Issues in Indian Philosophy #3

[Guest guest]

HERE IS ISSUE #3:

 

Every system of Classical Indian Thought has expressed its

opinion on the stages and nature of perception. Most systems

accept 2 stages in the perceptual process. Others hold that it

is just a one-step affair. The first stage is called

indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakSha) and the second

stage is called determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakSha).

 

Here is the line-up of the various systems on this particular

issue:

 

 

1. JAINISM:

 

All perception where any real knowledge is obtained is, by

definition, determinate. Any pre-relational apprehension does not

even qualify to be called perception. Hence, perception is

always determinate (savikalpaka). There is no such thing as

indeterminate perception.

 

 

2. BUDDHISM:

 

Perception is, by definition, indeterminate. Perception is the

pure sensation of an unique individual entity devoid of its

generic correlation, name and qualities. Any association of the

unique individual entity (vyakti) with a class-essence (jAti),

name (nAma) etc. is a subsequent mental construct and is not

an innate feature (svalakShaNa) of that entity. Hence the only

true perception is indeterminate. The so-called determinate

perception, since it is a subjective interpretation of the

initial pure cognition (which alone reveals the thing-in-itself)

is, in the final analysis, false.

 

 

 

THE HINDU SYSTEMS:

 

3. THE NYAAYA-VAISHESHHIKA:

 

Perception takes place in two stages. It proceeds from the

simple to the complex. The initial stage, i.e. indeterminate

perception, is the simple and bare apprehension of an entity

without the knowledge of its class-essence (jAti) and attributes

(guNa). The second stage, i.e. determinate perception, is the

complex and concrete comprehension of that entity together with

the substance-attribute relationship (guNa-guNI sambandha) and the

universal-particular relationship (jAti-vyakti sambandha).

 

 

 

 

4. THE SAANKHYA-YOGA:

 

Perception takes place in two stages. It proceeds from the

vague complex to the simple, and then to the concrete complex.

The initial stage, i.e. indeterminate perception, is the vague

apprehension of an amorphous mass wherein the distinguishing

features of an entity are not yet comprehended. The second

stage, i.e. determinate perception, is itself divided into two

phases, i.e. the analytic and the synthetic. In the analytic

phase, the substance-attribute and the universal-particular

aspects of the entity are clearly distinguished and in the

synthetic phase, the entity is cognized as an integrated whole

with reference to the overall context and circumstances.

 

 

 

 

5. MIIMAAMSAA:

 

Perception takes place in two stages, i.e. the indeterminate

and the determinate. Indeterminate perception is the immediate

apprehension of an object together with its generic and

specific features but not their distinction. It is also devoid

of assimilation, discrimination, recollection and recognition. In

the determinate stage of perception, the generic and specific

features are clearly distinguished together with the other

qualifying properties of the object.

 

 

 

6. SHANKARA (ADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

Perception takes place at two levels, i.e. the indeterminate

and the determinate. Indeterminate perception is devoid of all

qualifications. It apprehends neither an individual object nor

its qualities. It is merely the apprehension of pure

undifferentiated Being (sattAmAtra sannikarSham). This is absolute

perception. Determinate perception is the perception of objects

together with their attributes. This is relative perception

which is ultimately false as it is superimposed (Aropita) on

the one and true perception, i.e. indeterminate perception.

 

 

 

7. RAAMAANUJA (VISHISHHT.AADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

Perception takes place in two ways. When someone perceives an

object for the very first time, this is called indeterminate

perception. Here, the object is perceived with some of its

qualities such as its generic character in the shape of a

particular configuration of its parts (samsthAna vishiShTa

guNAlambana) etc. But there is no recognition (pratyAbhijn~A)

that this generic character is shared with other members of

the class by the object in question. The determinate stage of

perception is the apprehension of the object from the second

time onwards. Here the generic characteristics of the said

object are recognized as being shared in common with other

members of that class.

 

 

 

8. MADHVA (DVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

There is only one type of perception, i.e. determinate

perception. These determinate forms are of 8 types where the

apprehension of an object is either qualified by the substance,

quality, action, name, generality, particularity, inherence or

non-being. Indeterminate perception described by the other

systems is just fictional as there are no such things as

formless, unqualified or non-relational percepts.

