Issues in Indian Philosophy #4

[Guest guest]

ISSUE #4: TYPES OF CONTACT BETWEEN A SENSE-ORGAN AND ITS

OBJECT

 

Since the Jains and the Buddhists considered the most important

sense-organ, i.e. the visual organ, to be aprApyakAri, they did

not bother to analyze the types of contact between the

sense-organs and their objects. However, all systems of

Classical Hindu Thought (all of whom considered all the

sense-organs to be prApyakAri) have opined on the issue of the

types of contact (sannikarSha) between a sense-organ and its

object. Below is given the line-up of the various Hindu

systems on this particular issue:

 

THE HINDU SYSTEMS:

1. NYAAYA-VAISHESHHIKA:

The philosophers of the NyAya-VaisheShika system have pointed

out that there are 6 types of contact possible between the

sense-organs and their objects. These are:

a) samyoga (union): contact between the sense-organ and the

substantive aspect of the object.

b) samyukta-samavAya (united-inherence): contact between the

sense-organ and the attributive or active aspect of the object

by virtue of attributes (guNa) and actions (karma) being

related to the substance through inherence (samavAya).

c) samyukta-samaveta-samavAya (united-inherent-inherence): contact

between the sense-organ and the generic aspect of the object.

d) samavAya (inherence): contact between the sense-organ and the

inherence aspect of the object which unites universals with

particulars and substances with attributes.

e) samaveta-samavAya (inherent-inherence): contact between the

sense-organ and its own inherence in terms of its capacity to

peceive its object in its own particular manner.

f) visheShaNatAbhAva (absence of qualification): when there is

no contact between the sense-organ and its object on account

of the absence of the latter.

 

 

2. SAANKHYA-YOGA:

The philosophers of the SAnkhya-Yoga system accept five forms

of contact between the sense-organ and its object. These are:

a) samyoga: contact of a sense-organ with the substantive

aspect of an object.

b) samyukta-tAdAtmya: contact of a sense-organ with the

attributive aspect of an object.

c) samyukta-tAdAtmya-tAdAtmya: contact of a sense-organ with the

generic aspect of an object.

d) tAdAtmya: contact of a sense-organ, the antaHkaraNa trio [of

aham (ego), manas (mind) and buddhi (intellect)] with all the

patent aspects of an object.

e) tAdAtmya-tAdAtmya: contact of a sense-organ, the antaHkaraNa

trio [of aham (ego), manas (mind) and buddhi (intellect)] and

puruSha (soul) with all the patent aspects of an object.

 

 

3. THE PRABHAAKARA SCHOOL OF MIIMAAMSAA:

The philosophers of the PrabhAkara school of MImAmsA accept

only three forms of contact between the sense-organ and its

object. The ones given below have the same definitions as in

the NyAya-VaisheShika system. These are:

a) samyoga

b) samyukta-samavAya

c) samavAya

 

 

4. THE KUMAARILA SCHOOL OF MIIMAAMSAA:

The philosophers of the KumArila school of MImAmsA also accept

only three forms of contact between the sense-organ and its

object. The ones given below have the same definitions as in

the NyAya-VaisheShika system. These are:

a) samyoga

b) samyukta-samavAya

c) samyukta-samaveta-samavAya

 

 

5. SHANKARA (ADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

Like the NyAya-VaisheShika philosophers, the philosophers of the

Advaita school of VedAnta also accept the same six types of

contact between the sense-organ and its object. However, they

use different set of nomenclatures in some cases. However in

definition, they are the same six as in the NyAya-VaisheShika

system. They are:

a) samyoga

b) samyukta-tAdAtmya

c) samyuktAbinna-tAdAtmya

d) tAdAtmya

e) tAdAtmyavadabinnatva

f) visheShya-visheShaNa bhAva

 

 

 

6. RAAMAANUJA (VISHISHHT.AADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

The VishiShTAdvaita philosophers only accept just two types of

contact between the sense-organ and its object. These are:

a) samyoga

b) samyuktAshrayaNa: contact between the sense-organs and the

attributes of the object.

