Part 2: The One Eschatology as Individual Eschatology

[Guest guest]

>

> i) All Holy Scriptures declare life is eternal;

> ii) The resurrection of Jesus Christ demonstrated that human

> evolution into the eternal spirit, a fundamental promise of all

> Holy Scriptures, is a fact;

> iii) The Advent and Message of Shri Mataji as the Comforter/Holy

> Spirit/Ruh meets the exacting requirements of eschatology;

> iv) Shri Mataji is verily the incarnation of the Adi Shakti/Holy

> Spirit/Ruh of God Almighty;

> v) adishakti.org is the only unassailable evidence available for

> those who want to confirm all the above before pursuing life

> eternal.

>

> Almost daily adishakti.org reminds me that the Divine Feminine

> within is omnipotent (all powerful), omniscient (all knowing), and

> omnipresent (always present everywhere). These attributes solely

> belong to God Almighty and His Power (Shakti), and adishakti.org

> confirms those attributes. Unlike the vast majority, my faith in the

> Divine is based on the experience, evidence and enlightenment of

> eschatological evolution. Can you name even a single priest, pastor,

> reverend, bishop, pope, rabbi, cleric, imam, mullah, shaikh, ulema,

> ayatollah, guru, swami, pandit, brahmin, acarya, bhagwan, amma,

> granthi, giani, lama, monk, or dalai lama capable of giving you that

> experience, evidence and enlightenment of eschatological evolution?

>

 

 

The Foundations of Karl Rahner

Paperback: 224 pages

Publisher: Herder & Herder

Publication: November 25, 2005

ISBN: 0824523423

 

Paraphrase by Mark F. Fischer

 

Chapter Nine: Eschatology

Chapter Nine has three parts. In the first part, Rahner lays out the

presuppositions for understanding eschatology, the doctrine of the

last things. He states that we must understand eschatological

statements as a projection by the Christian community about its own

future. That future is not to be understood merely as the future of

individuals, but also as the collective destiny of all persons. It

cannot be reduced to a single scenario.

 

In the second part of the chapter, Rahner examines the individual

aspect of eschatology. Rahner distinguishes individual eschatology

(the destiny of the individual at death) from collective eschatology

(the destiny of creation as a whole). He rejects, however, the idea

of two eschatologies, for together they make up a single reality.

 

The eternal life that is God's will for human beings is their

participation in the good, the good which God invites them to choose.

Once they have chosen it, their participation in God has communal

consequences.

 

The third part looks at the collective dimension of eschatology. The

death of an individual is not simply a moment of his or her escape

from history. It is rather the moment in which the individual's

contribution to history -- i.e., to the fulfillment of human destiny -

- begins to achieve its final form. The individual's concrete acts of

love are a participation in the salvation and love of God and

contribute to it.

 

The Foundations of Karl Rahner

Paperback: 224 pages

Publisher: Herder & Herder

Publication: November 25, 2005

ISBN: 0824523423

 

Paraphrase by Mark F. Fischer

 

Chapter Nine: Eschatology

Part 2: The One Eschatology as Individual Eschatology (p. 435)

 

The second part of this chapter is about the last things understood from the

viewpoint of the individual. Rahner distinguishes individual eschatology (the

destiny of the individual at death) from collective eschatology (the destiny of

creation as a whole). He rejects, however, the idea of two eschatologies.

Although one can speak of them as individual and collective, they mutually

influence one another and make up a single reality. Rahner begins by noting

that, although it is customary to distinguish between the body and the soul,

this is the language of apocalyptic, and the two form an eschatological unity

(A). The eternal life that is God's will for human beings is their participation

in the good, the good which God invites them to choose and which, once chosen,

has eternal consequences (B). Purgatory is the doctrine that expresses the

interval between an individual's fundamental decision for God and the

integration of that decision in the whole of one's reality ©. The many

statements in tradition about the last things represent a plurality of

viewpoints and we should not expect to synthesize them into a neat concept (D).

Hell represents the possibility of eternal loss, a possibility that exists

throughout all of one's life, but which is not equal in weight to God's will

that all will be saved (E).

