a transient event, lasting only a short time and

then disappearing. Rather, the experience might be an abiding consciousness,

accompanying a person throughout the day, or parts of it. For that reason, it

might be better to speak of mystical consciousness, which can be either fleeting

or abiding. Hereafter, the reader should understand " experience " in this sense.

 

In the wide sense, mystical experiences occur within the religious traditions of

at least Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Indian religions, Buddhism, and primal

religions. In some of these traditions, the experiences are allegedly of a

supersensory reality, such as God or Brahman (or, in a few Buddhist traditions,

Nirvana, as a reality (See Takeuchi, 1983, pp. 8-9). Many Buddhist traditions,

however, make no claim for an experience of a supersensory reality. Some

cultivate instead an experience of " unconstructed awareness, " involving an

awareness of the world on an absolutely or relatively non-conceptual level (see

Griffiths, 1993). The unconstructed experience is thought to grant insight, such

as into the impermanent nature of all things. Buddhists refer to an experience

of tathata or the " thisness " of reality, accessible only by the absence of

ordinary sense-perceptual cognition. These Buddhist experiences are sub

sense-perceptual, and mystical, since thisness is claimed to be inaccessible to

ordinary sense perception and the awareness of it to provide knowledge about the

true nature of reality. Some Buddhist experiences, however, including some Zen

experiences, would not count as mystical by our definition, involving no alleged

acquaintance with either a reality or a state of affairs (see Suzuki, 1970).

 

 

1.2 The Narrow Sense of `Mystical Experience'

 

In the narrow sense, more common among philosophers, `mystical experience'

refers to a sub-class of mystical experience in the wide sense. Specifically it

refers to:

 

A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual unitive

experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a

kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or

standard introspection.

 

A unitive experience involves a phenomenological de-emphasis, blurring, or

eradication of multiplicity, where the cognitive significance of the experience

is deemed to lie precisely in that phenomenological feature. Examples are

experiences of the oneness of all of nature, " union " with God, as in Christian

mysticism, (see section 2.2.1), the Hindu experience that Atman is Brahman (that

the self/soul is identical with the eternal, absolute being), the Buddhist

unconstructed experience, and " monistic " experiences, devoid of all

multiplicity. (On " unitive " experiences see Smart 1958 and 1978, and Wainwright,

1981, Chapter One.) Excluded from the narrow definition, though present in the

wide one, are, for example, a dualistic experience of God, where subject and God

remain strictly distinct, a Jewish kabbalistic experience of a single supernal

sefirah, and shamanistic experiences of spirits. These are not mystical in the

narrow sense, because not unitive experiences.

 

Hereafter, `mystical experience' will be used in the narrow sense, unless

otherwise noted. Correspondingly, the term `mysticism' will refer to practices,

discourse, texts, institutions, and traditions associated with unitive

experiences.

 

Care should be taken not to confuse mystical experience with " religious

experience. " The latter refers to any experience having content or significance

appropriate to a religious context or that has a " religious " flavor. This would

include much of mystical experience, but also religious visions and auditions,

non-mystical Zen experiences, and various religious feelings, such as religious

awe and sublimity. Also included is what Friedrich Schleiermacher identified as

the fundamental religious experience: the feeling of " absolute dependence "

(Schleiermacher, 1963).

 

We can call a numinous (from " numen " meaning divine or spirit) experience, a

non-unitive experience (purportedly) granting acquaintance of realities or

states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense perception,

somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection. Your garden-variety sense

of God's (mere) " presence " would count as a numinous experience. Numinous

experiences contrast with religious experiences that involve, for example,

feelings but no alleged acquaintance with non-sensory realities or states of

affairs.

 

Rudolf Otto reserved the term " numinous experience " for experiences allegedly of

a reality perceived of as " wholly other " than the subject, producing a reaction

of dread and fascination before an incomprehensible mystery (Otto, 1957). In the

sense used here, Otto's " numinous " experience is but one kind of numinous

experience.

 

 

 

2. Categories of Mystical Experiences

 

Mystical and religious experiences can be classified in various ways, in

addition to the built-in difference between mystical super sense-perceptual and

sub sense-perceptual experiences. This section notes some common

classifications.

 

 

2.1 Extrovertive and Introvertive

 

When any experience includes sense-perceptual, somatosensory, or introspective

content, we may say it is an extrovertive experience. There are, then, mystical

extrovertive experiences, as in one's mystical consciousness of the unity of

nature overlaid onto one's sense perception of the world, as well as non-unitive

numinous extrovertive experiences, as when experiencing God's presence when

gazing at a snowflake. When not extrovertive, we may say an experience is

introvertive. An experience of " nothingness " or " emptiness, " in some mystical

traditions, and an experience of God resulting from a disengagement from sense

experience, would be examples of introvertive experiences (For more on these

terms see section 4).

 

 

2.2 Theistic and non-theistic

 

A favorite distinction of Western philosophers is between theistic experiences,

which are purportedly of God, and non-theistic ones. Non-theistic experiences

can be allegedly of an ultimate reality other than God or of no reality at all.

Numinous theistic experiences are dualistic, where God and the subject remain

clearly distinct, while theistic mysticism pertains to some sort of union or

else identity with God.

 

 

2.2.1 Union with God

 

" Union " with God signifies a rich family of experiences rather than a single

experience. " Union " involves a falling away of the separation between a person

and God, short of identity. Christian mystics have variously described union

with the Divine. This includes Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) describing

unification as " mutuality of love, " Henry Suso (1295-1366) likening union with

God to a drop of water falling into wine, taking on the taste and color of the

wine (Suso, 1953, p. 185), and Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) describing union

as " iron within the fire and the fire within the iron " (see Pike, 1992, Chapter

2). Generally, medieval Christian mysticism had at least three stages, variously

described, in the union-consciousness: quiet, essentially a prelude to the union

with God, full union, and rapture, the latter involving a feeling of being

" carried away " beyond oneself (see Pike, 1992, Chapter 1).

 

 

2.2.2 Identity with God

 

Theistic mystics sometimes speak as though they have a consciousness of being

fully absorbed into or even identical with God. Examples are the Islamic Sufi

mystic al-Husayn al-Hallaj (858-922) proclaiming, " I am God " (see Schimmel,

1975, Chapter 2), and the Jewish kabbalist, Isaac of Acre (b. 1291?), who wrote

of the soul being absorbed into God " as a jug of water into a running well. "

(see Idel, 1988, p. 67.) Also, the Hasidic master, R. Shneur Zalman of Liady

(1745-1812) wrote of a person as a drop of water in the ocean of the Infinite

with an illusory sense of individual " dropness. " And, the (heretical) Christian

mystic, Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1327/8) made what looked very much like

identity-declarations (see McGinn, 2001 and Smith, 1997). It is an open

question, however, when such declarations are to be taken as identity

assertions, with pantheistic or acosmic intentions, and when they are perhaps

hyperbolic variations on descriptions of union-type experiences.

 

 

2.3 Theurgic vs. Non-Theurgic Mysticism

 

In theurgic (from the Greek theourgia) mysticism a mystic intends to activate

the divine in the mystical experience. (See Shaw, 1995, p. 4.) Thus, a Christian

mystic who intends to activate God's grace, is involved in theurgy. Nonetheless,

while typically theistic mystics claim experience of God's activity, many do not

claim this to result from their own endeavors, while others refrain from

declaring the activation of the divine as the purpose of their mystical life. So

they are not involved in theurgic activity.