 

 

7. MADHVA (DVAITA) VEDAANTA:

The Dvaita philosophers accept only one type of contact between

the sense-organ and its object, i.e. samyoga.

 

 

Comments:

When one cognizes an object, one perceives the substantive and

attributive aspects as a unitary cognition (ekAshrayapratIti).

Afterall, when one perceives a green cloth, the greeness and

the cloth are perceived as one cognition. In this sense, the

Dvaita philosophers have rightly held that there is only one

type of contact, i.e. samyoga. Even the Scriptures have warned

us NOT to look upon attributes as distinct from its substrate

(Ashraya). KaThopaniShad II:1:14 clearly points this out with

the words: " evam dharmAn pRthak pashyanstAnevAnuvidhAvati " (one

who views attributes as different runs after them distractedly).

So, by positing two types of sannikarSha between the

sense-organ and object, VishiShTAdvaita has clearly both

contradicted experience and violated Scripture and in the

process, I am afraid, has once again missed the boat!

 

The other problem with VishiShTAdvaita, on this issue, is that

it talks of subtance and attributes as being different

(guNagunIbheda) and yet in the same breath talks of their

inseparability (apRthaksiddhatva). Why this meaningless verbal

gymnastics, I don't understand? To what end? Firstly, they

dichotomize Reality into dravya and adravya (which itself is

wrong) and then try to fudge all the rest of their doctrines

to be in consonance with that initial blunder, thereby digging

themselves deeper into the quagmire. Instead, if they were to

have merely and simply followed the dictates of both of sense

and Scripture, they would not have found themselves in this

sorry predicament and would have seen themselves as coming out

in flying colors.

 

Finally, no true saguNavAdI should ever hold that substance and

attributes are different. It only gives room to the Advaitin

(albeit in a remote way) to convince you, sooner or later,

about the possibility of the existence of an attributeless

substance. Again, the far-sighted Dvaita philosophers have nipped

a potential disaster in the bud. SaguNatva can only be

properly upheld ONLY IF substance and attributes are declared

to be one and perceived as being " distinct " only by virtue of

visheSha. This is precisely what is referred to as

savisheShAbheda (distinction-laden identity)----shrImadAcArya's

metaphysical masterpiece! It remains the only viable solution

to the substance-attribute problem in world metaphysics.

 

 

regards,

Mukunda-MukhyaprANa smaraNa

B.N.Hebbar

[Guest guest]

Dear KP:

 

Thanks for your reply. Unless you understand the concept of

visheSha in all its details and niceities, you cannot

understand the how substances & attributes are identical and

yet different as per Dvaita.

 

On the other hand, if substances and attributes are different,

the problem comes up as to how they would enter into a

relation. There can be only two types of relationships:

 

1. samyoga: conjunctional relationship. This obtains only between

two substances, not between substance and attribute.

 

2. samavAya: inherent relationship. This is accepted only by

NyAya-VaisheShika and PrabhAkara MImAmsA. As your folks and our

folks have both pointed out, this sort of relationship leads

to anavasthA AbhAsa (fallacy of infinite regress). Thus it is

rejected by both.

 

ApRthaksiddhatva is clearly cooked up and just doesn't explain

the HOW A RELATION TAKES PLACE, it only explains HOW IT IS.

There is a BIG difference between the two.

 

SavisheShAbheda, on the other hand, avoids this by pointing

that the substance and attribute are actually ONE distinguished,

only and epistemologically, by visheSha.

 

BTW, the citation you wanted for the two types of sense-object

contact in V'advaita was given to me almost 20 years ago by

late Honorable Prof. S.S.Raghavachar. I was surprised that I

could even find it. As per my notes, it is to be found on

p.77 of AcArya VedAnta Deshika's NyAyaparisuddhi.