 

A. The Definitive Validity of Free Human Actions (p. 435). Rahner begins this

section by recalling Chapter Three. There he argued that statements about heaven

and hell are not parallel. " Heaven " is a much more potent symbol. Why? Because

Christian faith teaches that " the history of salvation as a whole will reach a

positive conclusion " (435). Hell, by contrast, is a negative symbol. It

symbolizes what God does not want, namely, the rejection by human beings of

God's vision for the world. To be sure, we cannot simply hold a theory of

" apocatastasis " (i.e., the restoration, re-establishment, or renovation of the

world by an act of God that makes all things right). But we are not obliged

either to say that the history of salvation will result for some people in

absolute loss. God wills that all will be saved, but merely allows creatures to

reject salvation.

 

When Christians speak of the last things, they normally distinguish between the

fate of the body (which undergoes corruption) and that of the soul (which is

immortal). But Rahner questions the value of the distinction for a unified

eschatology. What does it mean, he asks, to speak about a person whose body is

buried and whose soul or transcendental being enjoys God's presence? The human

being is a unity. We only meet the human spirit as corporeal and historical. It

is " superfluous, " says Rahner, " to ask what a person does while his body is in

the grave and his soul is already with God " (436). The dichotomy is more

apocalyptic than eschatological. In other words, we distinguish between body and

soul to express a profound truth, namely, that the spiritual reality of the

person does not die. We express this reality in terms of the traditional

concepts of beatific vision and resurrection of the flesh. They mean that the

entire person, body and soul, is fulfilled in God.

 

What, then, does the Church mean by speaking of a " time " between the death of

the individual and his or her ultimate destiny? Rahner answers this question by

speaking of two " finalities. " One finality is that of the individual's personal

history. That personal history ends at the moment of death. The other finality

is that of the human collective reality. It refers to the ultimate destiny of

humanity, including the effect that every individual has on that ultimate

destiny. Thus the two finalities are not separate. The finality of each

individual's death is linked to the finality of human destiny, a destiny to

which each individual contributes.

 

B. Death and Eternity (p. 436). What does it mean to say that the dead are

" still alive " ? It certainly does not mean that life just continues after death.

" Death marks an end for the whole person, " says Rahner (437). But it is equally

wrong to reject the concept of eternity and to say that human life is over at

death. The individual has a proper end, an end that begins in life and continues

after his or her death. The new does not simply annul the old that has died.

Rahner expresses the doctrine in this way: " Eternity subsumes time by being

liberated from the time which came to be temporarily so that freedom and

something of final and definitive validity can be achieved " (437). What does

this mean? Eternity subsumes time because what was achieved in time becomes

eternal. It is no longer time-bound. Yes, our actions are temporary, but their

value is not. Their value expresses our freedom.

 

When we act freely -- that is, in true spiritual freedom, unhindered by what

would prevent us from obeying God -- then we are joined with God's eternal life.

Our deeds in time flower in eternity. They flower in that they are the mature

expression of God's Spirit in us. Death, the end of the whole person, allows

that person to reach or express his or her God-given freedom in a final way. Our

final validity comes to be in time, not to continue on in time, but to " form "

time. In other words, we are co-creators with God, and we put God's stamp on

time.

 

Personal existence survives despite biological death. It does so because the

person is more than time. He or she is part of an " inexhaustible and

indestructible mystery " (438). The person's real self does not simply fall into

nothingness after death, but rather shares in an absolute good. The self has

produced something in time that cannot be erased by time. Our good, that is, the

good we have chosen and to which we have committed ourselves, has " ripened into

an experience of immortality " (438). Death is not the end because we have

already experienced immortality before death. It is the immortality of a

commitment to the good. It is the immortality of a hope that God's grace and

promise are real.

 

The good we do, and the hope we have, are experienced in moral decisions. These

decisions are " incommensurable " with transitory time. Our present assessment of

them is not a final assessment. There is more to them than we can say. In a

decision for absolute goodness, we transcend time. When we choose the good, we

participate in the eternal life of God, the source of good.

 

It is not uncommon to hear today that by rejecting Christianity's moral law, one

is ultimately expressing one's freedom. The rejection of Christian morality,

some say, frees people from superstition and the inhibitions of outmoded belief.