 

The Jewish kabbalah is the most prominent form of alleged theurgic mysticism. In

it, the mystic aims to bring about a modification in the inner life of the

Godhead (see Idel, 1988). However, it is questionable whether in its theurgic

forms kabbalah is mysticism, even on the wide definition of mysticism, although

it is clearly mysticism with regard to its teaching of union with the Godhead

and the Einsof, or Infinite.

 

 

2.4 Apophatic vs. Kataphatic

 

Apophatic mysticism (from the Greek, " apophasis, " meaning negation or " saying

away " ) is contrasted with kataphatic mysticism (from the Greek, " kataphasis, "

meaning affirmation or " saying with " ). Apophatic mysticism claims that nothing

can be said of objects or states of affairs which the mystic experiences. These

are absolutely indescribable, or " ineffable. " Kataphatic mysticism does make

claims about what the mystic experiences.

 

An example of apophatic mysticism is in the classical Tao text, Tao Te Ching,

attributed to Lao Tsu (6th century B.C.E.), which begins with the words, " Even

the finest teaching is not the Tao itself. Even the finest name is insufficient

to define it. Without words, the Tao can be experienced, and without a name, it

can be known. " (Lao Tsu, 1984).

 

In contrast, with this understanding of kataphatic and apophatic, Fr. Thomas

Keating has argued that Christian mysticism strongly endorses God's being

unknowable. Instead, the distinction between kataphatic and apophatic refers

solely to differences in the preparatory regimen employed in the " mystical way, "

the former using " positive " techniques, the latter only " negative " techniques.

Kataphatic preparation, he states, employs reason, imagination, memory, and

visualization for getting into position for mystical consciousness. Apophatic

preparation involves a practice of " emptying " out of other conscious content in

order to " make room " for the apprehension of God, who is beyond our discursive,

sensual natures. (see Keating, 1996, Chapter 4).

 

 

 

3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience

 

 

3.1 Ineffability

 

William James, (James, 1958, 292-93) deemed " ineffability " or indescribability

an essential mark of the mystical. It is not always clear, however, whether it

is the experience or its alleged object, or both, that are to be ineffable. A

logical problem with ineffability was noted long ago by Augustine, " God should

not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a

contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be

spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called ineffable " (Augustine, 1958,

pp. 10-11). To say that X is ineffable is to say something about X, which

contravenes ineffability. This problem has been raised anew by Alvin Plantinga

(Plantinga, 1980, 23-25) and Keith Yandell (Yandell, 1975).

 

Several responses to this problem are possible for the mystic. One is to avoid

speech altogether and remain silent about what is revealed in experience.

Mystics, however, have not been very good at this. A second possibility is to

distinguish first-order from second-order attributions, where " ineffability "

both is a second-order term and refers solely to first-order terms. To say,

then, that something is " ineffable " would be to assert that it could not be

described by any first-order terms, " ineffability " not being one of them. A

third possibility is to say, for example, that " X is ineffable " is really a

statement about the term `X,' saying about it that it fails to refer to any

describable entity. A fourth possibility lies in the ongoing negation of

whatever is said about X, ad infinitum, in what Michael Sells has called an

infinite " unsaying " or taking back of what has been said (See Sells, 1994,

Chapter 1).

 

An example of unsaying can be found in the endless negations in some Madyamika

and Zen Buddhist meditative consciousness. Since the truth about reality - as it

is - lies outside of our conceptualizations of it, we cannot say that truth,

only experience it. Hence, when we say, " Reality is not reality, " that is, that

reality as it is differs from what we take it to be conceptually, we must also

say that " Reality is not - not reality. " Otherwise we will have been caught in

conceptualizing about reality (saying about it that it is not what our

conceptualizations say it is). We must then immediately negate the latter saying

by saying that reality is neither not-reality nor not not-reality. And so on.

(See Thich Nhat Hanh, 1994, Chapter 5). A second, theistic, example of this

approach is in the negative theology of (Pseudo) Dionysius (c.500) for whom God

was " a most incomprehensible absolute mystery, " about which we can only say what

it is not. Such continuing negation points beyond discourse to experience.

 

A fifth possibility for resolving the paradox of ineffability issues from

William Alston's observation that mystics professing the utter unknowability of

God have had much to say about their experiences and about God (Alston, 1991).

Alston maintains, therefore, that when mystics talk about `indescribability'

they refer to the difficulty of describing in literal terms, rather than by

metaphor, analogy, and symbols. This is not a peculiar mark of mysticism, demurs

Alston, since quite common in science, philosophy, and religion. Alston's

position, however, may not square well with the explicitly " unsaying " trends in

mysticism.

 

A sixth solution to the ineffability paradox could come from Richard Gale (1960)

and Ninian Smart (1958, 69) each of whom have argued that 'ineffability' is

(merely) an honorific title marking the value and intensity of an experience for

a mystic. Similarly, Wayne Proudfoot argues that mystics could not know that

what they experienced could not be expressed in any possible language, because

they do not know every possible language. He concludes that the

ineffability-claim only prescribes that no language system shall be applicable

to it, and is not a descriptive claim. The word `ineffable' serves to create and

maintain a sense of mystery (Proudfoot, 1985, 125-27). These positions beg the

question against the possibility of there being mystical experience so different

in kind from what humans otherwise know that it cannot be expressed by ordinary

human language. Against Proudfoot it may be said that: because mystics could not

know that a mystical object was indescribable in any possible language, it does

not follow they would not, in their enthusiasm, make a claim beyond their

knowledge. In any case, mystics might reasonably believe that since languages

known to them cannot describe what they experienced, in all likelihood no other

human language could describe it either.

 

Some philosophers think that a stress on ineffability signifies an attempt to

consign mysticism to the " irrational, " thus excluding it from more sensible

human pursuits. Grace Jantzen has advanced a critique of the emphasis on

ineffability as an attempt to remove mystical experiences from the realm of

rational discourse, placing them instead into the realm of the emotions

(Jantzen, 1995, p. 344). Others have staunchly defended the " rationality " of

mysticism against charges of irrationalism (Staal, 1975). The issue of

ineffability is thus tied into questions of the epistemic value of mystical

experiences, to be discussed below in section 8.

 

 

3.2 Paradoxicality

 

Scholars of mysticism sometimes stress the " paradoxical " nature of mystical

experiences. It is not always clear whether the experience, the mystical object,

or both, are supposed to be paradoxical. We can discern four relevant senses of

`paradoxical': (1) According to its etymology, `paradoxical' refers to what is

surprising or " contrary to expectation. " (2) Language can be intentionally

`paradoxical' in using a logically improper form of words to convey what is not

intended to be logically absurd. This may be for rhetorical effect or because of

difficulty in conveying a thought without resort to linguistic tricks. (3) As in

philosophy, a `paradox' can involve an unexpected logical contradiction, as in

the " Liar Paradox. " (4) Walter Stace sees paradoxality as a universal feature of

mystical experiences, equating `paradoxality' with an intended logical

contradiction (Stace, 1961, 212. See section 4 below).

 

Insofar as mystical experience is out of the ordinary, and the unitive quality

strange (for ordinary folk, at least), reports of them may very well be

surprising or contrary to expectation. Hence, they may be paradoxical in sense

(1). Reports of mystical experiences may be paradoxical also in sense (2),

because at times mystical language does assume logically offensive forms, when

actual absurdity may not be intended. However, paradox in this sense occurs less

frequently in first-hand reports of mystical experiences and more in

second-order mystical systems of thought (Moore, 1973, and Staal, 1975).