 

 

regards,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa,

B.N.Hebbar

[Guest guest]

 

Balaji Hebbar [sMTP:bhebbar]

Sunday, November 28, 1999 9:29 AM

kkalale1

Cc: ; mani; gurukripa1;

vijay_srinivasan; seshadri; mmurthy;

venkataramu

Re: Issues in Indian Philosophy #4

 

Balaji Hebbar <bhebbar

 

Dear KP:

 

Thanks for your reply. Unless you understand the concept of

visheSha in all its details and niceities, you cannot

understand the how substances & attributes are identical and

yet different as per Dvaita.

 

On the other hand, if substances and attributes are different,

the problem comes up as to how they would enter into a

relation. There can be only two types of relationships:

 

1. samyoga: conjunctional relationship. This obtains only between

two substances, not between substance and attribute.

 

2. samavAya: inherent relationship. This is accepted only by

NyAya-VaisheShika and PrabhAkara MImAmsA. As your folks and our

folks have both pointed out, this sort of relationship leads

to anavasthA AbhAsa (fallacy of infinite regress). Thus it is

rejected by both.

 

ApRthaksiddhatva is clearly cooked up and just doesn't explain

the HOW A RELATION TAKES PLACE, it only explains HOW IT IS.

There is a BIG difference between the two.

 

SavisheShAbheda, on the other hand, avoids this by pointing

that the substance and attribute are actually ONE distinguished,

only and epistemologically, by visheSha.

[Krishna Kalale]

 

Dear Balaji, I still did not get it. I really need your definition of

visesha and a clear explanation of that concept. How does visesha explain

how the relation takes place between substance and attribute. Please apply

the concepts to a concrete example such as an object and its weight for

example. Or sun and its rays. Unfortunately, I dont have any text book on

Sri Madhva system that explains to me this.

 

BTW, the citation you wanted for the two types of sense-object

contact in V'advaita was given to me almost 20 years ago by

late Honorable Prof. S.S.Raghavachar. I was surprised that I

could even find it. As per my notes, it is to be found on

p.77 of AcArya VedAnta Deshika's NyAyaparisuddhi.

[Krishna Kalale]

 

I really need to get that book nyaya parishuddhi. I dont have a reference

for this and I will find some help here soon.

 

 

regards,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa,

B.N.Hebbar

 

nAham kartA hariH kartA tatpUjA karmachaakhilam.h|

taThaapi matkR^itaa pUja tatprasaadhEna naanyaThaa|

tadbhakti tadphalam.h mahyam.h tatprasaadaat.h punaH punaH |

karmanyaasO harAvevam.h vishNOsthR^iptikaraH sadhA ||

 

" I am not the doer, shri Hari is the doer, all the actions that I do are

His worship. Even then, the worship I do is through His grace and not

otherwise. That devotion and the fruits of the actions that come to me are

due to His recurring grace "

If one always practices to do actions with a dedicated spirit to Hari, in

this way, it pleases Vishnu.

--- Quoted by Sri madhvAchArya in GitA tAtparya

[Guest guest]

BTW, the citation you wanted for the two types of sense-object

contact in V'advaita was given to me almost 20 years ago by

late Honorable Prof. S.S.Raghavachar. I was surprised that I

could even find it. As per my notes, it is to be found on

p.77 of AcArya VedAnta Deshika's NyAyaparisuddhi.

 

 

[Krishna Kalale] Dear Balaji,

 

I found a copy of nyaya parishuddhi. IT is in sanskrit. page 77 in my book

has anumana adhyaya, which cannot deal with indriyas and objects. I guess

you have to somehow locate more info on this for me to go ahead.

 

thanks

 

Coming to Katopanisad, I guess the verse is :

 

yathodakam durge vristam parvateshu vidhavati

evam dharman prithak pashyan staneva anu dhavati

 

The meaning of course depends on the interpreter. Obviously there are

differences in meanings offered by Madhva and RangaRamanuja on this verse.