 

 

 

 

Comments on the RAmAnujite views of indeterminate & determinate

perceptions:

 

1. As one can clearly see, the very understanding and

definitions of indeterminate and determinate perception by the

VishiShTAdvaita philosophers stands out from the " rest of the

crowd " . Though their definitions are, in an overall sense,

generally pertinent to the problem of knowledge as a whole,

they are certainly wide off the mark in terms of their

specific relevance to the issue at hand. Where is the need to

talk suddenly about perceptions of an initial type when all

the other systems are trying to understand the mere mechanics

of perception, be it initial or subsequent ? It seems a moot

point to the issue at hand.

 

2. Secondly, a staunchly realistic system like AcArya RAmAnuja's

which primarily arose in direct protest to Advaita, ought to

have seen the metaphysical complications and implications by

even entertaining the idea of the term " nirvikalpaka " (whatever

be the definition). AcArya Madhva (and coincidentally the

Jains) have seen clearly where this would lead to, and

therefore, confidently rejected the whole idea of nirvikalpaka

pratyakSha. Afterall, it would not be too difficult to convince

someone who has already accepted " nirvikalpaka " in the

epistemological arena, to later on accept nirvisheSha Brahman in

the theological area. The far-sighted Dvaita philosophers, by

contrast, have nipped the problem in the bud!

 

3. Thirdly, how can one be even aware of the generic features

of an object in indeterminate perception, if that is the very

first time the person has perceived it ? For the generic

feature to be known as a generic feature, at least two

members of a class must be beheld simultaneously. Otherwise it

would not be possible to call it generic. It is just plain

common sense.

 

4. Fourthly, there seems to be, on the part of the RAmAnujite

philosophers, a failure to distinguish between determinate

perception (savikalpaka pratyakSha) and recognition

(pratyAbhijn~A). All the above systems see the two as distinct

except AcArya RAmAnuja's. This indeed is curious, if not

outright strange.

 

5. Finally, this is not an interpretation-of-Scripture issue

where one can hide behind grammar and etymology. These are

issues of pratyakSha pramANa which is in the experiential

purview of one and ALL (yogya or ayogya). And no realistic

system of thought can afford to take pratyakSha pramANa

lightly.

 

Thus, I request my dear friends from the RAmAnujite tradition

(with ALL due respect to them and their tradition) to provide

a proper reply to the above criticisms. I am eager to hear

from them from the standpoint of learning and better

understanding the motivations behind their views on this issue

in the true spirit of " tamaso mA jyotirgamaya " . I mean no

disrespect to nor deem no sarcasm of anyone. This, I hope, is

clear.

 

 

regards,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa

B.N.Hebbar

[Guest guest]

Dear KP:

 

Thanks for reminding me. I plan to answer your question in

detail while dealing with the notion of jIvAtmas in the

various systems of Indian thought so that we get to see the

issue in its whole " nine yards " .

 

Briefly, sAkShI jn~Ana cannot be the same as dharmabhUtajn~Ana

as the former is of the essence of the jIva and hence

spiritual in nature, whereas dharmabhUtajn~Ana is not of the

essence of the jIva (which is svarUpajn~Ana). Dbjn~Ana is

neither Atmic nor pRAkRtic (like manas). It is in a " no man's

land " between the two. That itself is puzzling. No other

system agrees with this " no man's land " status.

 

Further, if Dbjn~Ana is a substance (it is one of the 6

ontological substances in V'advaita) how can it be attributive?

If substances (dravyas) can become attributes (guNas) what is

the point in primarily dichotomizing Reality (Tattva) into

dravya and adravya? It is really pointless. Dravya is dravya

and guNa is guNa. In fact the very deinition of dravya is

guNakarmAshraya (locus of attributes & actions). In the Dvaita

case, the primary division of Reality into Independent

(svatantra) and dependent (paratantra) is the never confused.

