Guest guest Posted September 9, 2008 Report Share Posted September 9, 2008 Kautiliya (Chanakya or Vishnugupta) The Great Scholar and his Arthashastra part 6 Namaste Wish you all a happy Onam Many of us know about Great Scholar CHANAKYA. A Transalation of His great Arthashastra.. let us read Kautilyas ( Chanakya or Vishnuguptha) Arthashastra Chapter 16. The mission of envoys Whoever has succeeded as a councillor is an envoy. Whoever possesses ministerial qualifications is a chargé-d'affaires (nisrishtárthah). Whoever possesses the same qualifications less by one-quarter is an agent entrusted with a definite mission (parimitárthah). Whoever possesses the same qualifications less by one-half is a conveyer of royal writs (sásanaharah). Having made excellent arrangements for carriage, conveyance, servants and subsistence, he (an envoy) shall start on his mission, thinking that "the enemy shall be told thus: the enemy (para) will say, thus; this shall be the reply to him; and thus he shall be imposed upon." The envoy shall make friendship with the enemy's officers such as those in charge of wild tracts, of boundaries, of cities, and of country parts. He shall also contrast the military stations, sinews of war, and strong-holds of the enemy with those of his own master. He shall ascertain the size and area of forts and of the state, as well as strongholds of precious things and assailable and unassailable points. Having obtained permission, he shall enter into the capital of the enemy and state the object of the mission as exactly as entrusted to him even at the cost of his own life. Brightness in the tone, face, and eyes of the enemy; respectful reception of the mission; enquiry about the health of friends; taking part in the narration of virtues; giving a seat close to the throne; respectful treatment of the envoy; remembrance of friends; closing the mission with satisfaction;--all these shall be noted as indicating the good graces of the enemy and the reverse his displeasure. A displeased enemy maybe told:-- "Messengers are the mouth-pieces of kings, not only of thyself, but of all; hence messengers who, in the face of weapons raised against them, have to express their mission as exactly as they are entrusted with do not, though outcasts, deserve death; where is then reason to put messengers of Bráhman caste to death? This is another's speech. This (i.e., delivery of that speech verbatim) is the duty of messengers." Not puffed up with the respects shown to him, he shall stay there till he is allowed to depart. He shall not care for the mightiness of the enemy; shall strictly avoid women and liquor; shall take bed single; for it is well-known that the intentions of envoys are ascertained while they are asleep or under the influence of liquor. He shall, through the agency of ascetic and merchant spies or through their disciples or through spies under the disguise of physicians, and heretics, or through recipients of salaries from two states (ubhayavétana), ascertain the nature of the intrigue prevalent among parties favourably disposed to his own master, as well as the conspiracy of hostile factions, and understand the loyalty or disloyalty of the people to the enemy besides any assailable points. If there is no possibility of carrying on any such conversation (conversation with the people regarding their loyalty), he may try to gather such information by observing the talk of beggars, intoxicated and insane persons or of persons babbling in sleep, or by observing the signs made in places of pilgrimage and temples or by deciphering paintings and secret writings (chitra-gúdha-lékhya-samjñá-bhih). Whatever information he thus gathers he shall try to test by intrigues. He shall not check the estimate which the enemy makes of the elements of sovereignty of his own master; but he shall only say in reply, ‘All is known to thee.’ Nor shall he disclose the means employed (by his master) to achieve an end in view. If he has not succeeded in his mission, but is still detained, he shall proceed to infer thus:-- Whether seeing the imminent danger into which my master is likely to fall and desirous of averting his own danger; whether in view of inciting against my master an enemy threatening in the rear or a king whose dominion in the rear is separated by other intervening states; whether in view of causing internal rebellion in my master's state, or of inciting a wild chief (átavika) against my master; whether in view of destroying my master by employing a friend or a king whose dominion stretches out in the rear of my master's state (ákranda); whether with the intention of averting the internal trouble in his own state or of preventing a foreign invasion or the inroads of a wild chief; whether in view of causing the approaching time of my master's expedition to lapse; whether with the desire of collecting raw materials and merchandise, or of repairing his fortifications, or of recruiting a strong army capable to fight; whether waiting for the time and opportunity necessary for the complete training of his own army; or whether in view of making a desirable alliance in order to avert the present contempt brought about by his own carelessness, this king detains me thus? Then he may stay or get out as he deems it desirable; or