 

There is no good reason, however, why mystical experiences or their objects

should be paradoxical in either senses (3) or (4). In general, there is no good

reason for thinking that reports of mystical experience must imply logical

absurdity. As we have seen above, while there do occur forms of expression that

are contradictory, the contradiction is often removed by the device of

" unsaying " or canceling out, which propels the discourse into a non-discursive

realm.

 

The attempt to designate mystical experiences as paradoxical in senses (3) and

(4) may result from being too eager to take logically deviant language at its

most literal. For example, Zen Buddhism speaks of reaching a state of mind

beyond both thought and " no-thought. " However, rather than referring to a middle

state, neither thought nor no-thought, often the intention is to point to a

state of mind in which striving is absent, and labeling of mental activities

ceases. The mind of " no effort " strives neither for thought nor for no-thought.

No logical absurdity infects this description. In a different direction, Frits

Staal has argued that paradoxical mystical language has been used systematically

to make logically respectable claims (Staal, 1975). While mystics use much

literal language in describing their experiences (see Alston, 1992, 80-102), the

literality need not extend to paradox in senses (3) or (4).

 

 

 

4. Perennialism

 

Various philosophers, sometimes dubbed " perennialists, " have attempted to

identify common mystical experiences across cultures and traditions (for the

term `perennialism,' see Huxley, 1945). Walter Stace's perennialist position has

generated much discussion (Stace, 1960, 1961). Stace proposes two mystical

experiences found " in all cultures, religions, periods, and social conditions. "

He identifies a universal extrovertive experience that " looks outward through

the senses " to apprehend the One or the Oneness of all in or through the

multiplicity of the world, apprehending the " One " as an inner life or

consciousness of the world. The Oneness is experienced as a sacred objective

reality, in a feeling of " bliss " and " joy. " Stace's universal extrovertive

experience (or the experienced reality, it is not always clear which) is

paradoxical, and possibly ineffable (Stace, 1961, 79).

 

Secondly, Stace identifies a universal, " monistic, " introvertive experience that

" looks inward into the mind, " to achieve " pure consciousness, " that is, an

experience phenomenologically not of anything (Stace, 1961, 86). Stace calls

this a " unitary consciousness. " Some have called this a " Pure Conscious Event "

or " PCE " (Forman, 1993b and 1999. See section 6 below). A PCE consists of an

" emptying out " by a subject of all experiential content and phenomenological

qualities, including concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and sensuous images.

The subject allegedly remains with " pure " wakeful consciousness. Like his

extrovertive experience, Stace's universal introvertive experience involves a

blissful sense of sacred objectivity, and is paradoxical and possibly ineffable.

Stace considers the universal introvertive experience to be a ripening of

mystical awareness beyond the halfway house of the universal extrovertive

consciousness.

 

Stace assimilates theistic mystical experiences to his universal introvertive

experience by distinguishing between experience and interpretation. The

introvertive experience, says Stace, is the same across cultures. Only

interpretations differ. Theistic mystics are pressured by their surroundings,

says Stace, to put a theistic interpretation on their introvertive experiences.

Ninian Smart also maintained the universality of the monistic experience,

arguing that descriptions of theistic mystical experiences reflect an

interpretive overlay upon an experiential base common to both theistic and

non-theistic experiences (Smart, 1965).

 

Stace has been strongly criticized for simplifying or distorting mystical

reports (For a summary, see Moore, 1973). For example, Pike criticizes the

Stace-Smart position because in Christian mysticism union with God is divided

into discernable phases, which find no basis in Christian theology. These

phases, therefore, plausibly reflect experience and not forced interpretation

(Pike, 1992, Chapter 5).

 

In contrast to Stace, R. C. Zaehner identified three types of mystical

consciousness: (1) a " panenhenic " extrovertive experience, an experience of

oneness of nature, one's self included, (2) a " monistic " experience of an

undifferentiated unity transcending space and time, and (3) theistic experience

where there is a duality between subject and the object of the experience

(Zaehner, 1961). Zaehner thought that theistic experience was an advance over

the monistic, since the latter, he thought, expressed a self-centered interest

of the mystic to be included in the ultimate.

 

William Wainwright has described four modes of mystical extrovertive experience:

a sense of the unity of nature, of nature as a living presence, a sense that

everything transpiring in nature is in an eternal present, and the Buddhist

unconstructed experience. Wainwright, like Zaehner, distinguishes two mystical

introvertive experiences, one of pure empty consciousness, and theistic

experience marked by an awareness of an object in " mutual love " (Wainwright,

1981, Chapter 1).

 

 

 

5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)

 

 

5.1 The Defenders of Pure Conscious Events

 

Much philosophical disagreement has taken place over questions concerning PCEs,

allegedly an " emptying out " by a subject of all experiential content and

phenomenological qualities, including concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and

sensuous images. Do such events ever really occur, and if they do, how

significant are they in mysticism? Defenders of PCEs depend on alleged

references to pure consciousness in the mystical literature. One striking

example is the Buddhist philosopher, Paramaartha (499-569), who stated

explicitly that all of our cognitions were " conditioned " by our concepts save

for the non-sensory " unconditioned " Buddhist experience of emptiness (see

Forman, 1989). Another example cited is from the writings of the Christian

mystic Meister Eckhart that describe a " forgetting " that abandons concepts and

sense experience to sink into a mystical " oblivion " (Forman, 1993a). In

addition, Robert Forman has testified to a PCE he himself endured, describing it

as an empty consciousness from which one " need not awake " (Forman, 1993b).

 

 

5.2 Criticism of the Defense of Pure Conscious Events

 

Here is a sampling of important criticisms of the defense of Pure Conscious

Events (PCEs): (1) Reports of PCEs found in the literature may not be decisive

in establishing the occurrence of PCEs. We should suspect the phenomenon of

" idealization " in these reports. Idealization occurs when an ideal goal is

presented as achieved, when it wasn't. Whether or not pure consciousness ever

occurs, we should suspect it might be presented as though it did because so

strived for by the mystic. (2) The PCE defenders exaggerate the centrality of

complete emptying out in mysticism. It is questionable if it is central in the

mainstream of Christian mysticism, for example, where typically the mystic

forgets all else only to better contemplate God. Typical is the Christian mystic

Jan Ruysbroeck who wrote that emptying oneself is but a prelude to the mystical

life of contemplating God through an act of Divine grace (Zaehner, 1961,

170-71). Likewise, the " shedding of corporeality " in early Hasidism was meant,

for example, to enable the mystic to contemplate the unified supernal structure

of the divine sefirot. And the Zen master, Dogen (1200-1253), wrote about

" wrongly thinking that the nature of things will appear when the whole world we

perceive is obliterated " (Dogen, 1986, 39). (3) Accordingly, reports of

" emptying out " and " forgetting " may refer only to an emptying of ordinary

experiential content, making room for an extraordinary content. This accords

well with the conception of ayin (nothingness) in Jewish mysticism, which is

positively saturated with divine reality (Matt, 1997). Some have claimed that

even for Meister Eckhart " emptying out " is having one's mind on no object other

than God, rather than an absolute emptiness of content (Matt, 1997). (4)

Perennialists may be exaggerating the wakefulness of some emptying out. The

Islamic Sufi fana experience ( " passing away " ) is sometimes described as an

unconscious state, and the Sufi might become purely unconscious upon finding

God, in wajd (Schimmel, 1975, 178-79). Therefore, an emptying out might

sometimes simply be pure unconsciousness. (5) Even if a subject honestly reports

on a pure conscious episode, there may have been conceptual events the subject

either repressed or experienced in a nebulous way (see Wainwright, 1981,

117-119). These latter simply do not remain for memory.