God ALONE & FOREVER is Independent and the rest is FOREVER

dependent on Him. This is true Theism. AcArya Madhva has

carefully examined all the schemes of Reality (including that

of AcArya RAmAnuja) and has rejected them as being

unsatisfactory. Therefore, AcArya Madhva's philosophy is the

best.

 

high regards to self,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa,

B.N.Hebbar

[Guest guest]

Balaji Hebbar writes:

> AcArya Madhva has

> carefully examined all the schemes of Reality (including that

> of AcArya RAmAnuja) and has rejected them as being

> unsatisfactory. Therefore, AcArya Madhva's philosophy is the

> best.

 

Dear Sri Balaji,

 

To my knowledge, Madhva never took Ramanuja's views as pUrvapaksha.

In fact, I don't think Madhva ever refers to any of Ramanuja's

views in his works. If I am not mistaken, the first author in

the Dvaita school to specifically target the conclusions of

Ramanuja's school is Jaya Tirtha.

 

Mani

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Mani:

 

Until any new findings are made to the contrary, I have to

agree with you that shrImadAcArya himself did not use AcArya

RAmAnuja's system as a pUrvapakxa. The first reference would be

in the works of shrI shrI Jaya tIrtha, shrImadAcArya's grand

disciple.

 

However, we must keep in mind that the very fact shrImadAcArya

did not recognize AcArya RAmAnuja's interpretation of the sacred

lore as proper would tantamount to an implicit rejection of

his views.

 

regards,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa

Hebbar

[Guest guest]

Mani Varadarajan <mani

Monday, November 29, 1999 3:07 PM

 

> Mani Varadarajan <mani

>

>

> Dear Sri Balaji,

>

> To my knowledge, Madhva never took Ramanuja's views as pUrvapaksha.

> In fact, I don't think Madhva ever refers to any of Ramanuja's

> views in his works. If I am not mistaken, the first author in

> the Dvaita school to specifically target the conclusions of

> Ramanuja's school is Jaya Tirtha.

>

> Mani

 

Balaji Hebbar <bhebbar

Monday, November 29, 1999 9:33 PM

>

> Dear Sri Mani:

>

> Until any new findings are made to the contrary, I have to

> agree with you that shrImadAcArya himself did not use AcArya

> RAmAnuja's system as a pUrvapakxa. The first reference would be

> in the works of shrI shrI Jaya tIrtha, shrImadAcArya's grand

> disciple.

>

> However, we must keep in mind that the very fact shrImadAcArya

> did not recognize AcArya RAmAnuja's interpretation of the sacred

> lore as proper would tantamount to an implicit rejection of

> his views.

>

> regards,

> Hari-vAyu smaraNa

> Hebbar

 

I am afraid, I have to disagree with this view.

 

This is about Sri Madhva's bR^ihadAranyaka bhAsya.

 

Please see pages 147-149 of the book

" The bR^ihadAranyaka upanishhad expounded from Sri MadhvAchAryA's

perspective "

by Dr. B.N.K Sharma

 

For a sampler, in page 149 it goes,

 

" Madhva takes his stand on several points contained in the recital of

AnandamImAmsa in this brAhmaNa and its counterpart in taitt. up. (II.8)

in coming to the conclusion that this beatific 'calculus' is propounded

with special reference to the state of moksha... " and in this page a

footnote is given with an extract from Ramanuja Sribhasya (IV - 4.20)

which goes " muktasyApyAnandasya paramapurushha eva heturiti...etc...

na kashchit.h virodhaH " .

 

If the " sarvamUla " itself has to be referred, please see

pp. 706-713 in the third volume in

" srImad.h Anandatiirthabhagavat.hpAdapraNIta sarvamUlagranthAH "

edited critically by Dr. Vyasanakere Prabhanjanacharya (which

of course is in Sanskrit).

 

Just my opinion. Though Sri Jayatiirtha's commentary runs much

longer than the mUla, he does not say what is not implied or

indicated in the mUla. In other words, he does not extrapolate

any thoughts even though he cross references Sri Acharya's

thoughts from other places. Just to give one simple example

for one of the words used " saMvettuH " (whose nominative case

is saMvetR^i), he gave a long explanation, but he gave the

reasoning for that saying that such an explanation is hidden

in the upasargas " saM " and " tR^in.h " .

