Exposition of Brahma Sutra 1.1.5

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Sri Balaji raises the following question:

 

> In BrahmaSutra 1:1:5 why is RAmAnuja refuting SAnkhya-Yoga? This

> is an avirodha adhyAya issue, what place does it have in the

> samanvaya adhyAya?

 

The answer to the question above lies in understanding the

context of Sutra 1.1.5. This sutra occurs after Badarayana,

the author of the Sutras, sets forth a definition of Brahman

at the beginning of the first chapter. In analyzing this first

section, we see that after declaring that something named " Brahman "

is to be inquired into (athAto brahma jijnAsA), the Sutra-kAra

proceeds to to specify what exactly Brahman is. The second sutra

completes this specification:

 

(Brahman is) that from which the origin, etc., of all this

proceeds. (janmAdy asya yatah).

 

The viSaya-vAkya (key Upanishadic text which the sutra presupposes)

here is the passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad which declares,

" yato vA imAni bhUtAni jAyante... " -- That from which all these

creatures are born, and when born they live, and that unto which

when departing, they enter -- desire to know that; that is Brahman.

 

With this text in mind, it is clear that universal causality

(jagat-kAraNatva) (and subsequent maintenance and dissolution) is the

primary distinguishing characteristic of Brahman. This is borne

out by also looking at the concluding section of the Brahma Sutras,

where once again " jagad-vyApara " or the business of cosmic creation,

preservation, and dissolution is stated to be a significant

distinguishing attribute of Brahman, as compared to the jIva

in the state of liberation.

 

Having stated that Brahman is to be known as the ground of the

cosmic process, the next two sutras specify that " SAstra " or

the scriptures alone are the source of our mediate knowledge of

Brahman, and that all the scriptures speak in a united, meaningful

voice about Brahman. Here, Ramanuja understands " SAstra " to refer

primarily to the various Upanishadic texts, which are considered

by the pUrva-mImAmsakas (ritualists) as being meaningless. Both

Ramanuja and Sankara refute the objection of the ritualists and

conclude that the Upanishadic texts are purportful (samanvaya).

[ I understand Sri Ananda Tirtha differs significantly in the

interpretation of this sutra, 1.1.4. However, let us finish

and see how Ramanuja makes meaning of this. ]

 

Thus far, Badarayana has defined Brahman as the cause of the

universe, and that we can know this from the Upanishads. The

problem is that sometimes the Upanishads speak as if cosmic

matter (pradhAna) is the first cause, or that the jIva is the

ultimate reality, or that prANa (vital breath), akASa (cosmic

ether), jyotis (light), are the ultimate. To allay these doubts,

most of the rest of the adhikaraNas (topics) of the first chapter

of the Brahma Sutras are devoted to demonstrating some of the

important characteristics of Brahman, which even more clearly

distinguish it from these lesser entities.

 

Sutra 1.1.5 -- Ikshater nASabdam

--------------------------------

 

We are now ready to discuss this sutra. Having established

Brahman as the first cause, Badarayana now seeks to establish

that Brahman is entirely different from both a non-sentient

entity such as cosmic matter (pradhAna), and a limited sentient

entity such as the jIva (individual self). The first of these

two topics is dealt with in this sutra.

 

Let us first look at the text of the sutra: Ikshater nASabdam.

This is taken to mean, " Non-sentient PradhAna as the cause of

the universe is not supported by scripture (aSabdam), because

the function of thinking (IkshaNa) is ascribed to the causal

substance. " The negative particle " na " implies the denial of

the prima facie view, which states that pradhAna is the cause

of the universe.

 

We can further understand this argument if we look at the

viSaya-vAkya for this sutra. This sutra is devoted to

the determination of the import of the Sad Vidya, the 6th

chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad, in which the famous

vAkya " tattvamasi " comes. Is Sat, which is declared in

this section to be the first cause, sentient or insentient?

Is Sat merely the material, unmanifested world, or something

more?

 

It so happens that the sAnkhyA school of philosophy holds

that the primordial ground of the universe is the insentient

pradhAna; they therefore conclude that Sat is identical

with the pradhAna and insentient.

 

This sutra disposes of this point of view by referring to

the text of the Chhandogya, which says, " tad aikshyata; bahu

syAm... " -- " It thought (or resolved), may I become many " .

Since " resolving " or " thinking " can only be ascribed to

an intelligent, sentient entity, a non-sentient, unintelligent

pradhAna can never be equated with the Sat, which can only

refer to a sentient Brahman. In furtherance of this argument,

the same text identifies Sat with the Atman, etc., and knowledge

of the Atman (self) is taught to lead to moksha. If Sat were

merely pradhAna, it would amount to teaching a non-self, which

is contrary to the teaching. Ramanuja makes a few more arguments

based on the text in this direction.

 

In conclusion, Badarayana establishes that Brahman, a sentient,

intelligent being, alone is the cause of the universe, and not

the insentient, unintelligent pradhAna.

 

Justification and Response to Criticism

------

 

As explained above, the first chapter seeks to establish the

nature of Brahman based on Upanishadic texts. Ramanuja's

interpretation of 1.1.5 is fully inline with this idea of

" samanvaya " . Since the sAnkhyAs happen to hold a contradictory

view of the ultimate cause, their viewpoint is brought up for

refutation. This is fully in line with expanding on the

meaning of Sutra 1.1.2, which defines Brahman as the cause, etc.,

of the universe.

 

None of the philosophical conclusions (*not* interpretations) of Ramanuja

expressed above, as far as I know, are contrary to Sri Ananda Tirtha's

own ideology. Therefore, it is unnecessary to make a big deal of

a difference in interpretation in this area.

 

The next adhikaraNa, the AnandamayAdhikaraNa, seeks to distinguish

Brahman from a limited sentient entity such as the jIva. It is

plausible to therefore interpret this adhikaraNa as distinguishing

Brahman from an insentient entity such as pradhAna.

 

This line of thinking has a great deal of tradition behind it.

Even Sankara, who has to struggle to find Advaita in the Sutras,

interprets 1.1.5 with these viSaya-vAkya and pUrvapaksha in

mind, as does Bhaskara, as presumably did the revered Bodhayana

Maharishi, etc.

 

I hope I have explained this to satisfaction. Once again, I do

not expect others to agree with the *interpretation*, but to agree

that it is plausible. I do not intend to refute Sri Ananda Tirtha's

interpretation, as I am certain he had his reasons for going his

way. In this sutra, at least, the two schools' philosophical

conclusions do not differ.

 

bhaktAnghrireNu,

Mani