 

 

 

6. Constructivism

 

`Constructivism' underscores the conceptual " construction " of mystical

experience. Let us call `soft constructivism' the view that there is no mystical

experience without at least some concepts, concepts being what " construct " an

experience. Let us call `hard constructivism' the view that a mystic's specific

cultural background massively constructs - determines, shapes, or influences -

the nature of mystical experiences (See Hollenback, 1996, Jones, 1909,

Introduction, and Katz, 1978 and 1983). On the assumption that mystical

traditions are widely divergent, hard constructivism entails the denial of

perennialism. Soft constructivism is strictly consistent with perennialism,

however, since consistent with there being some trans-cultural mystical

experience involving concepts common across mystical traditions. Both hard and

soft constructivist arguments have been mobilized against the existence of PCEs.

 

 

6.1 Soft Constructivist arguments Against PCE Defenders

 

Here is a sampling of soft constructivist arguments against PCE defenders: (1)

PCEs are impossible because of the " kind of beings " that we are (Katz, 1978,

59). It is a fact about humans that we can experience only with the aid of

memory, language, expectations, and conceptualizations. Therefore, we cannot

have a " pure " awareness, empty of all content. (2) PCEs cannot be " experiences "

(see Proudfoot, 1985, Chapter 4, and Bagger, 1999, Chapter 4). We must

distinguish, the claim goes, between an " event " and an " experience. " That X has

" an experience " E entails that X conceptualizes E. Hence, even if pure conscious

events happen to occur, they do not count as " experiences " until the subject

conceptualizes them. At that moment, they cease to be " pure consciousness. " (3)

A survey of mystical literature shows that typical mystical experiences are

conceptual in nature and not empty of concepts. (4) An epistemological

objection: Subjects could not know they had endured a PCE. They could not know

this during a PCE, because it is supposed to be empty of all conceptual content

(Bagger, 1999, 102-3). A subject could not know this by remembering the PCE,

since there is supposed to be nothing to observe while it is going on, and hence

nothing to remember. Neither could a subject surmise that a PCE had transpired

by remembering a " before " and an " after, " with an unaccounted for middle. This

would fail to distinguish a PCE from plain unconsciousness. Indeed, it seems to

matter little whether a subject who emerges with mystical insights underwent a

PCE or was simply unconscious. (5) A second epistemological objection: Suppose a

PCE has occurred and that a subject knows that, somehow. Still, there is a

problem of the relationship of a PCE to the subsequent claims to knowledge, such

as when Eckhart purportedly grounds knowledge of the soul and God as one, in a

PCE (see Forman, 1993a). If in a PCE subjects were empty of all experiential

content, they could not claim to have had acquaintance of anything (Bagger,

1999, 102-3).

 

 

6.2 Criticism of Soft Constructivism

 

Several objections can be raised against the Soft Constructivist Position:

 

1. The argument from the kind of beings we are against the possibility of a PCE

is not convincing. While our cultural sets shape our ordinary experience, this

argument gives no good reason why we could not enjoy experiences on a

pre-conceptual level of awareness, especially through a regimen of training.

Steven Katz, the author of this argument, notes our " most brutish, infantile,

and sensate levels " of experience when we were infants (Katz, 1988, 755). It is

hard to see why in principle we could not retrieve such an unconceptualized

level of experience. And it is hard to rule out the possibility that undergoing

such events could provide allegedly new vantage points on the " nature of

reality. "

 

2. It makes little difference whether a PCE is called an " experience " or an

" event. " A PCE occurs within a wider experience of the subject, including the

subject's coming out of the PCE and assigning it meaning. Let this wider

experience be the " experience " under discussion, rather than the PCE alone.

 

3. Defenders of PCEs maintain that persons who endure PCEs afterward place

interpretations on them. The textual evidence that objectors cite against PCEs

occurring, having do with the assignment of meaning to the events, often seems

quite consistent with the view that PCEs exist and that different traditions

place different interpretations on them (see Pike, 1992, supplemental study 2).

 

4. Neuropsychological studies of mystical experience point to the possibility of

events of pure consciousness. A theory by Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg

(d'Aquili and Newberg, 1993 and 1999) claims to account for PCEs by reference to

occurrences in the brain that cut off ordinary brain activity from

consciousness. This theory, if upheld, would provide physiological support for

episodes of pure consciousness (for more on this theory see section 8.7.1.)

 

5. There need be no problem about mystics knowing they had PCEs. If we accept a

reliabilist account of knowledge, a belief is knowledge if produced by a

reliable cognitive mechanism (perhaps with some further conditions). In order to

have knowledge, a person does not have to be aware of and judge evidence, nor be

cognizant of the reliability of the mechanism that produces the knowledge.

Hence, " awakening " from (what is in fact) a PCE, if it produces the belief that

one has " awakened " from a PCE, could be a reliable cognitive mechanism

sufficient for knowing one had had a PCE. If we stick to an evidentialist

conception of knowledge, mystics might be able to have evidence they had endured

a PCE, though not at the precise time of its occurrence. Here's how: (a) By

hypothesis, a PCE is an event of conscious awareness. (b) A conscious event can

have elements one does not note at the time, but recalls afterward. This is

especially possible when the recall immediately follows the event. ©

Therefore, it should be possible for a mystic who endures a PCE to recall

immediately afterward the very awareness that was present in the PCE, even

though that awareness was not an object of consciousness at the time of the PCE.

The mystic, recalling the PCE awareness, could note that the awareness had been

of a " pure " type. Since the recall takes place just following a PCE, the entire

complex becomes enfolded into one recognizable " experience " of the mystic, for

which the mystic has evidence.

 

6. Defenders of PCEs can champion their epistemological significance, although

PCEs are not of anything. Recall that the noetic quality of a mystical

experience can come from an acquaintance of states of affairs involving an

insight directly, without supervening on acquaintance of any reality (see

Section 1.1, clause (5)). In addition, an experience is mystical as long as it

allegedly grants such an acquaintance. Neither need the insight be exactly

simultaneous with what makes the experience mystical. Hence, a person could

undergo a PCE, which then granted acquaintance of states of affairs by a direct

insight. The PCE plus the insight would constitute a complex mystical experience

that afforded awareness of a state of affairs not otherwise accessible.

 

 

6.3 Hard Constructivism against Perennialism

 

Hard Constructivism's main argument against any perennialism, not only against

defenders of PCEs, may be presented as follows (Katz, 1978):

 

Premise (A): The conceptual scheme a mystic possesses massively determines,

shapes, or influences the nature of the mystical experience.

 

Premise (B): Mystics of different mystical traditions possess pervasively

different conceptual schemes.

 

Conclusion: Therefore, there cannot be a common experience across cultural

traditions. That is, perennialism is false.

 

The hard constructivist denies the distinction between experience and

interpretation, since our conceptual apparatus massively shapes our very

experience. If successful, the argument would show that there were no common

numinous experiences across religious traditions either.

 

 

6.4 Criticism of Hard Constructivism

 

This section summarizes objections against hard constructivism that are not

objections to soft constructivism as well.