 

Many do not want the philosophical discussions on the net. I

am sorry for posting this. But others can carry on these

discussions further.

 

Regards,

 

Keshava Rao

[Guest guest]

Dear shrImAn Keshava Rao:

 

Thanks for sharing your thoughts with us. I personally request

you and touch your feet to kindly join the discussion. I have

had a first-hand experience of your depth of scholarship in

our siddhAnta. Your entry into the discussion will make it

only richer. Let me take the pleasure of introducing you to

my dear friend shrI K.P.Kalale, the learned gentleman upholding

the RAmAnujite view.

 

 

 

Dear shrImAn Krishna Prasad:

 

I take great pleasure in introducing Hon'ble Keshava R.

Padipatri to you. I think I will do justice to both of you

by saying " most learned and yet so humble " . There are plenty

of " empty vessels " like me, but both your kind are indeed

rare. Let me end by saying, I would have no hesitation in

touching both your feet for both your wisdom as well as your

virtue.

 

highest regards to both of you,

B.N.Hebbar

 

 

Dear shrImAn Jayakrishna:

 

Sir! Nimmantaha doDDavaru illade hyege mundu variyodo annodu

vandu doDDa samasye. So please join the discussion. Another

great scholar along with Keshava RAyaru and KP.

 

high regards,

Hebbar

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Balaji and Sri Krishna Prasad,

I sincerely feel that I don't deserve what is told in Sri

Balaji's remarks. Also we all hold Sri Balaji in high esteem and we

disagree with the remark that he is " empty vessel " .

 

I will attempt to explain the definition and need for a concept like

" visheshha " .

 

" Visheshha " is by definition a peculiar characteristic of things which

enables inseparable wholes to keep intact their richness of content from

being lost in the underlying unity of essence and preserve variety of

aspects and attributes, in their rightful places without overlapping of

any kind or from usurping or invading each other's place or

jurisdiction or function. In other words it is

 

" ekatara parisheshhAbhAvAdi nirvAhakaH "

 

This visheshha plays an important role in sentient and non-sentient

beings as well.

 

Just for a good understanding, let us take an example.

 

If there are two different cows C1 and C2. Let us take their totality

of attributes ( " gotva " [cowness], weight, size, color and other

characteristics) as AC1 and AC2.

 

(this totality of attributes is their visheshha). .

 

Now there are two questions.

 

1. Are the object and its totality of attributes identical ?

 

C1 = AC1 and C2 = AC2 ?

 

2. Are the totalities of those cow attributes identical ?

 

AC1 = AC2 ?

 

(Here the words " identical " and the sign " = " stand for " the same " and

not the equality in numbers or similarity in look etc.)

 

If both are true, then we end up with C1 = C2 which is an antithesis

(apasiddhAnta).

 

The dvaita position is both 1. and 2. are false.

 

Now if VishishhTAdvaita position is that 1. is true, then, we can ask a

simple question based on their own classification (of dravya and

adravya).

 

" Is AC1 a dravya or adravya ? "

 

We know C1 is dravya. So AC1 has to be also dravya. But AC1 is a set of

characteristics and hence must be adravya which is an antithesis.

 

Just because two things are always coexisting (apR^ithaksiddha), it

does not necessitate them to be identical.

 

The concept of visheshha is necessary to understand the nature of things

as well as the relationship of unique characteristics and the object.

 

Vedas clearly state that

 

" bhinnAscha bhinnadharmAscha padArthAH nikhilA.api "

 

Not only there is difference between things, there is also difference

between the properties of things which goes with their vishesha.