 

The original verse is quite cryptic. direct translation : :

 

like how water fallen on the tip of a mountain becomes different

tributaries and runs down the mountain, in the same way, in the case of

paramatman, one who sees his " dharmas " as different follows that very

diversity.

 

This verse is taken by Sri Rangaramanuja as : One paramatman is the in

dweller of all and holds everything as his sarira. The water fallen on the

top of a tall mountain comes down as rivers , lakes, rivulets, ponds etc.

Similarly, the attributes of Brahman, which are sarvantaryamitva, sarva

prakaratva, sarvatmatva sarva dharakatva, sarva sristi stithi laya

karanatva etc. One should not take the antaryamitva of Brahman in humans,

the antaryamitva of Brahman in devas, in animals as referring to

independent distinct entities. They all directly or indirectly belong to

that Paramatman. One who does not understand this and thinks that these

attributes are distinct and independent and refer to different entities,

takes birth as different beings such as devas, humans, animals etc. and

gets bound in this samsara.

 

I am not sure what Sri Madhvacharya's commentary on this is. I have a book

on this I have to refer to this. When I get this I will try to compare

and find what the issues. are.

 

My initial evaluation is that : the shloka is too cryptic. Hence some

minor differences in commentaries are possible.

 

 

asmadgubhyo namah

srikrishnarpanam astu

 

Krishna Kalale

[Guest guest]

Mr Kalale wrote

> I am not sure what Sri Madhvacharya's commentary on this is.

 

Dear Mr. Kalale,

 

Here is some input on the commentary on the Kathopanishat statement.

 

Yathodakam durge vristam parvatheshu vidhaavathi

Evam Dharmanprithakpashyamsthaanevaanu vidhaavathi ||

 

- Kathopanishat

 

 

To understand the meaning of this Shruti text, we must first study the

context in which this Shruti text has appeared.

 

For establishing the svatantra-tattva the Kathopanishat context is the

description of Nirbheda-bhaava of brahma-vastu. In the passage previous to

this one, it says

 

yadeveha tadamutra yadamutra tadanviha

mrityossa mrityumaapnoti ya iha naaneva pashyathi

Manasaiva idam aaptavyam neha naanaasti kinchana

mrityossa mrithyum gachhati ya iha naaneva pashyathi

 

The Upanishats trace the world of manifold aspects to a single principle and

call this principle Brahman. So this principle must be conceived in such a

manner as to explain the manifold. In explaining it in this manner, no

foreign element should be introduced into It, for, to introduce such

elements into Brahman is implicitly deny to that extent the self-sufficient

nature ( svatantratva) of the principle.

 

Both Advaita and Vishishtaadvaita have introduced foreign elements into the

principle. ( More on this in my next email).

 

Madhwa holds that the principle is infinitely rich ( Gunapoorna) and he does

not make any distinction between the principle and its richness.

Kathopanishat warns us not to make such distinctions among avayavas,

Gunas, kriya etc of Parabrahman. One who does see the distinction ( Ya iha

Naaneva Pashyati) will be doomed (mrithyossa mrithyum gachhati) it says.

 

The substantive-attributive (Guna-Guni) relation does not apply to

Shrutyukta ParaBrahman because Gunas themselves are the content of Him.

He is One. There is no svagatha-bheda in Him. There is no bheda in his

avataaras (matsya, koorma, varaaha ....).

 

With this background, we can understand the current passage,

 

Yathodakam durge vristam parvatheshu vidhaavathi

Evam Dharmanprithakpashyansthaanevaanu vidhaavathi ||

 

 

Bhashya:

 

Parvatheshu shikhare vristam adho vidhaavathi. Evam vishnohscha

dharmaan prathak pashyan andhanthamo vidhaavathi.