 

1. It seems quite possible for subjects in the first instance to apply " thin "

descriptions to experiences, involving only a small part of their conceptual

schemes. Only on second thought, perhaps, will they elaborate on their

experience in terms of the richness of their home culture. This would be like a

physician with a headache, who experiences pain in the first instance just like

ordinary folk and only subsequently applies medical terminology to the headache

(Compare King, 1988). If so, there is a possibility of common first-instance

mystical experiences across cultures, contrary to Premise A.

 

2. Premise A is thrown into further doubt by expressions of surprise by

mystics-in-training about what they experience (see Gellman, 1997, 145-46 and

Barnard, 1997, 127-130), as well as by heretical types of experience occurring

with mystics acculturated in orthodox teachings, such as Meister Eckhart and

Jacob Boehme (See Stoeber, 1992, 112-113). These illustrate the possibility of

getting out from under one's mystical background to have new experiences.

Likewise, hard constructivism's inherently conservative take on mysticism will

struggle to explain transformations within mystical traditions, and cannot

easily account for innovative geniuses within mystical traditions.

 

3. Two people walk together down the street and see an approaching dog. One

experiences the dog as " Jones's favorite black terrier that came in second in

last year's competition, " while the other experiences it as " a stray mutt that

the dog-catchers should take away. " Because of the excessive conceptual

differences in their experiencing, the constructivist would have to insist that

there was no worthwhile sense in which both dog-sighters had the same

experience. However, there is an interesting sense in which they are having the

same experience: seeing that black dog at that place, at that time. Similarly,

there might exist an interesting commonality of experiences across mystical

traditions, most plausibly theistic ones, despite conceptual disparity. The

conceptual differences might not be sufficient to deny this important

commonality (See Wainwright, 1981, 25).

 

4. Specific cultural conditioning does not influence everyone to the same degree

and in the same way. Individuals have rich and varied personal histories that

influence their experiential lives in widely differing ways. Some accept

cultural restraints gladly; others rebel against them; still others are blessed

with a creative spirit, etc. A " fat people must drive fat cows " approach to

mysticism fails to mirror the complex human phenomenon of acculturation.

 

5. Mystical traditions characteristically involve disciplines aimed at loosening

the hold of one's conceptual scheme on subsequent experience. Techniques

practiced for years promote a pronounced inhibition of ordinary cognitive

processes, sometimes called " deautomization " (Deikman, 1980). This plausibly

restricts the influence of one's cultural background on one's mystical

experiences, in turn making possible identical experiences across mystical

traditions.

 

6. The hard constructivist over-emphasizes the influence of pre-mystical

religious teaching on the mystic's experience. Mystical experiences can circle

around and reinvent meaning for the doctrines. An example is the Jewish

Kabbalistic transformation of the notion of mitzvah ( " commandment " ) to that of

" joining " or " connection " with God. Starting with commandment, the mystic ends

up with devekut, " clinging " to God.

 

7. Hard Constructivism fails to account well for widely differing mystical

understandings of the same religious text. For example, the Hindu text, The

Brahma Sutra, is monistic for Shankara (788-820), a " qualified dualism " for

Ramanuja (c. 1055-1137), and yet again a strict dualism, for Madhva (1199-1278)

(see Radhakrishnan, Introduction, 1968). Likewise, the teaching of emptiness in

the Buddhist text the Prajnaparamita Hrydaya Sutra (The Heart Sutra), receives

quite disparate unpacking in different streams of Buddhism. It's plausible to

conclude that distinct experiences were responsible, at least in part, for these

differences.

 

On the one hand, talk about mystical experiences " the same " across all mystical

traditions should be taken with a tablespoon of salt, if scholars claim to have

discovered them solely from isolated descriptions of experiences. It is

difficult to assess the nature of an experience without attending to how it

" radiates " out into the structure of the local mystical theory and life of which

it is a part (See Idel, 1997). Nevertheless, it does seem possible to generalize

about experiences " similar enough " to be philosophically interesting.

 

 

 

7. On the Possibility of Experiencing Mystical Realities

 

In a position related to constructivism, William Forgie has argued that there

could not be an experience " of God, " if we understand experience " of X " to mean

that it is phenomenologically given that the experience is of X (Forgie, 1984,

1994). Forgie argues that phenomenological content can consist of general

features only, and not features specifically identifying God as the object of

experience. He compares this to your seeing one of two identical twins. Which

one of the two you perceive cannot be a phenomenological given. Likewise, that

you experience precisely God and not something else cannot be a phenomenological

datum. Forgie's type of argument applies as well to objects of mystical

experiences other than God. Nelson Pike argues, against Forgie, that the

individuation of an object can be a component of the phenomenological content of

an experience, drawing on examples from sense perception (Pike 1992, Chapter 7).

 

Forgie assumes that the phenomenological content of a theistic experience must

be confined to data akin to the " sense data " of sensory experience, somehow

analogous to colors, shapes, movement, sounds, tastes, and the like.

Individuation is absent from phenomenological content of that sort. Pike, for

his part, teases out alleged phenomenological content for individuating God from

analogies to ordinary sense perception. Both philosophers restrict experiences

of God to phenomenal content somehow analogous to sense perception. This might

be a mistake. Consider, for example, that God could appear to a person

mystically, and at the same time transmit, telepathy-like, the thought that this

was God appearing. Imagine further that this thought had the flavor of being

conveyed to one from the outside, rather than as originating in the subject. The

thought that " This is God appearing " would be part of the phenomenological

content of the subject's present (complex) experience (though not part of the

mystical mode of the experience as defined in section 1.1), and yet not the

product of an interpretation by the subject. Indeed, reports of experiences of

God sometimes describe what seems to come with the thought included that " this

is God. " Whatever the epistemological merits of such an experience might be, it

would be quite natural to say that its phenomenology includes the datum that it

is an experience " of God, " in particular.

 

 

 

8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument from Perception

 

In his celebrated, The Varieties of Religious Experience (London 1925, p. 415),

Williams James, asked, " Do mystical states establish the truth of those

theological affections in which the saintly life has its roots? " This question

can be divided into two: (Q1) Is a person warranted in thinking that his or her

experiences are veridical or have evidential value? And (Q2) Are " we, " who do

not enjoy mystical experiences, upon examining the evidence of such experiences,

warranted in thinking them veridical or endowed with evidential value? While

related, these questions can be treated separately.

 

The major philosophical reply in the affirmative to (Q1) may be called the

" Doxastic Practice Approach. " The major defense of an affirmative reply to (Q2)

may be called the " Argument from Perception. "

 

 

8.1 The Doxastic Practice Approach

 

William Alston has defended beliefs a person forms based on mystical and

numinous (in the terminology of this entry) experience, specifically of a

theistic kind (Alston, 1991). Alston defines a 'doxastic practice' as consisting

of socially established ways of forming and epistemically evaluating beliefs

(the " output " ) from a certain kind of content from various inputs, such as

cognitive and perceptual ones (Alston, 1991, 100). The practice of forming

physical-object beliefs derived from sense perception is an example of a

'doxastic practice' and the practice of drawing deductive conclusions in a

certain way from premises is another. Now, Alston argues that the justification

of every doxastic practice is " epistemically circular, " that is, its reliability

cannot be established in any way independent of the practice itself. (See

Alston, 1993) This includes the " sense-perception practice. " However, we cannot

avoid engaging in doxastic practices. Therefore, Alston contends, it is rational

to engage in the doxastic practices we do engage in providing there is no good

reason to think they are unreliable. Now, there are doxastic practices

consisting of forming beliefs about God, God's purposes for us, and the like,

grounded on religious and mystical experiences such as " God is now appearing to

me. " Such, for example, is the " Christian Doxastic Practice. " It follows from

Alston's argument that it is rational for a person in such a practice to take

its belief outputs as true unless the practice is shown to be unreliable. Thus

we have an affirmative answer to question (Q1).