 

Regards,

 

Keshava Rao

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Keshava and Sri Balaji Hebbar,

 

I feel very same way as you put it, I dont deserve Sri Balaji's remarks

either. I am just a money minded person in US bound in matter and

ignorance. Sri Balaji is one person who has taken " philosophy " as life's

only mission unlike part-time philosophy enthusiasts like me. I should say

I spend only a few hours per week on this. This is not even part time. I

guess Sri Balaji understands the sentence - nasti akrtah kritena... tam

vijnanartham gurumeva abhigaccchet

 

Regarding Keshava Padipatri's explanation of vishesha, I have to admit

that I need to spend a lot more time to really understand it. Since my

career situation is in a difficult stage, I will have to take more time to

understand and get back to you. However, I have some questions :

 

Can you all (ie. people who are writing emails regarding this

inter-scholastic visistadvaita/dvaita subject) please give a short email

introducing - who, where, interest / background in philosophy, shastra

portions of interest, telephone numbers, addresses etc. so that we can talk

if have to and ask questions to the right parties regarding the subject of

their interest. I have talked to Sri Balaji for years and I know how to

contact him to understand which types of subjects. There is no doubt that

he has encyclopaedias stored both in his house as well as in his

knowledgebase. I dont know about others. Sometimes it is very difficult for

me to understand written email, particularly when difficult concepts that I

am not used to like vishesha are involved. I did receive Sri Nela Mangala's

email on kata upanisad and I am looking into it.

 

I got the chapter from Sri BNK sharma's book - which explains vishesha. I

still have not finished reading it. It takes a couple of revisions to

understand the concept particulary because I am not focussing on it 100%.

Do you have any other material - like a dialectics regarding vishesha?

where can One find good books on this subject. I can get some books from

India also since some friends of mine are leaving to India in few days.

 

In the mean time I will try to work on this using avalable resources.

 

I assume all of you are from USA so that we can talk over the phone. I

guess there may be many in the list in India.

 

My telephone - work and home is 858-780-1802

 

regards,

 

Krishna Kalale

 

kesava.padipatri [sMTP:kesava.padipatri]

Friday, December 03, 1999 9:44 AM

bhebbar

Cc: mani; kkalale1; ;

vijay_srinivasan; gurukripa1; seshadri;

mmurthy; venkatramu

Re: Re: Issues in Indian Philosophy #3

 

 

 

Dear Sri Balaji and Sri Krishna Prasad,

I sincerely feel that I don't deserve what is told in Sri

Balaji's remarks. Also we all hold Sri Balaji in high esteem and we

disagree with the remark that he is " empty vessel " .

 

I will attempt to explain the definition and need for a concept like

" visheshha " .

 

" Visheshha " is by definition a peculiar characteristic of things which

enables inseparable wholes to keep intact their richness of content from

being lost in the underlying unity of essence and preserve variety of

aspects and attributes, in their rightful places without overlapping of

any kind or from usurping or invading each other's place or

jurisdiction or function. In other words it is

 

" ekatara parisheshhAbhAvAdi nirvAhakaH "

 

This visheshha plays an important role in sentient and non-sentient

beings as well.

 

Just for a good understanding, let us take an example.

 

If there are two different cows C1 and C2. Let us take their totality

of attributes ( " gotva " [cowness], weight, size, color and other

characteristics) as AC1 and AC2.

 

(this totality of attributes is their visheshha). .

 

Now there are two questions.

 

1. Are the object and its totality of attributes identical ?

 

C1 = AC1 and C2 = AC2 ?

 

2. Are the totalities of those cow attributes identical ?

 

AC1 = AC2 ?

 

(Here the words " identical " and the sign " = " stand for " the same " and

not the equality in numbers or similarity in look etc.)

 

If both are true, then we end up with C1 = C2 which is an antithesis

(apasiddhAnta).

 

The dvaita position is both 1. and 2. are false.

 

Now if VishishhTAdvaita position is that 1. is true, then, we can ask a

simple question based on their own classification (of dravya and

adravya).

 

" Is AC1 a dravya or adravya ? "

 

We know C1 is dravya. So AC1 has to be also dravya. But AC1 is a set of

characteristics and hence must be adravya which is an antithesis.

 

Just because two things are always coexisting (apR^ithaksiddha), it

does not necessitate them to be identical.

 

The concept of visheshha is necessary to understand the nature of things

as well as the relationship of unique characteristics and the object.

 

Vedas clearly state that

 

" bhinnAscha bhinnadharmAscha padArthAH nikhilA.api "

 

Not only there is difference between things, there is also difference

between the properties of things which goes with their vishesha.

 

Regards,

 

Keshava Rao