Liberated individuals, it is said, make responsible choices without a slavish

belief in religion's " ultimate good. " But Rahner questions this assertion. He

states that the very concept of free choice, even the supposedly free choice to

reject the moral laws that society (including Christian society) defines as

good, implicitly affirms the basis for the moral law. It does so by affirming

the existence of freedom, which is a spiritual good. When a person proclaims

himself or herself as " liberated " from morality, he or she implicitly affirms

the spiritual freedom that is the foundation of morality.

 

The materialist states that all evolution is due to chance. He or she believes

that what Christians call the " good " is merely a radical and empty arbitrariness

or a set of conventional moral expectations. Christians affirm, however, that

one choice is truly better than another. They mean that there is a spiritual

reality, unseen by the materialist, namely the good itself. This has

consequences for the understanding of eternity. When people commit themselves to

the good, they are setting this commitment over against time. The very act of

making a commitment to the good is an experience of eternity. Eternity lives in

our choices, which are our participation in the good.

 

Christian revelation suggests that God allows every person to experience

eternity in this life. We experience what St. John called eternal life in our

moral choices. Rahner puts the matter this way: " Scripture does not know of any

human life which is so commonplace that it is not valuable enough to become

eternal " (441). When we experience this eternity in time, i.e., the eternal life

of our good choices, we experience our final and definitive validity. God

validates our contribution by adding it to the final destiny of human beings.

This final and definitive validity is what the Church calls the resurrection of

the flesh.

 

C. On the Doctrine about a " Place of Purification " (441). The doctrine of

purgatory expresses two main ideas. One is that the basic disposition of the

human being, a disposition that has come about in the exercise of free actions,

acquires a final validity at death. The other is that the person continues to

mature after death. Even at the moment of death the basic disposition of the

human being has not permeated his or her concrete, corporeal existence. The

person has made an ultimate and basic decision, but this decision has not yet

been fully integrated.

 

Rahner explains this, first of all, by distinguishing between language and what

it intends to convey. We commonly say that there is a " time " that arrives

" after " death during which the person still can become his or her true self. The

meaning of such temporal categories (e.g., " after " death) is far from clear.

Moreover, symbols such as purgatory's " purifying fire " are apocalyptic images

whose eschatological import must be rightly interpreted. We cannot simply accept

the traditional language without asking what truth it means to convey.

 

Next, Rahner focuses on the temporal categories themselves. His main point is

that there must be an interval between an individual's death and the person's

corporeal fulfillment. One such interval exists between the act of making a

fundamental decision for God and the full integration of that decision. Another

interval exists between the fulfillment of the individual in death and the

fulfillment of the world. A third interval exists between the final validity of

a person in death and the manifestation of that fulfillment in the glorification

of the body. This notion of interval is problematic, he says, and it is not

clear in what senses such a temporal category can be applied. Ultimately, the

dogma of purgatory needs to be retained, says Rahner, but not necessarily its

mode of expression.

 

D. On the Necessary Pluralism of Statements about Fulfillment (p. 443). In this

section, Rahner distinguishes between the fulfillment of the human being and the

various statements used to speak about this one reality. The Church has

transmitted a number of ways to express this fulfillment. Immortality of the

soul, resurrection of the flesh, interval after death, and collective

eschatology, are all ways to speak of the destiny of the person. The plurality

of statements cannot be synthesized into a neat conceptual model. The Bible

speaks of the last things in a straightforward way, but not all of its

statements can be easily reconciled with one another.

 

E. The Possibility of Eternal Loss (p. 443). The most important thing to know

about hell, says Rahner, is that it always remains a possibility for the human

being. Up to the very end of life, a person must reckon with " absolute loss as

the conclusion and outcome of his free guilt " (443). This is fundamental to

human freedom.

 

But the individual " does not need to know anything more than this about hell. "

For example, people do not have to resolve the question of the relation between

the content of Biblical statements about hell and their mode of expression, even

the content of the words about hell ascribed to Jesus.

 

Finally, Rahner repeats his remark from Chapter Three that statements about

heaven and hell are not parallel. Christian faith affirms that the history of

the world as a whole will in fact enter into eternal life with God. By contrast,

the possibility of eternal loss is merely a possibility, not God's will.

 

Part 2: The One Eschatology as Individual Eschatology