 

 

8.2 The Argument from Perception

 

Various philosophers have defended the evidential value, to one degree or

another, of some religious and mystical experiences, principally with regard to

experiences of God (see Baillie, 1939, Broad, 1953, Davis, 1989, Gellman, 1997

and 2001a, Gutting, 1982, Swinburne, 1991 and 1996, Wainwright, 1981, and

Yandell, 1993). These philosophers have stressed the " perceptual " nature of

experiences of God, hence the name given here, the " Argument from Perception. "

We can summarize the approach as follows:

 

1. Experiences of God have a subject-object structure, with a phenomenological

content allegedly representing the object of the experience. Also, subjects are

moved to make truth claims based on such experiences. Furthermore, there are

mystical procedures for getting into position for a mystical experience of God

(see Underhill, 90-94), and others can take up a suitable mystical path to try

to check on the subject's claims (see Bergson, 1935, 210). In all these ways,

experiences of God are perceptual in nature.

 

2. Perception-like experiences count as (at least some) evidence in favor of

their own validity. That a person seems to experience some object is some reason

to think he or she really does have experiential contact with it. So,

experiences of God count as (at least some) evidence in favor of their own

validity.

 

3. Agreement between the perceptions of people in different places, times, and

traditions, enhances the evidence in favor of their validity (see Broad, 1953).

Hence, agreement about experiences of God in diverse circumstances enhances the

evidence in their favor.

 

4. Further enhancement of the validity of a religious or mystical experience can

come from appropriate consequences in the life of the person who had the

experience, such as increased saintliness (See Wainwright, 1981, 83-88).

 

5. (1)-(4) yield initial evidence in favor of the validity of (some) experiences

of God.

 

Whether any experiences of God are veridical in the final reckoning will depend

on the strength of the initial evidential case, on other favorable evidence, and

on the power of counter-considerations against validity. Defenders of the

Argument from Perception differ over the strength of the initial evidential case

and have defended the staying power of the Argument from Perception against

counter-evidence to varying degrees. All agree, however in advancing a positive

answer to question (Q2).

 

 

8.3 An Epistemological Critique: Disanalogies to Sense Experience

 

Several philosophers have argued against either the doxastic practice approach

or the Argument from Perception, or both (see Bagger 1999, Fales, 1996a, 1996b,

and 2001, Gale, 1991, 1994, and 1995, C.B. Martin, 1955, Michael Martin, 1990,

Proudfoot, 1985, and Rowe, 1982). Here the focus will be on objections related

specifically to mystical and numinous experience, rather than to general

epistemological complaints,

 

Philosophers have disputed the Argument from Perception on the grounds of

alleged disanalogies between experiences of God and sense perception. Two issues

must be examined: (a) whether the disanalogies exist, and (b) if they do exist,

whether they are epistemologically significant.

 

 

8.3.1 Lack of Checkability

 

The analogy allegedly breaks down over the lack of appropriate crosschecking

procedures for experiences of God. With sense perception, we can crosscheck by

employing inductive methods to determine causally relevant antecedent

conditions; can " triangulate " an event by correlating it with other effects of

the same purported cause; and can discover causal mechanisms connecting a cause

to its effects. These are not available for checking on experiences of God. Evan

Fales argues that " crosscheckability " is an integral part of any successful

perceptual epistemic practice. Therefore, the perceptual epistemic practice in

which mystical experiences of God are embedded is severely defective (Fales,

200) In addition, Richard Gale (1991), argues that in experiences of God there

is missing agreement between perceivers as well as the possibility of checking

whether the perceiver was in the " right " position and psychological and

physiological state for a veridical experience. For similar reasons, C.B. Martin

concludes that claims to have experienced God are " very close " to subjective

claims like " I seem to see a piece of paper " rather than to objective claims

like " I see a piece of paper " (C.B. Martin, 1955).

 

William Rowe observes that God may choose to be revealed to one person and not

to another. Therefore, unlike with sense perception, the failure of others to

have an experience of God under conditions similar to those in which one person

did, does not impugn the validity of the experience. Therefore, we have no way

of determining when an experience of God is delusory. If so, neither can we

credit an experience as authentic (Rowe, 1982).

 

 

8.3.2 God's Lack of Space-Time Coordinates

 

Some philosophers have argued that there could never be evidence for thinking a

person had perceived God (Gale, 1994 and 1995, and Byrne, 2001). For there to be

evidence that a person experienced an object O, and did not have just an

" O-ish-impression, " it would have to be possible for there to be evidence that O

was the common object of different perceptions (not necessarily simultaneous

with one another). This, in turn, would be possible only if it were possible to

distinguish perceptions of O, specifically, from possible perceptions of other

objects that might be perceptually similar to O. This latter requirement is

possible only if O exists in both space and time. Space-time coordinates make it

possible to distinguish O from objects of similar appearance existing in other

space-time coordinates. God, however, does not exist in both space and time.

Therefore, there could never be evidence that a person had experienced God.

 

 

8.4 Evaluation of the Disanalogy arguments

 

Although Alston defends the perceptual character of mystical experiences of God

for his doxastic practice approach, there is no restriction to the perceptual on

the inputs of a doxastic practice. Any cognitive input will do. Hence,

disanalogies between experiences of God and sense perception, even if great,

would not be directly harmful to this approach (Alston, 1994).

 

Regarding the bearing of the alleged disanalogies on the Argument from

Perception, the disanalogists take the evidential credentials of sense

perception as paradigmatic for epistemology. They equate confirming and

disconfirming evidence with evidence strongly analogous to the kind available

for sensory perception. However, the evidential requirement should be only

" confirming empirical evidence, " be what it may. If God-sightings have

confirming evidence, even if different from the kind available for sense

perception, they will then be evidentially strengthened. If God-sightings do not

have much confirming empirical evidence, be it what it may, they will remain

unjustified for that reason, and not because they lack crosschecks appropriate

to sense perception.

 

Perhaps the disanalogy proponents believe that justification of

physical object claims should be our evidential standard, because only

where crosschecks of the physical object kind are available do we get

sufficient justification. However, this is not convincing. Our

ordinary physical object beliefs are far over-supported by confirming

evidence. We have extremely luxurious constellations of confirming

networks there. Hence, it does not follow that were mystical claims

justified to a lesser degree than that, or not by similar procedures,

that they would be unjustified.

 

A problem with the argument from God's lack of dimensionality is that the

practice of identifying physical objects proceeds by way of an interplay between

qualitative features and relative positions to determine both location and

identity. The judgments we make reflect a holistic practice of making

identifications of place and identity together. There is no obvious reason why

the identification of God cannot take place within its own holistic practice,

with its own criteria of identification, not beholden to the holistic practice

involved in identifying physical objects (See Gellman, 2001a, Chapter 3, for a

sketch of such a holistic practice). We should be suspicious of taking the

practice of identifying physical objects as paradigmatic for all epistemology.