he may demand a speedy settlement of his mission. Or having intimated an unfavourable order (sásana) to the enemy, and pretending apprehension of imprisonment or death, he may return even without permission; otherwise he may be punished. Transmission of missions, maintenance of treaties, issue of ultimatum (pratápa), gaining of friends, intrigue, sowing dissension among friends, fetching secret force; carrying away by stealth relatives and gems, gathering information about the movements of spies, bravery, breaking of treaties of peace, winning over the favour of the envoy and government officers of the enemy,---these are the duties of an envoy (dúta). The king shall employ his own envoys to carry on works of the above description, and guard himself against (the mischief of) foreign envoys by employing counter envoys, spies, and visible and invisible watchmen. [Thus ends Chapter XVI, “The Mission of Envoys” in Book I, “Concerning Discipline” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya.] Chapter 17. Protection of princes Having secured his own personal safety first from his wives and sons, the king can be in a position to maintain the security of his kingdom against immediate enemies as well as foreign kings. We shall treat of "Protection of Wives" in connection with "Duties toward's the Harem." Ever since the birth of princes, the king shall take special care of them. “For,” says Bháradvája, “princes like crabs have a notorious tendency of eating up their begetter. When they are wanting in filial affection, they shall better be punished in secret (upámsudandah).” "This is,” says Visáláksha, “cruelty, destruction of fortune, and extirpation of the seed of the race of Kshattriyas. Hence it is better to keep them under guard in a definite place.” “This,” say the school of Parásara, “is akin to the fear from a lurking snake (ahibhayam); for a prince may think that apprehensive of danger, his father has locked him up, and may attempt to put his own father on his lap. Hence it is better to keep a prince under the custody of boundary guards or inside a fort." "This," says Pisuna, “is akin to the fear (from a wolf in the midst) of a flock of sheep (aurabhrakam bhayam); for after understanding the cause of his rustication, he may avail himself of the opportunity to, make an alliance with the boundary guards (against his father). Hence it is better to throw him inside a fort belonging to a foreign king far away from his own state." “This,” says Kaunapadanta, “is akin to the position of a calf (vatsasthánam); for just as a man milks a cow with the help of its calf, so the foreign king may milk (reduce) the prince's father. Hence it is better to make a prince live with his maternal relations." “This,” says Vátavyádhi “is akin to the position of a flag (dhvajasthánamétat): for as in the case of Aditi and Kausika, the prince's maternal relations may, unfurling this flag, go on begging. Hence princes may be suffered to dissipate their lives by sensual excesses (grámyadharma) inasmuch as revelling sons do not dislike their indulgent father." "This," says Kautilya, "is death in life; for no sooner is a royal family with a prince or princes given to dissipation attacked, than it perishes like a worm-eaten piece of wood. Hence when the queen attains the age favourable for procreation, priests shall offer to Indra and Brihaspati the requisite oblations. When she is big with a child, the king shall observe the instructions of midwifery with regard to gestation and delivery. After delivery, the priests shall perform the prescribed purificatory ceremonials. When the prince attains the necessary age, adepts shall train him under proper discipline." "Any one of the classmate spies," say (politicians known as) Ambhíyas, "may allure the prince towards hunting, gambling, liquor, and women, and instigate him to attack his own father and snatch the reins of government in his own hands. Another spy shall prevent him from such acts." "There can be," says Kautilya, "no greater crime or sin than making wicked impressions on an innocent mind; just as a fresh object is stained with whatever it is brought in close association, so a prince with fresh mind is apt to regard as scientific injunctions all that he is told of. Hence he shall be taught only of righteousness and of wealth (artha), but not of unrighteousness and of non-wealth. Classmate spies shall be so courteous towards him as to say "thine are we." When under the temptation of youth, he turns his eye towards women, impure women under the disguise of Aryas shall, at night and in lonely places, terrify him; when fond of liquor, he shall be terrified by making him drink such liquor as is adulterated with narcotics (yógapána); when fond of gambling, he shall be terrified by spies under the disguise of fraudulent persons; when fond of hunting, he shall be terrified by spies under the disguise of highway robbers; and when desirous of attacking his own father, he shall, under the pretence of compliance, be gradually persuaded of the evil consequences of such attempts, by telling: a king is not made by a mere wish; failure of thy attempt will bring about thy own death; success makes thee fall into hell and causes the people to lament (for thy father) and destroy the