 

 

Just as the water (udakam) that has fallen on the mountain-head

(parvatheshu) splits and attains lower levels, same way one who considers

guna-guni-bheda (prithak pashyan) in Parabrahman i.e., in the

svatantra-principle will go to andhantamas or adhogathi.

 

 

 

Harihi Om Tatsat,

 

Jayakrishna Nelamangala

----------

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RJAY Consultants Inc.,

Tel: (703)430-8090 Fax: (703)904-8496

Email: jay

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Krishna Kalale <kkalale1

'bhebbar' <bhebbar

Cc: < >;

mani <mani; gurukripa1 <gurukripa1;

vijay_srinivasan <vijay_srinivasan;

seshadri <seshadri; mmurthy

<mmurthy; venkataramu

<venkataramu

Monday, November 29, 1999 12:50 AM

RE: Re: Issues in Indian Philosophy #4

 

 

>Krishna Kalale <kkalale1

>

>BTW, the citation you wanted for the two types of sense-object

>contact in V'advaita was given to me almost 20 years ago by

>late Honorable Prof. S.S.Raghavachar. I was surprised that I

>could even find it. As per my notes, it is to be found on

>p.77 of AcArya VedAnta Deshika's NyAyaparisuddhi.

>

>

>[Krishna Kalale] Dear Balaji,

>

>I found a copy of nyaya parishuddhi. IT is in sanskrit. page 77 in my book

>has anumana adhyaya, which cannot deal with indriyas and objects. I guess

>you have to somehow locate more info on this for me to go ahead.

>

>thanks

>

>Coming to Katopanisad, I guess the verse is :

>

>yathodakam durge vristam parvateshu vidhavati

>evam dharman prithak pashyan staneva anu dhavati

>

>The meaning of course depends on the interpreter. Obviously there are

>differences in meanings offered by Madhva and RangaRamanuja on this verse.

>

>The original verse is quite cryptic. direct translation : :

>

>like how water fallen on the tip of a mountain becomes different

>tributaries and runs down the mountain, in the same way, in the case of

>paramatman, one who sees his " dharmas " as different follows that very

>diversity.

>

>This verse is taken by Sri Rangaramanuja as : One paramatman is the in

>dweller of all and holds everything as his sarira. The water fallen on the

>top of a tall mountain comes down as rivers , lakes, rivulets, ponds etc.

> Similarly, the attributes of Brahman, which are sarvantaryamitva, sarva

>prakaratva, sarvatmatva sarva dharakatva, sarva sristi stithi laya

>karanatva etc. One should not take the antaryamitva of Brahman in humans,

> the antaryamitva of Brahman in devas, in animals as referring to

>independent distinct entities. They all directly or indirectly belong to

>that Paramatman. One who does not understand this and thinks that these

>attributes are distinct and independent and refer to different entities,

>takes birth as different beings such as devas, humans, animals etc. and

>gets bound in this samsara.

>

>I am not sure what Sri Madhvacharya's commentary on this is. I have a book

>on this I have to refer to this. When I get this I will try to compare

>and find what the issues. are.

>

>My initial evaluation is that : the shloka is too cryptic. Hence some

>minor differences in commentaries are possible.

>

>

>asmadgubhyo namah

>srikrishnarpanam astu

>

>Krishna Kalale

>

>

>>nAham kartA hariH kartA tatpUjA karmachaakhilam.h|

>taThaapi matkR^itaa pUja tatprasaadhEna naanyaThaa|

>tadbhakti tadphalam.h mahyam.h tatprasaadaat.h punaH punaH |

>karmanyaasO harAvevam.h vishNOsthR^iptikaraH sadhA ||

>

> " I am not the doer, shri Hari is the doer, all the actions that I do are

His worship. Even then, the worship I do is through His grace and not

otherwise. That devotion and the fruits of the actions that come to me are

due to His recurring grace "

>If one always practices to do actions with a dedicated spirit to Hari, in

this way, it pleases Vishnu.

> --- Quoted by Sri madhvAchArya in GitA tAtparya