 

 

8.5 The Argument from Perception as Dependent on the Doxastic Practice Approach

 

In the end, the Argument from Perception might have to yield to the Doxastic

Practice Approach. One reason is that it is doubtful if many experiencers of God

make truth claims solely on the basis of their mystical experiences, rather than

within a doxastic practice. For example, as Rowan Williams has commented

concerning Teresa of Avila, she would never have imagined that her experiences

alone were sufficient evidence for any truth. The criterion of authenticity for

her experiences was how they related to subsequent concrete behavior, as judged

by and within her religious practice. Mystical experience as such was given no

special authority.

 

A second reason why the Argument from Perception might have to yield to the

Doxastic Practice Approach is that if, as noted in section 8.4, identification

of God takes place in an holistic practice, then quite plausibly this is a

social practice in which one judges one's mystical experiences to be of God.

Turning again to the example of Teresa, her experiences in themselves did not

always give her assurance that she was not experiencing the Devil rather than

God. She adjudicated the issue from within the teachings of the Church. Finally,

it is an open question to what extent alleged God-experiences are sufficiently

detailed to provide grounds to the subject that they are of God. Hence, a

subject's judgment that a particular encounter is with God might well be the

fruit of assimilating the present event into a larger social practice.

 

 

8.6 An Epistemological Critique: Religious Diversity

 

A critique of the Argument from Perception for the epistemic value of theistic

experiences comes from the facts of religious diversity. This critique applies

to non-theistic experiences as well. In the history of religions, we find

innumerable gods, with different characteristics. Shall we say they all exist?

Can belief in all of them be rational? (Hick, 1989, 234-5) In addition, there

are experiences of non-personal ultimate realities, such as the Nirguna Brahman

of Indian religions. Nirguna Brahman cannot be an ultimate reality if God is

(Hick, 1984, 234-5). The Argument from Perception cannot work for both, so works

for neither. Furthermore, different theistic faiths claim experience of the one

and only God, ostensibly justifying beliefs that are in contradiction with one

another (see Flew, 1966, 126). If the Argument from Perception leads to such

contradictory results, it cannot provide evidence in favor of the validity of

experiences of God.

 

In reply to this objection, straight away we can discount experiences of

polytheistic gods because of their being embedded in bizarre, fantastic

settings, and because of the relative paucity of reports of actual experiences

of such beings. Regarding clashing experiences within theistic settings, Richard

Swinburne has proposed an ascent to generality as a harmonizing mechanism.

Swinburne believes that conflicting descriptions of objects of religious

experience pose a challenge only to detailed claims, not to general claims of

having experienced a supernal being (Swinburne, 1991, 266).

 

John Hick has proposed a " pluralistic hypothesis " to deal with the problem of

religious diversity (Hick, 1984, Chapter 14). According to the pluralistic

hypothesis, the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions

of one reality that Hick christens " the Real. " The Real itself is never

experienced directly, but has " masks " or " faces " which are experienced,

depending on how a particular culture or religion thinks of the Real. The Real

itself is, therefore, neither personal nor impersonal, these categories being

imposed upon the Real by different cultural contexts. Hence, the typical

experiences of the major faiths are to be taken as validly of the Real, through

mediation by the local face of the Real.

 

Hick has been criticized for infidelity to the world's religious traditions.

However, we should understand Hick to be providing a theory about religions

rather than an exposition of religions themselves would endorse (for criticism

of Hick see Gavin d'Costa, 1987). Some propose harmonizing some conflicting

experiences by reference to God's " inexhaustible fullness " (Gellman, 1997,

Chapter 4). In at least some mystical experiences of God, a subject experiences

what is presented as proceeding from an intimation of infinite plenitude. Given

this feature, a claim to experience a personal ultimate, for example, can be

squared with an experience of an impersonal ultimate: one " object, " identified

as God or Nirguna Brahman, can be experienced in its personal attributes or in

its impersonal attributes, from out of its inexhaustible plenitude.

 

Whether any of these solutions succeed, the body of experiential data is too

large for us to simply scrap on the grounds of contradictory claims. We should

endeavor to retain as much of the conflicting data as possible by seeking some

means of conciliation.

 

 

8.7 An Epistemological Critique: Naturalistic explanations

 

Bertrand Russell once quipped that " We can make no distinction between the man

who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes.

Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has abnormal

perceptions " (Russell, 1935, 188). C.D. Broad wrote, to the contrary, " One might

need to be slightly `cracked' in order to have some peep-holes into the

super-sensible world " (Broad, 1939, 164). Thus is the issue engaged whether we

can explain away religious and mystical experiences by reference to naturalistic

causes.

 

Wainwright has argued that a naturalistic explanation is compatible with the

validity of an experience since God could bring about an experience through a

naturalistic medium (Wainwright, 1981, Chapter 2). However, we should take into

account that there might be naturalistic explanations that would make it

implausible that God would appear in just those ways (this is elaborated in

section 8.7.2).

 

Various psychological naturalistic explanations of religious and mystical

experience have been offered, including pathological conditions such as:

hypersuggestibility, severe deprivation, severe sexual frustration, intense fear

of death, infantile regression, pronounced maladjustment, and mental illness, as

well as non-pathological conditions, including the inordinate influence of a

religious psychological " set " (See Davis, 1989, Chapter 8, and Wulff, 2000). In

addition, some have advanced a sociological explanation for some mysticism, in

terms of the socio-political power available to an accomplished mystic (Fales,

1996a, 1996b).

 

Naturalistic proposals of these kinds exaggerate the scope and influence of the

cited factors, sometimes choosing to highlight the bizarre and eye-catching at

the expense of the more common occurrences. Secondly, some of the proposals, at

least, are perfectly compatible with the validity of experiences of God. For

example, a person's having a religious psychological set can just as well be a

condition for enjoying and being capable of recognizing an experience of God, as

it can be a cause of delusion.

 

 

8.7.1 Neuropsychological Explanations

 

Neuropsychological research has been conducted to look for unique brain

processes involved in religious and mystical experiences, resulting in a number

of competing theories (see Wulff, 2000). The " explaining away " enters when one

claims that " It's all in the head. " The most comprehensive current theory, that

of d'Aquili and Newberg (d'Aquili and Newberg 1993 and 1999), proposes the

prefrontal area of the brain as the locus of special brain activity during

mystical episodes. Through " deafferentiation, " or cutting off of neural input to

that area of the brain, they claim, an event of pure consciousness occurs. The

patterns set up in the brain create an overwhelming experience of " absolute

unitary being. " If reinforcement of a certain hypothalamic discharge then

occurs, this will prolong the feeling of elation, and will be interpreted as an

experience of God. Otherwise, there will arise a deep peacefulness due to the

dominance of specified hypothalamic structures. This gets interpreted as an

experience of an impersonal, absolute ground of being. The theory associates

numinous experiences with variations in deafferentiation in various structures

of the nervous system, and lesser religious experiences with mild to moderate

stimulation of circuits in the lateral hypothalamus. The latter generate

religious awe: a complex of fear and exaltation (see d'Aquili and Newberg, 1993,

195). The brain functions in related ways in aesthetic experience as well

(d'Aquili and Newberg, 2000).

 

The authors themselves do not say their theory shows there to be nothing

objective to mystical or religious experience. However, they do recommend

explaining away objective differences between, for example, theistic and

non-theistic experiences. And their theory could be utilized in a " It's all in

the head " strategy.