only clod (ekalóshtavadhascha, i.e., thyself)." When a king has an only son who is either devoid of worldly pleasures or is a favourite child, the king may keep him under chains. If a king has many sons, he may send some of them to where there is no heir apparent, nor a child either just born or in the embryo. When a prince is possessed of good and amicable qualities, he may be made the commander-in-chief or installed as heir apparent. Sons are of three kinds: those of sharp intelligence; those of stagnant intelligence; and those of perverted mind. Whoever carries into practice whatever he is taught concerning righteousness and wealth is one of sharp intelligence; whoever never carries into practice the good instructions he has imbibed is one of stagnant intelligence; and whoever entangles himself in dangers and hates righteousness and wealth is one of perverted mind. If a king has an only son (of the last type), attempts shall be made to procreating a son to him; or sons may be begotten on his daughters. When a king is too old or diseased (to beget sons), he may appoint a maternal relation or a blood relation (kulya) of his or any one of his neighbouring kings possessed of good and amicable qualities to sow the seed in his own field (kshétrebíjam, i.e., to beget a son on his wife.) But never shall a wicked and an only son be installed on the royal throne. A royal father who is the only prop for many (people) shall be favourably disposed towards his son. Except in dangers, sovereignty falling to the lot of the eldest (son) is always respected. Sovereignty may (sometimes) be the property of a clan; for the corporation of clans is invincible in its nature and being free from the calamities of anarchy, can have a permanent existence on earth. [Thus ends Chapter XVII, “Protection of Princes” in Book I, “Concerning Discipline” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya.] Chapter 18. The conduct of a prince kept under restraintand the treatment of a restrained prince A Prince, though put to troubles and employed in an unequal task, shall yet faithfully follow his father unless that task costs his life, enrages the people, or causes any other serious calamities. If he is employed in a good or meritorious work, he shall try to win the good graces of the superintendent of that work, carry the work to a profitable end beyond expectation, and present his father with the proportional profit derived from that work as well as with the excessive profit due to his skill. If the king is not still pleased with him and shows undue partiality to another prince and other wives, he may request the king to permit him for a forest-life. Or if he apprehends imprisonment or death, he may seek refuge under a neighbouring king who is known to be righteous, charitable, truthful, and not given to cunning, but also welcomes and respects guests of good character. Residing therein he may provide himself with men and money, contract marriage-connection with influential personages, and not only make alliance with wild tribes, but win over the parties (in his father's state). Or moving alone, he may earn his livelihood by working in gold mines or ruby mines or by manufacturing gold and silver ornaments or any other commercial commodities. Having acquired close intimacy with heretics (páshanda), rich widows, or merchants carrying on ocean traffic he may, by making use of poison (madanarasa), rob them of their wealth as well as the wealth of gods unless the latter is enjoyable by Bráhmans learned in the Vedas. Or he may adopt such measures as are employed to capture the villages of a foreign king. Or he may proceed (against his father) with the help of the servants of his mother. Or having disguised himself as a painter, a carpenter, court-bard, a physician, a buffoon, or a heretic, and assisted by spies under similar disguise, he may, when opportunity affords itself, present himself armed with weapons and poison before the king, and address him :-- "I am the heir-apparent; it does not become thee to enjoy the state alone when it is enjoyable by both of us, or when others justly desire such enjoyment; I ought not to be kept away by awarding an allowance of double the subsistence and salary." These are the measures that a prince kept under restraint has to take. Spies or his mother, natural or adoptive, may reconcile an heir-apparent under restraint and bring him to the court. Or secret emissaries armed with weapons and poison may kill an abandoned prince. If he is not abandoned, he may be caught hold of at night by employing women equal to the occasion, or by making use of liquor, or on the occasion of hunting, and brought back (to the court). When thus brought back, he shall be conciliated by the king with promise of sovereignty ‘after me’ (i.e., after the king's death), and kept under guard, in a definite locality. Or if the king has many sons, an unruly prince may be banished. [Thus ends Chapter XVIII, “The Conduct of a Prince kept under Restraint and the Treatment of a Restrained Prince,” in Book I, “Concerning Discipline” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya.] Will Continue on part 7 with regards dilip Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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