 

Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis (1993) maintain (comparing religious experiences

to creative problem solving) that a person who has a religious experience faces

an existential crisis, and attempts to solve it within fixed cognitive

structures, which are embedded in the brain's left-hemisphere. This yields no

solution. The person may then undergo a transforming religious experience, in

which the brain temporarily switches from left-hemisphere to right-hemisphere

dominance, from verbal/conceptual thinking to non-verbal insight " beyond " the

person's dominant conceptual structure. The switch then reverberates back to

restructure the left-hemisphere conceptual network, now made apt for dealing

with the existential crisis. The right-hemisphere switch can account for the

sense of `ineffability,' since the right hemisphere is not analytic or verbal

(See Fenwick 1996 and Michael Persinger, 1994). Because the shift involves

" transcending " the cognitive, it may explain the conviction of having contact

with a " transcendent realm. " If offered as a naturalistic " explaining away, "

this theory would imply that what a person thinks is an experience of God, say,

is really an experience of temporary right-hemisphere dominance. The theory has

the drawback, however, of applying only to conversion experiences, and not to

other religious and mystical episodes.

 

Other theories that have attracted attention include one focusing on anomalous

features of the temporal lobes of the brain, the locus for epileptic conditions

(Persinger, 1987). One study even claims to have discovered a correlation

between temporal lobe epilepsy and sudden conversion experiences (Dewhurst and

Beard, 1970). James Austin, a neurologist and himself a Zen practitioner, has

developed a theory of brain transformations for prolonged Zen meditative

practice (Austin, 1998). The theory is based on gradual, complex changes in the

brain, leading to a blocking of our higher associative processes. Austin

believes that the Zen kensho experience, according to Austin an experience of

reality " as it is in itself, " is an experience with (relatively) shut down

neural activity.

 

 

8.7.2 Evaluation of Neuropsychological Explanations

 

It would seem that a neuropsychological theory could do no more than relate what

happens in the brain when a mystical or religious experience occurs. It could

not tell us that the ultimate cause for a theory's favored brain-events was

altogether internal to the organism. On the other hand, such a theory could help

rule out cases of suspected deception and block the identification of mystical

experiences with mere emotion. True, there may not be out-of-brain

" God-receptors " in the body, analogous to those for sensory perception, which

might reinforce a suspicion that it's all in the head. However, out-of-brain

receptors are neither to be expected nor required with non-physical stimuli, as

in mystical experiences. God, for example, does not exist at a physical distance

from the brain. Furthermore, God could act directly upon the brain to bring

about the relevant processes for a subject to perceive God.

 

On the other hand, a neuropsychological theory would put pressure on claims to

veridical experiences, if it could point to brain processes implausibly

grounding a veridical experience. The implausibility would flow from a being of

God's nature wanting to make itself known by just that way. Suppose, for (an

outlandish) example, researchers convinced us that all and only alleged

experiencers of God had a brain-defect caused only by a certain type of blow to

the shoulder to people with a genetic propensity to psoriasis, and that the area

of the defect was activated in the experiences. This might not prove that

experiences of God were delusory, but would raise serious doubts. It is too

early in the research, however, to say that implausible brain conditions have

been found for experiences of God.

 

 

8.7.3 The Superiority of Naturalistic Explanation

 

Some philosophers have argued that because the " modern inquirer " assumes

everything ultimately explicable in naturalistic terms, in principle we should

reject any supernatural explanation of mystical and religious experience (see

Bagger, 1999). Invoking God to explain mystical experiences is like invoking

miracles to explain natural phenomena. We should match our elimination of

miracles from our explanatory vocabulary with an elimination of a supernatural

explanation of mystical experiences of God. Hence, we do not have to wait until

we discover a live alternative explanation to the theistic explanation of

mystical experiences of God. We should resist a theistic explanation in the name

of our epistemic standards. Hence, we should reject both the doxastic practice

approach and the Argument from Perception.

 

This argument raises the important question of the relationship between theistic

explanation and a naturalistic program of explanation. Various theistic

philosophers have attempted to square special divine activity with a modern

scientific understanding of the world (See for example, Swinburne, 1989).

Whether they have succeeded is a question beyond the scope of the present essay,

however. Of course, a person for whom supernatural explanation is not a live

option would have reason to reject the Argument from Perception and refuse to

engage in a doxastic practice of identifying valid God-experiences. However,

most defenders of the Argument from Perception advance it at best as a

defensible line of reasoning, rather than as a proof of valid experiences of God

that should convince anyone, and the doxastic practice approach is not meant to

convince everybody to participate in a theistic doxastic practice (see Gellman,

2001b).

 

 

 

9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender

 

Feminist philosophers have criticized the androcentric bias in mysticism and its

philosophical treatment. There are three main objections: (1) Contemporary male

philosophers treat mysticism as most centrally a matter of the private

psychological episodes of a solitary person. Philosophers believe these private

experiences reveal the meaning and value of mysticism (Jantzen, 1994 and 1995).

Instead, philosophers should be studying the socio-political ramifications of

mysticism, including its patriarchal failings. (2) Scholars of mysticism have

systematically ignored or marginalized much of women's mysticism. Closer

attention to women would reveal the androcentric bias in male mysticism

(Jantzen, 1995). (3) The traditional male construction of God has determined the

way male philosophers think of theistic experience. Thus, theistic experience is

conditioned from the outset by patriarchal conceptualizations and values, and by

sex-role differentiation in the practice of religion (Raphael, 1994). Typically,

the view states, men understand theistic experience as a human subject

encountering a being wholly distinct, distant, and overpowering. A paradigm of

this approach is Rudolf Otto's " numinous experience, " of a " wholly other "

reality, unfathomable and overpowering, engendering a sense of dreaded

fascination. The mystic is " submerged and overwhelmed " by his own nothingness

(Otto, 1957). Otto claims that this is the foundational experience of religion.

This approach, it is claimed, is mediated by the androcentrism of Otto's

worldview, entrapped in issues of domination, atomicity, and submission.

Feminist thinkers tend to deny the dichotomy between the holy and the creaturely

that makes Otto's analysis possible (see Daly, 1973 and Goldenberg, 1979).

Feminist theologians stress the immanent nature of the object of theistic

experience, and bring to prominence women's experience of the holy in their

fleshly embodiment, denigrated by androcentric attitudes.

 

The feminist critique poses a welcome corrective to undoubted

androcentric biases in mysticism and mystical studies. Regarding (1),

while studying the socio-political ramifications of mysticism is

certainly a mandatory undertaking, and should contribute to future

social justice, it is not necessarily the task of philosophers, and

certainly not all philosophers. A division of labor should free

philosophers to examine the important phenomenological and

epistemological aspects of mysticism, though always in awareness of

possible androcentric prejudices. That being said, the feminist

critique should help to neutralize the conception of the private

nature of mysticism and religious experience, introduced to philosophy

largely by William James. Objection (2) has begun to bring about a

welcome change with scholarship dedicated to women's mysticism and its

significance (see for example, Hurcombe, 1987, Brunn and

Epiney-Burgard, 1989, Beer, 1993, and Borchert, 1994). Regarding (3),

we must distinguish between Otto's androcentric claim that his type of

numinous experience constitutes religious experience at its most

profound, and the rich variegation of religious and mystical

experience of men throughout history. This includes men's experiences

of God's immanent closeness as well as mystical union with God, quite

opposite, by feminist lights, to Otto's numinous experience. The study

of gender in religious experience and mysticism has barely begun and

promises new insights into and revisions of our understanding of these

human phenomena.

 

 

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Other Internet Resources

 

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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/#1